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ABSTRACT 




In modern international law, it is a near consensus that no state can use force against 
another – the main exceptions being self-defense and actions mandated by a U.N. 
Security Council resolution. However, one more potential exception exists: forcible 
intervention undertaken upon the invitation or consent of a government, seeking 
assistance in confronting armed opposition groups within its territory. Although the latter 
exception is of increasing importance – for instance, in light of the need to address 
humanitarian catastrophes caused by civil wars, or as a potential justification for 
transnational drone attacks – the numerous questions it raises have received scant 
attention in the literature. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap, by analyzing the consent-
exception in a wide context, and attempting to delineate its limits – including, perhaps, 
cases in which government consent power is not only negated, but might be transferred to 
opposition groups. The dissertation discusses the concept of consensual intervention in 
contemporary international law, in juxtaposition to traditional legal doctrines, seeking to 
reveal that nowadays, the central determinant of consent power is the consenting party’s 
effective protection of civilians, rather than its effective control over territory. The 
dissertation traces the development of law in this context by drawing from historical 
examples such as the American and Spanish civil wars, to recent cases such those of the 
DRC, Somalia, Libya and Syria.   
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I. THE QUESTION 
Forcible intervention in internal armed conflicts, by the invitation or consent of a 
beleaguered government, has been considered an exception to the prohibition on the use 
of force, as enshrined in article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. While this is not an obvious 
conclusion, in recent years it has almost come to be taken for granted as part of the legal 
case for counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. This work 
seeks to clarify the nature and the limits of this exception, and to place it in a wider legal 
and theoretical – and sometimes historical – context.  
Doing so, this study discusses a broad spectrum of issues relevant to the question 
of intervention in international law, hopefully contributing to the general understanding 
of the concept. In this sense, no-less than it inquires into the question of intervention and 
consent, this study embarks on a journey into the perception of international law, 
throughout the centuries, of internal armed conflicts at large. It seeks to expose the fact 
that in contemporary international law such conflicts are assessed from a substantive 
standpoint, rather than from a technical, ostensibly impartial point of view. International 
law, at large, is concerned about the protection of civilians; much less so about the 
traditional formalist rights of sovereigns; notions of impartiality; the economic interests 
of third-party states; or even ideas of procedural democracy. 
Indeed, in the decades since the coming into being of the U.N. Charter, a legal 
consensus has been solidified that no state may use force against another. The two 
primary exceptions to this rule – that a state may use force as self-defense or when 
 2 
authorized to do so by the U.N. Security Council – have been robustly debated in the 
literature.
1
 In the context of the latter exception, vast scholarship has been devoted to the 
questions whether the Security Council is at all authorized to act in relation to strictly 
“internal conflicts,” and whether, and in what circumstances, states or groups of states 
can decide to intervene unilaterally should the Security Council fail to do so. The latter 




The question of humanitarian intervention arises in the nexus between the general 
norm of non-intervention in internal affairs of states, the prohibition on the use of force, 
the law of international human rights and the principle of protection of civilians. 
However, at the same nexus, another much less explored, but equally important, question 
surfaces: what happens if during an internal armed conflict, one of the parties invites an 
external force to intervene, or consents to such an intervention? International law has 
been extremely unclear on this question. Some went as so far as to label state practice in 
this context as “chaotic.
3
 
Intervention of the latter type is widely referred to, in the literature, as 
intervention by invitation.
4
 However, as will be demonstrated, the potential legalizing 
element of such interventions is the wider element of consent. Thus, a proactive 
invitation is but only one form of expression of consent. It can also be expressed through 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN 
CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE (2010); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE  
Ch. 7 (2008).  
2
 See, e.g. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & 
Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003). 
3
 See Independent Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report (Vol. 2), at 276 (Sept. 30, 
2009). 
4
 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 1, Ch. 3; Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention 
by Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y’BOOK INT’L L. 189 (1985); GEORG NOLTE, EINGREIFEN AUF 
EINLADUNG (1999). 
 3 
acquiescence or any other conveyance of approval; it does not have to be initiated strictly 
by the consenting party; it can be, theoretically, proactive or retrospective. Therefore, this 
study suggests a more inclusive term – consensual intervention. A consensual 
intervention, thus, is every forcible intervention in an internal armed conflict, undertaken, 
in practice, for the benefit of one of the parties, in which an explicit or implicit – but 
genuine – consent can be inferred. Importantly, the term “consensual,” in our context, 
does not mean by agreement of all parties – quite the opposite. It must be against the will 
of at least one party; otherwise it would be a peacekeeping operation, rather than a 
forcible intervention. 
The question of intervention and consent is especially important – but as we shall 
see, not only – when the U.N. Security Council fails to satisfy its responsibility to act in 
light of humanitarian catastrophes, which are common in internal strife. This special 
importance derives from the fact that when the consenting party is a government, and 
while the Security Council does not decide otherwise, the question can be viewed as 
removed from the realm of international jus ad bellum, since the government presumably 
consented to the intervention by exercising its own sovereign power. This notion has 
roots in traditional international law regarding the question of non-intervention,
5
 
notwithstanding its inherent paradoxes that we shall discuss at length. However, it seems 
implausible that contemporary international law will be interpreted as accepting that a 
government, engaged in mass atrocities, will be able to crush its opposition merely 
because it can wield the power of consent, while the international community is left to 
observe the Security Council deadlock. Thus, it seems that contemporary international 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW §134 (2
rd
 ed., 1912) (labeling consensual 
intervention, such as Russia’s 1849 intervention in Hungary by request of Austria, as “co-operation” rather 
than intervention). 
 4 
law – as opposed to traditional, effective-control based doctrines – allows us to 
substantively assess conflicting parties and their power to consent to external forcible 
support.   
Nowadays, the question of consensual intervention is undoubtedly governed, first 
and foremost, by the law on the use of force. However, the question has deeper roots, 
reaching down to an era in which limitations on the war-right of sovereigns were still 
inconceivable. In essence, the problem of consensual intervention is a sub-question of the 
wider issue of recognition of entities in international law, and the determination of the 
rights and powers of parties to internal conflicts at large. As such, it is intrinsically woven 
in the centuries-long debate between effective control and legitimacy as sources of 
sovereign power. In this context, and perhaps in contrast to the common notion that 
“traditional” international law did not concern itself at all with internal armed conflicts, 
the status of conflicting parties in internal strife has disturbed diplomats and lawyers for 
centuries. Considerations of non-intervention, recognition, the motivation to avoid being 
drawn into the conflict, and, perhaps above all, the interest to secure maritime trade have 
forced states to develop an intricate system of norms regarding their relations to such 
conflicts.  
Nevertheless, the question of the rights and powers – and indeed obligations – of 
parties to internal armed conflicts has been subject, like all areas of international law, to 
changes in the philosophy, jurisprudence and institutions of the international system that 
have taken place throughout the centuries. Within these processes, the question of 
consensual intervention gained substantial legal significance only with the prohibition on 
the use of force, which can be traced back to the 1928 Kellogg Briand Pact, and to 
 5 
previous weaker attempts on the regulation of force, such as the 1907 Hague Convention 
on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations.
6
 It 
can be said that the question, in its true legal sense, is only a product of this era, since the 
existence of a prohibition on the use of force is a logical precondition for any discussion 
of potential exceptions to it. Indeed, in the earlier era, in which states could go to war at 
will, it made little sense to ask whether the consent of the government or of its rivals has 
had any implications on the legality of the external intervention.  
This realization does not imply that the norm of non-intervention, in some form, 
did not exist prior to the prohibition on the use force; it could have been, however, 
effectively extinguished by the war-right of states, if they were willing to pay the price 
that war entailed. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the rights and powers of parties to 
internal armed conflicts did, in fact, concern states even before the prohibition on the use 
of force, for various reasons. As such, discovering the underlying rationale of their 
concerns – as we shall attempt to do – can assist in shedding light on the development of 
international law regarding internal armed conflicts, and the question of intervention and 
consent specifically.  
Besides the coming into being of the prohibition on the use of force, there are 
other major, intertwining processes that should be taken into account when analyzing the 
development of the law on consensual intervention. Notable among these processes is the 
decline of the strict legal positivism that dominated international law in the 19
th
 century; 
the movement from a multi-polar, balance-of-power system into a system that relies more 
and more on collective institutions; the changing of the perception of the norm of non-
                                                 
6
 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 
27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I), Oct. 
18, 1907; Covenant of the League of Nations, Jun. 28, 1919.  
 6 
intervention from its Westphalian origins to one that connotes self-determination in one 
form or the other; and, importantly, the decline of the principle of territorial effectiveness 
(or effective control) as the sole source of sovereign rights – and the advent of 
substantive considerations such as the sovereign’s responsibility to protect the 
populations under its control. Accordingly, the approach of international law regarding 
internal armed conflicts has moved from external parties asking mainly “how does the 
conflict affect us,” to asking also “how does the conflict affect the parties and the 
populations under their control.” The emphasis of the law on internal armed conflict has 
thus moved from securing the commerce rights of external parties to the political and 
humanitarian rights of internal parties.
7
 These processes underlie the analysis throughout 
this work.  
Indeed, the rights and powers of parties in internal armed conflicts were long 
determined by strict territorial effective control standards, reflected in traditional 
customary international law in the belligerency and insurgency doctrines. Territorial 
effectiveness as the sole determinant of sovereign power was viewed as a necessary 
corollary of the norm of non-intervention, which was perceived at the time as protecting 
the “internal affairs” of effective regimes, regardless of their merits. Leaders, diplomats, 
scholars, lawyers and judges of the time took pride in the seemingly amoral nature of 
these doctrines, as a manifestation of the progress of international law. It was especially 
viewed in stark contrast to the legitimism doctrine, espoused by the conservative Holy 
Alliance, which was a priori adverse to any revolutionary movement challenging the 
“divine right” of the ruler.  
                                                 
7
 For a similar observation see  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶96–97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 7 
However, through the decades of the 20
th
 century, the concept of territorial 
effective control as the sole source of sovereign power was challenged by a set of other 
competing principles, raising difficult questions regarding the extent of a government’s 
capacity to consent to external forcible support. To argue that the prohibition on the use 
of force, as embodied in the U.N. Charter, provides an answer to these questions by 
enshrining a complete preference of governments, does not take us too far. This is 
because in itself, the prohibition does not serve to clarify the balance that should be 
struck between the relevant competing principles.  
In essence, the root of the problem lies in the fact that Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against states, but nowhere is it clarified who 
is entitled to speak for the state in extreme situations. The usual reply, according to which 
the “government” is entitled to do so, raises, in turn, a plethora of perplexing questions 
regarding the determination of the identity of the government; and even if this is clear, in 
specific circumstances – the question still arises regarding the limits of the government’s 
powers to receive forcible support in a given internal conflict. Another possible solution 
to these questions could be that it is only for the U.N. Security Council to determine the 
balance between the competing interests at hand. While such an approach could be 
prudent from the perspective of international policy, and can indeed solve the problem in 
specific instances, it by no means provides a comprehensive solution. This is because the 
Security Council, due to the veto power enjoyed by its permanent members, has not been 
historically quick to react in the face of catastrophes that occur in contemporary internal 




This work aims to analyze and hopefully clarify the questions above. The first 
precondition for a clear discussion is an understanding of the terms we use. The first Part 
of the work, therefore, will seek to define and clarify the main concepts addressed in this 
study. Chapter 1 thus clarifies the use of the term “consensual intervention,” by 
exemplifying the modalities and dynamics of such interventions. Namely, the Chapter 
explores the wide spectrum of the term, the nature of the relationship between the 
intervener and the consenting party, and the interaction between consent and Security 
Council authorized interventions.   
Chapter 2 addresses the concept of internal armed conflicts, both in terms of 
definition and in substance. It attempts to present a typology that will demonstrate the 
complexity of such conflicts. The definition of internal armed conflicts is of significance, 
as we shall see, since it potentially affects the legality of external forcible intervention.  
Chapter 3 clarifies several distinctions relevant to the elusive term “intervention.” 
It addresses, inter alia, the use of the term across difference disciplines, and the shifting 
meaning of the norm of non-intervention in contemporary thought.  Thereafter, Chapter 4 
will attempt to explain what actions constitute, in practice, forcible interventions.  
The second Part of this work will embark on an in-depth analysis of the law 
regarding the rights and powers of parties to internal armed conflicts in the pre-U.N. 
Charter era. The discussion serves three purposes. First, it will serve to clarify, to the 
extent possible, an area in traditional international law that has been notoriously vague. 
Second, this works argues that prior to the prohibition on the use of force, and at least 
before the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, the question of intervention and consent was 
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largely irrelevant, since sovereigns enjoyed an unlimited war-prerogative. Third, the 
discussion will demonstrate the generally amoral territorial effectiveness-based doctrines 
which dominated the era. These can be contrasted with the substantive doctrines of later 
decades, which – as I argue – have direct implication over the contemporary law 
regarding consensual intervention.  
Accordingly, Chapter 5 will address the general question of internal armed 
conflicts and consent in the era of the “prerogative of war.” Chapter 6 will survey the 
development of the effectiveness-based doctrines of belligerency and insurgency as 
sources of rights and powers of parties to internal armed conflicts, focusing, inter alia, on 
the American Civil War. Chapter 7 will address the question of consensual intervention 
in the inter-war period, where nascent limitations on the use of force were already in 
place, and the international system started to shift to collective decision making, as 
exemplified in the Spanish Civil War. The latter conflict can also be seen as the point 
where the old doctrines regarding internal armed conflict were, to a certain extent, 
abandoned.  
Part 3 of this study concerns the law of consensual intervention in the era of the 
U.N. Charter. Indeed, since the prohibition on the use of force was firmly set in place, the 
question of the scope of the exception to the prohibition embodied in the law of 
consensual intervention has gained distinct importance. Chapter 8, thus, addresses the 
doctrines of intervention as these developed in the first decades of the U.N., and 
establishes the general principle of the presumption in favor of governments in the 
context of consensual intervention.  The Chapter juxtaposes between the traditional 
notion of “strict-abstentionism” – asserting that when internal conflict erupts, external 
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actors should abstain from any intervention – and the competing approach of 
government-preference. We argue and demonstrate that the former view is obsolete. 
Chapter 9 inquires into the contemporary relevancy of the question of consensual 
intervention, namely with regards to the struggle against transnational terrorism and the 
need to protect civilians from mass atrocities. Thereafter, the Chapter analyzes the scope 
of government consent power, by setting forth several thresholds. Notably, the chapter 
proposes a reversal of some traditional doctrines that limit consent power when internal 
armed conflicts take place, by suggesting that nowadays, the existence of an armed 
conflict is a precondition for the capacity to consent to forcible support. The Chapter 
further attempts to place the traditional doctrine of counter-intervention in the 
contemporary context.  
Chapter 10 sets forth the concept of protection of civilians as an emerging 
fundamental principle of international law, which in turn spawns the doctrine of effective 
protection – manifested in the Responsibility to Protect concept – as a chief source of 
sovereign power. The notion of effective protection, it is argued, is and should be the 
dominant factor in the assessment of the question consensual intervention in 
contemporary international law.  
Recognizing this conclusion, Chapter 11 discusses other substantive 
considerations for the assessment of consent power, such as democracy and self-
determination. It attempts to places these key concepts within a modern framework, in 
which effective protection is the immediate concern of the law of intervention and 
therefore affects our understanding of the role of democracy and self-determination in 
this context.  
 11 
Chapter 12 ventures into the controversial field of consensual intervention and 
opposition movements, and will explore the potential role of the consent of such 
movements in the face of governmental atrocities. In essence, the Chapter analyzes the 
relations between external parties and opposition groups, as these can be placed on the 
spectrum between recognition as governments and humanitarian intervention.  The 
Chapter demonstrates that although opposition consent cannot legalize intervention 
against recognized governments, it can perhaps play a part in traditional just-war 
considerations, which are widely accepted as ethical thresholds for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention.   
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CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION: MODALITIES AND DYNAMICS 
 
I. THE WIDE SPECTRUM OF CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION 
I.1 THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE INTERVENTION UPON INVITATION PARADIGM 
The attempt to define “consensual” interventions as opposed to other types of 
interventions presents a significant challenge. On the one hand, one can envision the pure  
“intervention upon invitation” scenario, in which a government explicitly, ad hoc and in a 
written treaty – invites a previously uninvolved state to assist it in confronting an 
organized armed group that seeks to overthrow it. In this “pure” scenario, the intervener 
will have no independent interests in the intervention itself beyond the fact that it was 
requested to assist the inviting government. Furthermore, the intervener will have no 
interaction with other international actors, nor will it seek any authorization from the 
U.N. Security Council. This altruistic – perhaps “Kantian”1 – intervener will therefore 
present no other justification for its actions other than its good-will and the invitation 
itself.  
Indeed, the concept of “intervention by invitation,” while seemingly providing a 
clearly definable and identifiable categorization, does not reflect the reality of the 
                                                 
1 IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS sec. 1 (1875) (presenting 
the concept of “good will” as the only thing with intrinsic value). 
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contemporary international system, or the complexity of the question of intervention and 
consent in international law. Practically – needless to say – states will rarely display the 
Kantian virtues as reflected in the pure “intervention by invitation” paradigm. Legally, 
moreover, the term “invitation” lacks in precision, since it focuses on the narrow 
technical element of the question rather than on the substantive one: it merely refers to 
the instrument of the expression of consent. If we agree that the “active” legitimizing 
agent regarding a consensual intervention can be the consent itself, it makes little sense to 
ask whether an invitation, in the narrow sense, has been extended. Instead, by focusing on 
the substantive element of consent, we realize that the term consensual intervention, in 
practice, actually encompasses a much wider scope of instances than the ones the classic 
“intervention upon invitation” scenario refers to. When departing from the simple 
“intervention upon intervention” paradigm, and turning instead to focus on the element of 
consent itself, an abundance of complex scenarios become possible.  
Thus, consent will not always be in the form of an invitation in advance. It can be 
expressed, on the time continuum, not only proactively but also on a retroactive basis, 
and can be conveyed, in both cases, explicitly or implicitly, so long as it is established and 
not simply presumed by the intervener.2  Moreover, consent can be ad hoc and specific, 
expressed in real-time in relation to a concrete instance of intervention; or, conversely, it 
can be granted in the form of a general, forward-looking intervention treaty, whether 
concluded on the bilateral or regional levels. In such cases, a perplexing case can occur 
                                                 
2 Roberto Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N , 3 35– 36 (1979), cited in 
David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT'L L. 209, 209 n.1 (1996); see also INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, Pt. 1, Arts. 1–3, 316 –317 (Shabtai Rosenne 
ed., 1991) (referring to the distinction between implied consent and presumed consent, which is actually 
tantamount to no consent at all).    
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when a government, party to a forward-looking intervention treaty, seeks to withdraw its 
consent in real-time in the face of an impending intervention.3 Theoretically – setting 
aside, for now, the issue of legality – consent can be expressed by governments or 
opposition groups, the latter situation challenges, of course, the prohibition on the use of 
force and the norm of non-intervention as classically understood. 
Furthermore, consent can be addressed, in theory, to various types of external 
actors. It can be granted to states; to groups of states that act as a regional organization; 
but also to other actors such as non-state actors or multinational forces established by a 
U.N. Security Council resolution. When a state agrees that a non-state actor “intervene” 
on its behalf in an internal armed conflict, the intervening group may or may not be 
considered as having been integrated into the consenting state’s armed forces. Such a 
determination will be made in light of the application, in the specific circumstances, the 
relevant rules of international humanitarian law and state responsibility.4 In cases where 
consent is expressed in the context of a Security Council authorized intervention, the 
consent, as we shall see, interacts with a Chapter VII based mandate and supplements it. 
Naturally, instances in which the consent is both proactive and explicit, and is 
extended ad hoc by a state to another state, are relatively simple cases that correspond 
with the classic “intervention upon invitation” paradigm. Any other combination raises 
complex issues –in particular regarding the free nature of the putative consent,5 but also 
                                                 
3 On such treaties see Chapter 10, sec. III. 
4 On the integration of organized armed groups into a state’s armed forces see NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. 
RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  21 –26 (2009). Regarding state attribution see Chapter 4, sec II. 
5 See, e.g., John Lawrence Hargrove, Intervention by Invitation and the Politics of the New World Order, in 
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 113, 117 –118 (Lori Fisler-Damrosch & David. J. 
Scheffer eds., 1991) (outlining briefly a framework of principles for the genuineness of consent and 
evidentiary factors that should be taken into account while assessing an instance of consensual 
intervention). 
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concerning a plethora of other issues. Indeed, considering the diverse modalities of 
consensual intervention, it comes as no surprise that a wide variety of complex cases can 
be found. For instance, such a case occurs when consent is given to a foreign force which 
is already present in the state’s territory, with many independent interests of its own, 
perhaps operating in conjunction with international forces.6 Another complex case can be 
when consent is granted implicitly, in parallel with a transnational armed conflict 
between the intervening party and a non-state actor operating from the within the 
consenting territorial state. This is arguably the case in some instances of the so-called 
“war on terror.” In such instances, as we shall exemplify shortly through the Kenyan 
intervention in Somalia – and as invoked by the US administration in the context of 
targeted killing operations – claims of self-defense can intertwine with the territorial 
state’s consent.7 Furthermore, the lawfulness of such consensual interventions can be 
conditioned on the question whether the consenting state itself is involved in an internal 
armed conflict with the non-state actor.8  
Since the term “consent” can allude to a wide variety of situations, this work takes 
an admittedly wide view of this issue. A consensual intervention, as the term is used in 
this work, refers to every forcible intervention – unilateral or multilateral – in an internal 
armed conflict, undertaken in practice, in part or in whole, for the benefit of one of the 
                                                 
6 Such was the case regarding the American Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan. See infra sec. I.2. 
7 See Harold Hongju Koh, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.html ; Eric Holder, Speech at Northwestern University 
School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/05/ag-holders-national-security-
speech-text/. This is arguably the situation involving at least some of the U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan, 
although the existence of consent, in this context, is debatable. See generally Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin 
R. Farley, Characterizing US Operations in Pakistan: Is the United States Engaged in an Armed Conflict? 
34 FORD. INT’L L. J. 151 (2010); compare Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks under the Jus ad Bellum and 
Jus in Bello: Clearing the ‘Fog of Law’ 13 Y’BOOK OF INT’L HUM. L. 311, 315 (2010). This paradigm 
could account for some US attacks also in Yemen and Somalia. See id.  
8 See Chapter 9 sec. II.1.  
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parties, regarding which genuine consent can be inferred, whether explicitly or implicitly. 
In essence, then, a substantial element in the concept of consensual intervention is the 
partiality of the intervention. Indeed, every non-impartial intervention serves to further 
the interests of one party to the conflict over the other. Here lies the nexus between 
partiality and consent: it is reasonable to presume that the party which benefits from the 
intervention has consented, in some way or the other, to the operation. In this sense, we 
assume in this work that any de facto non-impartial intervention is consensual, in relation 
to a certain party, unless the intervention is publically and credibly rebuffed by all parties. 
For instance, every intervention in an internal armed conflict, in which opposition forces 
are attacked by the intervener, and is not denounced by the territorial government as an 
aggressive act is presumably conducted with the government’s consent. Likewise, when 
an intervention receives the support and cooperation of opposition groups, it is quite 
possible to deduce that the latter have consented to it. This realization, of course, does not 
prejudge the legality of the action – it merely allows us to establish that the intervention 
is consensual, and that the potential legal implications of the consent can be analyzed. 
However – our wide definition of consensual intervention notwithstanding – when the 
intervention is not authorized by the Security Council, the question is at its most acute, 
since it is precisely in these cases where consent might have a powerful legalizing role. 
Thus, this work will focus primarily on interventions conducted unilaterally. 
 
I.2 CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION AND MULTIPLE JUSTIFICATIONS 
In most scenarios of consensual interventions – and bearing in mind their complexity – 
the justification of consent will frequently be explicitly or implicitly advanced in 
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conjunction with other, substantive justifications for the intervention. In these instances, 
the relation between the different justifications should be analyzed.  
Forcible interventions, in general, have been historically justified from two 
distinct points of view. The first view strictly reflects the interests of the intervening state. 
Such justifications may include interventions for the protection of nationals abroad; 
interventions as self-defense or counter-interventions aimed to restore a perceived 
balance of power. As we shall see in later chapters, this point of view was prevalent in 
the multi-polar era of the 19th and early-20th centuries, although not entirely absent from 
contemporary discourse. A second set of justifications, more prevalent in the present-day 
international system, concerns mainly the fulfillment of the rights of the people within the 
target state, sometimes linked also to the interests of the international community at 
large. Such justifications, for instance, are found in the core of concepts such as self-
determination, humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect. 
At this stage, the legal validity of justifications according to both points of view is 
not of our concern. What is important, however, is to note that each one of them can be 
supplemented by consent. The question whether consent is a legal precondition, in any 
combination of justifications, is a complex question – some aspects of it will be explored 
later on in this work. However, as we shall see, the mere fact that consent constitutes but 
one of several justifications to one instant of intervention does not mean ipso facto that it 
is devoid of legal value of its own.9  
Indeed, these justifications often overlap and are many times raised 
simultaneously. The examples, throughout the decades, are numerous. For instance, 
                                                 
9 See Terry D. Gill, Military Intervention at the Invitation of a Government, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 229, 229 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010).  
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Britain has justified its 1957 forcible intervention in Muscat and Oman on three distinct 
grounds. First, it claimed, the intervention was conducted by “request of a friendly ruler” 
(consent); second, it claimed, “the dissidents have clearly received assistance from 
outside territories (counter-intervention); and third, it vaguely mentioned “direct British 
interests.”10 France, intervening in Rwanda in 1990 in favor of the Rwandan Hutu 
regime, facing at the time an imminent defeat by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front, had 
justified its intervention both on counts of explicit invitation by Hutu Rwandan president 
Habyarimana, as well as on its duty to intervene for the protection of French nationals.11 
Russia, when intervening in the Georgian conflict of 2008 between the central 
government and the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, justified its 
actions both on humanitarian grounds, and on claims of consent by the breakaway 
authorities – in addition to its immediate reliance on the fact that Russian peacekeepers 
were attacked by Georgian armed forces. However, this case is more complicated since 
Russia soon thereafter recognized the independence of these territories, which 
theoretically allowed it to invoke the doctrine of international collective-self defense 
between independent states as a justification for its intervention.12  
In other instances, an invitation to intervene by one party coincides with a self-
defense claim by the intervening party. This is a common characteristic of modern 
transnational armed conflict. For instance, Rwanda’s involvement in the 1996–1997 
internal conflict in Zaire/Congo was mainly a self defense action against cross-border 
incursions by Hutu militias supported by Zaire; but was also a consensual intervention in 
                                                 
10 Statement by British Foreign Secretary Lloyd (Jul. 22, 1957), quoted in ANTONIA TANCA, FOREIGN 
ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 150–151 (1993). 
11 See Mel McNulty, From Intervened to Intervener: Rwanda and Military Intervention in Zaire/DRC, in 
AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES 173, 176–177 (Oliver Furley & Roy May eds., 2001). 
12 See discussion in Chapter 12 sec. III. 
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favor of the Congolese warlord and president to be Laurent-Desiré Kabila.13 Likewise, 
the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia was justified by Ethiopia inter alia as self-
defense against Islamist militias; however, their can be no doubt that Ethiopia operated 
with full consent and cooperation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government.14 
Angola, intervening in support of the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
in 1998, justified its intervention on counts of an "explicit request" by President Joseph 
Kabila; "legitimate" national interests; and in order to "pre-empt" actions by the Angolan 
rebel movement UNITA.15  
An informative recent example for the interaction between consent and self-
defense could be found in the 2011 Kenyan operation in Somalia. This case clearly 
reflects the contemporary tendency of states, when engaged in transnational armed 
conflicts against non-state actors, to rely on state-consent as an augmentation of other 
claims. On October 16th 2011, Kenyan forces invaded Somalia aiming to “inflict trauma 
and damage” on the Al-Shabaab militia, which controls much of south-west Somalia, 
including the border area with Kenya.16 Besides being locked in an ongoing armed 
conflict with the internationally supported Transitional Federal Government of Somalia,17 
Al-Shabaab’s presence on its borders was also harming the interests of the relatively 
stable Kenyan state.  
                                                 
13 See generally William G. Thom, Congo-Zaire’s 1996-1997 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns 
of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence, 19 J. CONFLICT STUDIES (1999).  
14 See Chapter 9 sec. II.4. 
15 Norrie McQueen, Angola, in AFRICAN  INTERVENTIONIST STATES , supra note 11, at 93, 108– 109. 
supra note X, at 93, 108  
16 See Kenya Invades Somalia: a Big Gamble, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21534828l; Kenyan Troops Push into Somalia, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
Oct. 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204479504576635301627490590.html. 
Shortly thereafter, Ethiopia too invaded Somalia. See Jeffery Gettleman, Ethiopian Troops Said to Enter 
Somalia, Opening New Front Against Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/world/africa/ethiopian-troops-enter-somalia-witnesses-say.html. 
17 On the situation in Somalia, see Chapter 9, sec. II.4. 
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The main motivation for the Kenyan operation thus seems to have been the 
instability on its borders. However – and perhaps since self-defense claims against 
decentralized acts by non-state actors can raise legal and political difficulties – Kenya has 
also justified its actions on counts of consent expressed by the Somali government. This 
claim was based on an October 18 joint communiqué between the countries, signed two 
days after the beginning of the Kenyan operation, which called for joint “decisive action” 
by Somalia and Kenya against Al-Shabaab. The countries pledged, in the communiqué, 
“to cooperate in undertaking security and military operations, and to undertake 
coordinated pre-emptive action, and pursuit of any armed elements that continue to 
threaten and attack both countries.”18 Simultaneously, and in reference to the 
communiqué, Kenya has notified the Security Council that –  
 
with the concurrence of the Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia, [Kenya] has been compelled to 
take robust, targeted measures to protect and preserve the 
integrity of Kenya and the efficacy of the national economy 
and to secure peace and security in the face of the Al-
Shabaab terrorist militia attacks emanating from Somalia.19 
 
Somalia’s international public reaction to the invasion was somewhat muffled and 
vague – a fact that highlights the blurry line between “partial” and “consensual” 
interventions –  ranging from laconically acknowledging the presence of Kenyan troops; 
to welcoming Kenyan support to the extent that it was only “logistical;” and later to 
                                                 
18 Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion of a Meeting Between the Government of Kenya and the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Oct. 18, 2011, available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/joint-communique-kenya-somalia.pdf. 
19 Letter Dated Oct. 17, 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2011/646 (Oct. 18, 2011). 
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distancing itself from the intervention.20 In the course of these reactions, there have also 
been conflicting public statements toward the invasion issued by the Prime Minister of 
Somalia, initially supporting the action, and the President, later expressing objection to it. 
Thus, there is general confusion concerning the government’s genuine stance regarding 
the invasion.21 Nevertheless, the existence of the joint communiqué, the ambiguous initial 
reaction by Somalia, the potential benefit the Transitional Federal Government could reap 
from the invasion, and its failure to pursue action against Kenya in the Security Council 
establishes the reasonable assumption that the Kenyan operation received the consent of 
Somalia – although the latter attempted to maintain public ambiguity regarding the 
operation, perhaps for internal political purposes. The Kenyan intervention has 
accordingly been met by international acquiescence.22  
Indeed, multiple justifications can understandably lead to political and ethical 
skepticism, as they can imply that consent was used, in a specific instance, as a pretext 
for intervention.23 However, in the legal sphere, the mere fact that an action was justified 
on a number of different grounds does not necessarily implicate each claim’s separate 
legality – as long as the claims do not explicitly negate each other. For instance, different 
justifications can sometimes be mutually complementing, such as in the case of a 
                                                 
20 See Kenyan Troops Push into Somalia, supra note 16; Kenya Invades Somalia, supra note 16; Josh Kron, 
Kenyan Offensive is not Welcome, Somalia’s President Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/world/africa/grenade-attack-on-kenyan-bar-raises-fear-of-widening-
conflict.html. 
21 Mohamed Shiil, Kenya’s Invasion of Somalia Raises Controversy, ALL HEADLINE NEWS, Nov. 8. 2011, 
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/90063851?Kenya's%20invasion%20of%20Somali%20raises%20
controversy. 
22 A Security Council resolution concerning Somalia, adopted only two-weeks after the Kenyan invasion, 
extended the mandate of the African Union in Somalia (AMISOM) without any reference to the Kenyan 
operation. See S.C. Res. 2010, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2010 (Sept. 30, 2011).   
23 Walzer calls this phenomenon “mixed motives.” See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 101–
102 (4th ed. 2006); see also  Military Aid and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶127 (June 27) (on mixed motives in the conduct of the US in the context of 
intervention in Nicaragua).   
 
 22 
counter-intervention conducted in favor of a beleaguered government facing a foreign-
supported armed insurrection.24 In other cases, consent and other justifications can be 
raised as alternative claims, still retaining their power – as “fallback” justifications – in 
case one of the others is found baseless or otherwise exhausted.  Such can be the case, as 
has arguably been with regards to Kenya’s 2011–2012 intervention in Somalia, when a 
state obtains consent to act forcibly against a hostile organized armed group operating 
from another state’s territory. Consent in such cases supplements the self-defense claim 
in at least two different aspects.  
First, “pure” self-defense arguments in actions against non-state actors can be 
controversial or at least hard to prove.25 Second, obtaining the consent of the territorial 
state can counter claims that the intervener’s self-defense actions are in violation of the 
jus ad bellum concept of proportionality in self-defense,26 if the operation is significantly 
wider than the attack by the non-state actor. For instance, it is one thing to recognize the 
immediate right of self-defense of the U.S. to act against Afghanistan in light of the 
attacks of September 11;27 it is an entirely different thing to justify the decade long 
presence of American forces there merely on such counts. This is why the international 
community opted for the establishment of an international security force (ISAF), 
mandated by the Security Council pursuant to the Bonn Agreement, and concluded 
                                                 
24 See Chapter 9, sec. III.  
25 For a detailed discussion see, NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS 25 –69 (2010); see also  Blank & Farley, supra note 7; Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed 
Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 47–51 (2003). 
26 On proportionality in self-defense see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 235–
244 (4th ed., 2005). 
27 S.C. Res 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1358 (Sep. 12, 2001); S.C. Res 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 
2001).  
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between various Afghan delegations.28 Granted, the Bonn Agreement was supplemented 
by a Security Council resolution; however, as was the case with the U.S.-Iraq SOFA of 
2008,29 it is entirely possible that the agreement could have legitimized the presence of 
coalition forces in Afghanistan even absent such resolution. Indeed, ISAF, which is 
commanded by NATO, operates in parallel – and generally independent from – the U.S.-
led coalition of Operation Enduring Freedom, which too operates, albeit with different 
rules of engagement, in support of the Afghan government.30 
In light of all the above, the mere assertion that consensual interventions are 
usually justified also by other claims, does not, in itself, have effect over the legal status 
of such consent; the relation between the different justifications varies according to their 
combination in specific circumstances.      
 
II. CONSENT: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXTERNAL VALIDITY AND INTERNAL 
CONSENT POWER 
II.1 VALID AND GENUINE CONSENT AS CONFERRING REVOCABLE AGENCY UPON THE 
EXTERNAL INTERVENER 
The concept of consensual intervention is commonly addressed as one, organic term. 
However, in actuality it encompasses two distinct meanings. The first deals with the issue 
of the genuineness of consent expressed by a party in relation to an external element. It 
                                                 
28 See Chapter 9, sec. I. 
29 Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their 
Activities during their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, S. EXEC. DOC. 09-6 (2009) 
[hereinafter SOFA]. 
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See  Rebecca J. Barber, The Proportionality Equation: Balancing Military Objectives with Civilian Lives 
in the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 467, 469 –474 (2010) (outlining the 
distinction between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom;) see also See Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting 




does not concern itself with the internal legitimacy of the consent expressed, and thus 
sets aside the question of the consenting party's general legal power to do so. This 
meaning of the term “consent” encompasses questions such as whether, in a specific set 
of circumstances, a genuine expression of consent actually took place; or rather, the said 
expression was a product of external coercion or other consent-vitiating circumstances. 
For instance, such would be the question whether the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq since 
June 2004, or November 2008, received the genuine and free-willed consent of the Iraqi 
government (the latter officially, and repeatedly, invited the U.S. to stay and assist it in 
stabilizing the country)31 or, conversely, was a product of coercion.  
 Another interesting case, relating to the issue of genuineness of consent, can be 
found in the massive Syrian involvement and presence in Lebanon between 1976 and 
2005. Although Syria claimed, inter alia, that its June 1976 intervention in Lebanon’s 
bloody Civil War was requested by the Lebanese government – a claim reaffirmed over 
the years in various treaties32 and Lebanese statements –33 the Security Council, 
eventually, and following attempts by Syria to force constitutional changes in Lebanon, 
ceased to view Lebanon’s consent as genuine. This approach was reflected in the 
arguments34 in support of Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for the 
                                                 
31 See S.C. Res. 1546, annex, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1546 (June 5, 2004). further Iraqi requests for the 
extension of the multinational forces’ mandate were authorized in S.C. Res. 1637, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1637 
(Nov. 8, 2005); S.C. Res. 1723,U.N. DOC. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006); and S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. DOC. 
S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007); this consent supplemented the recognition by the Security Council of the 
coalition forces as a Multinational Force operating under Chapter VII; thereafter, U.S. presence was 
authorized through the SOFA. See supra note 29; see also Letter Dated Dec. 7, 2008 From the Prime 
Minister of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council, S.C. Res 1859, annex, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1859 (Dec. 22, 2008).  
32 See, e.g., Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, Syria-Leb., May 22, 1991, 1675 
U.N.T.S. I-28932, 154. 
33 Some as late as 2004. See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5028th mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5028 (Sept. 2, 
2004) (statement of Lebanon). 
34 See id. at 3–4 (statements of the U.S. and France.) 
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withdrawal of all forces from Lebanon, despite the interesting fact that both Syria and 
Lebanon itself objected to the resolution.35   
 Since questions of the types mentioned above concern the relationship between 
the consenting party and the external actor, they do not address the complex substantive 
issues that relate to the recognition of rights and powers of parties during internal armed 
conflicts. Indeed, despite the difficulties in application in specific cases, solutions 
regarding many questions of this order can be found in widely accepted principles of 
international law governing the subjects of agreement, coercion and state 
representation,36 as these are manifested in the international law of treaties and the laws 
of state responsibility. Namely, intervention agreements, in this sense, are controlled by 
fundamental norms such as pacta sunt servanda37 and the invalidity of coerced acts.38  
 Assuming that genuine consent exists, the law of consensual intervention is 
complicated by the virtually unlimited capacity of the host-state to withdraw its consent – 
a right that stems from the prohibition on the use of force and is augmented by article 
3(e) of the Definition of Aggression.39 The almost ever-present right of withdrawal – 
                                                 
35 S.C. Res 1559, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1559 (Sep. 2, 2004). For the Lebanese and Syrian positions see, 
respectively, Identical Letters Dated Aug. 30 From the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United 
Nations Addressed to the Secretary General and to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2004/699 (Aug. 31, 2004); Identical Letters Dated Sep. 1 From the Permanent Representative of Syrian 
Arab Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General and to the President of the 
Security Council UN Doc. S/2004/706 (Sep. 1, 2004).  
36
See Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, supra note 2, at 209. 
37 Pacta sund Servanda is viewed by some as the “categorical imperative” of international law. See Josef L. 
Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta sunt Servanda 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 180, 180–181 
(1945). 
38 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 12 (2007); Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties arts. 51 –52, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 
26, at 40.  
39 See, Eliav Lieblich, Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in Internal Armed 
Conflicts as International Agreements, 29 B.U. INT’L L. J. 338, 357–366 (presenting a detailed analysis of 
the law of treaties and the customary law of international agreements, in conjunction with the right of 
withdrawal); see also Chapter 10, sec. III.1; on article 3(e) of the Definition of Aggression see Chapter 8, 
sec. I  
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limited only in situations in which internal consent power, as defined in the next section, 
is lacking – characterizes consensual interventions as based on a hybrid between rights-
creating agreements and instruments that confers authority to act within a host-state 
territory. As such, consent to forcible intervention can be understood as creating a 
revocable principal-agent relationship between the consenting party and the intervener.40  
 This distinction is of substantive importance. It facilitates the realization that 
while the legality of forcible intervention is sometimes discussed in terms of whether a 
“right” of intervention exists or not,41 the prohibition on the use of force and the principle 
of sovereignty actually allude to the fact that such relationships, in their core, are closer 
to fiduciary relationships – in which the intervener acts as the trustee of the consenting 
party. This notion coincides with the emerging perception of the international community 
as bearing “responsibility,” rather than rights, concerning the protection of civilians in 
other states.42 Indeed, a “right” of forcible intervention can only be asserted if one adopts 
the controversial view that certain situations, if considered erga omnes violations of 
international law, can give rise to such a right.43 
 As an agent, the intervener cannot pursue interests that are contrary to those of the 
consenting party; although it is unrealistic to expect –  in contrast to expectations from 
domestic administrative bodies – that in the international system the intervener will have 
absolutely no interests of its own. Furthermore, the intervening-agent is also bound by the 
                                                 
40 For a brief explanation of principal-agent relationships see ARNOLD J. GOLDMAN & WILLIAM D. 
SIGISMOND, BUSINESS LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES  401 –402 (2010); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §1 (1958). 
41 See, e.g., Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS   232, 245 (J.L. Holzgrefe & 
Robert O. Keohane 2003).  
42 See Chapter 10, sec. II.2. 
43 On erga omnes violations see Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 
3, ¶¶33 –34 (Feb. 5); Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (Advisory Opinion) 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶155 (Jul. 9).. 
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treaty obligations of the consenting party: powers that the consenting party itself does not 
possess cannot be conferred to it.44      
 
II.2 INTERNAL CONSENT POWER: BETWEEN EFFECTIVE CONTROL AND LEGITIMISM 
The second meaning of the concept of consent alludes to the substantive question of 
internal consent power – meaning, the material consent-capacity of the internal actors.45 
Here, we assume that the consent is genuine, and turn to analyze the legal implications of 
the consenting party’s characteristics. Namely, we consider whether the consenting party 
represents the state, or whether it gained, in any other way, status that allows it to 
potentially speak for a certain community. Essentially, thus, questions of internal consent 
power are questions of recognition and legitimacy, in the wide sense of these terms. 
Perhaps as opposed to questions regarding genuineness of consent, analysis of the 
concept of internal consent power gives rise to many perplexing legal questions. 
 Logically, for legally valid consent to materialize – meaning, consent that can 
potentially serve to legitimize a forcible intervention – both elements of consent must 
exist. For instance, in a specific case, consent must not only be freely given, but also be 
expressed by an actor possessing internal consent power. In the latter context, 
international law’s centuries-old “pendulum swing” between considerations of de facto 
effectiveness and de jure legitimacy as generators of rights has decisive legal importance.  
 The struggle between effective control and forms of substantive legitimacy as 
determinants of sovereignty has deep historical roots within the philosophy of 
                                                 
44 See Hargrove, supra note 5, at 116 –117; Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State 
Consent, supra note 2, at 215.  
45 Elsewhere, I have referred to the distinction between external genuineness and internal legitimacy as 
“procedural” versus “substantive” questions of consent. See Lieblich, supra note 39, at 344–346. 
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international law. Prior to the French Revolution of 1789, the prevalent theory of 
sovereignty was based on legitimism, according to which sovereignty was a corollary of a 
divine or historic right of the ruler, and not of de facto reality.46 Legitimism was closely 
linked to the centuries-old concept of the universal jurisdiction of the Pope and the Holy 
Roman Emperor, thought to extend well beyond the territories that were actually under 
their physical control.47  
 However, already in the 17th and 18th centuries, the pioneers of international law 
have begun to explore a rival doctrine – in which sovereign power, as recognized on the 
international level, was attached to de facto control over territory. The emergence of this 
doctrine was a direct challenge to the ostensible universal jurisdiction of the Pope and 
Emperor, and correlated with the rise of states in Europe;48 it was related to the 
understanding that the “subjectivity of value” prevails over natural, religious or 
monarchic sources of authority.49 The most immediate result of the challenge to 
legitimism was the realization that revolutionary removal of monarchs can be legally 
possible under certain situations.50 According to Lauterpacht, international jurists such as 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek and Vattel were willing to recognize the effective 
sovereignty of revolutionaries, even if temporarily. They saw, at large, the principle of 
effective control as a practical necessity to maintain stability; Vattel viewed the principle, 
in addition, as an important aspect of the principle of non-intervention, as the term was 
                                                 
46 THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND EVOLUTION 8 
(1999).  
47 ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 143–150 (2011). 
48 Id. at 150. 
49 See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2011). 
50 See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATELL THE LAW OF NATIONS ¶51 (1797), available at http://books.google.com; 
1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, Book  2, Ch. 25, §8 (William Whewell, trans. 1853), 
available at http://books.google.com. 
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classically understood.51 This link between effectiveness and non-intervention, 
connected, in later times, also to the principle of self-determination,52 has been a 
recurring feature of the debate regarding questions of recognition and intervention 
throughout the centuries.53  
 Legitimism witnessed a doctrinal comeback in the beginning of the 19th century. 
The challenge posed by the French Revolution – in which the ancient monarchy was 
overthrown – and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars has motivated the conservative 
powers of Europe to rejuvenate the concept.54 The Holy Alliance – a coalition of the 
monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia, which lasted roughly from 1815 until 1848 – 
sought to solidify the achievements of Napoleon’s defeat and to curtail potential 
revolutionary movements, by promoting the principle of legitimism, inter alia through 
intervention on behalf of beleaguered rulers. This doctrine was in stark contrast to the 
general British policy of non-intervention, and thus declined with the rise of the latter’s 
power.55 Accordingly, legitimism has eroded through the decades of the 19th century, as 
the effective control doctrine regained ground in practice. Therefore, revolutionary 
governments, throughout the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century – and 
especially after the fall of the great monarchies in 1918 –56 were not categorically refused 
                                                 
51 See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 99–102 (1948) (providing a 
summary of the approaches of the mentioned pioneers of international law); see also BRAD R. ROTH, 
GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 –137 (2001).   
52 See, e.g., ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 16 (2009) (regarding self-determination and 
non-intervention in the context of decolonization.) 
53 See, e.g., MONTAGUE BERNARD, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION (1860). 
54 See ROTH, supra note 50, at 136, 142–144.  
55 See GUGLIELMO FERRERO, PROBLEMS OF PEACE: FROM THE HOLY ALLIANCE TO THE LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS 34–35 (1919); see also GRANT, supra note 46, at 8 –9; 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, A TREATISE: PEACE §139 (2nd ed., 1912), available at http://books.google.com; AUGUSTUS 
GRANVILLE STAPLETON, INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERVENTION; OR, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT 
BRITAIN FROM 1790 TO 1865 27–37 (1866) (contrasting between the Holy Alliance and British policies). 
56 GRANT, supra note 46, at 9. 
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recognition merely on counts of their revolutionary nature, or, on the other hand, their use 
of violence in their rise to power.57 
 Thus, the effectiveness doctrine – a seemingly amoral perception concerning the 
recognition of the rights of entities in international law – was adopted by prominent legal 
philosophers of the first half of the 20th Century, such as Hans Kelsen.58 Indeed, this 
preference corresponded to the roots of the modern international system: as realistically 
commented by Lauterpacht, legitimist tests for sovereignty have become “clearly 
illogical" in the new world, "in which all governments owe[d] their origin to a 
revolutionary event in a more or less distant past.”59  
 The principle of territorial effective control has thus trickled to virtually every 
field of international law that addressed the question of recognition rights and powers of 
entities, in internal armed conflicts or otherwise. For instance, the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933, which laid down the most authoritative pronunciation of the 
effective control standards for the recognition of states, reflected this dominant idea.60 
The belligerency and insurgency doctrines, which served as the main prisms through 
which to analyze the status of entities during an internal armed conflict, were too based 
mainly on effectiveness criteria.61  
 However, as pendulum-swings go, triumphs of effectiveness have constantly led 
to legitimist reactions and vice versa. These reactions and counter-reactions were by no 
means limited to the old debate regarding monarchic legitimism. Accordingly, Roth 
                                                 
57 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 103–108.  
58 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 220 –221 (1961); cited in ROTH, supra note 50, at 
137. 
59 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 105.  
60 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 
19. 
61 See Chapters 5–6. 
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identified four historical challenges to effectiveness in the last two centuries:62 divine 
right legitimism (the Holy Alliance);63 constitutional legitimism (the Tobar Doctrine);64 
cold-war ideological legitimism (Brezhnev and Reagan Doctrines);65 and the concept of 
democratic legitimism, based on the perception of democratic governance as a right – a 
“democratic entitlement,” as phrased famously by Thomas Franck.66 It is also possible to 
identify trends of non-recognition of governments set up by external aggression;67 as well 
as a growing tendency towards regionalism and multilateralism when assessing parties to 
internal armed conflicts.68 In our context, as we shall elaborate later on, a potential hybrid 
has emerged: one that does not neglect the importance of effectiveness on the one hand, 
but binds this concept with substantive considerations of civilian protection and human 
security. For now, it suffices to keep in mind that the rivalry between effectiveness and 
legitimacy has been, for centuries, a key driving force behind international law’s 
development. As such, this ever-present interaction affects our contemporary perception 
of the modalities of internal consent power.  
 
                                                 
62 ROTH supra note 50, at 136–152. 
63 See also Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and Recognition, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 123, 140 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).   
64 The Tobar Doctrine of 1907, accepted by many American states (including the U.S.), denied recognition 
from governments seizing power unconstitutionally. See ROTH, supra note 50, at 144–145; Murphy, supra 
note 62, at 141. 
65 See also, Chapter 8, sec. II. 
66 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992).  
67 See Murphy, supra note 62, at 151.  
68 Regionalism means, in this context, the deference shown by the international community in recognition 
questions to decisions by regional or sub-regional bodies. See, for instance, the universal non-recognition 
of Somaliland, which follows the policy of the African Union. Benjamin Farley, Calling a State a State: 
Somaliland and International Recognition, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 777, 809 –815 (2011). Multilateralism 
refers to the general aversion from unilateral solutions to internal armed conflicts, as condoned, for 
instance, by the opponents of Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral declaration of independence. See the positions 
expressed in U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5839th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5839 (Feb. 18, 2008). 
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III. EXEMPLIFYING THE DYNAMICS OF INTERVENTION AND CONSENT: CONGO 
1996 –2010 
The tragic series of armed conflicts that have been taking place in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) allows us to understand the different dynamics of intervention 
and consent in a complex contemporary setting where many interests converge, and 
ethnic identities transcend borders and perceptions of sovereignty. We shall not, for now, 
analyze the legality of the actions of the various parties; we shall only use this conflict as 
a factual exemplification for the dynamics of consensual interventions, thus facilitating 
the understanding of their different characteristics. 
  
III.1 THE FIRST CONGOLESE CONFLICT, 1996–1997: THE OUSTING OF MOBUTU 
 Mobutu Sésé Seko has ruled Zaire (today, the DRC) since 1965. In 1994, 
following the genocide committed by Hutu elements against the Tutsis in neighboring 
Rwanda, and the subsequent overthrow of the Hutu regime by Rwandan Tutsi warlord 
Paul Kagame, Hutu refugees fled to Zaire fearing retaliation by the new Tutsi 
government. Intermingled with the refugees were members of the extreme Hutu militias – 
the interahamwe – that have played a pivotal role in the Rwandan Genocide. The 
presence of genocidal elements in Eastern Zaire spawned a series of tragic conflicts 
which are yet to be resolved. These Hutu militias gained effective control over the 
refugee camps in east Zaire, and used them as bases to launch attacks against Tutsis in 
east Zaire and across the border into Rwanda. Doing so, they were supported to varying 
extents by Mobutu’s army.  
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 In late 1996, some of Mobutu’s rivals formed the Alliance of Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Zaire (ADFL) – with encouragement and support from Rwanda, 
which became increasingly frustrated by the cross-border attacks launch against it from 
East Zaire.69 Laurent-Desiré Kabila, a long time foe of Mobutu, emerged as the ADFL’s 
leader. Thereafter, the ADFL, supplemented by Rwandan (RPA)70 and Ugandan forces, 
moved to weaken the interahamwe in East Zaire's refugee camps. 71   
 Capitalizing on their early successes in East Zaire, the opposition forces staged an 
assault westward toward Kinshasa – Zaire’s capital – defeating Mobutu’s government 
forces and the Rwandan Hutu militias supporting him, and sparking a full-scale struggle 
for control over the state apparatus. In subsequent months Angolan troops have also 
joined to aid the rebels, while Angolan dissidents (UNITA) joined to support Mobutu, as 
they enjoyed Mobutu’s acquiescence concerning their use of Zaire's territory to stage 
attacks against Angola.72 By mid 1997 Kabila’s forces were on the outskirts of 
Kinshasa.73  Mobutu fled the country and on May 17th, 1997, Kabila declared himself as 
president and established an authoritarian regime, renaming the state the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).  
 The first Congolese Conflict exemplifies some of the complex dynamics of 
consensual intervention. For instance, most of the interventions in this conflict involve 
retroactive consent – instances in which a party's consent was granted ex post, after the 
intervening power has already made forcible moves in the target state's territory. Such 
                                                 
69 See Int’l Crisis Group, How Kabila Lost His Way: The Performance of Laurent Désiré Kabila’s 
Government 4, ICG Congo Report No. 3 (May 21, 1999); see also McNulty, supra note 11, at 174–179.  
70 Rwandan Patriotic Army, an organ of Rwandan president Kagame’s political party, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front. See id. at 177–179. 
71 See id. at 180–181. 
72 See Norrie McQueen, Angola, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES, supra note 11, at 93, 104 –105.  
73 See Thom, supra note 13.  
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cases, naturally, raise grave concerns of coercion or pretext. The retroactivity of the 
opposition's consent, in this stage of the Congolese conflict, is manifested in the fact that 
the intervening powers (except Angola) were actively involved in the formation of the 
ADFL – the same opposition body that they came later to support militarily. Obviously, 
this raises serious questions regarding the capacity of the ADFL to express independent 
consent (setting aside the issue of legality). Retroactive consent can be found also in the 
relations between the government and the Interahamwe and UNITA, since these elements 
were already present in Zaire by the time the conflict started. These relations are of 
course complicated by the fact that these parties are non-state actors. As aforementioned, 
consent can come in many forms and expressed proactively or retroactively, provided 
that it is genuine. Instances of retroactive consent will require a high threshold of proof 
that the consent was not coerced. It is therefore reasonable that retroactive consent 
establishes a strong presumption against the intervening party. 
 
III.2 THE SECOND CONGOLESE CONFLICT, 1998–2003: WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT AND 
INVITATION OF OTHER POWERS 
The end of the first Zaire/Congo conflict saw Laurent Kabila as president of the DRC, 
while many foreign forces were still present on its soil. On July 27th, 1998, Kabila 
ordered all foreign forces – and Rwandan forces in particular – to leave the country: 
 
The Supreme Commander of the Congolese National Armed 
Forces, the Head of State of the Republic of the Congo and the 
Minister of National Defence, advises the Congolese people 
that he has just terminated, with effect from this Monday 27 
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July 1998, the Rwandan military presence which has assisted 
us during the period of the country’s liberation. … he would 
like to thank all of the Rwandan people for the solidarity they 
have demonstrated to date. He would also like to congratulate 
the democratic Congolese people on their generosity of spirit 
for having tolerated, provided shelter for and trained these 
friendly forces during their stay in our country. This marks the 
end of the presence of all foreign military forces in the 
Congo.74 
 
However, Rwanda and Uganda were unwilling to withdraw their forces.75 Uganda 
claimed that Kabila did not actually withdraw his consent to the presence of its forces, 
inter alia because Uganda was not mentioned explicitly in his statement.76 The 
withdrawal of consent by Kabila was perceived by the ethnic Tutsis of East Congo as a 
threat, since they relied on support from Rwanda's Tutsi controlled government. This 
prompted them to form the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and a renewed 
internal and internationalized armed conflict erupted on August 1998.77 With the active 
participation of Rwanda and Uganda, the rebel forces – mainly the RCD, the newly 
formed and Uganda-supported Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and anti-
Kabila elements from within the former ADFL – swiftly took over resource rich areas in 
Eastern Congo. The DRC, in retaliation, sought the support of Hutu militias (known as 
the FDLR since 2000) – the same elements that supported, in the first conflict, President 
Kabila’s arch-enemy Mobutu – and urged them to retaliate against Tutsis. 
                                                 
74 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (December 19) ¶49 
[hereinafter DRC v. Uganda]. 
75 See McNulty, supra note 11, at 182–183. 
76 Another claim by Uganda was that the DRC’s consent to its intervention was renewed in the Lusaka 
Agreement of 1999. See Congo v. Uganda, supra note 73, ¶¶92–105. 
77 McNulty, supra note 11, at 183 –184. 
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Thus, this stage of the Congo conflict involved a withdrawal of consent by the 
DRC’s government, which was all but ignored by the intervening powers; and, once 
again, retroactive consent to Ugandan and Rwandan intervention – by the new rebel 
groups. When Kabila’s government started to lose ground rapidly, it turned to invite 
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Chad to assist it.78 These circumstances led to the 
eruption of a multi-party war by September 1998.79  
The Zimbabwean and Namibian intervention in favor of Kabila was based on 
proactive consent, as neither of these state’s forces were forcibly on DRC territory 
beforehand;80 the same can be said of the intervention of Chad.81 Conversely, Angola’s 
intervention was arguably based on retroactive consent, as Angolan forces assisted Kabila 
previously in the overthrow of Mobutu’s regime.82 All of these forces were invited to 
intervene explicitly.83   
Uganda and Rwanda justified their actions on counts other than mere consent. 
The intervening powers (mainly Rwanda) also raised concerns of genocide against the 
Tutsis in DRC – essentially invoking the humanitarian intervention doctrine, even if not 
by name;84 and self defense against continuing cross border actions by various militias.85 
Uganda has also raised the claim of counter-intervention, as it alleged that the DRC has 
invited Sudan – Uganda’s rival – to support it in various conspiracies with opposition 
                                                 
78 For a detailed survey of the various players in the Second Congolese Conflict and their interests, see 
Gary Cleaver & Simon Massey, DRC: Africa's Scramble for Africa, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES, 
supra note 11, at 193. 
79
 See, See Int’l Crisis Group, Congo At War: A Briefing of the Internal and External Players in the Central 
African Conflict 6 ICG Congo Report No. 2 1 –3, 14–25 (Nov. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Congo at War].  
80 See id. at 20–22.   
81 See id. at 25. 
82 See id. at 22.  
83 See id. at 20; see also McQueen, supra note 15, at 108. 
84
See Congo at War, supra note 78, at 6. This example highlights the relation between humanitarian 
intervention and consent; the former might be looked upon, essentially, as intervention with consent of the 
opposition forces, when they are subject to mass atrocities. We discuss this in Chapter 12, sec. IV.   
85 See Congo at War, supra note 78, at 14, 16; Congo v. Uganda, supra note 73. ¶¶ 106–109. 
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groups against Uganda.86 In this sense, the conflict is a clear example of the problem of 
multiple justifications, mentioned in Section II above. 
The Lusaka Agreement, concluded in 1999 in an attempt to end the conflict did 
not hold. However, it called for the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission 
(MONUC), which, upon its establishment, was not mandated to use force. 87 In January 
2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated, to be replaced by his son Joseph.88 Throughout 
2002 Joseph Kabila managed to solidify his rule over the DRC, much with the help of his 
foreign allies.89 In July and September 2002 Rwanda and Uganda respectively signed a 
peace treaty with the DRC. Subsequently, Rwanda withdrew its troops. On December 
17th 2002 the various Congolese parties signed an agreement to form a transitional 
government, thus, de jure, bringing an end to this stage of the Congolese conflict.90 
Uganda withdrew its troops on June 2, 2003. A transitional government was formed in 
the DRC on July 18th, 2003. However, as we shall see, parts of the state still remain in 
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 See Congo at War, supra note 78, at 17–19; Congo v. Uganda, supra note 73,  ¶¶ 120–127.   
87 MONUC was established in S.C. Res. 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999), pursuant to article 
11(a) of the Lusaka Agreement, which provided that “The United Nations Security Council, acting under 
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III.3 THE CONFLICT IN THE KIVUS, 2004–2010: PRO-GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION BY 
RWANDA AND FORCIBLE MONUC OPERATIONS 
The Conflict in the Kivus is a direct continuation of the Second Congolese Conflict, the 
end of which did not see a solution to the main root of the conflict: the ethnic tension 
between the Rwandan Hutu extremists of the FDLR present in Eastern Congo and Tutsi 
groups supported by Rwanda; and the economic interests supplementing the conflict.91  
Laurent Nkunda was a commander in the Rwandan backed RCD during the 
Second Congolese Conflict. After that conflict ended de jure in 2003, and following a 
brief stint with the new transitional government’s forces, Nkunda broke with the 
government to form a new force in the Eastern Congo provinces of the Kivus – the 
National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). The CNDP was based on 
former RCD troops. 92 Nkunda’s newly formed organization, much like the RCD before 
it, received aid from Rwanda – albeit covertly.93  
In 2004, after claiming that genocide against the Tutsis in Eastern Congo is taking 
place (an allegation dismissed by the U.N.), Nkunda’s forces took control over the city of 
Bukavu in South Kivu, to withdraw only after U.N. led negotiations and international 
pressure.94 In subsequent years, Nkunda continued to steadily build his forces, while 
occasionally clashing with the DRC’s army and calling for the overthrow of the Kabila 
government and the removal of Hutu FDLR forces from the DRC.  
                                                 
91 See Int’l Crisis Group, The Congo's Transition Is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus 8, Africa Report No. 91 
(Mar. 30, 2005). 
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 See id. at 4–6.  
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94 Crisis in the Kivus, supra note 90, at 6, 11–12, 19–20.  
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In 2007 the conflict intensified, as MONUC forces occasionally assisted DRC 
forces against the CNDP in Kivu. In 2008, clashes between the CNDP and the FDLR 
worsened. In the end of that year, when Nkunda’s forces took over a strategic area in 
North Kivu, MONUC forces attacked the CNDP with heavy weaponry, but were not 
successful in having significant impact over the situation.  
MONUC’s operations in the DRC were conducted, at this stage, under a Chapter 
VII mandate for the protection of civilians, to be undertaken in “close cooperation” with 
the DRC’s government.95 The DRC, accordingly, has viewed MONUC's forcible 
intervention favorably and wholeheartedly consented to it. In the discussion leading to 
the adoption of Security Council resolution 1856, in which MONUC’s mandate was 
significantly expanded, the representative of the DRC expressed his government's 
consent to this move: 
 
[T]he Government of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo welcomes this new resolution. We are especially 
pleased that MONUC missions, in close cooperation with 
the Government, are being strengthened and consolidated 
in the protection of the civilian population . . .  and support 
for security sector reform and for the territorial integrity 
and political independence of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The Congolese Government and people 
therefore expect these new United Nations forces to be 
deployed rapidly… .96 
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Thus, MONUC’s forcible intervention was a Chapter VII based intervention, 
supplemented by explicit consent on part of the DRC. As we shall elaborate shortly, the 
Security Council had the power to order such an intervention even without such consent – 
but this would have been far more difficult politically, and to some extent, also legally. 
In parallel with the strengthening of MONUC, the DRC invited Rwanda on 
December 5, 2008 to intervene on in its behalf in the Kivu Conflict. The premise of the 
surprising deal (surprising, since merely five years before, the DRC fought a bitter war to 
oust Rwanda from its territory),  was that Rwanda would be allowed to act against the 
Hutu FDLR in the DRC’s territory; in return, Rwanda would cease its support of Nkunda, 
and assist in removing him from influence. From that point on, the CNDP was effectively 
neutralized as an opposition force, as Nkunda was replaced, and CNDP troops started a 
process of integration into the army of the DRC.97 On January 20th, 2009, joint military 
operations by Rwanda and the DRC commenced, and two days later Nkunda was arrested 
in Rwanda when trying to flee.98 On February 25th the joint operations officially ended, 
and Rwandan troops subsequently withdrew.99 These joint operations by the DRC and 
Rwanda represent a relatively clear cut proactive and explicit consensual forcible 
intervention by a state, on behalf of a government.  
On March 23 of that year, the CNDP signed a peace treaty with the 
government.100  However, the FDLR was only partially weakened by the joint 
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operations.101  In May 2009 the FDLR launched deadly attacks against civilians,102 
spawning military operations by the DRC and MONUC, which ended in December 
2009.103 Joint military action by the DRC and MONUC continued in 2010.  
However, in April 2010, Joseph Kabila's government has called for the 
termination of MONUC's mandate, and demanded the complete withdrawal of all foreign 
forces by mid-2011. Nonetheless, as of February 2010, MONUC's mandate (renamed 
MONUSCO)104 has been extended until June 2012.105 The interaction between the DRC 
and the Security Council mandated forces on its territory exemplify the relation between 
consent and Chapter VII interventions, which we will now turn to address. 
 
IV. CONSENT AND SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZED INTERVENTIONS: A COMPLEX 
INTERACTION 
IV.1 CHAPTER VII RESOLUTIONS AND CONSENT 
Arguably, forcible interventions authorized by Security Council resolutions, adopted in 
accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, should not fall with the scope of this 
work – since these are legally based on the existence of a threat to international peace and 
security, and not on the expression of consent. However, closer analysis exposes that 
Chapter VII interventions are not entirely irrelevant to the analysis of the problem of 
consensual intervention. 
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 42 
For instance, as we have seen, during the Kivus Conflict, the DRC has explicitly 
consented to the expansion of the mandate of MONUC on its territory.106 However, the 
Security Council, in the relevant resolutions, did not refer explicitly to the DRC’s consent 
as a legal basis for MONUC’s forcible intervention.107 Had the DRC expressed objection 
to the expansion of MONUC’s mandate, would the legal situation necessarily be 
different? The prima facie answer is a negative one. As aforementioned, Chapter VII, 
unsurprisingly, does not require consent as a legal precondition for enforcement 
measures, once a threat to peace, breach of peace or aggression has occurred.108  
Nevertheless, in practice, the Security Council virtually always seeks the consent 
of the “target” or “host” state when authorizing forcible enforcement measures in the 
context of internal conflicts.109 This tendency was especially evident in the debate on 
possible intervention in Darfur, where lack of governmental consent on part of Sudan 
seems to have played a significant part in Security Council decision making.110 Similarly, 
even the 1999 Australian-led intervention in East Timor, effectively leading to the 
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territory’s independence from Indonesia, was conducted with Indonesia’s consent.111 In 
fact, the Security Council has not explicitly authorized a partial, forcible intervention in 
an internal armed conflict against the will of an incumbent, functioning and recognized 
government, until the 2011 intervention in the Libyan conflict.112 Even in that exceptional 
case, the Security Council was careful, in practice, to tailor its resolution around the 
demand of the Libyan opposition and the Arab League that any forcible action will be 
conducted “with no boots on the ground,” meaning with no use of ground forces.113 
Accordingly, resolution 1973 authorized all necessary measures to protect civilians, 
“while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory.”114  
With the impending final defeat of the forces loyal to Libyan ruler Qaddafi, and 
the widespread recognition of the opposing National Transitional Council as the lawful 
authority of Libya, the Security Council was quick to link the continuing mandate granted 
in resolution 1973 to the consent of the new authorities. It stressed, in resolution 2009, 
that the termination of the mandate would be possible, “as appropriate and when 
circumstances permit,” “in consultation with the Libyan authorities.” [emphasis added]115 
The mandate for forcible measures was finally terminated in October 2011, after the 
“Declaration of Liberation” by the Libyan National Transitional Council.116 
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The tendency of the Security Council to seek consent, even when authorizing a 
non-partial, Chapter VII based forcible intervention is hardly surprising. Consent 
naturally facilitates the operation; moreover, it can bolster the political legitimacy of the 
authorizing resolution. Indeed, Bowett, while acknowledging this tendency, explained it 
in terms of “political wisdom” rather than on “legal necessity.”117 However, upon closer 
look, consent can also fortify the legal merits of the action.  
First, it can mitigate challenges arising from the potential obligations the Security 
Council owes to the principle of non-intervention, as entrenched in article 2(7) of the 
U.N. Charter.118 Indeed, if the Council can link its enforcement actions to the consent of 
an element within the target state that enjoys some legitimacy – setting aside, for now, 
the nature of such legitimacy – it would be hard to claim that the Council is in violation 
of the principle of non-intervention in its substantive sense. Conversely, if a legitimate 
entity within the target-state explicitly objects to a Chapter VII intervention – although it 
would supposedly benefit it – it is hard to envision that the Council will proceed, or 
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indeed be justified to do so,119 with its enforcement measures, unless an utter 
humanitarian catastrophe is taking place.  
For instance, imagine that during the discussions regarding the 2011 Chapter VII 
intervention in Cȏte d’Ivoire,120 Alassane Ouattara – recognized internationally as the 
country’s lawful president – would have unequivocally proclaimed that his standoff with 
lingering ruler Laurent Gbagbo should be strictly resolved by Ivorians, without any 
international involvement. In such a case, and in the circumstances of the Ivorian crisis, it 
seems implausible that the Council would have authorized an action meant ultimately to 
reinstate Ouattara, since it would be not only viewed as a blunt intervention in the 
internal affairs of Cȏte  d’Ivoire, but it would also be entirely counterproductive.121 
Relying on a formally “impartial” mandate for the forcible protection of civilians, as was 
done in the Cȏte  d’Ivoire case,122 would not have sufficed in our hypothetical: because of 
the fact that at that stage Gbagbo was considered the obvious culprit, the intervention 
would have still been perceived as conducted for the benefit of Ouattara.  
In the same vein, one can analyze the 1994 Security Council authorized 
intervention in Haiti in light of the dynamics of consent, or its absence. After the 
democratically-elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide was ousted by a military junta in 
1991, he was reluctant to receive any forcible external assistance.123 This disinclination 
might have accounted for the fact that a forcible intervention aimed to reinstate Aristide, 
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was prescribed by the Security Council only three years later – 124 and two days after 
Aristide expressed his despair regarding the prospects of a political solution to the crisis, 
and requested that the international community take “prompt and decisive action” against 
the junta.125 Thus, it is hard to argue that Aristide’s consent was irrelevant to the Security 
Council’s decision to authorize forcible intervention.126  
Second, the role of consent in the legitimization of Security Council mandated 
interventions is somewhat contingent upon our understanding of the nature of that body. 
Indeed, the traditional perception views the Security Council as a body enjoying almost 
unfettered discretion to act once it determines the existence of a threat to international 
peace; and that also in the process of making such determination it has wide (but not 
unlimited) discretion.127 Should this be our understanding of the role of the Council, 
consent indeed seems to play a minor normative part, if at all, in its considerations. 
However, it can also be argued that the Council is limited by proportionality and 
necessity requirements, potentially stemming from several sources: these can be 
constructed directly from the text of the U.N. Charter;128 deduced from the emerging idea 
of global administrative law, attributing to the Council executive characteristics that 
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spawn administrative-legal limitations on its exercise of discretion;129 or, at least as a 
residual claim,  traced to well established notions of just-war theory that arguably ought 
to guide the Council’s discretion.130 If we accept the latter approaches, consent by 
internal entities can, respectively, reflect the administrative-deliberation of the Council, 
as well as contribute to the action’s legitimacy from a just-war perspective. For instance, 
U.S. President Obama has highlighted several justifications for the 2011 military action 
in Libya, among them: (a) the prospect of violence on a horrific scale (just cause and last 
resort); (b) the unique ability to stop the atrocities (reasonable prospects of success); (c) 
the existence of an international mandate (right authority); and (d) the plea for help from 
the Libyan people (opposition consent as augmentation for other just-war 
justifications).131 We shall elaborate on consent and just-war, in a related context, in 
Chapter 12. 
Third, in situations where the initial forcible action was not mandated by the 
UNSC, consent expressed by the target state can, in some cases, immune the Council 
from claims that in adopting a later resolution, it has legitimized an illegal situation ex 
post. Such might be the case with Resolution 1546, in which the Council adopted a text 
arguably conditioning the presence of a multinational force (effectively – the coalition 
forces) in Iraq, on the consent of the Iraqi Interim Government:  
 
                                                 
129 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONT. PROB. 15 
(2005) (introducing the concept of global administrative law, inter alia in the context of the Security 
Council). 
130 See generally Michael W. Brough et al., Introduction, in RETHINKING THE JUST WAR TRADITION 1, 1 –3 
(Michael W. Brough et al. eds., 2007). 
131 Barack Obama, Remarks at National Defense University, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 28, 2011) available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya; see 
also See James Pattison, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, ETHICS & INT’L. AFF. 1, 3 
(2011). 
 48 
[The Security Council] [n]otes that the presence of the 
multinational force in Iraq is at the request of the incoming 
Interim Government of Iraq and therefore reaffirms the 
authorization for the multinational force under unified 
command established under resolution 1511 (2003), having 
regard to the letters annexed to this resolution.132  
 
Fourth, receiving state consent can reconcile, to a certain extent, the need to 
forcibly intervene in internal armed conflicts with the principle of “sovereign equality,” 
as enshrined in Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter, which applies also to the Security 
Council.133 
In light of the above, while lack of consent – in itself – is not sufficient to annul 
the Council’s authority to take such actions,134 consent might add to the political and 
legal legitimacy of Chapter VII interventions. Once we realize that consent does play a 
part in Security Council considerations, it is worthwhile to consider whose consent makes 
a difference and under what circumstances. In this sense, Chapter VII interventions – 
while not its main focus –  are indeed relevant to this work. 
 
IV.2 CHAPTER VII RESOLUTIONS AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT 
As discussed in Section II.1, withdrawal of consent to a forcible intervention is all but an 
absolute right. Does the same rule apply when the intervening force is mandated by the 
Security Council? Returning to the Kivus Conflict, in April 2010, the DRC has called for 
the termination of MONUC, and asked for the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces 
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by mid-2011.135 Can such actions alter the legal position of operations like MONUC?  
Recall, that the establishment a U.N. peacekeeping force in the DRC was requested 
explicitly by the parties to the Lusaka Agreement of 1999.136 Accordingly, Security 
Council resolution 1279 noted this request, and established MONUC, mainly mandating 
it to conduct missions of liaison, observation, and information gathering.137 Resolution 
1279 was based on Chapter VI of the Charter, which authorizes the Council to make 
recommendations. Therefore, in this initial stage, since the resolution established a 
neutral peacekeeping force, the DRC’s consent – and in practice, the opposition’s 
consent as well – was indeed constitutive with regards to MONUC’s mandate.138 
However, since 2003, MONUC has been operating under a Chapter VII 
mandate,139 and since 2008 its mandate has been expanded to include forcible 
intervention, as resolution 1843 authorized “robust rules of engagement” and stressed 
MONUC’s role in the protection of civilians.140 From this point on, and since a threat to 
international peace and security was established, the DRC’s consent, as aforementioned, 
was not legally necessary, in the strict sense, to authorize the forcible operations by 
MONUC. Therefore, it must follow that a withdrawal of such consent could not preempt 
the authority of the Security Council, irrespective of the fact that the initial establishment 
of MONUC was done pursuant to the request of the parties to the Lusaka agreement.  
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Nonetheless, the situation regarding the DRC’s consent – and the possible 
implications of its withdrawal – was further complicated by Security Council Resolution 
1856.141 Recall, that the resolution provided that MONUC’s expanded mandate will be 
exercised in “close cooperation” with the government of the DRC. Therefore, it seems 
that the Council has bound MONUC’s mandate with the consent of the DRC. The 
tendency of the Security Council to seek consent even when it is not legally necessary in 
the strict sense has been discussed above. When the resolution goes further and binds 
itself to the consent or “cooperation” of a party – a withdrawal of consent can indeed end 
the operation’s mandate.  
In resolution 1925 of May 28 2010 (and subsequently in resolution 1991 of 2011) 
the Security Council extended the mandate of MONUC, now renamed MONUSCO.142 
The name change was explained on counts of the "new phase" in the DRC, which also 
prompted the Security Council to authorize the withdrawal of up to 2000 troops where 
"the security situation permits."143 Furthermore, the Council called for "enhanced 
dialogue and partnership" with the DRC, and decided "to keep under continuous review 
the strength of MONUSCO on the basis of assessments from the Secretary-General and 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo," while not narrowing the 
mandate of MONUSCO to use force.144 Therefore, while Kabila's aspiration to have all 
foreign forces withdrawn until mid-2011 was not fulfilled, his threat to withdraw his 
government's consent brought some change – at least in rhetoric – to the operation of 
U.N. forces in the DRC. 
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In sum, and unlike the legal situation regarding instances of intervention by states, 
withdrawal of consent, in itself, does not negate the Security Council’s authority when 
conducting a forcible intervention under Chapter VII. However, in cases, where the 
Council itself binds the mandate of the U.N. forces with a requirement of cooperation or 
consent by the target state, a withdrawal of consent might require a new Security Council 
resolution. 
Having clarified, hopefully, the modalities and dynamics of consensual forcible 
intervention, we shall now proceed to enquire further into the building blocks of the 
concept of consensual intervention in internal armed conflicts, by first exploring the 




 UNDERSTANDING INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
 
I. GENERAL 
The following chapter will present a “working definition” of the somewhat elusive 
concept of “civil wars” (or internal armed conflicts). The attempt to define this term 
serves a threefold objective. First, it allows for the clarification of the terms used in this 
work; second, it facilitates the understanding of the scope of this research, and, 
accordingly, to what factual situations any suggested normative conclusions would apply.  
Furthermore, as we shall see in Chapter 9, the determination of the existence of an 
internal armed conflict can affect also the legality of forcible intervention.   
 After suggesting a definition, we shall present a typology of common internal 
armed conflicts, elaborating – and building upon – past attempts to do so. In general, the 
conflicts will be typified according to the objective goals the parties wish to achieve – as 
far as these can be ascertained. Such an attempt can serve a third objective for this 
chapter – the demonstration of the complex nature of internal armed conflicts. Indeed, 
internal armed conflicts will constantly present the jurist with "hard cases," where rigid 
rules might have to be abandoned in favor of more elastic standards. 
 Furthermore, the treatment of all internal armed conflicts as a singular-body can 
result in the overlook of relevant legal differences. For instance, there is considerable 
difference, in the international legal sense, between struggles that challenge the principle 
of territorial integrity – such as struggles for secession – and those that do not, such as 
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struggles that aim to achieve regime change. The following chapter will allow us to make 
these distinctions. 
 
II. A WORKING DEFINITION:  FROM “CIVIL WAR” TO INTERNAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 
The common term "civil war" will occasionally be used in this work to describe armed 
internal strife. However, such use will allude to the generic meaning of the term, since it 
is nowadays imprecise. A civil war, as defined by Merriam-Webster, is “a war between 
opposing groups of citizens of the same country.”
1
 This definition does not encompass 
the complexity of modern internal strife. For instance, its association of the term “civil 
war” strictly with the participation of “citizens” is problematic. Indeed, while many “civil 
wars” involve state actors and institutions, others include parties which are not 
necessarily comprised of citizens of the relevant state.
2
  
 In the legal sphere, the term suffers from further limitations. The use of the legal 
term war– and in particular in the context of the belligerency doctrine, which will be 
explored later on –   presupposes the existence of a factual condition which may (or may 
not) have implications on the rights of the parties involved. As such, its use can prejudge 
the situation and be therefore misleading.
3
 Moreover, the use of the term war to describe 
acts of hostility in a certain instances, which had definite legal implications in traditional 
international law, has given way, in the era of the U.N. Charter and the 1949 Geneva 
                                                           
1
 Available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civil%20war 
2
 For instance, in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–1990, Palestinian refugees and P.L.O. militants (which 
were never granted Lebanese citizenship) played a central role. See EDGAR O’BALLANCE, CIVIL WAR IN 
LEBANON, 1975–1992 1–20 (1998). Another example could be the involvement of foreign fighters in the 
internal strife in Iraq following the invasion of 2003. See, e.g., ZAKI CHEHAB, IRAQ ABLAZE, 33–69 (2006); 
or the involvement of the FDLR in the conflict in Congo. See Chapter 1, sec. III. . 
3 
See Chapter 5 sec. I.   
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Conventions, to the factual terms of use of force and armed conflict.
4
 Accordingly, this 
work will use the more precise term internal armed conflict or internal conflict. The term 
non-international armed conflict will not be used, since it refers, in the context of 
international humanitarian law, also to instances which are not necessarily internal: it 
encompasses also the complex phenomenon of transnational armed conflict.
5
        
 In practice, an internal armed conflict is thus, essentially, a violent political 
dispute, where armed violence takes place primarily within the boundaries of a single 
state.
6
  The acceptable contemporary legal definition of the term can be found in the 
ICTY’s famous Tadic case:  
… an armed conflict exits whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed 




                                                           
4
 See, e.g. Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, Characterizing US Operations in Pakistan: Is the United 
States Engaged in an Armed Conflict? 34 FORD. INT’L L. J. 151, 160 (2010). 
5
 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (holding that the term non-international armed 
conflict, as it appears in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not apply only to internal 
armed conflicts.) Another example for this complex phenomenon is the intense armed conflict between 
Israel and Hamas in Gaza, which erupted in December 2008. It is not a clear international armed conflict, 
since neither Hamas is not a “High Contracting Party” to the Geneva Conventions; however, since Gaza is 
not a territory of Israel, it cannot be labeled as an internal armed conflict. See HCJ 769/02 The Public 
Committee Against Torture in Israel v.  The Government of Israel [2006] IsrSC 57(6) 285, ¶21 (holding that 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is closer to one of an international character); but see Eyal Benvenisti, The 
Legal Battle to Define the Law on Transnational Asymmetric Warfare 20 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L L. 339, 341– 
344, 350  (2010) (suggesting the term "transnational warfare" for conflicts between states and non-state 
actor operating across borders).   
6
 Michael E. Brown, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 1, 1 
(Michael E. Brown ed., 1996). “Within the boundaries of a single state” includes conflicts that take place 
within the boundaries of a federal system. For the complexities of defining conflicts within a federal 
system, see infra at X.   
7
 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (emphasis added). 
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 The term protracted implies – and in contradistinction to conflicts between states 
that do not require such a condition –
8
 that internal armed conflicts have to be both 
sustained (along the time continuum) and large-scale (in terms of the friction between the 
parties).
9
 Importantly, for an internal armed conflict to materialize there must be at least 
one armed group of sufficient organization that challenges the government.
10
 
Accordingly, as defined in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II, the term excludes 
“situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts 
of violence and other acts of similar nature.”
11
  
 The determination whether the conditions for an armed conflict exist is a question 
of fact,
12
 meaning, it should be entirely separated from our perception regarding the 
merits of the conflict. In general, it is possible to ascertain whether an internal armed 
conflict exists by analyzing the course of actions undertaken by the involved parties. For 
instance, it is helpful to ask whether the state has deployed its regular armed forces, or 
rather it is confronting the upheaval mainly through law enforcement measures employed 
by its police force and justice system.
13
 However, even if a state does deploy its armed 
forces, this is not sufficient, in itself, for the materialization of an internal armed conflict, 
since there must also be an organized armed group that confronts the government. If there 
                                                           
8
 See NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 86 –88 (2010). 
9
 Compare RICHARD A. FALK, ED. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WARS 18 (1972); see also Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, Introduction, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 1, 
4 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993). 
10
 Blanck, supra note 4, at 163 –164; see also Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, Hum. Rts. Council, ¶¶46–56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 
28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Study on Targeted Killings]; LUBELL, supra note 8 at 109–110.  
11
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 art. 1(2) 
[Hereinafter  Additional Protocol II], [Hereinafter – APII] (regulating the conduct of parties to a non-
international armed conflict); see also Falk, supra note 9, at 18.  
12
 Blanck, supra note 4, at 160 –162; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (ICTY Oct. 2, 1995); cited in Blanck, supra note 4, at 162. 
13
 Blanck, supra note 4, at 163 and the many sources cited therein; LUBELL, supra note 8, at 107.  
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are no such organized armed groups, and the violence between the state apparatus and 
civilians can be dealt with sufficiently through domestic criminal law, the situation is 
controlled, in turn, by international human rights law.  In this context, it is worthwhile to 
note that in contrast to Additional Protocol II, the Tadic court did not refer to control over 
territory by opposition groups as a condition for the existence of internal armed conflict.
14
  
However, control over territory can still serve as an indication for the existence of such 
conflict, since loss of control might imply that the government is unable to curtail the 
opposition’s activities through law enforcement mechanisms, as provided for in 
international human rights law, and must therefore result to military force to assert 
control over the state’s territory.   
 Notwithstanding the requirement that internal armed conflicts would be both 
sustained and large-scaled, it is reasonable that for an internal armed conflict to 
materialize there would be some inverse ratio between duration and intensity. For 
instance, a very short but extremely intense period of violence may be looked upon as an 
internal armed conflict;
15
 and conversely, a long and relatively low-intensity conflict may 
also qualify as one.
16
 It seems that both duration and scale serve as indicators for the 
conflict's effect over the ability of the state to extinguish it through its justice system and 
by law enforcement measures. In this sense, prolonged low-intensity conflicts, as well as 
short high-intensity ones, can both be indications that such ability is hindered.       
                                                           
14
 Additional Protocol II, supra note 11, art. 1(1). 
15
 See the decision by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Abella Case, Abella v. 
Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No 55/97, IACHR OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. 
at 221, cited in LUBELL, supra note 8, at 105. 
16
 Compare Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former 
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (holding that the “term” protracted, in the context of internal armed conflicts, 
refers more to the intensity of the violence than to its duration), cited in LUBELL, supra note 8, at 105 –106. 
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 In contemporary international law, the main corollary of the distinction whether 
an internal armed conflict exists or not concerns the question whether the application of  
international humanitarian law is triggered, or rather that the situation is controlled 
strictly by the more restrictive law enforcement paradigm, as entrenched in international 
human rights law.
 17  
For instance, the gist of the requirement that the opposition be an 
organized armed group is that there must be, in fact, at least two real parties to the 
conflict, as opposed to a situation where the state is simply using armed violence against 
largely unarmed and unorganized civilians. Absent this requirement, states would be 
capable of diluting their obligations under international human rights law by claiming, as 
a pretext, that a fabricated internal armed conflict exists. 
 Indeed, the development of human rights law has shifted the discourse on the 
existence of armed conflicts at large. In the past, states were reluctant to acknowledge the 
existence of a “civil war” within their territories, both since such recognition entailed 
international status for the opposition,
18
 and because internal law enforcement was 
beyond the reach of international law, and was therefore less restrictive, on the 
international level, than the law of armed conflict. Nowadays, in contrast, the restrictions 
imposed by international human rights actually make the law of armed conflict more 
permissive – especially in the context of the use of lethal force – possibly incentivizing 
states to quickly claim that they are indeed involved in armed conflict. For instance, in 
the initial stages of the 2011–2012 crisis in Syria, the Assad regime was quick to claim or 
admit that it was facing an armed insurgency, as a principled justification for its use of 
                                                           
17
 See Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 10,  ¶¶31–33; see also NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 24 (2009). 
18
 See chapter 5. 
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lethal force – a claim that has had some factual merits, at least since the formation of the 
Free Syrian Army by defecting Syrian soldiers.
19
 An especially vigorous debate has taken 
place, in a different but related context, regarding the methods employed in the so-called 
transnational “war on terror,” in which the U.S. was keen to describe its struggle with Al-
Qa’ida as an armed conflict, while various commentators maintained that the struggle is 
in actuality a law-enforcement operation.20  
 Although the indicative tests for the existence of internal armed conflict are used 
in order to determine whether jus in bello applies, they are relevant in our context too – 
for the purpose of definition, and, as we shall see, also regarding the legality of 
consensual interventions in specific instances. We shall address this question later on.
21
 
 Last, an oft-made confusion is made between internal armed conflicts and 
revolutions – terms which are not synonymous. A revolution is a culmination, or a result, 
of a process aimed to overthrow a government and bring forth regime change, using 
methods that are outside of the regular constitutional framework of the state. It is a 
“[successful] effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for 
political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and 
non-institutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities.”
22
 As such, a revolution 
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 mtg, at 12–14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011) (statement by the 
Syrian representative in front of the Security Council); Syria Defectors “Attack Military Base in Harasta” 
B.B.C. NEWS, Nov. 16, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15752058. 
20
 See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Human Rights, National Security and the Law of 
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terrorism, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 675 (2004); Mary Ellen O’Connell, When is 
War Not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 5 (2006);  Study on 
Targeted Killings, supra note 10, ¶¶46–56; LUBELL, supra note 8, at 112 –121; compare PHILIP BOBBITT, 
TERROR AND CONSENT 128–134 (2008), 
21
 See Chapter 9, sec. II.1. 
22
 Jack A. Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, 4 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 139, 
142 (2001). 
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can be preceded, followed or accompanied by internal armed conflict;
23
 it can also 
involve limited and small scale violence or riots; it can also be more-or-less non-
violent.
24
 Therefore, a revolution is not necessarily an internal armed conflict and vice-





III. INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS:  TYPOLOGY  
III.1 THE COMPLEX THEORY OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
Common internal armed conflicts may include attempts to overthrow an established 
government; secession struggles; ethnic conflicts; strife due to the disintegration of civil 
order; struggles over humanitarian relief efforts
26
 and a myriad of other circumstances 
which may lead to internal violence. This wide variety of conflicts can be typified by 
numerous methods of categorization found in political science literature.
27
 Beyond the 
categorization of the types of conflicts, vast research exists concerning the circumstances 
conducive to the eruption of internal armed conflicts, seeking, in general, to outline the 
                                                           
23
 For an example of an internal armed conflict that followed, rather than preceded a revolution, see the 
1967 conflict of Nigeria, where conflict erupted following a coup and a subsequent counter-coup. See 
GODFREY MWAKIKAGILE, ETHNIC POLITICS IN KENYA AND NIGERIA 3–17 (2001) (detailing the background 
for the eruption of the conflict).  
24
 Generally, non-violent revolutions can occur when the central governments degenerate (such as in many 
cases in Eastern Europe during the collapse of the Eastern Bloc); when the government acquiesces to the 
revolution due to non-violent pressure (for instance, as in South Africa or Egypt). On types of revolutions 
see Goldstone, supra note 22, at 142–144.   
25
 The distinction between revolutions and internal armed conflicts is an ancient one. Aristotle also 
distinguished between the “revolution” itself and “use of force,” noting that “[f]orce may be applied either 
at the time of making the revolution or afterwards.” He also contended that revolutions can come to be 
either by “force” or by “fraud.” See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 111 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 2009).      
26
 ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note 3, at 5. 
27
 For instance, it is possible to classify conflicts by the nature of their participants, by their success or by 
their intensity. See, e.g., D.E.H. RUSSEL, REBELLION, REVOLUTION AND ARMED FORCE 60–62 (1974).   
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permissive conditions, proximate and ultimate causes and various sources of grievances 
that render a state vulnerable to plunge into conflict. 28  
 For instance, Brown suggests a categorization of such conditions as structural, 
political, economical-social and cultural-perceptual.
29
 Structural factors include state 
weakness, in which power-vacuums are conducive to the creation and aggravation of 
power-struggles, and bare the potential to generate a “Hobbesian” state of fear, giving 
rise to a security dilemma in which various groups participate in an internal arms-race in 
anticipation of impending conflict.
30
 Political factors include discriminatory political 
institutions; exclusionary national ideologies; contentious inter-group politics; and 
opportunistic and populist tactics used by politicians.
31
 Social-economic factors include 
the existence of constant and widespread economic problems;
32
 economical 
discrimination and resulting social gaps;
33
 and tensions related to modernization and 
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Regarding causes of internal armed conflict, as in causation in general, Brown distinguishes between 
“permissive” and “proximate” causes, see Brown, supra note 6, at 22 (on permissive and proximate 
factors).   
29
 Id. at 13–23. 
30
 According to this view, lack of political institutions which enforce the rule of law leads to anarchy, where 
a situation similar to a “state of nature” exists, compelling the different groups to fear other groups. The 
“security dilemma” is originally a term used in the context of inter-state relations in anarchy, “imported” 
into the realm of internal armed conflict, mainly regarding ethnic strife. See Barry R. Posen, The Security 
Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, 35 SURVIVAL (1993) 27;  David A. Lake & Donald Rotschild, Containing 
Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, in  NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT  126, 137 
(Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 2001); Jack S. Levy,  International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War,  
in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 17, 27 (Chester A. Crocker  
et al. eds., 2007).  
31
 Brown, supra note 6, at 16–18. Gurr argues that a greater risk for violence exists in states which are 
under authoritarian rule. According to Gurr, tendencies towards “collective violence” depend on the extent 
of the violations of “socially derived expectations about the means and ends of human action.” Such 
violations are more acute in “societies that rely on coercion.” However, if frustrated people have 
“constructive means to attain their social and material goals, few will resort to violence,” as violence is less 
likely when people are presented with effective nonviolent means for the attainment of their goals. See TED 
ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL 317 (1970). 
32
 Such as scarcity of resources, high unemployment or radical inflation. 
33  
See RODERICK MARTIN ALLEY, INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: WARS 




 Last, cultural and perceptual factors may include “mutually exclusive” 
narratives between groups within the state.
35
 All of these circumstances might lead to a self-
perception of relative deprivation among groups, enhancing the chances for violence.
36
  
 These are mainly questions of political science. Indeed, they may have legal 
implications in international human rights law, considering the growing focus on “root 
causes” of human rights violations.
37
 However, this is not the main focus of his work. 
Instead, we shall present a categorization of internal armed conflicts based on their 
objectives – meaning, the tangible legal outcome the parties involved seek to achieve.
38
 
Building on a model suggested by Falk, the main types of such conflicts are struggles for 
control over the state apparatus; struggles for secession; and struggles for unification or 
reunion.
39
Another category of goals can be found in struggles for the dismantlement of 
the state as part of a decentralized transnational movement.  
 Indeed, it can sometimes be extremely difficult to make a clean-cut distinction 
regarding the goals of a specific internal armed conflict. Many conflicts may be “caught” 
within more than one category; fall within different categories according to the narratives 
of different parties; or shift from one category to another over the course of the conflict. 
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See Saul Newman, Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Conflict? 43 World Politics (1991) 451; see also 
D.G. Morrison & H.M. Stevenson, Cultural Pluralism, Modernization and Conflict, 5 CAN. J. POL. SCI 
(1972) 82, 83–84. In addition, research has found linkage between the extent of a state's economic reliance 
on basic commodities, and the likelihood of internal conflict erupting, since groups are prone to struggle for 
the control of these resources. See Paul Collier et. al The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War and the Case 
Study Project Research Design, in THE WORLD BANK, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR VOL. 1 (Paul Collier & 
Nicholas Sambanis, eds. 2005) 1, 16.   
35
 See Brown, supra note 6, at 21.  
36
 GURR, supra note 31, at 24, 29 –30. The concept of Relative Deprivation is not too far removed from the 
Aristotelian notion regarding motivations for revolution. For a survey of this approach and of other 
literature about subjective causes of strife see id, at 37–46. 
37
 See Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 57 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011). 
38
 There are numerous ways to classify objective goals which parties to internal armed conflict may seek to 
achieve The UCDP/PRIO Dataset, for instance, suggests a distinction between incompatibility concerning 
government and incompatibility concerning territory. See NILS PETTER GLEDITSCH ET AL. UCDP/PRIO 
ARMED CONFLICT DATASET CODEBOOK 2 (Version 4-2009). 
39
 FALK, supra note 9, at 18–19.   
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Moreover, the parties, within themselves, are not always monolithic; and frequently, 
"real" intentions are covered by propaganda, populist discourse and myths. This difficulty 
is enhanced by the ease that a party to a conflict – any conflict – may invoke high 
universalist claims while actually concerned with local power-wielding and, conversely, 
to raise narrow legalistic claims as a subtext for promoting fundamental, system-wide 
changes.
40
 Notwithstanding these difficulties, as we shall see, the objective goals of the 
parties can perhaps affect the legality of intervention in a specific instance.  
 
III.2 STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OVER THE STATE APPARATUS  
A Struggle for Control over the State Apparatus is the classic – and supposedly simple – 
“civil war” situation where a government is challenged by the opposition over the control 
of the state, the objective goal of the parties being the eventual appropriation of control 
over the state apparatus, or bringing significant change to the structure of the state. The 
conflict may involve the government, as a unit, deploying its armed forces to curtail 
counter-governmental activities; it may involve an intra-governmental rift in which 
various institutions of the state confront each other; it may also be the case that the 
government becomes irrelevant and neutral, or ceases to exist in its entirety, while 
different groups fight to replace the government or wield more power over it. The conflict 
strictly takes place within the boundaries of the state, and foreign powers may become 
involved in the conflict through the support of one party or the other. Naturally, the 
position – or mere existence – of the government in such conflicts can have effect over 
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 See infra sec. III.2 (regarding the nature of the Lebanese crisis of 1958.)   
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the question of consensual intervention, if we assume that governmental consent can, in 
general, legitimize forcible intervention.   
 A simplified example of such a conflict is the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939
41
 
where the opposing Nationalists rebelled against the Republican government in order to 
bring about regime-change;
42
 both sides, in various stages of the conflict, were supported 
by foreign intervention.
43
 When foreign powers intervene, a struggle for control may 
transform to a conflict of hegemony,
44
 in which a foreign power wishes to support a 
dependent elite within the conflict-torn state, in order to retain (or achieve) hegemony or 
influence in the region.
45
  
 A key question that arises principally in struggles for control is whether the 
conflict is aimed at altering the “basic norm” of the relevant political entity; or rather it is 
one which takes place within the confines of this norm, where none of the parties are 
interested in changing it.
46
 An obvious case in which a state’s basic-norm is challenged is, 
for instance, when an authoritarian government is challenged by a liberal or Marxist 
opposition, seeking to rearrange the basic fundamental ethos of the state, or vice-versa. 
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 See Chapter 7 sec. IV. 
42
 See, e.g., ANTHONY BEEVOR, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 1936–1939 11 (2006) (Outlining the various 
interests and aspirations of the rival factions.)   
43 
Among others, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy intervened in favor of the Nationalists; the Soviet Union 
assisted, rather covertly, to the Republicans. See id. at  113–114, 122–123, 145). 
44
 A term that Falk uses to describe a classification separate than “standard civil war.” However, since 
parties to a “war of hegemony” seek to take control over the state apparatus, I found it beneficial to include 
this category of internal strife within “struggle to control state-apparatus.” 
45
 But not to create a full-fledged “agent” government.  
46
 “Basic Norm” in the sense as described by Kelsen (grundnorm) as a “presupposition, establishing the 
objective validity of the norms of a moral or legal order” HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 7–8 (5
th
. ed. 
2008).  It “furnishes the reason for the validity of this constitution and of the coercive order created in 
accordance with it.” Id. at 201. Indeed, there is a jurisprudential argument regarding the existence or 
necessity of the concept of a “basic norm.” See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 293 (2
nd
 ed. 1997). 
This question was already addressed by Aristotle, who made a distinction between “revolutions” aimed at 
completely changing a state’s constitution from one to another, versus those that merely seek to modify the 
current constitution. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 295 (T.A. Sinclair, trans., 1992).  
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Such a case is the aforementioned Spanish Civil War, in which a fascist coalition sought 
to create a new order.
47
  
 Many times it is extremely hard to distinguish whether the conflict erupts over the 
validity of the basic-norm itself, or rather regarding its application in a specific 
circumstance. An example of such an ambiguous situation is the Lebanese crisis of 1958. 
While it is possible to frame this conflict as one which revolved around Lebanese 
president Chamoun’s attempt to amend the Lebanese Constitution to allow for his 
reelection after six years in office (hence, a conflict within the Lebanese basic-norm 
framework,) it can also be looked upon as a conflict between Lebanese Nationalists and 
pan-Arab, pro-Soviet groups over the independence of Lebanon against mounting 
pressure to join the newly formed United Arab Republic.
48
  
 As we shall see later on, since struggles for control are usually do not aim to alter 
the state’s borders, they do not risk the external order and the corresponding principle of 
territorial integrity. In this strict sense, they represent less of a challenge to the existing 
international system than secession struggles. However, in the context of intervention, 
they raise the classic dilemmas, explored later in this work, of the principles of non-
intervention and self-determination. 
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 See BEEVOR, supra note 42, at 11. 
48  
President Eisenhower referred to the Lebanese case as one of “indirect aggression” which was 
perpetrated “under the cover of a fomented civil strife,” by the United Arab Republic – the unification of 
Egypt and Syria and a project of Egyptian president Nasser’s Pan-Arab Nationalist ideology. It seems then 
that Eisenhower adopted the mainly Lebanese Christian point of view that the conflict is indeed aimed at 
altering the basic-norm of an independent Lebanon.  See Quincy Wright, United States Intervention in 
Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112, 113 (1959); for a detailed account of the 1958 Lebanese crisis see 
Malcolm Kerr, The Lebanese Civil War, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS 65 (Evan Luard 
ed., 1972). Regarding the dispute whether the conflict in Lebanon was a product of pro-Soviet interference, 
see id. at 77–78. 
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III.3 STRUGGLES FOR SECESSION AND AUTONOMY  
Struggles for secession are situations in which an ethnic, religious, ideological or social-
economical segment of a state’s population demands to separate itself from the state and 
establish a new state. The challenging group does not contest the legitimacy of the 
government or the existence of the state per se, but only to the extent that it exercises it’s 
authority over a territory associated with the group.
49
 Thus, a struggle for secession is 
different from both of the preceding classes of conflicts: unlike in a struggle for control, 
the opposition does not seek to replace the government. 
  In general, demands for secession may be based on two different classes of 
claims. The first type involves claims according to which a central government oppresses 
or neglects a segment of its population, thereby prompting it to demand secession – this is 
the controversial doctrine of remedial secession.
50
 An illustrative way to look at such 
claims may be through the social compact metaphor.
51
 While recognizing that a compact 
was originally in place, the group would argue that its terms have been violated thus 
granting it the right, or obligation, to revolt against the central government,
52
 which 
would in turn spawn a right to be recognized as an independent state vis-à-vis the 
international community.  
 A classic example for such a case is the American Civil War. While the 
Confederate States never doubted the initial validity of the Union, they saw their struggle 
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for secession as a result of the violation of the original social compact, a violation that 
spawned their right to secede.
53
 This notion is revealed in the preface to Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis’ account of the Civil War and the events that preceded it:  
 
The object of this work has been from historical data to show 
that the Southern States had rightfully the power to withdraw 
from a Union into which they had, as sovereign communities, 
voluntarily entered; that the denial of that right was a violation 
of the letter and spirit of the compact between the States; and 
that the war waged by the Federal Government against the 
seceding States was in disregard of the limitations of the 





 A second type of struggle for secession occurs in the situation where a 
challenging party denies the very existence of a social compact between the group and 
the central government, in which case there was never consent by the group to be ruled 
by the challenged state. If such consent never existed, the claim goes, separation is 
justified. An informative example for such a situation can be found in the conflict in 
Chechnya. Chechnya, like many of the eighty-nine administrative territorial units that 
comprise the Russian Federation, is ethnically distinct, and is one of the Federation’s 
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DETERMINATION 272, 273 (Stephen Macedo & Allen Buchanan, eds., 2003) (providing a case study of the 
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 The basic Chechen claim against Russia is that Chechnya 
should be looked upon as a former republic under the Soviet Union, rather than under the 
Russian Federation.
56
 If such a claim would have been accepted, Chechnya would have 
become and independent state with the collapse of the Soviet Union, just like the 
Ukraine, Latvia and other ex-Soviet states. This was the backdrop for Chechnya’s 
unilateral declaration of independence from the U.S.S.R, in September 1991, which led to 
the catastrophic Russian invasion of 1994
57
 and the more successful operation of 1999.
58
     
Secession conflicts, as opposed to struggles for control, present additional dilemmas to 
the international system. First, they have the potential to become “international” once the 
seceding party receives widespread recognition. In addition, they challenge the basic 
principle of territorial integrity of states. These complexities, addressed later on, should 
be taken into consideration when assessing interventions in secession conflicts.  
 Secession struggles should be distinguished from struggles for autonomy. The 
latter occur when opposition forces seek to depose a government which is an agent of a 
foreign power, in an effort to establish political autonomy. Such efforts may invoke, for 
instance, the right to self-determination, and were a frequent feature of the colonial era. 
In struggles for autonomy, where agency relations exist between a local government and 
a foreign power, it can be difficult to draw the line as to when a struggle is a genuine 
internal conflict, and when it is actually a direct conflict between an indigenous 
population of a certain territory and a dominating foreign power.  
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 As we shall see in Part 2, “colonial” struggles were seen, in the age of empires, as 
regular internal armed conflicts. However, this rule was a product of an era in which 
colonialism was – at least in the eyes of the major powers – an accepted international 
phenomenon. It is clear that such a formalistic approach has become outdated in the post-
colonial era, and that struggles for autonomy in the colonial contexts were categorized, in 




III.4 STRUGGLE FOR (RE)UNIFICATION (IRREDENTISM)  
This category of internal conflicts encompasses situations in which a group, within a 
state, struggles for the purpose of achieving political unification or reunification of a 
territory with the territory of a (usually) neighboring state. Such conflicts are sometimes 
referred to as based on irredentism – claims for expansion or unification based on ethnic, 
national or historical rationales.
60
 As such, conflicts of this order challenge the principle 
of territorial integrity, and may involve active support by the government of the 
neighboring state.
61
 In such cases the neighboring state might admit that it, itself, seeks to 
acquire the disputed territory; conversely, it may only tacitly admit such aspirations while 
maintaining – on the formal level – that it supports a certain party for a different reason, 
other than its motivation to acquire the disputed territory.  
 Nevertheless, it is common for claims advocating (and opposing) unification to be 
based on historical narratives regarding the existence or inexistence of past political 
                                                           
59
 See Chapter 11, §II. 
60
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bodies under which the territories were unified.
62
 A simplified example for a struggle for 
reunification is the strife in Northern Ireland.
63
 In general, Irish Nationalists believe that 
Northern Ireland should be removed from British rule, and incorporated to Ireland.
64
 
However, the Irish Republic itself does not explicitly claim to support, in practice, such 
unification – and holds the public position that the conflict should be settled by 
“democratic means,” as was agreed upon in the Good Friday Agreement.
65
  
 The conflict between Georgia, Russia, and local elements over South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, which culminated in the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, is informative in 
demonstrating the difficulty of classification when attempting to distinguish between 
struggles for secession and unification – especially where an external power is actively 
involved (in contrast to the situation in Northern Ireland, where the Irish Republic was 
not thoroughly active in the dispute).66 This conflict could be defined as a borderline case 
between a struggle for secession and a struggle for unification; or as a situation in which 
separation is championed with the encouragement of a neighboring power, as a pretext 
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 For an in-depth investigation of the 2008 Goergia-Russia conflict see Report of the Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (Sept. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html [hereinafter Georgia Report]. In short, the Mission found that the conflict 
was sparked by Georgia; however, it also found that South Ossetia has no right to seceed under 
international law; and that the Russian counterattack in to Georgia was disproportionate.   
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for annexation and unification; or as a linear process in which separation precedes 
unification, and where the act of unification is aimed to be achieved through the prior 
realization of sovereignty.  
 Evidence of the unification nature of the conflict indeed exists: as in Northern 
Ireland, justifications for unification can be based, in this conflict, on historical 
narratives.
67
 Also, there is an ethnic linkage between the people of South Ossetia and the 
population of Russia’s North Ossetia. Moreover, since 1992 and 1994, Russian troops are 
deployed (as “peacekeepers”) in South Ossetia and Abkhazia respectively.
68
 In addition, 
since 2002, Russia carries out a policy of “passportization,” in which Russian passports 
are conferred en masse to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The acceptance of 
these passports by the majority of the residents, although the validity of the passports is 
dubious,
69
 is another indication for the conflict’s nature as one of unification.  
 Furthermore, some Russian officials claimed that South Ossetia will become a 
part of Russia, in which the South Ossetians will be united with their North Ossetian 
kin.
70
 However, the ethos of the conflict, from the point of view of the Abkhazians as 
well as Ossetians, is grounded in the principle of self-determination and independence; it 
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is unclear to what extent their movement advocates unification with the Russian 
Federation, or rather seeks to achieve separation from Georgia without such unification.
71
   
 The mixed and complex nature of the conflict was evident as the war of August 
2008 was essentially a “combined inter-state and intra-state conflict,”
72
 where Georgian 
troops collided with intervening Russian troops on the external level, and also with South 
Ossetians and Abkhaz armed groups on the internal one – further blurring the line 
between the conflict's nature as a struggle for secession versus one for unification.  
 Another, even more complex scenario of a struggle for unification, occurs when a 
group is dispersed throughout a few states, none of which are under that group’s 
domination; and, accordingly, elements of this group – within these states – struggle for 
unification in the form of a new state which, as they aspire, will be comprised of 
territories seceded from the several states and united together. Such may be the case with 
the struggle of the Kurds. The Kurdish people – branded “the largest nation in the world 
without its own independent state”
73
 – are concentrated in a geographical area, parts of 
which are mainly within the borders of Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
74
  
 Despite periods of violent conflicts among themselves,
75
 the idea of greater 
Kurdistan has been a symbol of much importance among militant groups within the 
Kurdish national movement. The original charter of the militant Kurdistan’s Workers Party 
(PKK) called for a “democratic and united Kurdistan” encompassing territories in Turkey, 
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Iran, Iraq and Syria.
76
 Such claims, naturally, challenge not only the internal regime of 
the affected states, but also the international stability and territorial integrity of the 
involved surrounding states.  
 
III.5 STRUGGLE FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF THE STATE AS PART OF A DECENTRALIZED 
TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT 
This category of internal conflicts includes instances where an armed conflict is taking 
place within the boundaries of one state, when the opposition forces are a part of a 
decentralized – yet interconnected – transnational movement, which is not effectively 
controlled by any government, aiming to bring about a fundamental change to the global 
international structure. Such struggles include both intra-state and transnational elements. 
Their intra-state elements involve confrontations between the state and forces which 
operate from within it, whether comprised entirely of the states’ citizens or supplemented 
by foreigners. Their transnational elements are the opposition’s state-transcending 
aspirations and the cooperation it enjoys with similar actors outside of the state. 
  An example is the conflict between Jihadist movements and the Iraqi 
government. To the extent that the Jihadi groups were indeed “pursuing an objective – the 
establishment of a global caliphate – that is incompatible with a global system of human 
rights,”
77
 these conflicts constitute a struggle for the dismantlement of the state. Of 
course, like with regards to other categories, the distinction between such conflicts and 
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others is not always clear-cut. For instance, it is unclear whether Abu Mus’ab Al-
Zarqawi, former leader of Al Qa’ida in Iraq, was genuinely aiming to promote the idea of 
an Islamic Caliphate, or whether he was more interested in igniting sectarian violence.
78
 
Struggles of this type give rise to numerous questions regarding the responses of 
international law to terrorism, and their relations to traditional approaches towards 
internal armed conflict. Arguably, in the context of the question of consensual 
intervention, struggles for dismantlement represent “easy cases.” Indeed, when the 
internal conflict involves elements that do not accept the state-structure to begin with, 
arguments of self-determination and non-intervention – which are inherent to the 
discussion of intervention in the international system of states – are effectively quashed.    
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 UNDERSTANDING INTERVENTION –KEY DISTINCTIONS AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 
 
I. INTERVENTION ACROSS DISCIPLINES – THEORETICAL FAULT-LINES AND 
CLARIFICATIONS 
I.1 THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE ON INTERVENTION  
The term “intervention” is elusive on many levels. A few distinctions should be made 
prior to any discussion of it. The first concerns the understanding that intervention can 
mean different things across different disciplines. As James Rosenau argued, the 
discussion of intervention is usually addressed by three distinct disciplines – moral, legal 
and strategic. He suggested that these be complemented by a scientific approach.
1
 One 
can also argue that a distinct historic approach to intervention exists also.  
The moral or ethical approach seeks answers to the question regarding the 
circumstances in which it is morally right to intervene.
2
 The strategic approach, 
conversely, studies the question of where, how and when do interventions succeed, in 
light of values we aspire to achieve; and why do such interventions take place, in terms of 
the interests of various parties. It can be generally argued that these questions are the 
primary concern of scholars of political science.
3
 The scientific approach can be looked 
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upon as a branch – or method – of the strategic approach. It attempts to analyze cases of 
intervention in a manner which produces results “in such a way that findings derived 
from one case can be applied to and tested by other cases,” for the purpose of explaining 
“scientifically” the “dynamics of intervention.”
4
 The historic point of view concerning 
intervention seeks to investigate the details of a specific intervention or of interventions 
at large, in order to build a coherent and credible factual basis.
5
 The legal approach, 
however, is concerned with the attempt to outline the circumstances, if at all, where states 
or organizations have the legal power, responsibility, right or duty to intervene.
6
 It 
attempts to analyze the sources of international law to circumscribe a set of normative 
rules and principles. 
Initially, these disciplines seem far apart; however, they are more intertwined than 
one would expect. Rosenau – albeit critically – addressed this interconnectivity, stating 
that  
The moral dimension . . .is plagued by a double-standard 
problem; the legal dimension suffers from a definitional 
problem, and the strategic dimension is beset by the 
problem of operationalizing the national interest . . . To the 
extent that the three dimensions are interdependent, so are 
the problems, thus further compounding the confusion.
7
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Thus, the legal dimension of intervention interacts with other dimensions – which 
interact also with each other.
8
 For instance, to the extent that we accept that ethics can 
play a part in the interpretation of ambiguous legal norms,
9
 the legal interpretation of 
international law concerning intervention can indeed interact with the ethical approach to 
intervention. Furthermore, concepts such as necessity and proportionality, which are, to 
some extent, strategic questions –are also an integral part of the classic Just War 
assessment of intervention, which might be a part not only of the ethical discussion of 
intervention, but also of the considerations that must be taken in the executive discretion 
exercised by international functions.
10
  
The fact that the different disciplines regarding the question of intervention are 
not mutually-excluding might create some confusion. Indeed, Rosenau’s assertion that the 
legal study of intervention suffers from a deficit of “definition,” might find its roots in the 
confusing differences in discourse between the different disciplines. For instance, when 
an international lawyer says intervention, she does not necessarily attribute to the term 
the same meaning that a political scientist would; the same applies to the terms “use of 
force,” “civil war” and others. Lack of sensitivity to these subtleties might result 
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in “incommensurability” in the study of intervention.
11
 For instance, if a strategic study 
defines intervention as only one which is only committed by a state’s regular forces, its 
findings might not be applicable to a legal study, which, as we shall see, potentially 
includes within the confines of the term also acts by non-state actors encouraged or 
tolerated by a state. 
  
I.2 A LEGAL APPROACH TO INTERVENTION OR SETTING ASIDE REALISM   
 In the sphere of political science, it should come as no surprise that the discussion 
regarding intervention in internal armed conflicts is a sub-question of the longstanding 
debate between the realist approach to international relations and the liberal or legalistic 
approaches.  
Realists – and particularly neorealists from the school of Kenneth Waltz – stress 
the anarchical characteristics of the international system, which result in inter-state 
relations that are subject strictly to power considerations. Accordingly, legal or moral 
norms, or the internal political structure of the state, are irrelevant as determinants of state 
action on the international level.
12
 Thus, since realists “tend to see all states as caught in a 
state of war in which the only source of security is self-help,” their analysis of forcible 
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interventions will be mainly based on states’ “relative capabilities.”
13
 It therefore only 
makes sense that realists see forcible intervention strictly as a tool utilized to achieve 
security, inter alia, through the maintenance of the balance of power.
14
 For realists, this is 
a descriptive claim regarding how states act; and given their perception of the 




International liberals, on the other hand, agree that at least some of the forcible 
interventions undertaken by states are based on principles independent from pure power 
calculations.
16
 They argue that international institutions and economic interactions create 
interdependence that reduces conflicts and enhances cooperation.
17
 They identify the 
development of inter-governmental networks which modify state actions through 
socialization processes,
18
 and emphasize the role of fairness and legitimacy in the 
international system.
19
 They do not accept the neorealist separation between domestic 
politics and inter-state relations, and advance liberal peace arguments, drawing on 
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Kantian principles to demonstrate that the internal structure of liberal states results in 
their reluctance to fight each other.
20
 Others argue for a concept of international morality 
which is independent from the realist view of inter-state relations as a Hobbesian 
anarchy.
21
    
In our context, it is plain to see that realists will not attribute major importance to 
the existence or absence of consent when a state contemplates intervention, at least as 
long as the consent does not affect its power calculations. Liberals, on the other hand, 
might view consent as a legitimizing factor – whether morally or legally – independent 
from the question of power-relations. This work does not purport to solve the debate 
between realism and liberalism regarding forcible intervention. The international lawyer 
is indeed in a bind; if she must always, a priori, prove the mere existence of international 
law as a significant force in the relations between states, before embarking on any study 
of international law, she will inevitably find herself trapped in an endless cycle of 
apologetics, preventing her from developing law itself. This work, therefore, notes that 
international law is far from perfect. However, it must adopt the presupposition that 
international law indeed exists, that it is binding, and that it actually affects the behavior 




                                                           
 
20
 See, e.g., Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 206.  
(1983)  
21
 See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979). 
  
80 
I.3 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL ARMED 
CONFLICTS AND INTERVENTION IN POLITICAL DISPUTES 
It could be argued, that the question of consensual intervention in internal armed conflict 
should be analyzed in a similar manner, regardless of the existence of an internal armed 
conflict. Indeed, the merits of a struggle are not solely contingent upon its “violent” or 
“nonviolent” character. Thus, one can argue, the power to consent to forcible intervention 
should be analyzed irrespective of any pre-existing internal armed conflict, and be 
assessed solely on the character of the regime involved. However, the existence of an 
internal armed conflict prompts a set of considerations – ethical and legal– that do not 
arise in its absence.  
First, internal armed conflicts represent, in a visible and distinctive manner, a 
situation where “anarchy prevails” within a state. In such cases the general norm of non-
intervention loses much of its theoretical appeal.
22
 In this sense, the existence of an 
internal armed conflict serves as a strong indication that the norm of non-intervention, 
regarding the conflict-torn state, should be interpreted in a qualifying manner.   
Second, intervention for the sake of regime change, absent an internal armed 
conflict (or widespread atrocities,) and merely on counts of the regime’s “immoral” 
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 See EMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 112–113 (1759) (Mary Campbell 
Smith, Trans., 1903) (the Fifth Preliminary Article of Perpetual Peace), available at 
http://books.google.com/. Kant, however, distinguished between different levels of internal conflicts, 
according to which only when a state “has become split up through internal corruption into two parts, each 
of them representing by itself an individual state which lays claims to the whole” a state of anarchy 
“prevails,” in which foreign intervention does not constitute “interference.”  
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characteristics, can be seen as a case of preventive use of force, with all the legal and 
ethical problems it entails.
23
  
Third, a democratic standpoint will always seek to see internal differences settled 
through deliberation. An eruption of an internal armed conflict represents a strong 
indication that (a) a democratic process in the state is completely absent; or (b) that 
democratic options have been exhausted. In any case, deliberation or other non-violent 
measures have been effectively abandoned. This situation clearly distinguishes instances 
of internal armed conflicts from other political conflicts. When deliberation is abandoned, 




Fourth, Mill stressed the significance of the local population’s independent 
motivation to win its freedom and acts upon accordingly. It must be prepared to embark 
on an “an arduous struggle to become free on their own efforts.” Such as struggle is more 
likely to bring long-term freedom as “[m]en become attach to that which they have 
fought long for, and made sacrifices for.”
25
  The eruption of armed conflict may serve as 
one indication that such a genuine motivation for change indeed exists, a fact that may or 
may not affect our understanding of the effects of intervention.  
Fifth, importantly, internal armed conflicts inflict extensive humanitarian 
suffering. This, in itself, justifies placing them in a criteria different than regular political 
                                                           
 
23
 See WALZER, supra note 2, at xiii. However, when dealing with regimes that are beyond doubt “capable 
of aggression and massacre,” Walzer argues for preventive “measures short-of-war” such as no-fly zones - 
although he does note condone “preventive war.” Id. at xiv. However, since modern international law does, 
in general, distinguish between such measures in the application of  jus ad bellum, this distinction is not 
relevant in our context. 
24
 See, e.g., ICISS Report, supra note 10, at 36–37. 
25
 Mill, supra note 2, at 260; See also WALZER, supra note 2, at 87–88; DOYLE, supra note 8, at 395.  
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differences, unless these amount substantively to the same humanitarian suffering that 
would have been caused by an armed conflict. 
 Sixth, and here we return to the realm of positive law, internal armed conflicts 
change the normative environment of international law, as norms of international 
humanitarian law – inapplicable in absence of an armed conflict – begin to apply. As we 
shall see, this question affects both the legality of the use of force of the challenged 




 These six considerations thus serve to distinguish between internal armed conflict 
and other manifestations of political turmoil, differences or dissent; they lay the grounds 
for the legal distinction between intervention in internal armed conflicts and intervention 
in other political disputes.  
 
II. INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: KEY DISTINCTIONS  
II.1 PHYSICAL (DESCRIPTIVE) VERSUS NORMATIVE (PRESCRIPTIVE) 
The term “intervention” is notoriously known to be one of an open-textured nature.
 27
 
Indeed, short of the adoption of a pure neutral stance – which in itself could be 
sometimes construed as a type of intervention –
28
 any action (or omission) by a state 
regarding events that take place within another state, ranging from utterances of officials 
to military invasions, can be considered as an intervention. 
                                                           
 
26
 See Chapter 9, sec. II.1. 
27
 Rosenau, supra note 1, at 152–155. 
28
 See, in this context, the discussion of the non-intervention agreement in the Spanish Civil War in Chapter 
7, sec.  IV. 
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 A possible starting point in the attempt to clarify the use of the term can be found 
in distinguishing between its physical and normative meanings. When we use the term 
intervention, we may refer to two different meanings. The first refers to the physical, or 
descriptive sense. Thus, whenever a state engages parties in an internal armed conflict – 
whether by invitation or consent of a certain party; whether by forcible or non-forcible 
measures; whether legally or illegally – it intervenes physically in the conflict. A physical 
intervention is thus a “finite and temporary” phenomena; its beginning can be identified 
as the moment when “conventional modes of conduct are abandoned;” and its ending as 
the instance when “the conventional modes are restored or the convention-breaking mode 
becomes conventional through persistent use.”
29
  
 The second meaning of the term intervention is in the normative, or prescriptive 
sense: meaning, the potentially unlawful interference or encroachment upon the territorial 
integrity or internal political affairs of another state.
30
 This meaning refers to the 
centuries-old principle of non-intervention, which is entrenched in different customary 
rules and in many historical and contemporary documents, judgments and treaties.
31
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 Rosenau, supra note 1, at 161. 
30
  LORI FISLER DAMROSCH, Introduction, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNAL CONFLICTS 1, 3 (Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., 1989).    
31
  See e.g. article LXIV of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648); Covenant of the League of Nations art. 10; 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference of 
American States art. 8, Dec. 23, 1933, 165 L.O.N.T.S  19;  U.N. Charter art. 2(7) (note, however, that this 
article is addressed to the U.N. rather than to its member states); Pact of  the Arab League of States art. 8, 
Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S 237); Article 18 of the Charter of Organization of American States art. 15, Apr. 
30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 48); article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 41(1), Apr. 
18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S 95;); General Assembly Res. 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. 
A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration of Friendly Relations]; Military Aid and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), ¶¶202–209 (opinion of Judge 
Singh) (hereinafter  Nicaragua); The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9), p. 35; 
See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 53–58 (2005); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across 
Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J, INT’L L. 1, 6–9 
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Therefore, in essence, only engagements which violate the general norm of non-
intervention are interventions in the normative sense. Thus, while every involvement – 
whether forcible or non-forcible; military, economic or political – of an external party in 





II.2 TYPOLOGY OF INTERVENTION: NON-FORCIBLE VERSUS FORCIBLE; NEGATIVE VERSUS 
POSITIVE; AND UNILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL  
Intervention, as a physical concept, can take place in many different forms. Inter alia, it 
can consist of direct military intervention, economic intervention, or a combination of 
both;
33  
it could be in the form of diplomatic intervention – whether by concerted 
diplomatic activity or by granting or denying recognition;
34
 it can take the form of 
logistical or other support of armed groups within another state; It could be an 
amalgamation of all of these methods. 
 Each one of these methods encompasses an infinite variety of actions. In general, 
these methods can be classified as non-forcible versus forcible ones. Non-forcible 
intervention is, at large, controlled by the general principle of non-intervention, as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
(1989) and the sources cited therein. For an historical overview of the development of the norm, see J.H. 
LEURDIJK, ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
5–26 (2006). 
32
 Damrosch prefers the term “influence” to describe what I refer to as “physical” intervention –meaning, 
intervention which is not legally prejudged. I use the term “intervention” because the term “influence” 
seems to be weak in the context of military intervention. See Politics Across Borders, supra note 31, at 12–
13. Moreover, the term “influence” is more apt to describe the outcome – or objective – of a particular 
intervention. See Rosenau, supra note 1, at 159. 
33 
See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 3, at 25.
  
34
 ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note 30, at 4. 
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by international human rights law.
35
 Forcible intervention – the main concern of this 
work, is controlled too by the norm of non-intervention, but also, first and foremost, by 
the international law regarding the use of force.  
 A related distinction is between negative and positive forms of intervention.
36 
The 
boundaries of these distinctions are admittedly rough. Negative interventions are 
naturally non-forcible; they involve the complete withdrawal or partial reduction of 
existing interactions with a target state, or forward-looking bans or limitations on such 
interactions. Such activities include economic sanctions – ranging from withdrawals of 
various kinds of favorable treatments to comprehensive trade embargoes (including arms 
embargoes); as well as political and cultural sanctions.  Negative intervention is regulated 
by a rather flexible legal framework. For instance, in the landmark Nicaragua case, the 
ICJ held that forms of unilateral negative economic intervention – such as withdrawal of 
aid or trade sanctions – are not prohibited by customary international law, meaning, they 
do not constitute illegitimate normative interventions.
37
 Indeed, economic sanctions – the 
                                                           
 
35
 On the effect of economical sanctions over human rights see Comm. on Econ. Soc. & and Cult.  Rights, 
General Comment No. 8, The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. CESCR/E/C.12/1997/8 (Dec. 12, 1997). of course, this position assumes 
that the Covenant's applies extra-territorially. See Fons Coomans, Some Remarks on the Extraterritorial 
Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 183 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004) 
(exploring the extraterritorial dimensions of the ICESCR). The extraterritorial application of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), although also contested, is more established. 
The Human Rights Committee is of the opinion that the ICCPR's provisions protect anyone within the 
power of effective control of the state, also when outside its territory. See Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 31, Nature of the Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21.Rev.1/Add.13 (2004); this interpretation was endorsed by the ICJ. See Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 ¶¶ 108–
111 (Jul. 9).  
36
 In the same vein, Damrosch makes a distinction between affirmative and negative techniques of 
economic leverage. See Politics Across Borders, supra note 31 at 6, 31 (1989).  
37
 Nicaragua claimed, inter alia, that the American cessation of economic aid, imposition of quota 
restrictions on sugar imports and trade embargo is contrary to international law. The ICJ rejected this claim 
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most common form of negative non-forcible intervention – are not considered, in general, 
as unlawful intervention unless they amount to extreme economic coercion.
38
 This notion 
is based on the idea that states are sovereign to conduct their economical policies – 
whether internal or external –39 and that as long as an action is not limited by treaties or 
customary international law, it is not prohibited.
40
 
 Positive interventions are actions that can be described as “affirmative” - 
meaning, all actions involving changes of the status-quo ante in inter-state interactions, 
which go beyond withdrawals or bans. These can be either non-forcible (e.g., the granting 
of economic or aid or recognizing the opposition as the state’s lawful government or as a 
seceding state) or forcible (the use of military force, directly or indirectly and some forms 
of military aid such as arms transfers). In general, positive non-forcible intervention in 
favor of opposition groups is severely limited in international law, through the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
holding briefly that “At this point. the Court has merely to say that it is unable to regard such action on the 
economic plane as is here complained of as a breach of the customary-law principle of non-intervention.” 
Nicaragua, supra note 31, ¶245 (Singh, J.); See also Politics Across Borders, supra note 31, at 34; Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L.  1, 53–55 (2001).    
38
 This principle was enshrined, inter alia, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, G.A. Res 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc.  A/8082 (Oct. 24, 
1970). However, even “extreme economic coercion” was not defined as “aggression” by the General 
Assembly in the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), ¶3(g), U.N. Doc A/9631 (Dec. 14, 
1974)  [hereinafter  Definition of Aggression]; See Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 
Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 224, 224, 230 (1977); compare Tom J. Farer, Political and 
Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 413  (1985).  
39
 See, e.g., LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW  §129 (1992); see also Laura Picchio Forlati, The 
Present Sate of Research Carried out by the English Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and 
Research, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  129, 131 (Centre for Studies and Research in 
International Law and International Relations, 2000); Cleveland, supra note 37, at 53. The claim that such 
unilateral economic sanctions indeed constitute a normative intervention was usually invoked by 
developing countries, but rejected by developed countries, thereby negating the possibility that such a 
customary norm has emerged. See Politics Across Borders, supra note 31, at 32–33. For a rebuke of many 
critiques regarding the use of unilateral sanctions by the U.S., see Cleveland, supra note 37, at 48.    
40
 See, in this context, the debate regarding the legality of the non-intervention agreement in the Spanish 
Civil War, see Chapter 7, sec. IV. 
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Declaration of Friendly Relations –providing that it is a violation of international law for 
a state to 
[O]rganize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate 
subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the 
violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or 




The question regarding a party's power to consent to external forcible intervention 
also has positive and negative aspects. Should we claim that international law negates, in 
some circumstances, the power of consent, we are essentially arguing for a norm of 
negative non-forcible intervention. Similarly, if we claim that law recognizes, in some 
circumstances, the power of consent – we are arguing for a norm of positive forcible 
intervention. Therefore, the normative frameworks that relevant to both types of 
interventions (negative or positive) might also affect the question of consent. 
 The last important distinction, applicable to all types of interventions in internal 
armed conflicts – non-forcible or forcible; negative or positive - is between unilateral and 
multilateral interventions. The term unilateral intervention used in this work refers to any 
intervention which is conducted by a state, or a group of states (through an international 
organization or otherwise), not through the mechanism established in Chapter VII of the 
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 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 38. Such was also the attitude of the ICJ. See Nicaragua, 
supra note 31, ¶228. The same clause was included in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 
(XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965).   
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U.N. Charter. Actions taken pursuant to Chapter VII resolutions will be described as 
multilateral interventions.
42  
 In general, forcible intervention is governed by the U.N. Charter's law regarding 
the use of force – effectively separating the normative status of unilateral and multilateral 
forcible interventions. The law regarding non-forcible interventions, at large, places both 
unilateral and multilateral interventions under the same normative system. The main 
difference between them being, that multilateral non-forcible interventions are 
universally binding, while unilateral ones are not.   
 
III. THE SHIFTING MEANING OF THE NORM OF NON-INTERVENTION AND ITS 
INTERACTION WITH THE LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE 
III.1 THE SHIFTING MEANING OF THE NORM 
When discussing intervention and the use of force, some attention must be given to the 
shifting perception in the understanding of the norm of non-intervention. Indeed, while 
the norm is not challenged per se in existing international law, it certainly is not viewed 
as rigid or absolute.
43
 The norm of non-intervention is limited by various legal 
frameworks that may allow different types of interventions – sometimes justified, at least 
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 Some choose different definitions. In some works “multilateral” action is simply that which is conducted 
under auspices of international organizations or alliances, like the OAS or NATO – and not necessarily 
those which relate to Chapter VII. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 3, at 105; others use the term “collective 
intervention.” See ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note 30, at 2. 
43
 Leurdijk argues that the non-absolute character of the norm of non-intervention is a frequent feature of 
the norm throughout history. See LEURDIJK, supra note 31, at 19. 
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in the context of non-forcible intervention – by reference to the intervening party’s own 
right to conduct its policy without external intervention.
44
  
This ambiguous framework is a result of the many dilemmas the norm of non-
intervention presents, especially – but not only – to liberal thinkers.
45
 The “liberal 
dilemma” regarding the norm arises from its dual and seemingly contradicting meanings, 
when explained and justified in liberal discourse. On one hand, liberal thought condones 
the norm of non-intervention, since it solidifies peoples’ right to freely determine their 
path, as part of the basic right to self-determination; this right can only be secured in 
political structures that are free from external interference.
46
 On the other hand, the same 
liberal principles can be invoked to justify intervention when the people of the target state 
are denied this choice.
47
 According to Doyle, the liberal dilemma can be reconciled if we 
agree that “[s]ometimes the national self-determination that non-intervention is designed 
to protect is so clearly undermined by the domestic oppression and suffering that the 
principle should simply be disregarded.”
48
 In such situations, the realization of the same 
principles that uphold the norm of non-intervention, may – themselves – call for 
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 One explanation for the fluid nature of the norm of non-intervention is the fact that due to its wide 
application, states are often behind of a “veil of ignorance” as to their interests regarding the scope of the 
norm. Most states might find themselves on both ends of the norm in different times, and thus their interests 
are not clear. See Politics Across Borders, supra note 31, at 13.  
45
 The norm has also challenged socialist thinkers. In the context of the Brezhnev doctrine, see Chapter 8 
sec. II. 
46
 This view is radically different, for instance, than the 19
th
 century perception of non-intervention as 
solidifying the concept of legitimacy of authoritarian rulers, as promoted by the Holy Alliance. See HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1947). 
47
 See Michael W. Doyle, A Few Words on Mill, Walzer, and Non-intervention 23 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 349 
(2009) (addressing this dilemma and comparing the principles underlying non-intervention and intervention 
in the works of John Stuart Mill and Michael Walzer); see also DOYLE, supra note 8, at  394–402 
(providing an overview of traditional liberal approaches towards intervention and non-intervention.)  
48
 See id, at 361. 
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intervention. Consequentially, the intervener’s actions will not be considered a violation 
of the norm to begin with. 
Much of the contemporary legal understanding regarding the scope of the norm of 
non-intervention is traced to the 1986 International Court of Justice landmark ruling in 
the Nicaragua case.
49
 However, and as detailed later,
50
 while that ruling reaffirmed the 
classical – and broad – perception of the norm, the doctrine set forth in Nicaragua was 
too thin to be considered exhaustive. The Nicaragua ruling was a product of the last days 
of the cold war. The world has changed dramatically since, reflecting constant shifts in 
the perception of sovereignty and non-intervention.
51
 The human rights discourse has 
become a dominant voice in international law, supplemented by arguments for the 
recognition of an international “democratic entitlement.”
52
 The Responsibility to Protect  
(RtoP) concept has emerged, suggesting that the concept of sovereignty – the very 
intrinsic value non-intervention traditionally sought to guard – has arguably transformed 
from the de facto ability to exercise effective control over territory, to the ability to fulfill 
the responsibility to protect its population.
53
 In general, thus, the norm of non-
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 Nicaragua, supra note 31; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168 (December 19) ¶164. 
50
 Chapter 8 sec. IV.3. 
51
 See Tom J. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 53, 72 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); THE 
INDEPENDENT INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 168–169 (2000). 
52
 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance 86 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 46 (1992).  
53
 See FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY 1–34 (1996); ICISS Report, supra note 
10, at 8–34 (discussing this process). The most dramatic of these challenges may be the interventionist 
attitude that is reflected in new defense treaties of African regional organizations. These will be addressed 
infra, Chapter 10 sec. III; see also Oliver Furley & Roy May, Introduction, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST 
STATES 1, 4(Oliver Furley & Roy May eds., 2001); Jeremy Levitt, African Interventionist States and 
International Law, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES, id. at 15. In general, the official attitude of 
African regional organizations regarding the norm of non-intervention has been described as having shifted 
to “non-indifference”. See Paul D. Williams, From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: the Origins and 
Development of the African Union's Security Culture, 106 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 253 (2007). 
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intervention has arguably shifted its focus from seeking to ensure non-intervention in 
sovereign will, to the protection of other interests.  
In this context, two main levels of challenge to the traditional understanding of 
non-intervention can be identified. The first – perhaps narrow challenge – considers non-
intervention as contingent upon the sovereign’s physical protection of its population or 
civilians under its control. This is very much the approach of RtoP.  
   A wider challenge posits that non-intervention is set to entrench the substantive 
democratic will of peoples, meaning, not only their physical protection but also certain 
political values. The term “substantive” alludes to rights that go beyond the principle of 
majority rule, and extend also to the protection of human rights that are a precondition for 
any true democratic process.
54
 This challenge corresponds with the perception of 
democracy as a human right in itself – or, as Thomas Franck famously put it, democracy 
as an “entitlement” that has “trumped the principle of non-interference.”
55
 Damrosch thus 
defines this “reformulated” norm of non-intervention as only prohibiting “actions by one 
state that deny the people of another the opportunity to exercise free political choice.”
56
  
Be it as it may, the mere existence of the principle of non-intervention is not 
seriously contested. Therefore, a precise way of expressing the relation between the norm 
of non-intervention and its substantive challenges, would not be that the latter has 
"trumped" the former, but rather that the former should be interpreted in light of the latter. 
The practical meaning of such a perception would be that states cannot invoke the norm 
                                                           
 
54
 On “Substantive” democracy  see AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
THEIR LIMITATIONS 218 (2012).  
55
 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy and Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 46 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, eds. 2000). 
56
 Politics across Borders, supra note X, at 6, 18.    
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of non-intervention when they – themselves – are failing to protect populations under 
their control, or are otherwise denying basic political rights of their citizens.
57
  
However, it should be stressed that the redefinition of the norm of non-
intervention does not always affect the question of forcible intervention. As we shall see 
later on, when the challenges to the norm are based on a government’s failure to protect 
civilians, they might affect its sovereign power, and thus result in implications on the 
issue forcible intervention. Conversely, while the norm of non-intervention might also be 
considerably weakened when democratic principles are violated, it is doubtful, in general, 
whether this in itself has bearing over the laws on the use of force.  This is because of the 
fact the non-intervention and the laws on the use of force are two intertwining – but 
nevertheless distinct – normative frameworks. 
 
III.2 THE “NORMATIVE DUALITY” OF FORCIBLE INTERVENTION 
Forcible intervention is a form of positive intervention. Like any other intervention it is 
subject to the general norm of non-intervention. However, unlike non-forcible 
interventions, it is subject also to the international law on the use of force. It is 
worthwhile to briefly comment on the relation between the two sets of norms. It could 
thus be said that the former covers a wider spectrum of situations than the latter; and, 
conversely, that while the latter’s objectives include elements of the former, it also sets 
out to achieve objectives of a different kind.  
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 See Cleveland, supra note 37, at  53–55.   
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Therefore, these two frameworks of norms – while sometimes protecting the same 
interests – are not entirely similar. This is a necessary corollary of the fact that the principle 
of non-intervention has preceded the prohibition on the use of force by three centuries, 
although the existence of the former without the latter raised a host of doctrinal problems.
58
 
Nevertheless, the principle of non-intervention generally rejects the use of force because it 
almost always represents a form of coercion inflicted upon the target state.
59
 As phrased in 
the ICISS Report, in contrast to most cases of non-forcible intervention, forcible intervention 
“directly interferes with the capacity of a domestic authority to operate on its own territory. It 
effectively displaces the domestic authority.”
60
 
Indeed, the law on the use of force also serves to curtail coercion. However, it has 
further objectives – first and foremost, it is concerned with the prevention of the “scourge” of 
war in inter-state relations.
61
 Importantly, while the norm of non-intervention, because of its 
ambiguous nature, represents a flexible “standard,” the prohibition on the use of force is 
closer to an absolute “rule,” less amenable, in general,  to teleological interpretation.
62
 
Therefore, both sets of norms seek to prevent the use of force – one on counts of 
its rejection of external coercion, and the other mainly by virtue of its objective to prevent 
violent settlement of disputes, with all their economic and humanitarian consequences. 
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 This problem is discussed in Chapter 5, sec. II.1 
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 As the ICJ in Nicaragua held that a breach of the norm of non-intervention is “particularly obvious” 
where force is being used. See Nicaragua, supra note 31, ¶205;  see also Dino Kritsiotis, Topographies of 
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MICH. L. REV 1620, 1625 (1984) (“... article 2(4) remains the most explicit Charter rule against intervention 
through armed force.”) 
61
  U.N. Charter, pmbl. 
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 Compare Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. J. INT’L L. 164, 187 (2011) (discussing 
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Since these are different protected interests, it seems that the two sets of norms would 
apply in parallel – in a complementary manner – in every instance of forcible 
intervention. Accordingly, any such intervention must not be contrary to the law of the 
use of force; in addition, it cannot be in contravention of the general norm of non-
intervention, according to its contemporary understanding.
63
  
One effect of this normative-duality is that even when an instance of use of force 
is legal (for instance, in self-defense), it must also conform to the norm of non-
intervention.
64
 An example may be found in the Hague law of occupation. Even where 
the occupation itself is legal (by standards of the law of the use of force), the occupying 
party is still obliged – “unless absolutely prevented” – to respect the laws “in force” in 
the occupied territory.
65
 The mirror image of this reasoning is more intuitive: even where 
the norm of non-intervention does not in theory prohibit an action (such as in intervention 
for the protection of nationals), the limitations on armed intervention imposed by the law 
on use of force are not necessarily negated.  
The question of consensual intervention, thus, must be viewed according to this 
normative-duality. Party consent should be therefore analyzed in light of its effects over 
the laws on the use of force, but also on counts of its interaction with the norm of non-
intervention. For instance, unilateral intervention upon the consent of a non-recognized 
opposition group, facing a government that commits mass atrocities, might not violate the 
                                                           
 
63
 Such was also the conclusion of the ICJ in Nicaragua, as it ruled that supply of arms to opposition forces 
is a violation of the law of use of force (but does not constitute  an armed attack) and also a violation of the 
norm of non-intervention. See Nicaragua, supra note 31, ¶247; see also Armed Activities on the Territory 
of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (December 19) ¶164; Kritsiotis, supra note 59, at 64.  
64
 For similar reasoning see WALZER, supra note 2, at xi (“[e]ven when a humanitarian crisis has rightly 
triggered intervention, we can still hope to minimize the coercive imposition of foreign ideas and 
ideologies.”) 
65
 Hague Convention II: Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899), 32 Stat 1803, art. 43. 
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norm of non-intervention per se – considering the understanding of the norm as discussed 
in the previous section – however, it might still violate the prohibition on the use of 
force.
66
 Conversely, consent by a recognized non-democratic regime might – in a purely 
hypothetical situation – legalize a forcible intervention in terms of jus ad bellum; but one 
can imagine a situation – if we accept that the norm is indeed affected by notions of 




                                                           
 
66
 However, as discussed in Chapter 12, the opposition might be granted recognition on counts of 
consideration of protection of civilians, which might result also in consent power. 
67
 This theoretical scenario should be read in a qualified manner. As we shall see in Chapters 10 and 11, 
non-democratic regimes, when confronted by a pro-democratic opposition, will almost always commit 
atrocities, in which case their consent will be nullified, and thus cannot justify intervention whether in the 
realm of  jus ad bellum or otherwise.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 DEFINING FORCIBLE INTERVENTION 
 
I. DEFINING UNILATERAL FORCIBLE INTERVENTION– SCOPE, MEANS AND 
STATE ATTRIBUTION  
It has been claimed that the occurrence of interventions, in their physical sense, is 
identified by their being “convention-breaking” – meaning, by their introduction of a 
situation which clearly departs from the status quo ante. Since “[m]ilitary interventions 
are perhaps the most dramatic and clear-cut departures from existing patterns,” forcible 
interventions in internal armed conflicts are supposedly easier to identify than non-
forcible interventions, positive or negative.1  
However, when attempting to define exactly when an intervention is considered 
“forcible” – in the legal sense – the task may be more complicated than intuitively 
expected. The question of distinction between non-forcible and forcible interventions is 
crucial from a legal perspective, as these two categories of interventions are controlled by 
different sets of legal norms. As demonstrated in the previous Chapter, both types are 
controlled by the ambiguous principle of non-intervention; however, only the latter is 
also regulated by the more restrictive law on the use of force.  
Since our analysis is concerned with consensual forcible interventions, the 
starting point for the definition of the term should be the interpretations suggested to the 
terms use of force and armed attack as these appear in the U.N. Charter. Once we 
understand which actions constitute “uses of force” or “armed attacks,” we can quite 
easily deduce that when such actions occur in the context of an intervention in an internal 
armed conflict, they will be considered as forcible interventions, and accordingly, when 
                                                
1 James N. Rosenau, Intervention as a Scientific Concept, 13 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 149, 163 (1969). 
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they are conducted with the consent of a party to the conflict, they will be considered 
consensual forcible interventions.    
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter famously prohibits the use of force by states (and 
the threat of use of force).2 Complementing article 2(4) is article 51 – recognizing the 
right of self-defense as one which materializes when “an armed attack occurs.” Two 
immediate questions must be answered, before we can “translate” the definition of these 
terms into the context of forcible intervention. First, what actions, in terms of means, are 
considered forcible, and actions of what scope amount to a “use of force” or an “armed 
“attack”? Second, when is a forcible act of intervention attributable to a state?  
This chapter attempts to clarify these two questions. Doing so, we shall 
demonstrate that forcible interventions come in different forms; some of them short of 
direct intervention (“less-grave” forcible interventions). One such method of intervention 
is through the transfer of arms. In order to prevent the confusion between arms transfers 
and non-forcible intervention, we shall elaborate, in a non-exhaustive manner, on this 
question in this chapter.  
 
I.1 SCOPE, MEANS AND METHODS OF FORCIBLE INTERVENTION 
The interpretation of the term use of force sets forth several questions, in which the issues 
of scope (how “comprehensive,” in duration and intensity, does an action have to be) and 
means (what measures are considered forcible ones) intertwine.  
                                                
2 I will not address separately the issue of “threats” of forcible intervention. It suffices to say that in 
instances where an intervention would be considered illegal in itself, a threat of intervention would also 
be illegal. Therefore, conclusions in this work regarding legitimacy of intervention apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to the threat of such intervention. See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶47 (Jul. 8); Dino Kritsiotis, Topographies of Force, in  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES : ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
YORAM DINSTEIN 29, 49 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007); For various interpretations on 
the prohibition on the threat of force see NICHOLAS STÜRCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 37– 61 (2009).        
 98  
For an action to be sufficient in scope to constitute a “use of force” – and thereby 
considered as a “forcible intervention” – it needs not amount to a full-scale war in the 
classic, technical meaning of the term.3 Accordingly, forcible acts which are “short-of-
war” may also be considered as “uses of force.”4 This conclusion coincides with the 
general process that occurred since the coming into being of the U.N. Charter, in which 
the term war, in the legal sense, has been marginalized: this is mainly due to the fact that 
the prohibition on force was never made contingent, in Charter law, upon the existence of 
a formal state of war.5  
Hence, according to Higgins, for an act to be controlled by Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, it does not make a difference “how brief, limited or transitory” it is; even a 
“simple aerial incursion” can forcefully violate the territorial integrity of a state.6 Thus, it 
suffices that the scope of actions, in order to be considered as forcible the purpose of 
Article 2(4), be brief and limited; and that the means employed include simple actions, 
such as aerial incursions, that do not necessarily involve the use of kinetic weapons.  
This wide definition potentially encompasses grave instances of unorthodox use 
of deadly force – even if not “military” in the traditional sense – such as the methods 
used in the attacks against the September 11 attacks. The Security Council, in resolutions 
1368 and 1373, as well as states and international organizations, found no difficulty to 
                                                
3 For the traditional definition of the term war, requiring large-scale use of force see LASSA 
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (1952). Compare YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND 
SELF-DEFENSE 3–15 (5th ed. 2011).  
4
 See ANTHONY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND 
THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 30–31 (1993). The distinction between “war” and acts “short of war” is 
relevant, according to Dinstein, to circumscribe the scope of the right to self-defense arising in each 
case – and specifically, the meaning of the “necessity” and “proportionality” qualifications imposed by 
the Caroline doctrine in each case. See DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 242–267; but see Kritsiotis, supra 
note 2, at 40–45 (analyzing and criticizing the implications of Dinstein’s distinction).  
5 See id. at 34–37.    
6 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 240 (1995). 
Higgins relies on the ICJ ruling in the Corfu Channel Case where it was held that British 
minesweeping activities taking place in Albanian territorial waters constitute a breach of the law on the 
use of force. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. V Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9). 
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view such acts as giving rise to the right to self defense.7 This means that in certain grave 
situations, can be considered as forms of use of force rather then mere “criminal” actions 
by individuals.8 The same wide standard should be used when defining forcible 
intervention in internal armed conflict. 
Of course, the 21st century brings about a plethora of questions regarding what 
constitutes an "incursion" and what means are "forceful." For instance, one especially 
perplexing question is the distinction of acts of information warfare (“cyber attacks;”) 
and, in our case, whether such acts – carried independently from other forceful acts – can 
constitute forcible interventions. The resolve of this complex question is beyond this 
work; however, to the extent that acts of information warfare would be considered uses of 
force, our conclusions will naturally apply to them also.9 
Moreover, actual hostilities between the intervener and parties within the 
conflicting state do not have to occur: for instance, the U.S. Marines encountered no 
resistance during their landing in Beirut beach in 1958.10 This mere fact does not negate 
the forcible nature of the American intervention. In the same vein, unilateral imposition 
of “humanitarian corridors” by external states within the territory of a conflict-ridden 
state – such as those considered by some states during the 2011–2012 crisis in Syria –11 
are also forcible acts even if not actively resisted by the territorial state.  
 
                                                
7 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sep. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. D/Res/1373 (Sept. 
28, 2001); Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51(1/2) 
of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 37–38  (2003). 
8 See id. at 41–46. 
9 The question of cyber warfare and the use of force will hopefully be clarified in the forthcoming 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (The Tallinn Manual). See 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/249.html; on the question in general see MICHAEL N. SCHMITT & BRIAN T. 
O’DONNELL, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002).     
10 See Malcolm Kerr, The Lebanese Civil War, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS 65, 
81–83 (Evan Luard ed., 1972).  
11 See Turkey Urges ‘Immediate’ Opening of Syria Aid Corridor After Bombing of Refugee Bridge, AL-
ARABIYA NEWS, Mar. 6, 2012, available at 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/06/198936.html. 
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I.2 “GRAVE” AND “LESS-GRAVE” FORCIBLE INTERVENTIONS 
By now we have a reasonably good idea of the scope and means of actions that amount to 
forcible interventions. However, for the sake of clarity, it is helpful also to consider the 
meaning of the term in light of the relations between the terms use of force (used in 
Article 2(4)) and armed attack (used in Article 51) as these appear in the U.N. Charter. 
Do forcible interventions, per se, fall under one term or the other? Indeed, the former 
term has been interpreted by the ICJ as one which is wider than the latter. The majority 
opinion in the Nicaragua ruling has distinguished between “grave” forms of the use of 
force – meaning, those that involve an armed attack – and “less-grave” forms, which 
usually do not constitute such an attack.12 The practical implication of the distinction 
between “armed attacks” and “less-grave” uses of force, according to the Nicaragua 
court, was that while every use of force is prohibited by the Charter, only “grave” forms 
of use of force constitute an “armed attack” that spawns the right to self-defense.13  
“Grave” forms of use of force, or “armed attacks,” were defined in Nicaragua to 
as including actions, which are not merely frontier incidents – whether taken by a state’s 
regular armed forces, or by other forces sent by the state or on behalf of it – across an 
international border.14 “Less-grave” forms of the use of force were defined by the Court 
                                                
12 Military Aid and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 
(June 27), ¶191. The same reasoning is found in Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 
I.C.J. 161, ¶51; See also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 8 (2008); 
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 355–356 (2005).    
13 However, such acts may entitle the wronged states to take “proportionate countermeasures.” The 
Nicaragua ruling did not elaborate what actions constitute such countermeasures. See Nicaragua, supra 
note 12, ¶¶247 –249; see also Kritsiotis, supra note 2, at 51–52. Judge Schwebel, in obiter dictum, 
rejected this approach. According to Judge Schwebel, Article 51 does not constitute a definition of the 
concept of self defense, which is grounded in customary law. Thus, he was of the opinion that Article 
51 should not be read as an exhaustive provision. Nicaragua, supra note 12, ¶¶171–173 (Schwebel, J., 
dissenting.)    
14 Nicaragua, supra note 12, ¶195. This definition leaves much to be desired nowadays, when one 
considers the complexities mentioned in the previous section, regarding the question of what means are 
to be considered forceful. Concerning “frontier incidents,” It seems reasonable, when reading 
Nicaragua, that the Court included “mere frontier incidents” in the category of “less-grave” uses of 
force, since it exempted these actions from the definition of “armed attack.”  
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as the actions prohibited by the Declaration on Friendly Relations.15 These activities 
include, among others, a state's acquiescence to or toleration of acts committed by non-
state actors operating from that state’s territory, in the context of an internal armed 
conflict taking place in another state, as well as arming and training of opposition forces 
(indirect aggression.)16 “Less-grave” uses of force would be considered, in the view of 
the Nicaragua majority, not as “armed attacks.”17 An example for such a situation may be 
found in Zaire’s acquiescence to the operation of UNITA forces from its territory, against 
the government of Angola.18  
It is important to note, however, the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel 
concerning this distinction, which underlines a significant rift in the understanding of 
international law among different actors. According to Judge Schwebel, arming, training 
and providing logistical support to groups in an internal armed conflict, as well as other 
forms of substantial involvement (as the term appears in article 3(g) of the Definition of 
Aggression) in the activities of such groups is tantamount to an armed attack and 
potentially to aggression.19     
                                                
15 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc.  A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970); Nicaragua, supra note 12, 
¶191.   
16 The Declaration of friendly relations declares: “Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or 
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, 
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force” and also, “no State 
shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities 
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in 
another State.”(emphasis added in both quotes) These principles were reaffirmed in Article 6 of the 
Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or 
Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, U.N. Doc. A/Res/42/22 (Nov. 18, 1987), and 
repeated in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 
(December 19) ¶276 –305; see also GRAY, supra note 12, at 79–80; compare Hague Convention V: 
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (1907), 
U.S.T.S. 540, arts. 4, 6.  
17 See Nicaragua, supra note 12, ¶191.   
18 See Chapter 1, sec. III.1.  
19 Judge Schwebel advanced this interpretation as vindicating of the American intervention in 
Nicaragua. According to him, Nicaragua’s alleged intervention in El Salvador amounted to an armed 
attack spawning El Salvador’s right to collective self-defense, which in turn justified the U.S. support 
to Nicaraguan rebels as an exercise of this right. See Nicaragua, supra note 12, ¶¶154–171, 176 
(Schwebel, J., dissenting.).  
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In our context – whether an action is an “armed attack” or not; constitutes a 
“grave” or “less-grave” form of use of force – the key importance is in the fact that all of 
the said actions are considered forcible. Thus, in sum, forcible interventions can include 
“grave” uses of force: meaning, armed interventions by a state's military forces, or by 
non-state actors operating under the state's control; and “less-grave” uses of force, such 
as acquiescence and toleration of actions taken by non-state actors operating from the 
state’s territory, and transfers of arms.  
 
I.3 THE QUESTION OF STATE ATTRIBUTION: FORCIBLE INTERVENTION BY IRREGULAR 
FORCES AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
When can a forcible intervention be attributable to a state?20  Naturally, this question 
does not pose major difficulties when a state makes overt use of its regular armed forces. 
However, when irregular forces enter the picture, the issue of attribution becomes 
paramount. The question of state responsibility for acts taken by irregular forces – or the 
attribution of these acts to a state – has been one of steadily increasing importance since 
the end of World War II, as the use of irregular forces has been a recurring and dominant 
feature of forcible interventions in internal conflicts. This has been a feature of the cold 
war’s proxy conflicts;21 of Africa’s disastrous internal conflicts since the 1990s;22 and of 
contemporary struggles involving religious extremists in the early 21st century.23 
                                                
20 Article 2(a) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility conditions state responsibility on the act 
being attributable to the state; however, it does not specify the elements of such attribution, which may 
differ between different fields of international law. See U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, arts. 51, 53 in Rep. of 
the Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/56/20 (2001),  ¶¶1–5 [hereinafter ILC 
Draft & Commentaries].  
21 For instance, the relation between North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao insurgents in the Laotian 
internal conflict of the 1960s; the alleged connection between the Nasserite rebels and the United Arab 
Republic in the Lebanese conflict of 1958 (both prompted U.N. commissions to investigate these 
connections – both found no conclusive evidence). See John Main, The Civil War in Laos, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS 91 (Evan Luard ed., 1972); Malcolm Kerr, The Lebanese 
Civil War, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS, id., at  65, 66–67. 
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A relatively clear-cut example for the use of irregular forces can be found in the 
first stage of the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese conflict of 1975, in which Syria sent 
the "Palestinian Liberation Army" (PLA) – an officially Palestinian, but effectively 
Syrian force – to intervene in favor of the rebelling National Front in its struggle against 
the ruling, Maronite dominated elite. The PLA forces were directed from Damascus and 
utilized Syrian military hardware, which was hastily covered in PLA insignia.24 Another 
instance of forcible intervention through irregular forces is the involvement of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in the 1996–1997 Zaire/Congo conflict, in which RPA 
forces, loyal to Rwandan president Kagame, were instrumental in the removal of Zaire’s 
dictator Mobuto Sésé Seko.25 Recently, Iranian officials reportedly admitted that units of 
Hizbullah, crossing from Lebanon, have participated in the defense of army bases in 
Syria, after these have allegedly come under attack by the Syrian opposition.26 The latter 
situation demonstrates the attribution problem in full force, and namely whether 
Hizbullah’s intervention can be attributed to Lebanon, Iran, both or neither.   
Regarding irregular forces, article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression27 – 
augmented by a similar provision in the 2010 Kampala definition of the crime of 
aggression –28 provides that the term aggression includes 
 
                                                                                                                                       
22 This was a feature of the 1990s conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Sudan. See William 
G. Thom, Congo-Zaire’s 1996-1997 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict 
in Africa in the Era of Independence, 19 J. CONFLICT STUDIES (1999).  
23 See, e.g., the perplexing status of Hizbullah within Lebanon's political structure. See INTERNATIONAL 
CRISIS GROUP, DRUMS OF WAR: ISRAEL AND THE “AXIS OF RESISTANCE” 4–6 (Aug. 2, 2010) (analyzing 
the possible consequences of the “embedding” of Hizbullah in the Lebanese state).  
24 See NAOMI JOY WEINBERGER, SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON: THE 1975-1976 CIVIL WAR 142 
(1986). Syria has made use of the “Palestinian Liberation Army” banner also in 1970, during the Black 
September events in Jordan, where Syrian tanks were camouflaged under PLA insignia. See id. at 130.   
25 The Rwandan president admitted that RPA troops were heavily involved, and even took leadership, 
of the rebel forces in Zaire. Thom, supra note 22. This admission was retroactive, as during the conflict 
Rwanda repeatedly denied its involvement. See 1997 U.N.Y.B. 73–74. 
26 See Source: Lebanese, Syrian Situation May Lead to Abductions, NOW LEBANON, Jan. 22, 2012, 
available at http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=355577.  
27 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), ¶3(g),  U.N. Doc A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).  
28 The Crime of Aggression, art. 8bis(g), Resolution RC/Res.6, RC/11 (Jun. 11, 2010). 
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 [t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts 
of armed force against another State of such gravity as 
to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial 
involvement therein.  
 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ reaffirmed this article as reflecting customary international 
law, holding that the court  
 
sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the 
prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending 
by a State of armed bands to the territory of another 
State, if such an operation, because of its scale and 
effects, would have been classified as an armed attack 
rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been 
carried out by regular armed forces.29    
 
Thus, the ICJ has recognized the possibility of attribution between a state and 
irregular forces actively sent by it. Regarding the level of state control required such 
attribution, the Nicaragua court held that the state must exercise “effective control” over 
the specific operation.30 The ICTY, conversely, in the famous Tadic case, required a 
more lax standard of “overall control.”31 Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility 
requires, in this context, that “the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control” of the state.32 The Commentary to 
Article 8 addressed the different standards established in Nicaragua and Tadic, and 
summarized that “. . . it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular 
                                                
29 Nicaragua, supra note 12 ¶195 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. ¶¶115 –116. 
31 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chambers Judgment  ¶¶17–18 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
For the Former Yugoslavia, Jul. 15, 1999). 
32 ILC Draft & Commentaries, supra note 20, at 31. 
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conduct was or was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that the 
conduct controlled should be attributed to it.”33 In the 2007 Bosnia Genocide Case, the 
ICJ once again advanced the "effective control" test as established in Nicaragua, 
critiquing the ruling in Tadic and holding that the effective-control standard is also 
compatible with the aforementioned Article 8 of the ILC Draft, which it saw as reflecting 
customary international law.34   
The additional recognition by the ICJ – based on the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations – that a state’s toleration of or acquiescence to forcible acts by non-state actors 
operating from its territory can also amount to a forcible act by that state (albeit a “less-
grave” form in the eyes of the Court),35 also raises the question of attribution between the 
tolerated or acquiesced acts and the state. Of course, the level of toleration or 
acquiescence required to create a linkage between the state and the non-state actors is a 
complex question; it is also a relevant factor to consider whether the state has at all the 
capacity to control these actors. We shall not address this question widely in this work; 
suffice it to say that since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and the ensuing (and 
widely accepted) forcible response, some have argued that a positive duty of “due 
diligence” to prevent acts by non-state actors has emerged.36 Such a positive duty to 
prevent actions can perhaps justify – in our context – viewing attacks launched from a 
state’s territory, in specific situations, as forcible interventions attributable to the latter.  
                                                
33 Id. at 48. 
34 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. ¶398, ¶¶405–406 (February 26th); see 
also Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and the Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 649 (2007) (surveying the rulings in the aforementioned cases 
regarding the "effective" or "overall" control standards, and critiquing the court's reasoning in the 
Bosnia Genocide Case).  
35 See sec. I.2. 
36 See, e.g., ROBERT P. BARNIDGE, NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM: APPLYING THE LAW OF 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE 53 –110 (2007); see generally TAL 
BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2006).  
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Some have read the “due diligence” concept into the “overall control” standard, as 
imposing “protective duties” on the territorial state vis-à-vis other states. However, it is 
unclear to what extent, if at all, they see this duty as creating an attribution sufficient to 
implicate the territorial state itself, beyond allowing the attack of the non-state actor in its 
territory.37 In this context, it has been claimed – and this indeed seems reasonable and fair 
– that the question whether a state is genuinely “unable” to reign in the activities of non-
state actors operating from its territory, or is rather is merely “unwilling” to do so, can 
affect the scope of the right to self-defense of the attacked state.38 Such a distinction can 
also be understood as affecting the attribution of actions of non-state actors to territorial 
states. However, the exact ramifications of the concept of “due diligence” are beyond the 
scope of this work. 
In sum, forcible intervention by a state encompasses also forcible actions 
conducted through irregular forces controlled by that state – whether according to the 
"effective" or "overall" control tests – either by active encouragement, toleration or 




II. MULTILATERAL FORCIBLE INTERVENTION BY U.N. MANDATED FORCES  
The aforementioned modalities of forcible intervention apply also to cases in which the 
intervening powers are mandated to use force by U.N. Security Council resolutions 
adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (“enforcement measures”) – 
notwithstanding the different legal status of such forces. This distinction is important 
                                                
37 For a discussion see, e.g., Stahn, supra note 7, at 47–48, 50 –51. 
38 See Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244 (2011). 
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when seeking to analyze the role of party consent in such operations. Thus, When U.N. 
authorized forces forcefully engage a party to an internal conflict, these forces may be 
looked upon as forcible interveners. This is the case, for instance, of the U.N. Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (MONUC) involvement in the government 
offensive against rebel forces in East Congo between 2008 and 2010;39 or the bombing 
campaign against forces loyal to Libya’s Al-Qadhafi, in favor – even if tacitly –of rebel 
groups, as authorized by the Security Council in March 2011.40 
It is important to distinguish between the situations mentioned above, which 
represent robust U.N. operations characteristic of the post-cold war era, and classic, 
formally impartial peacekeeping missions. The latter consist of the consensual 
deployment of neutral humanitarian or peacekeeping forces across a state’s border. As 
such, they are excluded from the definition of forcible intervention.41 These operations 
will usually be conducted by U.N. or regional organizations’ authorized peace-keeping 
forces, which (at least de jure) are not mandated to actively assist – whether directly or 
indirectly – either party to the conflict. 
The difference between non-forcible and forcible Security Council authorized 
operations can be exemplified when comparing two resolutions adopted with regards to 
MONUC’s mandate. Resolution 1279 of 1999,42 establishing MONUC, primarily 
designated the operation as an impartial ceasefire observation force, established in the 
context of the Lusaka Agreement between the parties to the Second Congolese Conflict. 
                                                
39
 See Chapter 1, sec. III.3. 
40 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).   
41 This is irrespective of the question whether these forces are deployed pursuant to Chapter VI of the 
U.N. Charter, or Chapter VII. The intervention would be deemed “forcible” once the mandate of the 
U.N. force includes forcible engagement, and would be deemed “non-forcible” when the mandate does 
not include forcible actions beyond the use of unit self-defense.  For a similar distinction see Terry D. 
Gill & Dieter Fleck, Concept and Sources of the International Law of Military Operations, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 3, 4 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck 
eds., 2010).  
42 S.C. Res. 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999). 
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It had no mandate to use force. Resolution 1856 of 2008,43 conversely, mandated 
MONUC to use of force in “close cooperation” with the Congolese government.44   
 
III. “LESS-GRAVE” FORCIBLE INTERVENTION – THE QUESTION OF ARMS 
TRANSFER TO PARTIES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS  
A common type of forcible intervention, considered, as aforementioned, a type of “less-
grave” use of force, is the grant of direct support for the purpose of enhancing a party’s 
military capabilities, short of the direct forcible invasion in support of that party. Such 
actions are positive interventions, the most extreme of which include the transfer 
(whether by trade or aid) of military hardware to one of the parties, accompanied by the 
transfer of title or control over the equipment.45  
In the context of jus ad bellum – excluding perhaps the question of self-defense – 
the question of arms transfers to parties in internal strife can be regulated by the same 
normative framework that governs “grave” forcible intervention, and, in general, should 
not be treated differently. However, the problem of arms transfer raises some unique 
questions, which call for some separate treatment. The main difference between direct 
invasion and provision of arms – as methods of intervention – is that the latter is of dual-
character: it is viewed not only as a form of use of force, but also as an act of 
international trade. As a form of trade, arms transfers are more readily undertaken by 
private firms, which historically allowed for more flexibility in the provision of arms, 
even during internal strife. This feature of arms trade accounted for great controversy, for 
instance, during the American Civil War, when private British shipyards supplied 
                                                
43 S.C. Res. 1856, U.N. Doc.  S/RES/1856 (Dec. 22, 2008). 
44 Id. ¶3. 
45 For a definition of arms transfers see Maya Brehm, The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure 
Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 21, 23 (2008). 
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warships to the Confederacy – spawning the famous Alabama Arbitration.46 Moreover, 
arms transfers raise unique problems –especially with regards to small arms – of illicit 
trade.  
An easy case is thus when a state directly transfers arms to parties in an internal 
armed conflict. A more challenging legal situation arises when private entities do so. In a 
sense, this problem reflects dilemmas related to the question of attribution, as discussed 
in Section I.3 above. Without exhausting all aspects of this complex issue, we shall 
briefly delineate the main features of this confusing element of intervention, in order to 
clarify our later discussion.  
In practice (and reserving for now the question of legality,) unilateral forcible 
interventions in the form of transfer of arms to parties in internal armed conflicts – 
whether to governments or to opposition forces, has been a recurring phenomenon in the 
international system. In the cold war era, for instance, internal armed conflicts were 
frequently used as proxy-wars between the rival powers; accordingly, arms transfers, by 
multiple parties, were a common tactic – each power intervening according to its interests 
in a specific case. The U.S.S.R, for instance, transferred weapons to opposition forces in 
Namibia (1961), Angola (1964) and others.47  In the secession struggle between Nigeria 
and the breakaway republic of Biafra, for example, interests were more complex than 
“east versus west,” as France (indirectly) provided arms to Biafra; the U.S.S.R., 
Czechoslovakia, Britain (albeit in a limited manner) and some Arab states chose to 
transfer arms to Nigeria.48 The practice of arms transfers in the context of internal armed 
conflicts has not ceased in the post cold war era. For instance, NATO provided arms to 
                                                
46 See generally ADRIAN COOK, THE ALABAMA CLAIMS: AMERICAN POLITICS AND ANGLO-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS, 1865 –1872 (1975). 
47
 Lucy Mathiak & Lora Lumpe, Government Gun-Running to Guerillas, in RUNNING GUNS, THE 
GLOBAL BLACK MARKET IN SMALL ARMS 56–57  (Lora Lumpe, ed., 2000). 
48 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, SUPPLEMENTAL CASE 
HISTORIES Case 67–1 (3RD ed. 2007); see also JOHN DE ST. JORRE, THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (1972).  
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the Kosovo Liberation Army in its secession struggle against Serbia prior to 1999; and 
the U.S. supplied arms to opposition forces in Iraq during the mid 1990s.49  
Theoretically, arms transfers can also be part of a multilateral forcible 
intervention authorized by the U.N. Security Council. For instance, while resolution 1973 
of March 2011 authorized states to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in 
the Libyan armed conflict, it excluded the deployment of an “occupation force.”50 When 
it became clear that aerial attacks were insufficient to bring a swift end to the actions by 
loyalists to Libyan leader Al-Qadhafi, the option of transferring arms to the Libyan rebels 
surfaced. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton emphasized that the term “all necessary 
measures” indeed encompasses also arms transfers to the Libyan opposition.51 
 
III.1 ARMS TRANSFERS BY PRIVATE ENTITIES 
A distinction must be made between by arms transfers undertaken by a government in 
relation to an internal armed conflict in another state, and such acts committed by private 
entities from within the former state’s territory. Regarding the former, and as we shall see 
later in this work, traditional international law has been clear that prior to recognition of 
the conflicting parties as belligerents, transfer of arms to opposition groups was an 
unfriendly act that could lead to war. After belligerency recognition, if they wished to 
remain neutral, the widely accepted view asserted that states were required to refrain 
from arming either party.52 
                                                
49 See Mathiak & Lumpe, supra note 47, at 66 –70. 
50 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 40, ¶4.  
51 Mark Landler et al.,  Washington in Fierce Debate on Arming Libyan Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/world/africa/30diplo.html?_r=3&hp.  
52 See Hague Convention XIII: concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War  
(1907), art. 6; interestingly, such a categorical prohibition is not found in Hague Convention V, supra 
note 16 (concerning neutrality on land). However, Dinstein holds that it is “incontestable” that the same 
rule also concerns neutrality on land. See DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 28.  
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 However, even in such cases – when belligerency was recognized – states were 
not obliged to prevent arms sales by private entities, and could choose whether to allow it 
or prohibit it, as long as the policy would apply equally to the conflicting belligerents.53 
The only positive duty incurred by the neutral state was to prevent, within its jurisdiction, 
the fitting out or arming of warships (or aircraft) intended to engage in hostilities against 
a belligerent, even if the warships were built by a private entity. This exception is 
historically traced to the post-Civil War Alabama Claims arbitration between the U.S. 
and Great Britain.54  
Restrictions on arms transfers by individuals have been debated over the decades, 
and can be found in the non-intervention agreement of the Spanish Civil War and in 
domestic Neutrality Acts, notably of the U.S. and Britain.55 However, although attempts 
to do so were made, such restrictions were never codified as comprehensive international 
norms.56  
A 1925 convention to regulate arms transfers by private entities, in which states 
undertook “not to export or permit the export” of arms unless in “direct supply to the 
Government” never went into force.57 This rule possibly applied also in internal strife, 
allowing private arms transfers only to governments. However, when the conflict 
amounted to “war” – meaning, when belligerency was recognized – the convention 
would be trumped by the laws of neutrality, and the problem of arms transfers by private 
entities would again arise.58   
                                                
53 See id.  
54 See Hague Convention XIII: concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War  
(1907), art. 8; art. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923), art. 46; DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 29. 
55 See Chapter 7 sec. IV. 
56 For a historic overview see David G. Anderson, The International Arms Trade: Regulating 
Conventional Arms Transfers in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, 7 AM. U. INT’L L. R. 749, 758 –770  
(1992). 
57 Convention on Supervision of International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of 
War (Jun. 17, 1925), League of Nations Doc. A.16.1925.IX ,art. 2(1) (1925) (emphasis added); 
Anderson, supra note 56, at 761–762. 
58 Convention on Supervision of International Trade in Arms, supra note 57, art. 33. 
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This approach was repeated in the Convention on Duties and Rights of States in 
the Event of Civil Strife, adopted at the International Conference of American States in 
1928.59 The signatory states took upon themselves, inter alia, that in the event of “civil 
strife,” they shall “forbid traffic in arms and war material, except when intended for the 
Government, while the belligerency of the rebels has not been recognized, in which the 
latter case the rules of neutrality shall be applied.”60 Essentially, the said provision meant 
that in internal strife, only transfer of arms to governments was allowed, unless 
belligerency of the parties was declared – and then states shall remain neutral. The latter 
obligation, as aforementioned, entailed the abstention from transfer of arms by 
governments to either party, but did not, in general, address private arms trade.  
Modern international law has not been clear on this issue. It seems intuitive that, 
at large, in the era of the U.N. Charter, transfers of arms to governments involved in 
internal armed conflicts are not contradictory to international law, subject to the 
limitations we shall address later on, while arms transfers to opposition groups – whether 
by governments of private entities – will in general be unlawful.61  
This notion was reaffirmed in the Nicaragua ruling. There, the ICJ refused to 
recognize a customary international norm “whereby the level of armaments of a 
sovereign State can be limited;”62 while holding, conversely, that arms transfers by the 
U.S. to the Contras were in breach of the norm of non-intervention – thereby clearly 
favoring governments over opposition groups. Moreover, the Court held that although the 
supply of arms to opposition forces does not constitute an “armed attack” against the 
                                                
59 Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, Feb. 20, 1928, 134 L.N.T.S. 
45. 
60 Id. art. 1(3).  
61Chapters 8–12. Some claim, however, that transfer of arms to a state for the purpose of a violation of 
the prohibition on the use of force, as entrenched – regarding inter-state conflicts – in Article 2(4) of 
the U.N. Charter, may be prohibited. Also, transfer of arms can constitute “aid or assistance in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act” as prohibited in article 27 of the ILC Draft on State 
Responsibility. See Emanuela Chiara-Gillard, What’s Legal? What’s Illegal?, in RUNNING GUNS, supra 
note 47, at 27, 30, 36. 
62 Nicaragua, supra note 12, ¶269; See also Brehm, supra note 45, at 25.  
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government, it may still constitute a “less-grave” breach, as aforementioned, of the 
“principle of non-use of force.”63  
Since the Court relied extensively on the Declaration on Friendly Relations,64 it is 
reasonable to extend this principle – also to arms transfers by private entities:  
accordingly, a state that tolerates or acquiesces to arms transfers to opposition groups 
might thereby conduct a “less-grave” violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter and violate 
its “due-diligence” requirements.65  
 
III.2 ARMS TRANSFERS TO GOVERNMENTS AND THE MOVEMENT TO SUBSTANTIVE 
ANALYSIS 
Like our analysis of consensual forcible interventions at large, arms transfers to 
governments can also be controlled by emerging doctrines, purporting to limit the legality 
transfers on counts of substantive considerations. However, since arms transfers, as 
aforementioned, have unique aspects, there are ongoing attempts to regulate this issue 
separately from general questions of the use of force. 
Arms transfers have been all but non-regulated throughout the 20th century,66 
excluding a limited number of treaties prohibiting the transfer of specific kinds of 
weapons due to concerns – based on principles of international humanitarian law –
emanating from the effects of their use.67 
 In recent years, the U.N. has begun to address this issue in a substantive sense. 
General Assembly resolution 61/89 of 2006 recognized that international standards on 
arms transfer are absent, and accordingly called upon the Secretary General to establish a 
                                                
63 Nicaragua, supra note 12, ¶ 238, 247.   
64 Supra, note 15. 
65 See sec. I.2–I.3. 
66 Except, of course, mandatory arms embargos imposed by the U.N. Security Council, as detailed 
supra. See also Brehm, supra note 45, at 27.  
67 See Brehm, supra note 45, at 28–30.  
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group of experts to examine the drafting of a binding legal instrument to establish such 
standards.68 The resolution also acknowledged “the right of all States to manufacture, 
import, export, transfer and retain conventional arms for self-defence and security needs” 
– while balancing this right with its reaffirmation of respect “for international law, 
including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and the 
[U.N.] Charter.”69 Thus, the resolution alluded to concerns raised by arms transfer in the 
realms of human rights law, jus in bello and jus ad bellum. 
 The following expert report, which was endorsed by the General Assembly,70 
noted that any treaty should consider the issue of “transfers to non-State actors,” and 
should also “reflect respect for the sovereignty of every State, without interfering in the 
internal affairs of States.” In addition to the issue of non-intervention and arms transfers, 
the report noted that international human rights and humanitarian law may also have 
effect over the question of arms transfers.71 In consideration of this report, and 
subsequent discussions, the General Assembly decided that a four-week U.N. conference 
will convene in July 2012 in order to “elaborate a legally binding treaty” concerning arms 
transfers.72  
  Simultaneously, humanitarian concerns pertaining to the use of weapons have 
given rise to various potential doctrines, discussed in different forums, suggesting that 
arms transfers – even by private individuals – can be limited by existing due-diligence 
                                                
68G.A. Res. 61/89, pmbl., ¶2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006).  
69 Id. pmbl. 
70 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Examine the Feasibility, Scope and Draft 
Parameters for a Comprehensive, Legally Binding Instrument Establishing Common International 
Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms, U.N. Doc. A/63/334 (Aug. 26, 
2008) [hereinafter Arms Trade Report]; endorsed by the General Assembly in G.A. Res. 63/240, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/63/240 (Jan. 8, 2009).  
71 Arms Trade Report, supra note 70, ¶¶17–18, 24. 
72 G.A. Res 64/48, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/48 (Dec. 2, 2009); for the updated situation regarding the 
treaty see UNITED NATIONS, ARMS TRADE TREATY PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).  
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requirements enshrined in international humanitarian law or international human rights 
law,73 or by general principles such as the principle of protection of civilians.74     
Such doctrines, if codified within an upcoming arms trade treaty, may 
substantially affect and further clarify the legality of arms transfers as a form of forcible 
intervention. It remains to be seen what balance, if at all, will a future treaty strike 
between the issues of non-intervention, sovereignty, jus ad bellum, humanitarian law and 
human rights, and how it will treat arms transfers in the context of internal armed 
conflicts. It is clear, however, that the approach of international law towards this 
question, like the issue of intervention at large, is moving towards a substantive approach. 
Nonetheless, until such a binding instrument comes into force, the issue of arms transfers 
to parties in internal armed conflicts can be assessed according to the general principles 










                                                
73 Based on Article 1 Common to the Geneva Conventions (requiring states to “respect and to ensure 
respect” for international humanitarian law) and states’ general duty to exercise due diligence under 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR (requiring states to “respect and to ensure” protection of rights), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; See Brehm, 
supra note 45, at 30, 44 (arguing that human rights law does not contribute significantly to the 
regulation of conventional arms transfer); see also Barbara Frey, The Question of Trade, Carrying and 
the Use of Small arms and Light Weapons in the Context of Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, 
Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39 (May 30, 2002); Gillard, supra note 61, at 
31–32, 38–40. 
74 See Chapter 10. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Definition of Forcible Intervention  
Acts Constituting Forcible Intervention 
SCOPE MEANS “GRAVITY” 
“Grave” Uses of Force  
Armed Attacks: forceful acts across an international 
border; whether by states’ regular forces or irregular 
forces sent by it (Nicaragua) 
Wars 
Comprehensive use of 
force; (Dinstein) 
and 
Acts “Short of War” 
Brief, limited and 
transitory forceful acts  
(Higgins) 
*All cross-border means, ranging 
from simple aerial incursions 
(Higgins) and minesweeping 
activities (Corfu Channel) to use of 
deadly military force and weaponry 
* Might includes terrorist attacks 
through non-traditional means (SC 
Res 1368, 1373) 
* May potentially include 
“unorthodox” forceful acts such ass 
cyber-attacks 
“Less-grave” Uses of Force  
Including, inter alia, acquiescence, toleration and 
encouragement of forceful actions taken by non-
state actors from within a state’s territory. 
(“indirect aggression”) (Nicaragua; Corfu 
Channel; DRC v. Uganda); Arms transfers 
(Nicaragua) 
ACTORS LEVEL OF STATE CONTROL (ATTRIBUTION) 
Actions by states; actions through irregular forces and by 
non-state actors (including arms traders); regional 
organizations or U.N. mandated forces  
 
“Effective control” (Nicaragua) or “overall 
control” (Tadic); might be reviewed on a case by 
case basis (Commentaries to Article 8 ILC Draft); 
possible requirement of due diligence 
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PART 2: INTERVENTION AS CHOICE: THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES 
TO INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE PRE-CHARTER ERA 
 
This part will inquire, in depth, the sources, roots and implications of the main doctrines 
that governed internal armed conflicts in the pre-U.N. Charter era – the doctrines of 
belligerency and insurgency and their interaction with the nascent laws on the use of 
force which came into being in the era of the League of Nations. As we shall see, these 
doctrines did not directly concern the question of consensual intervention, since there was 
virtually no limitation on state’s prerogative to use force prior to the U.N. Charter – or at 
least before the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (hereinafter, this era would be referred to as 
the war prerogative era). The main effects of these doctrines therefore concerned neutral 
maritime trade, rather than the question of forcible intervention. Indeed, they reflected an 
international system that was explicitly preoccupied with the interests of external parties, 
and less with the political rights of the parties to the conflict.  
However, this by no means implies that the understanding of these doctrines, as 
they developed prior to the prohibition on the use of force, is irrelevant in our context – 
for several reasons. For instance, some scholars have made connections between the 
belligerency doctrine and the law of consensual intervention, and these are worthy of 
exploration and clarification. As we shall demonstrate, the question of intervention and 
consent has had substantial legal validity only after the prohibition on the use of force has 
been set forth. Moreover, whether having implications on the law of consensual 
intervention or not, the belligerency and insurgency doctrines were the main tools in 
traditional international law utilized to assess the rights and duties of parties to internal 
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armed conflicts – and as such they are of interest to us. Although they did not directly 
confer or negate any rights regarding external parties’ legal capacity  to  use force (which 
was always a viable option), it did affect substantive rights in the narrower realm of 
neutrality – which, to an extent, can also be looked upon as passing judgment on the 
merits of the conflict.
1
 A clearer understanding of these doctrines can therefore assist us 
in realizing the concerns of the international system in the war-prerogative era, allowing 
us to better perceive the differences between that era and today. 
 Furthermore, surveying the law of that time, can demonstrate the seemingly 
amoral nature by which law operated in an era when territorial effective control was the 
main criteria for the assessment of the rights of parties in internal conflicts. Juxtaposing 
these approaches with the more substantive concerns of contemporary international law – 
as these will be addressed later on – can assist in contextualizing the development of 
international law regarding internal armed conflicts. 
This, of course, does not imply that the question of consensual intervention was 
not debated morally by the great thinkers of the time. For instance, John Stuart Mill was 
much concerned with the 1849 Russian pro-government intervention upon the invitation 
of the Austrian Emperor, to assist it in quashing Hungary’s struggle for secession. Mill 
was so much against the Russian intervention that he argued that a counter-intervention 
by Britain would be justified.
2
 Conversely, as we shall see, Mill’s vehement 
condemnation of the Confederate States of America, on ethical grounds, led him to 
                                                
1
 See Norman J. Padelford, International Law and the Spanish Civil War, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 226, 237 n. 59 
(1937) (referring to Wilson and Westlake).  
2
 John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859), in DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 238, 
261 –262 (1882), available at http://google.books.com/; see also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST 
WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 91–95 (4
th
 ed., 2006). 
 (examining Mill’s approach towards the Hungarian Revolution). 
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completely negate the possibility of forcible intervention by Britain to assist the South’s 
behalf.
3
 However, such considerations remained on the ethical levels, far removed from 
the legal realm.  
Two important – perhaps intertwined – processes, which can allow us to better 
grasp the present state of international law, are revealed when assessing the traditional 
doctrines regarding the status of parties to internal armed conflicts. First, the movement 
from rigid frameworks such as the belligerency doctrine, most notably applied in the 
American Civil War, to more elastic norms as represented in the insurgency doctrine, as 
it was manifested in the Spanish Civil War. This approach, in general, reflects the 
relatively flexible, ad hoc, nature of international law’s contemporary approach to 
internal armed conflicts, and the diminishing importance of the term “war” in its 
technical-legal sense, which was replaced with the material concept of “armed conflict.” 
The second process is the movement from the largely amoral criterion of effective control 
– again, exemplified in the general obliviousness of states towards the issue of slavery in 
the American Civil War – into a more value-inclusive system of substantive 
considerations, which was advocated by certain states already during the Spanish Civil 
War, and is prevalent also today.  
                                                
3
 Chapter 7. sec. II.4.2.  
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CHAPTER 5 
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS AND CONSENT IN THE ERA OF THE 
PREROGATIVE OF WAR: A GENERAL VIEW 
 
I. AN INITIAL OVERVIEW THE BELLIGERENCY DOCTRINE  
I.1 THE RATIONALE OF THE BELLIGERENCY STATUS  
Before we turn to the in depth discussion of the law of internal armed conflict in the pre-
Charter era, and its interaction with the law of consensual intervention, we shall, first, lay 
down the basic characteristics of the belligerency doctrine – the dominant traditional 
doctrine of international law regarding internal strife.  
The doctrine of belligerency developed through several major internal armed 




 The term “recognition of belligerency”, as a cognizable 
doctrine, was galvanized in the context of the American Civil War. Its early appearances 
as a distinctly defined and coherent legal doctrine can be traced to Richard Dana’s edition 
of Wheaton’s Elements of International Law in the edition of 1866.
5
  
As defined by Lauterpacht, the recognition of belligerency was a “declaration, 
express or implied, that hostilities waged between two communities … are of such 
character and scope as to entitle the parties to be treated as belligerents engaged in a war 
in the sense ordinarily attached to that term by international law.”
6
 Accordingly, upon 
recognition of belligerency, the “civil war” – traditionally outside the reach of 
                                                
4
 See ROSCOE R. OGLESBY, INTERNAL WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR NORMATIVE ORDER 18 –32 (1971) 
(highlighting pre-1861 cases in which questions regarding the status of parties to an internal armed conflict 
were prevalent). 
5
 Id. at 33; WHEATON’S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §23 n, 15 (Richard Henry Dana, ed., 1866) 
6
 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (1948). 
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The recognition of belligerency, in essence, was an “interim” status, frequently 
recognized through a proclamation of neutrality, in which opposition forces would gain 
the rights and obligations attributable to governments in the course of warfare, without 
being recognized formally as governments or as independent states. As phrased by 
Bernard, the recognition of such status fell short of state or government recognition 
proper, as it merely constituted recognition of the “precarious power which it [the 
belligerent] possesses in fact.”
8
 It was merely an acknowledgment that the belligerent 
“claims to be a state and is de facto making war as such.”
9
  
Oppenheim clarified the intermediate nature of the status of belligerency, positing 
that there was no doubt that “in every case of civil war a foreign State can recognize the 
insurgents as a belligerent Power if they succeed in keeping a part of the country in their 
hands and set up a Government of their own.” However, he qualified this status, asserting 
that “there is a broad and deep gulf” between such recognition and the recognition of a 
new state.
10
 Therefore, belligerency only meant that the opposition possessed a limited or 
“apparent” international legal personality.
11
  
An example for the phrasing of the intermediate position of belligerency could be 
found in the declaration of neutrality proclaimed by the French Emperor in June 10, 
1861, in the context of the American Civil War: 
                                                
7
 LASSA OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW §59 (2
rd
 ed., 1912); see also Padelford, supra note 1, at 228. 
8
 MONTAGUE BERNARD, A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE NEUTRALITY OF GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 115 (1870). 
9
 Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Recognition of Cuban Belligerency, 9 HARV, L. REV. 406, 406 (1896). 
10
 LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW §74 (2
rd
 ed., 1912).  
11
 Id. §63.  
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His Majesty the Emperor of the French, considering the 
state of peace between France and the United States of 
America, has resolve to maintained strict neutrality in the 
struggle between the union government and the states 




Besides its intermediate nature, the status of belligerency was also temporary. For 
instance, if the recognized opposition group was defeated, its status as a belligerent 
elapsed, negating any belligerent rights it might have accrued by recognition.
13
  
The doctrine of belligerency relied heavily on the principle of effective control. 
As such, it developed in stark contrast to the Holy Alliance’s doctrine of legitimism, 
which rejected any recognition of the rights of revolutionary movements, regardless of 
any achievements they might have achieved on the ground.
14
 As such, the doctrine was, 
in general, amoral, except – perhaps – for its demand that opposition forces act according 
to the laws of war. However, even this requirement was thin, as the laws of war were 
themselves not immensely developed, and was mainly concerned with the application of 
the laws of war as these related to treatment of maritime prize.  
The belligerency doctrine developed out of practical necessity. As described by 
Bernard, International law, being a system of states, was viewed has having “no place in 
                                                
12
 Reprinted  in BERNARD, supra note 8, at 144 (emphasis added). 
13
 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, §59. An application of this rule can be exemplified in the practice of Britain 
after the defeat of the Confederacy. In May 1865, Britain ceased to permit access of Confederate warships 
to British ports, and also withdrew other belligerent privileges Confederate vessels enjoyed during the Civil 
War. See BERNARD, supra note 8, at 143. 
14
 OGLESBY, supra note 4, at 8, 13, 16 –17; AUGUSTUS GRANVILLE STAPLETON, INTERVENTION AND NON-
INTERVENTION; OR, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1790 TO 1865 27 –28 (1866). 
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a struggle between a Sovereign Government and its rebellious subjects.”
15
 However, 
Bernard rightly noted that rebels will not be concerned by this distinction, as they will not 
“admit that they are subjects.” Thus, they will inevitably employ the same military means 
that governments use – and will consequently face similar actions. Denial of belligerent 
rights would therefore be useless, since the opposition will certainly disregard this denial; 
ultimately, such denial could draw third parties into conflict with the rebels. Recognition 
of the belligerency of both sides was thus a “simple practical solution,” entitling them, 
vis-à-vis neutral states, “to all those exceptional rights or powers with which Sovereign 
States at war with on another are clothed by International Law.”
16
  
The practical need for the doctrine – as well as its “amoral” connection to the 
principle of effective control – was summarized in the British explanation to the Ottoman 
Empire, as recorded later by Lord Russell, following Britain’s recognition of Greek 
belligerency in the 1825 rebellion: 
 
the character of belligerency was not so much a principle 
as a fact; that a certain degree of force and consistency 
acquired by any mass of population engaged in war entitled 
that population to be treated as a belligerent, and even if 
their title were questionable, rendered it the interest well 
understood of all civilized nations so to treat them; for what 
was the alternative? A power or a community (call it which 
you will) which was at war with another, and which 
                                                
15
 BERNARD, supra note 8, at 113 – 114. 
16
 Id. at 114.  
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covered the sea with its cruisers, must either be 




II.2 THE CONDITIONS FOR RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY AS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD 
Initially, as reflected in Bernard’s writings, the recognition of belligerency was to be 
granted “as soon as it exists,” a situation that did not “admit of precise definition.”
18
 
Bernard’s American contemporary, Dana, suggested a more principled view of the 
doctrine. He saw the recognition of belligerency as due when the internal hostilities 
amounted to war; when the opposition adhered to laws of war; and could, if allowed to 
govern, constitute a state reasonably capable to discharge its duties. Furthermore, a 
practical necessity on the part of third parties was required for such determination to be 
made. Such necessity, according to Dana, would be the strongest when maritime 
questions were involved.
19
   
Over the decades – and certainly by the end of the 19
th
 century – scholars 
consolidated this doctrine, drawing from state practice, to formulate several preconditions 
for belligerency recognition.
20
 In the absence of such conditions, the recognition of 
belligerency was considered an infringement of the government’s rights,
21
 namely the 
norm of non-intervention, and could be construed as an unfriendly act.
22
   
                                                
17
 Cited in Beale, supra note 9, at 412 (emphasis added). As we shall see, this dichotomy between 
“belligerent” and “pirate” was challenged by the later “insurgency” doctrine.   
18
 BERNARD, supra note 8, at 116 –117. 
19
 WHEATON’S, supra note 5; W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1924). 
20
See, e.g., Institut de Droit International, Annuaire 18, 229 (1900). 
21
 OPPENHEIM 2, supra note 7, §298. 
22
 Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A.J. Thomas, Jr., International Legal Aspects of the Civil War in Spain, 
1936 –1939, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 144 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1972).  
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The customary conditions for the recognition of belligerency (a duty to according to 
Lauterpacht and others,
23
 and a discretionary freedom according to many, such as 
Oppenheim, or the Institut De Droit International)
24
 were four, bearing in mind certain 
nuances between different authorities: 
(a) the existence of an armed conflict of a general character; 
(b) effective control by a government set by the opposition over a substantial (or 
certain) part of the territory; 
(c) adherence by the opposition to the laws of war, through organized armed forces 
under a responsible authority; 
(d) the existence of circumstances that make it necessary for outside states to define 
their attitude towards the conflict through the recognition of belligerency.
25
  
The recognition of belligerency was not, in general, granted by formal declarations; as we 
shall see, it usually took the form of a declaration of neutrality or acquiescence to 







                                                
23
 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 175 –176, 240 –243; Vernon A. O’Rourke, Recognition of Belligerency 
and the Spanish War, 31 AM. J. INT’L L.  398, 407–408 (1937). 
24
 See Institut de Droit International, supra note 20 (asserting that third parties can withdraw recognition of 
belligerency notwithstanding the situation on the ground); see also O’Rourke, supra note 23, at 401 –402; 
H.A. Smith, Some Problems of the Spanish Civil War, 18 BRIT. Y’BK INT’L. L. 22 –23 (1937); for a concise 
summary of the debate regarding the obligation to recognize belligerency see OGLESBY, supra note 4, at 
62–69. 
25
  LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 176; see also Beale, supra note 9 at 407; Annual Message of President 
Grant (Dec.7, 1875); Annual Message of President McKinley (Dec. 6, 1897). Oppenheim did not include 
the fourth condition in his analysis; see 2OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, §74; see also WHEATON’S, supra note 5 
(explaining at length the rationale of such a condition); see also Theodore S. Woolsey, The Consequences 
of Cuban Belligerency, 5 YALE L. J. 182 (1896) 
26
 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 177–181. 
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II.3 THE RESULTS OF RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY IN TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
In general, prior to the recognition of belligerency, governments enjoyed certain 
privileges over the opposition. Significantly, states at peace with the beleaguered 
government were required not transfer arms or funds to the opposition, nor to allow 
“hostile expeditions” to leave their territory in support the rebels, or to interfere, in 
general, in the governments efforts to quell the uprising.
27
 After recognition of 
belligerency, the government lost some of these privileges, as third states could assume a 
neutral disposition without it being considered a violation of the peaceful relations with 
the challenged government. However, a major qualification was that before the 
prohibition on the use of force, these were only conditions required to maintain peace, in 
the legal sense; a third state could thus exercise its war prerogative and intervene 
forcefully regardless of belligerency recognition or its absence. It is thus clear that in any 
case, consent could be an important tactical asset for the intervener; however, it was not 
needed as a legal precondition for intervention. 
As aforementioned, belligerency was an intermediate status, the acquirement of 
which led to a complex structure of rights and obligations. In the political sense, logic 
dictates that the existence of a war must also imply a limited recognition of an 
independent authority that conducts it. Therefore, recognition of belligerency must have 
meant also a limited recognition of rebelling government, for the purpose of warfare.
28
 
Accordingly, for instance, a belligerent power would not enjoy the consular and 
diplomatic rights – the right of “legation” – of a recognized government or state; 
                                                
27
 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 230 (citing the 1900 resolution by the Institute of International Law.) 
28
 Smith, supra note 24, at 18, 21.  
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however, its representatives – or political agents – could be party to “informal” 
negotiations, and enjoy certain immunities.
29
  
In the era of the dominance of naval warfare, and as elaborated shortly, much of 
the preoccupation regarding the question of belligerency concerned the rights of 
belligerents at sea.
30
 In this context, a belligerent power was entitled to issue letters of 
marque and to deploy privateers,
31
 and to have its men-of-war enjoy the immunities 
guaranteed for warships under international law. Further rights at sea included the right to 
visit and search neutral merchant vessels, on the high seas, for contraband; to impose a 
third-party binding blockade on the government’s coasts;
32
 and even to establish prize 
courts for condemnation of captured neutral vessels carrying contraband or running a 
blockade, without being considered as pirates.
33
  As such, the recognition of belligerency 
had the potential to significantly disturb neutral commerce.
34
   
                                                
29
 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, §362, 453; see also Woolsey. supra note 25, at 182;  this question rose in 
the famous “Trent Affair” of 1861, in which a Union vessel intercepted a British vessel carrying 
Confederate agents en route to Britain and France. Britain, which recognized the Confederacy as a 
belligerent, claimed that these individuals enjoyed immunity. The affair almost sparked a war between 
Britain and the U.S., the latter eventually released the Confederate agent, apologized and paid reparations 
to Britain. See CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE TRENT AFFAIR: AN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT (1912). See 
also 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7,  §408 ff3; Quincy Wright, The American Civil War, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR, supra note 22, at 30, 90–93, 97 –98. 
30
 See, e.g., WHEATON’S supra note 5. 
31
 Privateers were private merchant vessels authorized by letters of marque to capture enemy vessels during 
war.  Letters of marque were issued by belligerents to private ships, thereby authorizing them to carry naval 
hostilities, mainly the capture of enemy merchant ships as prize.  See NATALINO RONZITTI, THE LAW OF 
NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 66 (1988). 
Privateering declined over the centuries as the technological gap between private and military vessels 
increased. See THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 80–81 
(1879); Privateering was abolished, between signatory states, in the Declaration of Paris of 1856. 
32
 See Institut de Droit International, supra note 20; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, §273; 2 OPPENHEIM , 
supra note 7, §298; see also Padelford, supra note 1, at 231 –232 (arguing that the General Franco’s forces 
attempt to blockade Spanish ports during the Spanish Civil War were ignored because of non-recognition 
of belligerency). For a relatively recent statement of customary international law regarding rights and 
obligations of belligerents in naval warfare see the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Armed Conflicts at Sea (Jun .12, 1994). 
33
 See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Closure of Ports in Control of Insurgents, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 70, 70 (1930); 
Woolsey, supra note 25, at 183–184. For a succinct summary of the logic of traditional prize law and 
neutrality, see the opinion of the Lord Chancellor in Ex Parte Chavasse, 46 E.R. 1072 (1865) (Gr. Brit.). 
34
 See e.g., Annual Message by President Grant, supra note 25.  
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Moreover, transfers of arms by third parties governments to opposition groups 
were considered wrongful, prior to the recognition of belligerency, while such actions 
vis-à-vis recognized governments were not. After recognition of belligerency, if the third 
state wished to remain neutral, government transfer of arms to both parties was 
prohibited.
35
 There was also a view, prevalent in the opinions of some commentators on 
the Spanish Civil War, that prior to such recognition it was illegal to impose an arms 
embargo (negative intervention), thereby prohibiting also private parties from selling 
arms to the recognized government involved in an internal conflict.
36
 Only after such 
recognition, this position argued, an embargo on both parties was considered legitimate, 
provided it was impartial.
37
 This view, however, did not gain hold.
38
 
Furthermore, prior to recognition of belligerency, if states chose to remain on 
friendly terms with a government involved in an internal strife, they were required to 
prevent the organization, in their territories, of private armed expeditions against the 
government. This term can be compared, perhaps, to the contemporary requirement that 
states exercise due diligence regarding non-state actors operating from their territories. 
Upon recognition of belligerency, if states wished to maintain neutrality, they were 
required to prevent such actions on behalf of both parties. However, they were not held 




                                                
35
 O’Rourke, supra note 23, at 409; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 231–233. See discussion in Chapter 4, 
sec. III. 
36
 See Thomas, supra note 22, at 143.  
37
 Id. 144.  
38
 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 6, at 243 n. 1. 
39
 Thomas, supra note 22, at 144 –145; Hague Convention V: Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (1907), U.S.T.S. 540, arts. 4, 6.  
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It could be argued, as we shall see, that after the renouncement of war enshrined 
in the 1928 Kellogg Briand Pact, recognition of belligerency resulted in mandatory 
neutrality
40
 since for the first time, force was no longer a sovereign prerogative, and thus 
neutrality was no more a matter of unfettered discretion.
41
  
A belligerent would incur responsibility for wrongful acts committed in the 
territory under its control –
42
 and thus, naturally, would release the government from 
liability for the same acts.
43
 It would be capable, in some cases, to create contract and 
property rights enforceable after the end of the conflict.
44
 Although prevalent authorities, 
for centuries, opined that the laws of war apply to every party to internal strife,
45
 even if 
the opposition was not recognized as a belligerent, the position of most jurists, 
traditionally, was that prior to recognition of belligerency such law does not bind legally, 
in the strict sense, but ought to be applied on counts of considerations of humanity.
46
 
However, after belligerency was recognized it was understood that contending parties 
were bound to observe the laws of war regarding their enemies as well as concerning 
neutrals, on land and on sea.
47
 Consequently, belligerents’ troops captured were generally 
entitled to the status of prisoners of war. 
 
 
                                                
40
 This is true if we adopt the notion of strict-abstentionism – meaning, the perception that states were 
prohibited from intervening on part of any party once a significant internal armed conflict erupted. For 
more on this approach see Chapter 8, sec. III. 
41
 Thomas, supra note 22, at 165. 
42
 OPPENHEIM 1, supra note 10, §167. 
43
 Woolsey, supra note 25, at 184; see also O’Rourke, supra note 23, at 399–401. 
44
 The Confederacy’s currency was also recognized de facto. See Wright, supra note 29, at 67.  
45
 See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATELL THE LAW OF NATIONS §§294–295. (1797), available at 
http://books.google.com/. 
46
 See Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), art. 152 
(Apr. 24, 1863); Wright, supra note 29, at 55; see also Padelford, supra note 1, at 229.  
47
 Smith, supra note 24, at 22.  
 130 
II. CLARIFYING MODERN COMMENTARIES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN 
RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY AND CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION  
II.1 UNDERSTANDING THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: THE USE OF FORCE IN THE ERA OF 
THE WAR PREROGATIVE   
By the late 18
th
 century, just war theory has lost much of its appeal, and thus had meager 
influence over emerging norms of the law of war. Rooted in the philosophy of ancient 
Rome and adopted by Catholic Christian theology – notably by Thomas Aquinas – the 
just war doctrine purported to assess the “justness” of war according to various 
procedural and substantive criteria, namely, the “just cause” of the war and the “right 
intention” to promote it. The just war doctrine has found its way, in numerous variations, 








However, the “secularization” of the doctrine, with the rise of separation between 
church and state, also led to its declining influence: when the Catholic Church could not 
anymore pronounce authoritatively whether in a certain situation war is indeed “just” – 
and in absent of alternative binding organizations –
49
 inevitably, both parties would claim 
the justness of their cause, and both would be indeed entitled to do so.
50
 This situation 
must have had implications over the question of intervention in internal conflicts: thus, 
                                                
48
 On the “just war” doctrine see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 65 –69 (5
th
 ed. 
2011); see also Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and 
Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 48, 57–63 (2009).  For a classic source 
see, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, 1 THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, Book 1, Ch. 2 (laying down the naturalist-era 
view that war has to be substantively just).  
49
 See, e,g., John Bassett Moore, International Law: Its Present and Future, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 11 (1907) 
(arguing briefly that the main shortcoming of international law of the time was the absence of international 
organizations). 
50
 DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 68 –69. 
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 set forth the logic of 
effectiveness which will later be in the background of the belligerency doctrine. He 
recognized that when a nation is completely divided, “the war between the two parties 
stands on the same ground, in every respect, as a public war between two different 
nations,” and, consequently, third powers could assist any party “which they shall judge 





 and early 20th centuries two important features of the international 
system were instrumental in the development of the international norms of the time. The 
first was legal positivism, espoused, in the Anglo-American world, by John Austin, 
which dominated the contemporary domestic jurisprudence.
53
 In the realm of 
international law, positivism meant, in general, that there exists no law beyond the 
explicit consent of sovereigns.
54
 The second feature was the decentralized and multi-polar 
nature of the 19
th
 century’s international system, which led to the development of norms 
that conformed to a classic balance of power system.
55
  
Accordingly, the question of war was removed, at the time, from the realm of 
“justice” and in to the realm of “consequence.” Justness of cause could be used as 
rhetoric – perhaps to appease internal public opinion – but was not a factor in the legal 
                                                
51
 Vattel’s thinking was complex regarding the idea of just war. See Simone Zurbuchen, Vattel’s Law of 
Nations and Just War Theory, 35 HIST. OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 408 (2009). While denouncing unjust wars, he 
denied the practical applicability of such a rule absent an international judge. See Sloane, supra note 48, at 
62. 
52
 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, supra note 45, §§295–296. Note, however, that Vattel argued that such 
intervention should be in support of the “right” party, which could be deemed as a just-war requirement. 
For a critique of Vattel in this context, see MONTAGUE BERNARD, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
INTERVENTION 20 –21 (1860). 
53
 See WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 503 (Michael Byers trans., 2000) 
54
 See id. at  503–504; see also Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 204, 209–210 
(J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).   
55
 On the administration of international law absent organized international institutions during the 19
th
 
century, see Wright, supra note 22, at 94; see also MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE 161 –




 States would not ask whether their cause for war is just – or legal – but rather, if 
they are willing to pay the price that war entailed, in the anarchic 19
th
 century system. 
Law was structured, then, for the purpose of ascertaining when “war” exists between two 
states, so as to enable third parties to calculate their steps in order to stay neutral, thereby 
avoiding the consequences of being dragged into the conflict against their will. This was 
the background for the development of the law of neutrality.  
In order to control their relation with belligerent parties, inter alia by enforcing 
the requirements of international neutrality law upon their citizens, states enacted 
domestic statutes such as the American Neutrality Act of 1794 and the British Foreign 
Enlistment Act of 1819. Domestic neutrality laws were aimed, in practice, to regulate the 
actions of private persons within the jurisdiction of the neutral state, and usually 
prohibited, in general, private expeditions against states with which legislating state is at 
peace, as well as providing belligerent states with warships.
57
 However, they have been 
of key significance to international law – and in particular when internal armed conflicts 
erupted – since, effectively, even if indirectly, they conferred rights to foreign entities, at 
an era in which “international legislation” was scarce.
58
 
Therefore, from the end of “just war” era, through the 19
th
 century, and prior to 
the prohibition on the use of force imposed by article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter –  and to a 
more limited extent, the founding of the League of Nations –
59
 the question of 
intervention in internal armed conflicts was governed, mainly, by the laws of neutrality, 
                                                
56
 DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 69; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, §64. 
57
 See, e.g., Neutrality act of 1794, §3, §5; see also See, e.g., N.A. Rogoff & E. Collins, The Caroline 
Incident and the Development of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 493 (1990). 
58
 See Edward Dumbauld, Neutrality Laws of the United States, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 258, 258 (1937). 
59
 See L. Kopelmanas, The Problem of Aggression and the Prevention of War, 31 AM. J. INT’L L.  244 
(1937). 
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and to some ambiguous extent, by the norm of non-intervention. The concept of non-
intervention, although much revered at the time, was especially vague in light of the 
dominant idea of the era, asserting that waging war was the pinnacle of the sovereign’s 
prerogative. Accordingly, war could be declared as a remedy for an international wrong, 
as well as for strictly political reasons.
60
 As a matter of fact, states could “resort to war 
for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all” –
61
 a right limited, perhaps, only by 
the “lip-service” requirement of engaging in previous negotiations.
62
 Indeed, as 
commonly phrased, international law in the war-prerogative era did not prohibit war, but 
merely attempted to regulate the way it was carried out through jus in bello.
63
  
Therefore, and as noted by Dinstein, the concept of war-prerogative resulted in a 
grave anomaly: on the one hand, international law sought to protect the sovereignty of 
states; however, on the other hand, any sovereign could subjugate the sovereignty of 
another by wantonly waging war. It is fair to ask then, what was the value, if at all, of the 
norm of non-intervention absent a prohibition on the use of force. Nevertheless, most 
international lawyers of that era did not perceive this inconsistency as detrimental to the 
existence of international law, or simply disregarded this problem;
64
 a fascinating 
example can be found in Bernard’s classic 1860 defense of the principle of non-
intervention, in which he sets forth an almost absolute perception of the principle, with 
virtually no attempt to reconcile it with the dominance of the war-prerogative.
65
   
                                                
60
 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, §54. 
61
 H.W. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 976 (1952); cited in DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 78. 
62
 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, §93. 
63
 See, e.g., 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, §53; Arnold D. Mcnair, Collective Security, 17 BRIT. Y’BK INT’L 
L. 150, 150 –152 (1936). 
64
 DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 78 –79, and the sources cited therein. Compare STAPLETON, supra note 14, at 
13–14 (1866) (claiming that forcible intervention must be justified with a casus belli. i.e. “external injury” 
to the intervener).  
65
 BERNARD, supra note 52. 
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In absence of a prohibition on the use of force, then, a violation in times of war of 
the terms of neutrality by a third party could result – in grave circumstances – in the loss 
of neutrality status and the accruement of the status of a belligerent.
66
 It is imperative to 
understand, however, that in absence of a special treaty,
67
 a violation of neutrality, when 
amounting to an act of hostility in the eyes of the belligerent state, was not an unlawful 
act per se, but simply on that signified the end of neutrality, thus triggering the set of 
consequences a state of war entailed.
68
  
Last, in the war-prerogative era, for the purpose of ascertaining when “war” 
exists, a rigid distinction between “wars” and means “short-of-war” developed. For 
instance, reprisals – including forcible ones – undertaken in order to compel a state to 
cease unlawful action or make reparation, could be pursued without actually being 
considered war, and thus without altering the otherwise peaceful relations, in the legal 
sense, between the involved states.
69
 War, on the other hand, required actual “fighting” 
between armed forces, or, at least, a declaration of war or a declaration by a state that 
another state’s actions are acts of war.
70
 This distinction, too, led to the preoccupation of 
the international system with the question whether war, in the technical-legal sense, 
existed.  
 




 century international law, there was a binary distinction between “neutrality” and “war.” The 
earlier concept of “benevolent neutrality” was no longer relevant due to the regulation of this issue in the 
Hague Conventions on neutrality, and the later – controversial – doctrine of “non-belligerency” was yet to 
emerge. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinigg, “Benevolent Third States in International Armed Conflicts: The 
Myth of the Irrelevance of the Law of Neutrality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES  543, 544 –545 (Michael N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2007). On the relations 
between the law of neutrality and the modern law on the use of force, see, e.g., Andrea Gioia, Neutrality 
and Non-Belligerency, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT ECONOMIC WARFARE 51 
(Harry H.G. Post ed., 1994). 
67
 DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 79–81. 
68
 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, §§358–359. 
69
 Id.  §37, 42.  
70
 Id. §55, 93. 
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II.2 THE DISCONNECTION BETWEEN BELLIGERENCY, OBLIGATIONS OF NEUTRALITY AND 
CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION IN THE WAR-PREROGATIVE ERA 
Notably missing from our survey regarding the consequences of belligerency 
recognition was the issue of consensual intervention. This is not coincidental.  
Some modern commentators have identified two “opposing” approaches 
regarding the traditional law on internal strife and consensual intervention. Presumably, 
one approach posits that upon recognition of belligerency, third states acquired a duty of 
neutrality. If such duty was assumed, intervention on behalf of both parties was a 
violation of international law. The other approach asserts that upon such recognition – 
and only upon it – states incurred the power to intervene on behalf of either party. The 
first approach, as shall be elaborated upon shortly, presents a logical problem, which can 
be solved – if at all – if we apply it only since the prohibition on the use of force. The 
second, while is indeed present in some literature – most notably in the works of 
Oppenheim –  is rather foreign to the general landscape of law prevalent when the 
belligerency doctrine has developed, and therefore it must be taken with, at least, with a 
grain of salt.  
In a 1985 article, Louise Doswald-Beck linked between the question of 




[t]here is a widespread view that the traditional law favours 
intervention by invitation of the government but not by 
invitation of the rebels. The only situation where traditional 
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 Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 
BRIT. Y’BOOK INT’L L. 189 (1985).   
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In a footnote to this assertion, Doswald-Beck referred to Oppenheim, in qualification of 
this statement, noting that “there is also a view that recognition of belligerency turns a 




Perhaps following the same logic, Roth argued that recognition of belligerency 
imposed on third parties “an obligation of neutrality, and thereby, in theory, render[s] it 
unlawful for foreign states to provide war materiél to either side of the civil conflict, 
notwithstanding the requests of the recognized governments for assistance.”
74
 Like 
Doswald-Beck, Roth notes that while this is the “usual view,” there is an “alternative 
view,” according to which upon recognition of belligerency foreign states acquire the 
choice of “joining either side or remaining neutral.”
75
 
These modern interpretations of traditional law raise some challenges, as they do 
not clearly distinguish between the law before the prohibition on the use of force – during 
the war-prerogative era – and the law after it. Thus, they assume that there was a 
discrepancy between the “neutrality” that recognition of belligerency entailed, and an 
“alternative” view, that upon recognition of belligerency, a third party could intervene on 
behalf of either side of the conflict. A precise analysis of traditional law makes it clear, 
however, that these competing views as such were not substantively possible, and that in 
                                                
72
 Id. 196 (1985) (emphasis added).  
73
 Id. n. 40. 
74
 BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (1999). 
75
 Id. n. 149. 
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actuality neutrality and intervention were simply two alternative choices, a fact which of 
course drained the principle of non-intervention from most of its substance.  
The root of the problem of the argument lies in the perception according to which 
recognition of belligerency required or obligated third parties to assume neutrality. 
However, as aforementioned, in the war-prerogative era, neutrality was not perceived as 
an obligation; it was simply a status that if states chose to adhere to, they could avoid 
being dragged into the conflict. In Hohfeldian terms, neutrality was a privilege, or a 
liberty, but not a duty.
76
  
Indeed, radical non-interventionists such as Bernard
77
 opined that intervention in 
internal strife will be virtually universally prohibited, whether it was justified on state 
interest (and here Bernard distinguished between “intervention” and self-defense) or upon 
consent of the government or the rebels.
78
 It seems that Bernard had drawn an implicit 
line between wars between states and internal wars, the latter imposing a restriction on 
the war-right of sovereigns that was non-existent in the former.
79
 However, in hindsight, 
this approach can only be view as de lege ferenda, as we do not know of any general 
applying legal norms at the time that could substantively restrict the war-prerogative.  
Thus, there could be no obligation of neutrality regarding internal strife, since 
there was no law that prohibited states from ending their neutrality, if they were willing 
to face the consequences. As put by Oppenheim, “[d]uties of neutrality exist so long only 
as a State remains neutral.”
80
 A recognition of belligerency, then, would result in 
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neutrality or in fact be prompted by a declaration of neutrality,
81
 which states were 
required to observe in order not to be drawn in to the conflict; but this did not in fact 
mean that states could not intervene at will, as in the war-prerogative era there was no 
legal prohibition on the use of force.
82
   
Another modern commentator claimed that in “pre-Charter international law,” the 
question of invited intervention was governed by the “determination of the degree of 
control exerted by the government and the insurgent forces.”
83
 Thus, he argued, forcible 
intervention in favor of either side was prohibited when the conflict was prescribed as an 
“insurgency;” but “once a state of belligerency was recognized, an invitation to intervene 
or to offer assistance was legally valid, regardless of whether the inviting party was the 
previously-recognized government or the anti-government forces.”
84
 
This position too reflects an intractable discrepancy. First, it also assumes the 
existence of a “duty” of neutrality when “insurgency” was recognized, disregarding the 
fact that neutrality was viewed as a choice; second, it accepts as obvious the position that 
recognition or non-recognition of belligerency had effect over the legality of forcible 
consensual intervention. However, as aforementioned, in the war-prerogative era, it made 
little sense to condition forcible intervention on any recognition of status, not least on 
consent. 
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Indeed, and as noted by Doswald-Beck, 19
th
 century writers such as Woolsey held 
the position that “no state is authorized to render assistance to provinces or colonies 
which are in revolt against the established government,” as it violates the norm of non-
interference;
85
 and conversely – and here Woolsey contradicted his contemporary 
Bernard – that “there is nothing in the law of nations which forbids one nation to render 
assistance to the established government,” as “[t]his aid is no interference.”
86
 
Nevertheless, Woolsey too recognized, albeit with visible dissatisfaction, that this rule 
can be challenged by “the exercise of the war-right” of a sovereign state, and on 
justifications that “are more or less vague and under the influence of subjective 
opinion.”
87
 Positions such as Woolsey’s, then, did little to bridge the gap between the 
principle of non-intervention and the sovereign right to wage war.  
The same inconsistency can be found in the writings of Oppenheim – perhaps the 
foremost source that connected the issue of recognition of belligerency and consensual 
intervention. While acknowledging that assisting governments, in general, is lawful “co-
operation,” Oppenheim argued that – 
 
[t]here is no doubt that a foreign State commits an 
international delinquency by assisting insurgents in spite of 
its being at peace with the legitimate Government. But 
matters are different after recognition. The insurgents are 
now a belligerent power, and the civil war is now real war. 
Foreign States can either become a party to the war or 
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remain neutral, and in the latter case all duties and rights of 




However, and rather similarly to Woolsey, Oppenheim did not explicitly reconcile the 
existence of an alleged “international delinquency” of assisting rebels in spite of being at 
“peace” with the government, with the fact that he, himself, stated that the claim that 
international law prohibits war was one made by “impatient pacifists.” As he powerfully 
argued, international law, at that time, could not and did not object “to States which are in 
conflict waging war upon each other instead of peaceably settling their difference.” 




If we attempt to read Oppenheim’s opinion regarding the aforesaid “international 
delinquency” in light of his position that war in itself was not prohibited, the conclusion 
must be that the delinquency of intervention prior to recognition of belligerency 
materialized only when the intervention was conducted through means historically 
considered as “short of war,” such as by transfer of arms; and if the actions in fact 
amounted to war, then they resulted in the termination of peace. The same consequence 
would occur when an intervention would be pursued following recognition of 
belligerency – here too, peace would be terminated. Therefore, the merits of 
Oppenheim’s distinction between forcible intervention prior to belligerency and after it 
are unclear.    
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A precise understanding of recognition of belligerency and the question of 
intervention was presented by Tom Farer – clarifying that upon recognition of 
belligerency, “states which did not wish to be treated as active participants in a war were 
obliged to assume the legal posture of neutrality.”
90
 The logical (and unsurprising) 
conclusion is that intervention on behalf of rebels was an “unfriendly” act towards the 
government; while intervention in support of the government was not. The former was, in 
effect, a declaration of war against the government, which resulted in the consequences 
of war but not in illegality.   
 
II.3 CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION AS CHOICE 
Indeed, the “default” consequence – or perhaps, the generator –of the recognition of 
belligerency was the assumption of the status of neutrality on part of the recognizing 
power.
91
 However, as the prohibition on the use of force did not yet come to be, the result 
of neutrality did not mean that states were bound to non-interference in the conflict, 
should they choose to waive their neutrality.
 92
 Furthermore, the choice of neutrality 
versus belligerency was – in accordance with the general approach of the time – was, at 
large, unaffected by the substantive merits of the belligerents.
93
 
It is revealing that when states and scholars grappled with the question of 
belligerency, the notion that intervention is somehow contingent upon such recognition 
was notably absent. The treatment of this question, for instance, is completely absent in 
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one of the most authoritative statements on the meaning of recognition of belligerency in 
19
th
 century law, as formulated in Dana’s  edition of Wheaton’s International Law.
94
 
There are indeed many indications which point to the conclusion that recognition 
of belligerency was but simply one course of action available to third-party states in face 
of an internal conflict, rather than a precondition for intervention. Nor was it a 
precondition of recognition of the rebels as a government (in a struggle for control over 
the state apparatus); or as an independent state (in case of a struggle for secession.)
95
  
This was evident already in decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of 
the Spanish Colonial Wars of 1810–1823. In U.S. v. Palmer,
96
 Chief Justice Marshall has 
ruled that “[i]n such contests [internal conflicts]  a nation may engage itself with the one 
party or the other – may observe absolute neutrality – may recognize the new state 
absolutely-or may make a limited recognition of it.”
97
 Limited recognition must have 
meant an intermediate position, such as recognition of belligerency or insurgency; 
however, it was not a precondition for intervention. The same logic echoed in the 
contemporaneous Supreme Court decision in the case of the Santissima Trinidad, which 
dealt with the consequences of the recognition of the belligerency of the Spanish 
colonies: 
 
Each party is, therefore, deemed by us a belligerent nation, 
having, so far as concerns us, the sovereign rights of war, 
and entitled to be respected in the exercise of those rights. 
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We cannot interfere to the prejudice of either belligerent 
without making ourselves a party to the contest, and 




In both of these decisions it is evident that the “limited” recognition of belligerency was 
an alternative to intervention, but not a necessary condition. As stated in the Santissima 
Trinidad decision, the consequence of intervention was merely departing “from the 
posture of neutrality,” but not illegality. 
In 1843, when opining on the long-running dispute between the U.S. and 
Denmark regarding the latter’s treatment of British prize caught by the Americans during 
the American Revolution, Henry Wheaton – one of the important international lawyers of 
the time – expressed this position clearly. Thus, he posited that a third party had three 
legal options in its dealings with an internal conflict: either to remain “passive” while 
extending to both parties the rights of sovereign states during war; or to recognize the 
opposition party as an independent state, and maintain neutrality; or, rather, to join in 
alliance with one party, thus becoming the other’s enemy.
99
 Wheaton stressed the amoral 
element of choice of the third party, and argued again, in 1846, that in case a state decides 
to forcefully intervene, “the law of nations makes no distinction, in this respect, between 
a just and an unjust war, the intervening State becomes entitled to all the rights of war 
against the opposite party.”
100
   
The wide spectrum of possibilities enjoyed by states, even without recognition of 
belligerency, was reflected in the approach of the U.S. towards the Cuban wars of the 
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1870s and 1890s, where Cuban opposition groups revolted against Spain. As President 
Grant stated in 1875: 
 
The recognition of independence or of belligerency being 
thus, in my judgment, equally inadmissible, it remains to 
consider what course shall be adopted should the conflict 
not soon be brought to an end by acts of the parties 
themselves, and should the evils which result therefrom, 
affecting all nations, and particularly the United States, 
continue. In such event I am of opinion that other nations 
will be compelled to assume the responsibility which 
devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the only 





Likewise, regarding the Cuban conflict of 1895, President McKinley justified the 
American refrain from recognition of belligerency and laid down the available courses of 
options: 
[o]f the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of 
the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the 
independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war 
by imposing a rational compromise between the 
contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other 
party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be 
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Note, that President McKinley understood the different courses of actions available to the 
U.S. as equal alternatives; thus, forcible intervention in favor of the opposition was 
viewed as a legal possibility – one which was actually independent of any previous 
recognition of belligerency, or of independence.  
Beale, addressing the concept of Cuban belligerency, has also stressed the 
element of choice in this context: 
It is necessary at the outset to distinguish three similar 
things: intervention, recognition of independence, and 
recognition of belligerency. Intervention is an actual 
interference in the affairs of a friendly nation, sometimes 
thought to be justifiable, but not usually consistent with our 




Recognition of belligerency could not be seen as a legal precondition for intervention; for 
intervention could take place even without it. Belligerency recognition was thus looked 
upon as an alternative to harsher actions:  
 
Intervention in Cuba would mean taking part in the contest 
there on one side or the other; recognition of Cuban 
independence would mean recognition of her separation 
from Spain as an accomplished fact. The latter course is 
impossible; no one advocates the former. Recognition of 
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Although Beale thought that intervention was not advocated, intervention by the 
U.S. indeed took place in 1898 – in what became the Spanish-Amerian War – without the 
recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans or of their independence. As a matter of 
fact, President Mckinley stated explicitly that he will pursue the intervention without 
recognition of belligerency, which he saw as adding nothing in this context.
105
 However, 
the intervention was presented by Mckinley as a neutral action to “stop the war,” justified 
by humanitarian language and by reference to American interests. He specifically 
refrained from expressing any preference towards the Cuban rebels, although the rebels 
previously requested an American intervention.
106
 Nevertheless, of importance was the 
invalidity of belligerency recognition to the American decision to go to war. 
In other cases, if a state was ready to actively and expressly support a party to an 
internal conflict, and was willing to pay the costs of war with the other party, it seems 
illogical that it would limit itself to the mere recognition of belligerency of the party it 
supports. Instead, it could grant its ally staunch moral support by recognizing it as the 
lawful government or independent state. For instance, France recognized the United 
States in 1778, before intervening on its behalf in the American Revolution.
107
 Likewise, 
the United States intervened in the internal conflict in Colombia, in 1903, after 
recognition of Panama’s independence without recognizing its belligerency.
108
 In a later 
era, in the Spanish Civil War, Germany and Italy recognized the Franco regime, which 
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II.4 THE MAIN CONSEQUENCE OF RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY: EFFECTS ON NEUTRAL 
COMMERCE 
If not the question of forcible intervention, what was the focus of the law of internal 
armed conflicts in the war-prerogative era? Indeed, the set of consequences of war, in the 
legal sphere, that so concerned the powers of the era, was quite different from the 
dominant concerns of contemporary international law. The main interest of the powers 
was to mitigate, or at least control, of the effects of war over neutral commerce – as 
opposed to today’s stated preoccupation with human rights, self determination and the 
protection of civilians. Accordingly, when an internal armed conflict erupted, the main 
concern was the economic rights of neutral powers, and not the political rights of the 
parties to the conflict, which were at best secondary. As demonstrated in an 1869 opinion 
of the U.S. Attorney General, regarding the recognition of belligerency of rebelling Cuba: 
 
The question of belligerency between organized 
communities is a question of fact, and may be one of the 
gravest facts upon which a nation is called to decide and 
act. The concession of belligerent rights … necessarily 
involves serious restrictions upon the ordinary rights of the 
people of this country to carry on branches of manufacture 
and trade which are unrestricted in time of peace. To 
prevent our mechanics and merchants from building ships 
of war and selling them in the markets of the world, is an 




interference with their private rights which can only be 
justified on the ground of a paramount duty in our 
international relations; and however much we may 
sympathize with the efforts of any portion of the people of 
another country to resist what they consider oppression or 
to achieve independence, our duties are necessarily 
dependent upon the actual progress which they have made 




The secondary, if at all, importance of the rights of the parties to the conflict can 
explain the condition, set forth by prominent authorities, that recognition of belligerent 
rights was contingent upon the recognizing power’s substantial interest in doing so. As 
summarized in Dana’s edition of Elements of International Law: 
 
The reason which requires and can alone justify this step 
[recognition of belligerency] … is, that its [the recognizing 
state’s] own rights and interests are so far affected as to 
requite a definition of its own relations to the parties … As 
to the relation of the foreign State to the contest, if it is 
solely on land, and the foreign State is not contiguous, it is 




War indeed entailed consequences on neutral commerce. Mainly, the existence of 
war was a precondition for the application of maritime prize law, which, as explained 
shortly, had immense effects over the trade interests of the great naval powers. Thus, the 
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distinction whether a state of war – or belligerency – existed, was one of great urgency to 
the trading naval powers. When major rebellions began to take place in the European 
colonies – for instance, the late 18
th
 century American Revolution or the early 19
th
 
century Spanish Colonial Wars – a question of utmost importance was whether such 
conflicts amounted to wars, entailing all the maritime law consequences of that status; 
and whether the parties should be treated as belligerents for the purpose of such law.
112
 
In traditional prize law, for instance, a belligerent vessel could legitimately visit-
and-search a neutral vessel on the high seas, and – if caught carrying contraband (and 
prior to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, enemy property at large) destined to enemy 
territory, to capture it. If a neutral vessel would breach or attempt to breach a blockade, it 
would suffer the same consequences. In any case, capture would not transfer the title to 
the vessel or goods, until they were condemned following in rem adjudication in front of 
a prize court, established by the belligerent. Furthermore, if the neutral would violate the 
terms of neutrality in a magnitude sufficient to render it an enemy belligerent by the 
“victim” state, vessels flying its flag could be captured on the high seas as enemy vessels, 
and condemned in front of prize courts, regardless of their destiny or cargo (however, if 




The British High Court of Admiralty summarized both the concerns of neutrals, 
and the logic of prize law, in its 1865 decision in the case of The Helen: 
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A neutral country has a right to trade with all other 
countries in time of peace. One of these countries becomes 
a belligerent, and is blockaded. Why should the right of the 
neutral be affected by the acts of the other belligerent? The 
answer of the blockading power is: “Mine is a just and 
necessary war,” a matter which, in ordinary cases, the 
neutral cannot question, “I must seize contraband, I must 
enforce blockade, to carry on the war.” In this state of 
things there has been a long and admitted usage on the part 
of all civilized states—a concession by both parties, the 
belligerent and the neutral—a universal usage which 
constitutes the law of nations. It is only with reference to 
this usage that the belligerent can interfere with the neutral. 
Suppose no question of blockade or contraband, no 
belligerent could claim a right of seizure on the high seas of 
a neutral vessel going to the port of another belligerent, 
however essential to his interest it might be so to do. 
… 
When all the necessary conditions are satisfied, then, by the 
usage of nations, the belligerent is allowed to capture and 





However, the rights of belligerents to capture and condemn neutral vessels 
running a blockade or carrying contraband did not render the act of such vessels illegal; 
nor did it require third states to prevent such actions. Capture and condemnation was the 
only penalty incurred, and was viewed as no more of a calculated risk taken by the 
vessel’s owner: 
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It never has been a part of admitted common usage that 
such voyages should be deemed illegal by the neutral state, 
still less that the neutral state should be bound to prevent 
them; the belligerent has not a shadow of right to require 
more than universal usage has given him, and has no 
pretence to say to the neutral: “You shall help me to 
enforce my belligerent right by curtailing your own 
freedom of commerce, and making that illegal by your own 
law which was not so before.” … [T]he law of nations has 
never declared that a neutral state is bound to impede or 




It is in this context where the concept of belligerency recognition developed, and 
not in the context of forcible intervention. The doctrine of recognition of belligerency, 
and – to a certain extent – the later doctrine of insurgency, were mainly concerned with 
determining when an internal conflict amounts to war, spawning the aforementioned 
effects over neutral commerce. The issue of consensual forcible intervention, conversely, 
was virtually non-existent in the discussion of the status of parties to an internal armed 
conflict, since, as aforementioned, use of force was a sovereign prerogative. Only since 
the “creation” of modern day jus ad bellum did the law on the use of force came to 
substantially affect the question of these rights, and thus – of consensual intervention.  
In sum, although belligerency recognition had implications over the rights and 
obligations of opposition forces, these implications were limited – mostly – to the law of 
neutrality, and did not affect substantively the question of forcible intervention. However, 
since the status of parties to internal armed conflicts was indeed affected by this doctrine, 
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it is of much importance to analyze the considerations that governed it. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, these were largely amoral. 
 153 
CHAPTER 6  
TERRITORIAL EFFECTIVE CONTROL AS A SOURCE OF RIGHTS: THE 
BELLIGERENCY AND INSURGENCY DOCTRINES 
 
I. THE BELLIGERENCY DOCTRINE: EARLY CASES  
Having understood, in the previous chapter, the general normative framework regarding 
the traditional law of internal armed conflict, we shall now survey its application in key 
conflicts of the war-prerogative era, in order to exemplify the amoral dynamics of the era, 
in relation to the determination of the rights and powers of parties to internal armed 
conflicts. This understanding can help us grasp the processes effecting the development 
of international law, and thus to better understand international law today. 
 
I.1 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION  
The concept of belligerency recognition developed gradually from the American 
Revolution, throughout a number of conflicts in the early-mid 19
th
 century, until it was 
galvanized in the American Civil War.
1
 Perhaps ironically, while the belligerency status 
granted to the South was at large deemed by the Union, during the Civil War, as adverse 
to its interest – the need for such doctrine was rooted in the days of the American 
Revolution. During that conflict, the nascent-U.S. commissioned privateers and 
established prize courts for the purpose of capture and condemnation of British ships.
2
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When Denmark refused, in 1778, to recognize, as legitimate prize, three British ships 
captured by the Americans and therefore returned them to Britain, a decades-long 
diplomatic dispute ensued, in which the U.S. demanded reparations for what can be 
described as non-recognition of its belligerent rights.
3
 
As in later conflicts, notably in the American Civil War, the opposition party – 
here, the Americans – claimed independence, and thus saw itself as entitled to the same 
rights in prize law as the government; the latter – here, the British – rejected the 
recognition of such rights, while invoking the same rights for itself. Third parties – here, 
Denmark – were caught in between. In 1843, Henry Wheaton, an American diplomat and 
preeminent expert in international law, was of the opinion that Denmark had acted 
wrongfully, since, in his view, by not treating the American privateers as pirates, it 
adopted, de facto, a neutral stance and therefore could not ignore their prize rights.
4
 
Furthermore, Wheaton argued that since Britain itself granted the Americans some 




As opposed to Denmark, Netherlands, it seems, acted according to what will be 
later on labeled as “recognition of belligerency:” when the Americans brought captured 
British merchant vessels into a Dutch port, the latter ordered the Americans to leave, 
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The American Revolution saw a case of consensual intervention by France. When 
it became obvious that Britain will act forcibly against American independence, foreign 
support became a key interest of American diplomacy, and emissaries were sent to the 
courts of the main European powers.
7
 The Americans found an ally in France. The 
Bourbons were eager to weaken Britain, and among the French public, revolutionary 
notions have already taken hold. For these reasons France was sympathetic towards the 
American cause.
8
 At first, aiding the Americans covertly, by mid-1778 France was 
involved in a full blown conflict with Britain, an important factor in the eventual 
American victory.
9
 The French intervention followed a treaty of alliance between France 
and the nascent U.S., signed on February 6
th
, 1778, in which France effectively 
recognized the latter’s independence. Among other issues, the treaty formed an alliance 
in the war against Britain, the purpose of which was securing American independence.
10
  
The international response to the American Revolution could be summarized in 
the following terms: most powers, in general, opposed the American struggle on counts 
their aversion towards revolutions and their adherence to the monarchic legitimacy 
principle.
11
 Denmark, as we saw, adopted a peculiar position. Netherland assumed 
neutrality, perhaps foreseeing the belligerency doctrine; this position eventually has 
drawn it into war against Britain, which disapproved of the Dutch insistence that 
neutrality grants immunity from capture to non-contraband enemy goods shipped in 
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 France recognized American independence, prior to its 
consensual intervention in favor of the United States.  
All in all, the American Revolution serves as an example for the different 
concerns which major civil wars invoked in third parties at the end of the 18
th
 century. 
When revisiting the problems that concerned states during that struggle, it is striking how 




 CENTURY CASES: THE SPANISH COLONIAL WARS  
The Spanish Colonial Wars of 1810–1823 served to clarify, doctrinally, the recognition 
of belligerency as an intermediate status between non-recognition and complete 
recognition of a government or a state. This is true, although in the discourse of the time, 
the terms “belligerents,” “governments” or “nations” were used sometimes 
interchangeably. The positions adopted regarding the rebelling colonies by the United 






 In September 1, 1815, President Madison proclaimed the neutrality of the United 
States towards the parties in the Colonial Wars (without, actually, using the term 
“neutrality”, but merely highlighting the obligations of U.S. citizens, presumably under 
the Neutrality Act of 1794.)
14
 This attitude was reaffirmed by President Monroe, who 
                                                
12
 See id. at 113–129. The Dutch insisted on the principle of “free ships, free goods” – meaning, that enemy 
property, as long as it is not contraband, cannot be captured on board neutral vessels. Id. at 131–132. The 
reluctance of Britain to adhere to the principle prompted some neutral powers, headed by Russia, to 
proclaim “armed neutrality” in 1780, in order to enforce the aforesaid principle. See id. at 149–171. The 
principle of “free ships, free goods” was enshrined in 1856, in the Declaration of Paris.  
13
 Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Recognition of Cuban Belligerency, 9 HARV, L. REV. 406, 408, 411 (1896).  
14
 See Proclamation 21 - Warning Against Unauthorized Military Expedition Against the Dominions of 
Spain (Sept 1, 1815). Britain too recognized the belligerency of the colonies, through an official 
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was the first to officially address the conflict as a civil war,
15
 and such was the American 
policy until full statehood of the Spanish Colonies was attained in 1822. Ironically, the 
American approach served as precedent for the British recognition of the Confederacy's 
belligerency in the American Civil War, decades later.
16
 
U.S. courts understood these statements by the executive as recognition of the 
belligerency status of the colonies.
17
 Accordingly, this approach was firmly applied by 
the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Palmer,
18
 and subsequently, in the case of the Divina 
Pastora, where the Court held that –  
 
the government of the United States having recognised the 
existence of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, but 
remaining neutral, the courts of the Union are bound to 
consider as lawful, those acts which war authorizes, and 





The Court, once again, grappled with the question of the rights of the rebelling 
colonies in the Santissima Trinidad prize case.
20
 There, goods carried by two merchant 
ships of the Spanish Empire were captured on the high seas by rebelling armed vessels– 
and brought to storage in the U.S. custom house in Norfolk. Of interest to us was the 
claim that the capturing vessels could not have received the immunities and privileges of 
                                                                                                                                            
proclamation of neutrality, warning all its subjects not to enlist in the armed forces of either party. See 
Beale, supra note 13, at 411.  
15
 In his message to Congress in November 17
th
, 1818. See Beale, supra note 13, at 409.  
16
 OGLESBY, supra note 1, at 8–13. On the confused British policy towards the Spanish colonies, until the 
grant of belligerency rights in 1822, see id., at 13–17. 
17
 Beale, supra note 13, at 409. 
18
 16 U.S. 610 (1818). 
19
 17 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1819). 
20
 The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283 (1822).  
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a “public ship” by the U.S., since the rebelling United Provinces were not recognized as a 
“sovereign independent government.”
21
 To that claim, the Court replied that –  
 
The government of the United States has recognized the 
existence of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, 
and has avowed a determination to remain neutral between 
the parties, and to allow to each the same rights of asylum 
and hospitality and intercourse. Each party is, therefore, 
deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far as 
concerns us, the sovereign rights of war, and entitled to be 
respected in the exercise of those rights. We cannot 
interfere to the prejudice of either belligerent without 
making ourselves a party to the contest, and departing from 
the posture of neutrality. All captures made by each must 
be considered as having the same validity, and all the 
immunities which may be claimed by public ships in our 
ports under the law of nations must be considered as 




The Court went on to uphold the ruling of the lower courts, restituting the prize to 
its owners, since the neutrality of the U.S. was compromised as there was an 
“augmentation of the force” of the capturing vessels while they were docked in American 
ports, previous to the capture of the Spanish ships.
23
  
While the logic of the belligerency doctrine is definitely present in the reasoning 
of both in the Divina Pastora and Santissima Trinidad cases, it should be noted that the 
loose use of the terms “nations” and “governments” in reference to the rebelling forces is 
                                                
21




 Id. at 344–346. Had restitution not been decreed, the U.S. could have been deemed as no-longer neutral.  
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somewhat confusing, when considering the intermediate status of belligerency. 




    
I.3 MID 19
TH
 CENTURY CASES: TEXAS, CANADA AND OTHERS 
Texas declared independence from Mexico in December 1835, after a year of conflict. 
Following prolonged hesitation, the U.S. recognized Texan independence in 1837, 
followed by Britain and France in 1840.
25
 Nevertheless, the U.S. granted belligerent 
status to the Texans from the outset of the conflict, as clarified in an 1836 diplomatic 
correspondence between the Mexican ambassador and Secretary of State Forsyth.
26
 
Perhaps adopting the language of the Supreme Court in the Santissima Trinidad, the 
Attorney General expressly opined, in May 1836, that an intermediate position of 
belligerency exists, and that such was recognized regarding the Texan conflict: 
 
Where a civil war breaks out in a foreign nation, and part of 
such nation erects a distinct and separate government, and 
the United States though they do not acknowledge the 
independence of the new government, do yet recognize the 
existence of a civil war, our courts have uniformly regarded 
each party as a belligerent nation, in regard to acts done 
jure belli … The existence of a civil war between the 
people of Texas and the authorities and people of the other 
Mexican States, was recognised by the President of the 
                                                
24
 See, e.g.,The Hornet, 12 F.Cas. 529, 531 (1870). 
25
 WHEATON’S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44–45 n. 16 (Richard Henry Dana, ed., 1866) 
26
 Id.  at 38, n. 15. 
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Accordingly, American courts applied the belligerent status of Texas by recognizing the 
immunity of its warships, and saw it as “entitled to all the sovereign rights of war.”
28
 
The U.S. has declared its neutrality vis-à-vis an internal conflict, once more, in 
the conflict in Canada in 1837. The conflict erupted when insurgents proclaimed an 
independent government in Upper Canada, occupied Navy Island (in the Canadian 
Niagara River) and appealed for foreign aid. This conflict spawned the famous Caroline 
incident, which is considered the root of the customary international law doctrine of the 
right to self-defense.
29
 The Caroline, a private American steamboat, was deemed by the 
British as aiding the opposition forces that have concentrated in Navy Island. Thus, on 
December 29, 1837 British forces crossed the Niagara River, captured the Caroline in the 
territorial waters of New York, destroyed it, and returned to Canada. Following this 
controversy, on January 5, 1838, President Van Buren proclaimed (perhaps hastily) that 
“civil war begun in Canada,” and that all persons that compromise the “neutrality of this 
government” by interfering in the Canadian conflict will be arrested and punished.
30
  
The intermediate status of belligerency, even if not explicitly labeled as such, has 
played a factor in several other conflicts of the 19
th
 century. We shall not elaborate on 
                                                
27
 United States Attorney General, Piracy upon the High Seas, 3 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 120 –122 (May 17, 
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these. To briefly mention, Britain respected the blockade proclaimed in 1828 by Dom 
Miguel, pretender to the throne of Portugal against the child Quean Dona Maria, who was 
recognized at the time by Britain.
31
 In 1848, Britain recognized the blockade imposed on 
Trieste by Italian insurgents, justifying it on counts of an existence of a de facto war.
32
 In 
1860, Britain recognized the blockade and prize law rights of the Garibaldi forces in 
Italy.
33
 All of these proclamation and actions were undertaken without making a moral 
judgment concerning the conflicting parties. 
 
II. THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BELLIGERENCY DOCTRINE: THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR  
II.1 GENERAL 
The conflicts discussed in the previous section have generally outlined the belligerency 
doctrine. However, it took a massive conflict such as the American Civil War to 
consolidate it. The American Civil War, as there is no need to elaborate, was prompted 
by the secession of the Southern States – organized as the Confederate States of America 
– mainly over the controversy between the parties over the institution of slavery.
34
 Full 
blown conflict erupted in the battle for Fort Sumter of April 12, 1861, and when a 
blockade was proclaimed against Confederate ports by U.S. President Lincoln a week 
later, the conflict immediately raised international concerns. As we shall see, the 
Confederacy was considered by the Union (albeit grudgingly), as well as by European 
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 Id. at 19–20.  
34
 For a factual summary and an extensive overview, see Quincy Wright, The American Civil War, in THE 
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Indeed, the American Civil War constitutes the quintessential example of the 
recognition of belligerency as a mean to regulate the relations between parties to an 
internal conflict and external powers – and also illustrates the discrepancies of the 
doctrine with contemporary law. Mainly, it is serves a uniquely clear example of the 
amoral perception of states at the time, as the issue of slavery – already seen by many as 
morally wrong – did not play a part in the decision by world powers to remain neutral in 
the conflict.   
 
II.2 INTERNAL APPROACHES 
From the outset of the conflict, the U.S. was caught in somewhat of a legal bind. Simply 
put, the U.S. aspired to exercise belligerent powers against the South, without 
recognizing, sweepingly, the South’s capacity to do the same. Thus, on one hand, the 
U.S. saw utmost importance in the prevention of the grant of any legal status to the South 
by foreign states; on the other, it had an interest in recognizing that the conflict was 
indeed a “war”, mainly in order to impose a third-party binding blockade and to trigger 
the application of prize law vis-à-vis Confederate vessels and neutral vessels carrying 
contraband.
 36
 This approach seems to have been advocated by Secretary of State Seward, 
as demonstrated in a blistering Dispatch 10 of May 21, 1861, to Charles Francis Adams, 
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 Wright, supra note 34, at 30–31. 
36
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INTERNATIONAL LAW 243–244 (1948). 
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U.S. ambassador to Britain.
37
 As we shall see, Britain and prominent British jurists of the 
time, such as Bernard, adopted a different view.
38
 
Wright labeled the U.S. approach, in general, as a “half-hearted” acceptance that 
the conflict amounted to belligerency.
39
 This explains, perhaps, the discrepancy between 
President Lincoln’s words in his blockade proclamation – according to which the 
Confederacy was merely “a combination of persons” engaged in insurrection, that have 
issued “pretended letters of marquee;” and therefore, harassment of U.S. ships by their 
vessels or privateers
40
 would be considered piracy –
41
 and subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions that addressed the belligerency status of the South. However, as we shall 
shortly see, the U.S. Courts too were not entirely consistent in their reasoning, as there 
was some tendency to recognize belligerency only in so far as it spawned rights for the 
U.S. rather than the Confederacy.  Be it as it may, it is striking that Union courts, even 
when at large hostile to Confederacy belligerent rights, were careful to base their 
decisions on reasons of effectiveness and sovereignty, rather on any substantive judgment 
of the parties. 
The belligerency doctrine was expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Prize 
Cases of 1862.
42
  There, the Court had to grapple in detail with the question whether the 
Civil War constituted a war in the sense of international law, triggering the application of 
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 In the Prize Cases, the Court ruled on an appeal by four merchant vessels – 
two Confederate, one British and one Mexican – that were captured by Union ships, to be 
condemned in a District Court sitting as a prize court. The claimants argued, inter alia, 
that the Union could not impose a blockade on the South with consequences in prize law, 
since the conflict was an insurrection rather than a war in the international or municipal 
sense.
44
 The Court, in a majority ruling (5-4), rejected these claims, setting forth a clearly 
de facto doctrine for the understanding of belligerent rights in civil wars.
45
 It ruled that 
prize law is triggered by the existence of a de facto war; and that internal conflicts can 
indeed constitute such “wars,” in which a clear intermediate status of belligerency exists: 
 
The parties belligerent in a public war are independent 
nations. But it is not necessary to constitute war, that both 
parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or 
sovereign States. A war may exist where one of the 
belligerents, claims sovereign rights as against the other . . . 
When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile 
manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their 
independence; have cast off their allegiance; have 
organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their 
former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as 
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The Court vehemently rejected the notion that there is something inherent in 
internal armed conflicts which prevents them from being “wars,” and the parties from 
being “enemies:” 
 
The law of nations is also called the law of nature; it is 
founded on the common consent as well as the common 
sense of the world. It contains no such anomalous doctrine 
as that which this Court are now for the first time desired to 
pronounce, to wit: That insurgents who have risen in 
rebellion against their sovereign, expelled her Courts, 
established a revolutionary government, organized armies, 
and commenced hostilities, are not enemies because they 
are traitors; and a war levied on the Government by 
traitors, in order to dismember and destroy it, is not a 




Furthermore, and citing Vattel, the Court held that parties to a civil war ought to 
adhere to laws of war, on counts of reason and reciprocity (stopping short of imposing a 
clear-cut legal obligation to do so); and that the existence of a civil war is a question of 
fact, notwithstanding formal declarations or the lack thereof, or the negative perception of 
one side regarding the other.
48
 
The Court ruled that the acknowledgment of an internal conflict as a war by third 
parties, which spawns the opposition’s belligerent rights, is done through a declaration of 
neutrality.
49
 Thus, it concluded that the Union blockade was legal under international and 
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municipal law, and that third parties must respect in order to maintain their neutral 
status.
50
 This conclusion was reaffirmed in further Supreme Court prize decisions 
throughout the Civil War.
51
 
However, the Court in the Prize Cases stopped short from specifying the 
belligerent rights of the Confederacy, since what was discussed there, to a large extent, 
was the belligerent rights of the Union. As aforementioned, the U.S. judiciary – as U.S. 
policy at large – was not consistent in its equal recognition of Union and Confederate 
belligerent rights. This was evident in the case of the Lilla. There, the District Court of 
Massachusetts, sitting as a prize court, was required to rule on the validity of prize 
decisions of Confederate courts.
52
 The Court labeled South Carolina prize proceedings as 
taking place under “assumed authority,” and held that such proceedings cannot divest the 
title of the original owner.
53
 The Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the Prize Cases, 
ruling that –  
treating the Confederates in some respects as belligerents 
was not an abandonment of sovereign rights, and by no 
means precluded us from treating them in other respects as 
rebels. Most assuredly I shall not recognize the Southern 
Confederates as a nation, or as having a government 
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This reasoning was criticized by the Law Officers of the British Crown. Much like the 
British courts,
55
 they adopted the view that the Confederacy possesses the same 
belligerent rights as the Union, among them the right to adjudicate prize.
56
  
The question of belligerency, unsurprisingly, did not surface in the state courts of 
the Confederacy. The Confederacy declared war on May 6
th
, 1861, passing an act 
“Recognizing the Existence of War between the United States and the Confederate 
States; and Concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes and Prize Goods.”
57
 As the Confederate 
judiciary recognized the Confederate government as a national government, subject to the 
law of nations,
58
 the question of any intermediate status of belligerency was quashed.     
  
II.3 EXTERNAL APPROACHES  
The prime concern of the Union was to prevent any recognition of the status of the 
Confederacy by foreign powers or any other type of intervention on its behalf. However, 
when the Union blockade was imposed, the conflict immediately produced international 
effects – mainly on naval commerce – requiring maritime powers to take a stand.
59
 On 
April 30, 1861, British Foreign Secretary Lord Russell learned that Fort Sumter fell into 
the hands of the Confederacy, and that President Lincoln called out the national militia. 
Six days later, Lord Russell announced in Parliament that the Government came to the 
conclusion that the Confederacy must be treated as a belligerent.
60
 After Confederate 
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President Jefferson Davis invited private vessel owners to apply for letters of marque,
61
 
and President Lincoln proclaimed a naval blockade of the South, the Queen proclaimed 
neutrality on May 13.
62
 Notably, the proclamation warned British subjects from 
breaching neutrality laws – enforced domestically through the Foreign Enlistment Act of 
1819
63
 – inter alia by a warning against 
 
fitting out, arming, or equipping any ship or vessel to be 
employed as a ship of war or privateer or transport, by 
either of the said contending parties; or by breaking, or 
endeavouring to break, any blockade lawfully and actually 
established by or on behalf of either of the said contending 
parties; or by carrying officers, soldiers, despatches, arms, 
military stores, or materials, or any article or articles 
considered and deemed to be contraband of war according 
to the law or modern usage of nations, for the use or service 




The declaration spawned an intense debate, in which British foreign minister 
Russell, in his discussion with John Francis Adams, U.S. ambassador to Britain, 
attempted to downplay the meaning of the British declaration, denying that it was a 
preclude to recognition of independence, and labeling it as a mere technical “necessity,” 
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based upon a determination of a “fact.” It was only designed to “explain to British 
subjects their liabilities.”
65
 Adams replied that, in principle, he agrees to this view 
(meaning, presumably, the concept of belligerency); however, he thought that it was 
premature, as the recognition took place “before they [the South] had ever shown their 
capacity to maintain any kind of warfare whatever, except within one of their own 




If framed in a normative way, it seems that the doctrinal dispute between the 
parties concerned the question whether a state could impose a third-party binding 
blockade and still claim, at the same time, that belligerency does not exist. It is clear that 
– contrary to the American view– Britain was prepared to recognize all belligerent rights 
of the Confederacy, including rights in maritime prize law. The belligerency status of the 
Confederacy and questions regarding the application of British neutrality were addressed 
by British courts in various instances, in which the belligerency of the South was not 
doubted.
67
 By the time the war ended, both Adams and Russell were in agreement on the 
general concept of belligerency recognition, and indeed seem to differ solely on the 
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France declared neutrality soon after the British declaration, on June 10, 1861; the 
majority of other states with interests in maritime trade followed suit in the following 
months.
69
 The conservative powers of Europe, namely Russia, Germany and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire denied any status to the South, due to particular interests and their 





II.4 THE AMORAL APPLICATION OF THE BELLIGERENCY DOCTRINE 
From our analysis until now, it is clear that the recognition of the rights of parties to 
internal armed conflicts were at large disconnected from any substantive or moral 
analysis – beyond the frequently stated condition that both parties must adhere to the laws 
of war, which were based on the concept of reciprocity between parties, and not 
concerned, at large, regarding a party’s treatment of its own population. The American 
Civil War was one of the rare cases in which it was definitely possible to identify a 
glaring immorality – the institution of slavery –
71
 and therefore, in its context, the amoral 
approach of the belligerency doctrine and the effectiveness-based approach towards the 
recognition of rights and powers of parties to internal armed conflicts, is most starkly 
emphasized. 
 
II.4.1 The Slavery X-Factor  
Since Britain was, in general, very hostile to the idea of slavery, it felt comfortable with 
its relatively supportive policy towards South only as long as slavery was not viewed as 
                                                
69
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the main issue at stake. Indeed, when Lincoln issued the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation in September 1862, British liberals were overwhelmingly supportive of the 
Union.
72
 Nonetheless, such support did not manifest itself in clear-cut policy deviating 
from neutrality towards the parties to the conflict.
73
 Throughout the war, Britain 
considered, from time to time, the recognition of the Confederacy as a state, but 
ultimately decided not to do so and to remain in the intermediate position of belligerency 
recognition.
74
 It is reasonable that the competing principles in British policy – favoring 
self-determination of the South on the one hand, versus disapproval of slavery on the 
other – were behind the fact that independence was never recognized and belligerency-
induced neutrality was opted for.
75
  
Although slavery was abhorred in Britain of the 19
th
 century, the issue of slavery 
did not affect its decision to adopt a neutral stance regarding the Civil War. So detached 
was the question of slavery from the question of belligerency recognition, that the U.S. 
Congress had to remind European powers what was at stake. When France proposed to 
mediate between the parties – perhaps having in mind eventual Southern independence – 
the offer was rejected “promptly” by Lincoln; Congress, in a joint resolution of March 3, 
1863,
76
 emphasized that slavery was at the core of the conflict. Congress resolved that 
while the U.S. could understand foreign powers’ interests to bring an end to internal 
conflicts, any offer of foreign “interference” in the struggle with the South would be “so 
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far unreasonable and inadmissible that its only explanation will be found in a 
misunderstanding of the true state of question, and of the real character of the war.” The 
real character, as resolved by the Congress, was one in which the South was aspiring to 
“build a new Power whose corner-stone … shall be slavery;” and the Union, conversely, 
was waging a battle to prevent the establishment of such a power. Thus, any foreign 




The Congress went so far as to resolve that further international attempts at 
mediation would be considered as “unfriendly” acts; and regretted that the foreign powers 
have not told the leaders of the rebellion that their endeavor, being based on slavery, “is 
so far shocking to civilization and the moral sense of mankind that it must not expect 
welcome or recognition in the commonwealth of nations.” The Congress asserted the 
universal morality of the Union’s cause, labeling its effort as one representing “good 
government and of human rights everywhere among men.”
78
   
This reminder was no doubt due. In order to understand the amoral approach of 
the powers to the American Civil War, it suffices to examine some of their declarations 
of neutrality. Like Britain’s, other neutrality declarations were extremely technical, most 
very laconic, and addressed almost exclusively to the relevant state’s citizenry by 
clarifying the adverse ramifications of breaches of neutrality laws by merchant vessels. 
Some declarations notified that, in conformity with the Declaration of Paris, privateers of 
neither party would be admitted to their ports. None of the declarations referred to the 
issue of slavery or to other substantive questions, such as conformity to the laws of war. 




 Id.  For more about the resolution, see Wright, supra note 34, at 101–102. 
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France addressed the fact that the Confederacy “claims” to be independent, without 
mentioning the merits, and proceeded to enumerate the neutrality provisions it will 
enforce.
79
 Spain “resolved to maintain strict neutrality in the contest begun between the 
Federal States of the Union and the States confederated at the South.”
80
 Prussia 
laconically notified its merchants that “during the continuance of the conflict that has 
broken out among the North American States, the mercantile classes must abstain from 
all enterprises which are forbidden by the general principles of international law.”
81
 
Belgium simply stressed its adherence to the Declaration of Paris.
82
 The Netherlands 
followed the same route, and warned its merchants of losses due to “any violation of the 




II.4.2 John Stuart Mill and the Idea of Consensual Intervention in the Civil War 
The hypothetic question of consensual intervention in the face of the South’s slavery 
policies bothered John Stuart Mill, albeit from an ethical rather than legal point of view. 
After the Trent Affair of November 1861 – concerning the interception of a British vessel 
and removal of Confederate officials – there was serious concern that Britain will 
intervene forcibly in favor of the Confederacy.
84
 When risk of war faded, Mill lauded the 
easing of the tensions in an article published in Fraser’s Magazine in February 1862, 
vehemently denouncing, on ethical counts, any potential intervention on behalf of the 
Confederacy.
85
 Indeed, Mill was not comfortable even with the recognition of the South’s 
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belligerency. He acknowledged the amoral aspect of the belligerency recognition of the 
South, mildly criticizing it, but viewing it nonetheless as a result of “political” necessity: 
 
There is no denying that our attitude towards the 
contending parties (I mean our moral attitude, for 
politically there was no other course open to us than 
neutrality) has not been that which becomes a people who 





Indeed, he saw the Union actions in the Trent Affair as “an indignity, and something 
more than an indignity, which not to have resented, would have been to invite a constant 
succession of insults and injuries.”
87
 However, his position negated any prospects that 
belligerency recognition might lead to eventual forcible intervention. Mill strongly 
argued that it was inconceivable that Britain, which has long been active against slavery, 
“should have lent a hand to setting up … a powerful republic, devoted not only to 
slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism.” Thus, argued Mill, while Britain had the right 
to respond to the wrong inflicted upon it, the consequences would soon overshadow the 
initial objective:  
 
When the new Confederate States, made an independent 
Power by English help, had begun their crusade to carry 
negro slavery from the Potomac to Cape Horn, who would 
then have remembered that England raised up this scourge 
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to humanity not for the evil’s sake, but because somebody 




Accordingly, Mill defended the policies of President Lincoln, which he saw as 
just in their essence. On counts of the wrongfulness of its cause – the perpetuation of 
slavery, he deduced that the South had no right to pursue secession: 
 
Secession may be laudable, and so may any other kind of 
insurrection; but it may also be an enormous crime. It is the 
one or the other, according to the object and the 
provocation. And if there ever was an object which, by its 
bare announcement, stamped rebels against a particular 





It was thus obvious that although he was willing to justify Britain’s neutrality, 
Mill would not espouse any forcible support of the South – on substantive grounds. It is 
doubtful, however, that Mill’s ethical position had any ground in international law of the 
time, which was controlled by the war prerogative and rooted in considerations of 
effective control. Nevertheless, his reluctant acceptance, as a “necessary evil,” of the 
neutral status induced by the recognition of the South’s belligerency, highlighted the 








 Id.  
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III. THE INSURGENCY DOCTRINE 
III.1 INSURGENCY: THE STATUS OF REBELS WITHOUT BELLIGERENCY RECOGNITION  
The recognition of belligerency was not without costs to third parties. On the one hand, it 
disturbed their relations with the recognized government; on the other hand, it exposed 
their merchant fleets to interruptions by the belligerents. However, non-recognition of 
belligerency left the situation unclear; and awkward situations, in which rebel vessels 
could be considered pirates, would take place.
90
 Soon enough, states had to grapple with 
the question of the status of opposition forces that were not recognized as belligerents, for 
one reason or the other. When faced with such situations, states realized that in order to 
apply domestic neutrality laws to persons within their jurisdictions, recognition of 
belligerency was not needed,
91
 and thus they could avoid the diplomatic and economic 
pitfalls that such recognition entailed.
92
 This was especially true when there were no 
maritime hostilities sufficient to gravely endanger the interests of third states.
93
  
These dilemmas were at the core of the development of the “elastic device” of 
recognition of insurgency (or insurrection) which was, in general, a flexible instrument 
aimed to deal with internal armed conflicts that required the attention of third parties, 
although belligerency was not recognized.
94
 As such, this status has gradually developed 
throughout the 19
th
 century, in parallel to the belligerency doctrine, and was considered, 
by the beginning of the 20
th
 century, as a distinct status “accepted in the international 
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 at least by Britain and the United States.
96
 Indeed, the approach of the 
insurgency doctrine, allowing for much flexibility when addressing internal strife, is 
reflected, to some extent, in contemporary international practice.  
The insurgency doctrine, while a significant step forward in comparison to the 
rigid and inflexible belligerency doctrine in terms of its response to the unpredictable 
questions that internal conflicts give rise to, was still generally devoid of substantive 
considerations. Like the belligerency doctrine, it was also based on the concept of 
effective control as source for rights and powers. The insurgency doctrine was premised 
on the logic that a “contest of armed forces” or “war in the material sense,” can take place 
de facto even without recognition of belligerency.
97
 As summarized by Beale: 
 
insurgency (distinguished from belligerency), is not usually 
recognized by writers on international law; but it seems to 
be a possible thing. In case of an insurrection there may be 
actual hostilities, but no belligerency, because there is no 
political organization on the part of the insurgents; or 
belligerency may in fact exist, but a state may not wish or 
need to recognize it. It may nevertheless be necessary to 
recognize the existence of hostilities, either to avoid 
dealing with an insurgent as a pirate, or to warn citizens 
against taking part in the contest. Such a recognition is of 
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The need to address internal conflicts that did not amount to “wars” has arisen, 
even before the American Civil War. Oglesby identified such cases during, inter alia, the 
first stage of the Greek revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1821, when Britain adopted 
a neutral position, prior to the proclamation of a blockade by the Greeks in 1822, which 
resulted in the recognition of belligerency;
99
 the Polish uprising in 1830 –1831, in which 
belligerency was denied ostensibly because lack of maritime operations, although the 
rebels seemingly possessed the qualifications to be considered as belligerents;
100
 the 
Hungarian war of independence of 1848, in which the U.S. did not recognize the 
belligerency of Hungary, although it was otherwise merited, since the former was not 
directly affected by the land-locked conflict;
101
 and the 1856–1858 insurrection in Peru, 
where the question of governmental power to close by decree ports under the effective 
control of insurgents has arisen.
102
   
If belligerency was an intermediate status between non-recognition and full 
recognition, insurgency was a status that could be looked upon, generally, in several 
ways. One way is to view it as entailing a few rights for the insurgents, but mostly 
obligations taken by third states in accordance with their domestic neutrality laws; 
another possible view would consider the status as a liability, as it serves to limit only 
insurgents, but not governments, by applying domestic neutrality law only regarding 
actions that support the former. Still another way was to consider insurgency as a status 
similar in essence to that of belligerency, but without a formal recognition as such; or as a 
status similar to belligerency, that applies, however, only to actions taking place in the 
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 The latter views correlate with the declaratory theory of 
recognition, professing that rights of entities are accumulated through facts on the ground 
rather than through formal acts of recognition.
104
 Yet another approach, notably adopted 
by Lauterpacht, could view insurgency as an extremely flexible intermediate status 
between non-recognition and belligerency, conferring ad hoc rights and obligations to the 
parties as circumstances necessitated.
105
  
The insurgency doctrine was thus elusive in two substantial aspects. First, as 
opposed to belligerency recognition, there are no comprehensive authoritative statements 
regarding the implications of such doctrine; second, it is often difficult, in absent of an 
explicit statement, to circumscribe the thin line between recognition of insurgency and 
belligerency, as both were made, to some degree, by declarations of neutrality.
106
   
 
III.2 INSURGENCY AS LIABILITY: DOMESTIC NEUTRALITY ACTS  
The seeds of the insurgency doctrine can be traced back to an 1817 amendment to the 
American Neutrality Act of 1794.
107
 The original Neutrality Act was generally 
considered the first domestic legislation enacted to enforce international neutrality 
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 In Section 3, it prohibited any person under the jurisdiction of the United 
States from fitting out or arming 
 
… any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or vessel 
shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince or 
state to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, 
citizens or property of another foreign prince or state with 
whom the United States are at peace…
109
  
   
It also prohibited persons to  
 
set on foot or provide or prepare the means for any military 
expedition or enterprise...against the territory or dominions 
of any foreign prince or state of whom the United States 




Therefore, the law was concerned only with wars between states, or those between 
states and rebels recognized as belligerents.
111
 This situation was detrimental to the 
interests of colonial powers in the proximity of the United States. In 1816, in the midst of 
the Colonial Wars of South America, colonial Spain and Portugal were concerned that 
some rebelling colonies might be able to procure vessels and privateers in the U.S., since 
unrecognized entities were not covered by the Neutrality Act, for better or for worst. 
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 See The Estrella, 17 U.S. 298 (1819) (holding that the recognition of the belligerency of Bolivarian 
Venezuela has made it a belligerent state for the purpose of the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1794).  
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Responding to this pressure, President Madison admitted that existing laws were 
ineffective.
112
 Accordingly, an amendment of March 13, 1817, extended the prohibitions 
of the Neutrality Act to extend beyond “princes” or “states,” also to the provision of  
 
… any such ship or vessel, with intent that such ship or 
vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign 
prince or state, or of any colony, district or people to cruise 
or commit hostilities, or to aid or co-operate in any warlike 
measure whatever, against the subjects, citizens, or 
property, of any prince or state, or of any colony, district or 




Thereby, the potential entities that could benefit from – and indeed be limited by 
– the Neutrality Act were extended beyond the traditional bodies. Chief Justice Marshall 
referred to the amendment as one that “adapts the previous laws to the actual situation of 
the world,”
114
 ostensibly, since it does not require formal acts of recognition of parties in 
order for neutrality laws to apply were de facto warfare exists.
115
 
The British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 was modeled after the American law, 
as section 7 applied neutrality requirements to a wide variety of bodies.
116
 The British 
law, for instance, prohibited to fit out and arm vessels for the service, during hostilities,  
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of any foreign prince, state or potentate, or of any foreign 
colony, province or part of any province or people, or of 
any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise 
any powers of government in or over any foreign state, 
colony, province or part of any province or people [against 





Indeed, it could be argued that the decision to apply domestic neutrality acts did 
not grant, de jure, any international status, as their effects are mainly internal;
118
 
however, it had practical implications over the status of insurgents, especially in an era in 
which international regulation of issues relating to war, in the form of treaties, was 
virtually non-existent. Thus, the recognition of insurgency was accorded by affected 
neutral states, usually, in the form of an expression by the executive that notices the facts 
and warns its citizens to obey neutrality laws.
119
 These executive declarations would 
thereafter be interpreted by courts.
120
  
The application of neutrality laws to insurgencies was a prominent feature of the 
American approach to the conflict in Cuba (The Ten Years’ War), between 1868 and 
1878. While not rebuking the validity of the belligerency doctrine, in the Cuban conflict 
the U.S. found that the circumstances did not call for such recognition. From the outset of 
the conflict, in 1869, President Grant argued that the rebels in Cuba did not establish a 
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“de facto political organization” sufficient to justify belligerency recognition.
121
 
Moreover, Grant stressed the amoral nature of the doctrine, emphasizing in 1870 that 
“[t]he question of belligerency is one of fact, not to be decided by sympathies for or 
prejudices against either party.”
122
 
Five years later, in a statement that became a classic representation of the 
belligerency and insurgency doctrines, President Grant still held that position:  
 
Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the 
tests recognized by publicists and writers on international 
law, and which have been observed by nations … I fail to 
find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial 
political organization … such organization of force … such 
occupation of territory, as to take toe contest out of the 
category of a mere rebellious insurrection … and place it 
on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of 
belligerency would aim to elevate it.
123
   
 
President Grant, importantly, made a connection between the need to regulate maritime 
commerce and the approach of foreign states to internal armed conflicts: 
 
The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection 
has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it may 
send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication 
with foreign powers except through the military lines of its 
adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and 
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difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to 
precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national, 
and upon the consular officers of other powers calls for the 




Accordingly, for instance, American courts refused to recognize the standing of agents 
claiming to represent the rebelling Republic of Cuba.
125
  
However, the recognition of insurgency was not without consequences: it 
prompted the application of the American Neutrality Act, at least with regards to acts 
committed in favor of the insurgents.
126
 The latter point is an important one, as it clarifies 
that the insurgency doctrine was used, at that stage, mainly to prevent disputes with the 
Spanish government, and thus resulted mostly in a liability for the recognized insurgents. 
Although the Neutrality Act was framed in a symmetrical manner, applied equally to 
governments as well as a “colony, district, or people,” the statute was creatively 
interpreted by U.S. authorities as to apply only to acts that would potentially benefit the 
insurgents. In 1869, the Attorney General was requested to provide an opinion, regarding 
the question whether the U.S. should act, under the law, against gun-boats built in New 
York for the Spanish government, engaged in the Cuban conflict, an inquiry to which he 
provided a negative answer.
127
 The Attorney General rejected the claim according to 
which the recognition of the Cuban rebels as a “colony, district or people” for the sake of 
the condemnation of armed vessels intended to serve them, entails also the opposite: 
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it is argued that this involves what is claimed to be the 
converse of the proposition, that, as we assert in those libels 
that Cuba is a ‘colony, district, or people,’ capable of 
committing hostilities against Spain, the law equally 
applies to an armament procured or fitted out by Spain for 
the purpose of hostilities against Cuba, and that the 
Executive Government, by filing those libels, have virtually 
recognized the ‘colony, district, or people’ of Cuba as 





This “erroneous” notion, the Attorney General opined, was that the Neutrality Act 
could only be applied where the parties were entitled to equal rights. Such “equal 
treatment,” can be expected only when the conflict is between two states, or in the case of 
an internal conflict – when the parties are recognized as belligerents.
129
 In any case of 
insurgency where belligerency was not recognized, the actions of insurgents seeking the 
procurement of vessels could indeed be considered hostilities against the government – 
acts that the neutrality act purported to prevent. However, the same course of action 
pursued by governments “does not involve a design to commit hostilities against 
anybody,” but merely to enforce governmental authority.
130
  While the legal reasoning of 
the AG could be disputed in light of the Neutrality Act’s text, his opinion, no doubt, 
clarified a main difference between the insurgency and belligerency doctrines, as 
understood at the time, and reflected the perception of governments as entitled to some 
“preferential treatment” when insurgency was recognized.  
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The same logic could be read into the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of 
The Three Friends.
131
 In this case, a steamer, The Three Friends, was seized in November 
1896 by U.S. custom officials in Florida, and was forfeited to the state for violation of the 
Neutrality Act, on counts that it was fitted out and armed for the intent of serving the 
Cuban rebels. One of the claims of the vessel’s owners was that it was not intended to “be 
employed in the service of any body politic recognized by or known to the United States 
as a body politic,” and thus could not be deemed to have violated neutrality laws.
132
 
Referring to the provisions of section 5283 of the Neutrality Act, as amended in 1817, the 
majority of the Court confirmed that “The statute was undoubtedly designed in general to 
secure neutrality in wars between two other nations, or between contending parties 
recognized as belligerents, but its operation is not necessarily dependent on the existence 
of such state of belligerency.”
133
 This interpretation was possible because, as 
aforementioned, the Neutrality Act did not prohibit violations of neutrality only vis-à-vis 
struggles between foreign princes or states, but since its amendment in 1817, also those 




there is nothing in all this to indicate that the words 
‘colony, district, or people’ had reference solely to 
communities whose belligerency had been recognized, and 
the history of the times (an interesting review of which has 
been furnished us by the industry of counsel) does not 
sustain the view that insurgent districts or bodies, 
unrecognized as belligerents, were not intended to be 
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embraced … instead of being limited to a political 
community which has been recognized as a belligerent, [the 
words] must necessarily be held applicable to a body of 
insurgents associated together in a common political 
enterprise, and carrying on hostilities against the parent 
country, in the effort to achieve independence, although 




Thus, the court ruled, the recognition of belligerency was immaterial to the application of 
American neutrality laws. The Court furthermore stressed the amoral nature of the law, as 
it endorsed the argument that “the words were ‘doubtless originally inserted with the 




However, recall that in the case at hand, the Court ruled that the Neutrality Act 
prohibited assisting rebels, although they were not recognized as belligerents. Thus, 
notwithstanding the symmetrical language of the Neutrality Act, and in conformity with 
view if the Attorney General expressed three decades earlier,
137
 it is doubtful whether the 
Court, in The Three Friends, was willing to recognize the positive rights of insurgents 
before their recognition as belligerents. It seems that the Court saw the insurgency 
doctrine as one that allows the U.S. to avoid conflict with Spain, rather one that confers 
material rights to insurgents: 
 
Any other conclusion rests on the unreasonable assumption 
that the [neutrality] act is to remain ineffectual unless the 
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government incurs the restraints and liabilities incident to 
an acknowledgment of belligerency. On the one hand, 
pecuniary demands, reprisals, or even war may be the 
consequence of failure in the performance of obligations 
towards a friendly power, while on the other the 
recognition of belligerency involves the rights of blockade, 
visitation, search, and seizure of contraband articles on the 
high seas, and abandonment of claims for reparation on 
account of damages suffered by our citizens from the 
prevalence of warfare. No intention to circumscribe the 
means of avoiding the one by imposing as a condition the 





III.3 INSURGENCY AS PRIVILEGE: CLOSURE OF PORTS, NON-PIRACY AND POTENTIAL 
RECOGNITION OF INSURGENTS AS DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS 
In a 1907 article, Wilson attempted to clarify the negative and positive aspects of the 
insurgency status. Citing numerous authorities, he was of the opinion that absent 
recognition of belligerency, substantial limitations apply to both parties in their relations 
to third states – not just to the insurgents. Thus, neither the government nor the insurgents 
could exercise the right to visit-and-search vessels of third states on the high seas, as this 
disruption of neutral trade was contingent upon the existence of war, which required the 
recognition of belligerency.
139
 Furthermore, insurgents could not proclaim a blockade, as 
they lacked “responsible” prize courts.
140
 Nevertheless, the same logic that was adopted 
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in the Prize Cases regarding recognized belligerents – that of reciprocity and reason – 
required the observation of laws of war between both parties in case of insurgency.
141
 
However, and notwithstanding the “liability” incurred by insurgents due to the 
negative effects of domestic neutrality laws, recognition of insurgency did in fact confer 
– even if indirectly – some status upon them, spawning rights (and obligations) usually 
associated with war. Thus, it conferred upon the rebels the right not to be considered 
pirates,
142
 at least when acting within the territorial waters under their control.
143
 Perhaps 
echoing an early departure from the strictly amoral approach of the effectiveness-
centered belligerency doctrine, the immunity of insurgents from being labeled as piracy 
was justified, sometimes, by “humanitarian” considerations, a “compromise principle 
which would elevate a political rebel to a plane higher than a pirate.”
144
 In addition, they 
acquired, in practice, a right according to which ports under their effective control could 
not be closed merely by decree of the recognized government, if not enforced by an 
effective blockade.
145
 These effects of the recognition of insurgency, although not 
universally accepted,
146
 were exemplified in the practice of the U.S. and Britain, as well 
as of other European powers.
 147
 
For instance, simultaneously with its recognition of the belligerency of the 
Confederacy in the American Civil War, Britain refused to recognize the belligerency of 
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the rebels in the 1860–1862 conflict in New Grenada (modern Colombia and Panama).
148
 
Nonetheless, Britain asserted that the government could not decree the closure of the 
ports that were in the hands of the rebels, although their belligerency was not recognized. 
Lord Russell, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated in June 1861 that if it wished to 
prevent neutral commerce, the government would have to impose an effective blockade: 
 
The Government of New Grenada has announced, not a 
blockade, but that certain ports of New Grenada are to be 
closed … in the event of insurrection or civil war in that 
country, it is not competent for its government to close the 
parts that are de facto in the hands of the insurgents, as that 





Recall, that this statement by Russell was given merely six weeks after the Queen’s 
proclamation of neutrality in the American Civil War. It seems, then, that a status of 
insurgency – meaning, the recognition of some de facto effects of insurgent control – was 
already in existence, at the same time Adams and Russell discussed the British 
recognition of the Confederate’s belligerency.    
The U.S. adopted a similar position regarding the 1885 conflict in the United 
States of Colombia. When the Colombian government requested that the U.S. respect the 
                                                
148
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closure of Colombia’s ports by decree, and treat opposition vessels as pirates, President 
Cleveland responded that these requests were inconsistent with international law: 
 
An effective closure of ports not in the possession of the 
Government, but held by hostile partisans, could not be 
recognized; neither could the vessels of insurgents against 
the legitimate sovereignty be deemed hostes humani 
generis within the precepts of international law, whatever 
might be the definition and penalty of their acts under the 





 Cleveland added, however, that this did not “imply the admission of a belligerent status 
on part of the insurgents.”
151
  
The insurgency doctrine recurred in practice in the following decades. When 
conflict erupted in Cuba again, in 1895, the U.S. – once more – refrained from the 
recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban rebels. However, President Cleveland, by 
proclamation, recognized “the existence of insurrectionary warfare” in Cuba.
152
 he 
informed that Cuba was “the seat of serious civil disturbances, accompanied by armed 
resistance to the authority of the established government of Spain, a power with which 
the United States are and desire to remain on terms of peace and amity.”
153
 Doing so, he 
declared that U.S. neutrality law prohibits the assistance to the rebels.
154
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 Id., at 502–503; see also Annual Message of December 2, 1895 cited in Wilson, supra note 95, at 48.  
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In his annual message of 1897, President McKinley vehemently criticized Spain’s 
policy and its means of repression against the Cuban rebels, exclaiming that “[i]t was not 
civilized warfare. It was extermination.” Nevertheless, McKinley followed Cleveland, 
and the reasoning expressed by President Grant in the previous Cuban conflict, in order 
to justify the American abstention from the recognition of belligerency.
155
 This decision 
by the U.S. highlighted, once again, the amoral character of the insurgency doctrine. 
Several logical conclusions could follow, from the negation of the government’s 
power to close ports by decree: most prevalent in practice, at least of the U.S. and Britain, 
was the notion that states were indeed entitled to impose an effective blockade in times of 
an insurrection that did not amount to war, and that the blockade in itself would not result 
necessarily in the conclusion that belligerency was recognized;
156
 another option, as 
perhaps evident from practice in the American Civil War, that the mere declaration of 
blockade by the government transformed the conflict into de facto belligerency, both in 
the view of the government and of third states.
157




Last, and as will be elaborated upon in our discussion of the  Spanish Civil War, 
Lauterpacht argued that the recognition of  insurgency could result in the recognition of 
the insurgents as de facto governments, regarding internal governing powers such as 
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legislation (but not with regards to belligerent rights vis-à-vis third parties).
159
 This far-
reaching feature of the doctrine can be viewed as one which, in essence, signified its 
demise rather than its potency, as it was inflated to include any possible policy decision 
opted for by external parties. 
 
III.4 INSURGENCY AS UNRECOGNIZED BELLIGERENCY? THE CASE OF THE ORIENTAL 
NAVIGATION COMPANY  
A further development of the insurgency concept can be found in the 1928 case of the 
Oriental Navigation Company, arbitrated in front of the U.S.-Mexico Claims 
Commission,
160
 established to settle claims resulting from the long running Mexican 
Civil War. This instance has taken place in the era of the League of Nations, which will 
be addressed in the next chapter, but on counts of its importance regarding the insurgency 
doctrine, we shall nevertheless explore it in this section.  
In April 1924, the American merchant vessel Gaston sailed from New Orleans to 
the Mexican port of Frontera. However, the Frontera port, along with other Mexican 
ports, was – at large – controlled by insurgents. During the Gaston’s unloading, a 
Mexican government gunboat appeared, and ordered the Gaston to leave the port. After 
warning shots were fired, the Gaston fled, leaving its cargo behind. The U.S. claimed that 
the action by Mexico was unlawful, and that the Oriental Navigation Company – the 
operator of the Gaston – should be indemnified for its loss.  
The issue at hand was, again, the closure of the rebel-held ports by decree of the 
Mexican government. Since the belligerency of the insurgents was not recognized by any 
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state, Mexico claimed that it had full power to decree the ports closed according to its 
municipal law, and that the U.S. was obliged to respect its sovereignty. The U.S. 
responded that when a port was in the hands of insurgents, the government could only 
close it through an effective blockade, and not by merely decreeing its closure.
161
 The 
Commission upheld, in principle, the view of the U.S.:  
 
[I]n time of civil war, when the control of a port has passed 
into the hands of insurgents, it is held, nearly unanimously, 
by a long series of authorities, that international law will 
apply, and that neutral trade is protected by rules similar to 
those obtaining in the case of war. It is clear also, that if 
this principle be not adopted, the conditions of neutral 





The Commission, thus, ignored the fact that belligerency was not recognized – in 
fact, it did not even mention this issue beyond in its summary of the Mexican claims – 
adopting a reasoning that can be construed as suggesting that such recognition has no 
constitutive power; and that the driving power behind the rights of the insurgents, 
therefore, is the de facto existence of a civil war and effective control of the insurgents 
over the ports. Accordingly, in absence of an effective Mexican blockade, the disregard 
of the Mexican decrees by the U.S. was deemed lawful by the Commission.  
The Commission ruled, however – and being novel at that –  that the mere 
presence of the Mexican gunship near the port during the unloading of the Gaston, 
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represented a challenge to the insurgents’ control over the port during that moment; and 
hence, Mexico was not in the wrong by acting against the Gaston, notwithstanding the 
absence of an effective blockade.
163
   
This opinion was challenged by the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Nielsen. 
Nielsen opined that in absence of an effective blockade, Mexico had absolutely no legal 
grounds to interfere in neutral commerce, regardless of the incidental presence of a 
Mexican gunship close to the rebellious port.
164
 Of interest to us, was the link made by 
Nielsen between the recognition of belligerency and the declaratory theory of 
recognition, which might account for the decline in the status of the former doctrine.
165
      
Nielsen specifically addressed the question whether there was a difference 
between ports controlled by insurgents recognized as belligerents and those under the 
hands of unrecognized insurgents. In his analysis of the issue, Nielsen opined that 
practice revealed that no distinction has been made between ports of controlled by 
recognized versus ports held unrecognized insurgents.
166
 Citing authorities, he 
enumerated the conditions that justified the recognition of belligerency. However, he 
argued that is doubtful whether an affirmative act of recognition of belligerency was 
required in order for the rebels – indirectly – to attain some legal status. Just as states did 
not begin to exist strictly upon recognition, he asserted, so did the status of insurgents – 
although the recognition of belligerency does “entail important consequences.”
167
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Therefore, Nielsen concluded, when a port is held by unrecognized insurgents, the 
implications vis-à-vis third parties are the same as if they were recognized belligerents. 
However, he dismissed the majority’s view that the mere and brief presence of the 
Mexican gunship near the Frontera port negated the effective control of the port by the 
rebels opposition, and in the absence of an effective blockade,
168
 ruled in favor of the 
United States. While Nielsen did not say so explicitly, a necessary expansion of the logic 
of his argument – binding the status of insurgents with the declarative view of recognition 
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CHAPTER 7 
INTERVENTION AND CONSENT IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 
 
I. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SYSTEM AND THE USE OF FORCE – FROM THE 
BALANCE OF POWER TO THE POWER OF PROCEDURE  
Following the trauma of World War I, popular public opinion in Europe and elsewhere 
was determined to limit the 19
th
 century’s balance-of-power approach towards the use of 
force. War, as a phenomenon, has come to be perceived as a product of 
misunderstandings between unaccountable leaders.
1
 This approach was reflected in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted in 1919. A revolutionary document at the 
time, the Covenant sought, for the first time, to prevent wars through a system of pacific 
settlement of disputes, augmented by a collective security mechanism.
2
  
The Covenant indeed presented new legal restrictions on the hitherto unfettered 
war-power of states. It was novel in the sense that it created a distinction between “legal 
and illegal wars.”
3
 Moreover, it declared, in Article 11, that war is no more merely a 
concern of the parties involved; it would be per se a concern of the whole League, which 
will take, accordingly, any action to safeguard peace. States conducting wars that were 
illegal, according to the covenant, would face collective action. The distinction between 
legal and illegal wars sparked a long-standing debate regarding the traditional freedom of 
states to assume neutral status. It was claimed, for instance, that where aggression occurs, 
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the previous perception of neutrality could no longer be relevant, and that some 
intermediate status between neutrality and participation in war must be recognized.
4
 
However, the Covenant did not prohibit war in its entirety, nor did it confine it 
only to cases of self-defense. It merely sought to prevent it through restrictions, and to 
inhibit it through the imposition of procedural requirements, reducing it to a measure to 
be taken only when other means of enforcement were exhausted.
5
 As such, and as we 
shall see, the Covenant system had significant “gaps” that allowed states to legally resort 
to war,
6
 and could theoretically be utilized to justify forcible interventions in internal 
strife, even against governments.  
 
I.1 PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
The theory behind the pacific settlement of disputes system saw war as an often irrational 
act, a product of miscalculations and ignorance. As such, it could be avoided by imposing 
a mandatory “cooling off” period, applied through complex bureaucratic procedures, and 
overseen by external actors. During this period, states would have the chance to regain 
rationality and reconsider their choices. Supposedly, the cool-headed, rational 
consideration of the situation would avert war.
7
 Should states act in contravention to this 
mechanism, they would have been, ideally, confronted by a collective security system – 
where a violation of one state’s security is a concern of all others, to be met with swift 
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and decisive collective action.
8
 The pacific settlement approach was laid down in the 
complex system circumscribed in Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant.  
The first basic distinction made by the Covenant system, albeit implicitly, was 
between disputes “likely to lead to a rupture” (“serious disputes”) and other disputes 
(“regular disputes”). According to Article 12, in case of serious disputes, states were 
required to submit the issue either to arbitration, judicial settlement or to an enquiry by 
the Council of the League of Nations. These mechanisms were obliged to render a 
decision in “reasonable time” (arbitration or judicial proceeding) or within six months 
(the Council). After a decision, states were required to wait for an additional three months 
before they chose to “resort to war.”  
Regular disputes were not under the jurisdiction of the Council, and were to be 
submitted, if recognized by the parties as suitable for such action, to arbitration or judicial 
settlement, the latter to be adjudicated in front of the new Permanent Court of 
International Justice (Article 13).
9
 Reading Articles 12, 13 and 15 together, clarifies that 
serious disputes could be submitted – only if all parties involved deemed them suitable – 
to arbitration or adjudication. When choosing this path of “litigation,” states agreed to 
comply with the decision rendered; not to resort to war against a member that complies 
with a decision; and to refer cases of non-compliance to the Council.  
In an event that a serious dispute occurred, and the parties did not find it fitting 
for arbitration or adjudication, Article 15 provided that the issue had to be referred to the 
Council; in contrast to arbitration or adjudication, such submission could be made by any 
party to the dispute, and could be seen as an obligatory path if the parties did not choose 
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 In such a case, the Council initially would attempt to 
achieve an agreeable settlement. If the attempts failed, the Council could decide to 
publish a report. If the Council adopted the report by consensus (not including the 
involved states), states agreed not go to war with a party that complies with the report’s 
recommendations.
11
 If, however, consensus could not be reached, members reserved to 
themselves “the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the 
maintenance of right and justice.” Importantly, if the Council found that a dispute has 
arisen from an issue “solely within the domestic jurisdiction” of a state, the Council 
would not make recommendations – supposedly leaving the solution of the issue to the 
states themselves.  
When attempting to reconcile Articles 12, 13, and 15, it seems that the right to go 
to war, in the era of Covenant of the League of Nation, could be summarized as follows: 
if the parties chose arbitration or adjudication (Article 13), the party complying with the 
decision could go to war against the non-complying partly, and not vice-versa, but only 
three months after the decision was rendered. It is not entirely clear what would be the 
Council’s role in such an instance – it could be argued that in case of non-compliance the 
issue must have been dealt with in accordance with Article 15.  
If, however, the parties chose to submit the matter to the Council – the question of 
war-rights would be determined by the outcome of the process. Should a consensus be 
achieved, the complying party was immune from war; however, war could be declared 
against the non-complying party, after the three-months cooling period. In case consensus 
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was beyond reach, both parties could resort to war; presumably, again, after the cooling 
period stipulated in Article 12. This, undoubtedly, was the most significant “gap” in the 
Covenant’s restriction on the use of force.
 12
 
Dinstein points out further “gaps” in the covenant: since the Council was not 
competent to make recommendations in cases within the domestic jurisdiction of a party 
(Article 15), in such instances the parties retained their freedom of action, including the 
right to go to war;  if the arbitration or adjudication, or the Council, would not decide on 
the issue within reasonable time or six months, respectively, states could go to war; and 
significantly, the Covenant only applied between the member states. The right of war 
regarding non-members remained unaltered.
13
 In this sense, the limitation on the war-
prerogative enshrined in the Covenant was not constitutional in its essence. 
Therefore, in the era of the League of Nations, consensual intervention in internal 
conflicts – even against governments – could be still legal, as long as it conformed to the 
procedure outlined in the Covenant. However, it could be argued that interventions in 
favor of governments were completely uninhibited, assuming that these would be viewed 
as within the “domestic jurisdiction” of a party. Here, for the first time, a substantial 
legally-grounded argument could be set forth in favor of the principle of governmental 
preference in the context of forcible consensual intervention. 
 
I.2 COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
In case any state would resort to war in contravention to Articles 12, 13 or 15, the 
Covenant’s collective security mechanism, set up in article 10 and 16, would come into 
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play. Article 10 provided, generally, that states undertake to “preserve” each other against 
“external” aggression, in which case the Council shall advise upon the means of action. 
This provision was heavily debated, as its additional value was unclear, in light of the 
more detailed subsequent clauses. A committee of jurists appointed by the League 
concluded that “although Article 10 lays down no general rule of procedure and contains 
no obligation which cannot be found elsewhere in the Covenant, it nevertheless possesses 
a certain value of its own.”
14
 
Article 16, the more operative collective security clause, provided that the 
violation would be considered an act of war against all member states; a complete boycott 
would be imposed;
15
 and the Council would be obligated to recommend forcible 
assistance to the victim states.
16
 However, such “recommendation” – like most Council 
actions –would have to be reached by consensus. 
The League of Nations system, as history teaches us, failed in the prevention of 
wars. The study of the reasons for this failure is beyond the scope of this work. Shortly 
put, the Covenant’s complex provisions left too much space for manipulation and very 
little clarity.
17
 The emerging superpower – the U.S. – was not a member, along with 
Germany and Japan.
18
 Moreover, the general rule, entrenched in Article 5, according to 
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which all decisions of the Council and Assembly had to be unanimous,
19
 rendered its 




II. THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT: TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL PROHIBITION ON 
WAR 
An abolishment of the right of war, per se, was introduced in international law only with 
the conclusion of the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of 
National Policy of 1928 (the Kellogg-Briand Pact),
21
 which purported to mend the “gaps” 
in the Covenant system.
22
 The three-articled pact renounced war as an instrument of 
“national policy;”
23
 and required that the settlement of all disputes would only be pursued 
by pacific means.
24
   
By the Second World War, the Pact had a record-setting membership of 63 
states.
25
 However, and notwithstanding its novelty, the Pact was not unflawed. First, it 
did not directly address the right of self-defense, although it was never doubted that it 
does not negate such a right. Second, it left open for interpretation the question of what 
constitutes “national policy,” as some claimed that the term did not include war as a 
sanction for violations of arbitration or judicial decisions (war as “international policy.”) 
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Third, the Pact was not universal (although close to it);
26
 and fourth, it did not address 
forcible actions that did not amount to formal war, in its traditional sense. In the era in 
which the distinction between acts of war and forcible acts short-of-war was of much 
importance, this was a substantial issue.
27
 Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 
1930s, states often conducted hostilities without declaring war or referring to their actions 
as such.
28
 It is reasonable that this practice, a “lamented and unforeseen consequence of 
the Kellogg Pact,”
29
 has resulted in the eventual omission of the term “war” from the 
prohibition on the use of force set forth in the U.N. Charter.  
The Kellogg-Briand Pact did not replace the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
It essentially caused states to lose their “residuary liberty to use war … as an instrument 
of national policy,”
30
 which was, as aforementioned, reserved to them in the Covenant.   
Attempts to amend the latter in order to harmonize the two instruments – so as to sanction 




III. THE USE OF FORCE IN INTER-WAR PERIOD AND CONSENSUAL 
INTERVENTION: A DEPARTURE FROM INTERVENTION AS CHOICE  
By 1936, following the League of Nations’ restriction on war and the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact’s nascent prohibition on war, it was already safe to say that the old attitude towards 
war, which saw it as a valid method of self-help – perhaps a necessary evil – that 
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international law merely attempted to regulate, has given way to a new approach. This 
change was reflected, in practice, in the Italy-Ethiopia war of 1935–1936 in which Italy 
was deemed to be in violation of the Covenant and was subjected to (eventually 
ineffective) economic sanctions. This new attitude has also challenged, to its core, 
traditional notions of the law of neutrality, which hitherto dominated the legal discourse 
regarding wars and their effects on third parties. States could now be – vis-à-vis an 
aggressor – in a status which was neither belligerent nor strictly impartial, as opposed to 
the dichotomy of traditional neutrality law.
32
  
Indeed, once a prohibition on war was put in place, it became valid to ask 
whether, and under what circumstances, an exception to this prohibition – through the 
expression of consent – was legitimate. It is at this point that the major set of questions 
regarding this issue was given real legal substance: if war, presumably between states, 
was no longer a legitimate “policy,” does that mean that war conducted on behalf of a 
state, against opposition forces, is always a legitimate policy? Moreover, assuming the 
answer was positive, was the government of the state always presumed to be speaking in 
the name of the state, in a matter sufficient to allow it to consent to external intervention? 
Furthermore, it became relevant to ask whether the answers to these questions were 
determined by the effectiveness doctrine, or rather that another, alternative set of 
considerations emerged, perhaps spawning from the developing doctrine of self-
determination.  
Among these questions, the traditional belligerency doctrine could also be 
assessed in light of the new legal environment. This potential change can be exemplified, 
for instance, in the Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, 
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adopted at the International Conference of American States of 1928,
33
 which must be 
read in light of the Kellogg Briand Pact, concluded in the same year. Although the Civil 
Strife Convention was by no means universal, it allows us to draw a clearer picture of the 
understanding of the law of consensual intervention of the time. At large, the Convention 
enshrined the principle of “preferential treatment” for governments, at least until 
belligerency was recognized.
34
 While this distinction had debatable consequences in the 
war-prerogative era, after the Kellogg-Briand Pact it seems that it could indeed have 
substantive implications.  
The five-articled Convention obliged states to prevent the inhabitants of their 
territory from starting or promoting or participating in civil strife in another state; to 
disarm and intern every rebel force crossing their boundaries; and to “forbid traffic in 
arms and war material, except when intended for the Government, while the belligerency 
of the rebels has not been recognized, in which the latter case the rules of neutrality shall 
be applied.”
35
 Recall, that before the Kellogg-Briand Pact – and to a lesser extent before 
the Covenant of the League of Nations – neutrality was always a choice; recognition of 
belligerency was a method to express this choice, but it could always be departed from by 
sovereign decision to enter into war. However, by the time Civil Strife Convention was 
adopted, the war-prerogative of sovereigns was limited. Therefore, it is reasonable that by 
that time, the recognition of belligerency and the resulting neutrality was the farthest a 
state could go if seeking to favor the opposition; any forcible intervention on behalf of 
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the opposition would violate the nascent-limitations on the use of force as long as the 
government was still recognized.
36
  
The question, then, would remain whether the right to consent to forcible 
intervention in favor of the government still remained, or was also limited. Presumably, 
the answer seems that the preferential treatment of governments entailed also that they 
enjoyed unlimited powers to consent to external intervention. Another possible answer 
was that the preference of governments would be limited when loss of territorial effective 
control. This approach will be addressed in the next chapter. However, a different opinion 
emerged also, reflecting a movement towards a substantive approach towards the rights 
of parties to internal armed conflicts. In the inter-war period, self-determination – 
however vague an idea – became a dominant concept in international discourse, through 
the powerful advocacy of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson.
37
  
Self-determination enhanced the discussion of the norm of non-intervention, 
leading to substantive ideas regarding intervention in internal armed conflicts – beyond 
the developing law on the use of force. Lauterpacht, for instance, echoed the views 
expressed by Montague Bernard from almost a century before,
38
 seeing every 
intervention in internal armed conflicts as interference. He saw it as a “denial of the right 
of the nation to decide for itself – by a physical contest, if necessary, between rival forces 
– the nature and the form of its government.”
39
 Therefore, he perceived the “preferential 
treatment” of governments as very limited, whether belligerency was recognized or not. 
                                                 
36
 Compare MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 96 –97 (4
th
 ed., 2006). 
37
 See JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION 13 –19 (2000).  
38
 MONTAGUE BERNARD, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION (1860). 
 
39
 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 233.  
 208 
Essentially, he argued for almost complete non-intervention, even without recognition of 
belligerency.
40
 However, Lauterpacht departed from the effectiveness doctrine, making a 
case for substantive analysis of parties –  
 
There must be definite limits to presumptions in favour of 
established governments so long as the international 
community has no such control over them as to secure 
effectively the fundamental rights of the individual and 




Lauterpacht’s position can thus be seen as an early substantive argument for a general 
qualification of the “preferential treatment” of governments, in the era of the limitation 
on the use of force. These qualifications, in their different developments, will be 
addressed later on in this work. 
 
IV. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND THE CRISIS OF THE TRADITIONAL LAW OF 
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 
The inter-war era, notwithstanding its de jure achievements in the realm of the limitation 
of the use of force, was also an era of crisis for international law and the international 
system at large. The advent of ideologies with global aspirations such as communism and 
fascism fundamentally challenged the traditional perceptions of inter-state relations.
42
  
The Spanish Civil War represented this ideological clash both internally and 
internationally, spawning reactions by third parties that reflected the ideological chasm of 




 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 234.  
42
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the time. Indeed, the conflict was seen as one that could not have been considered an 
isolated civil war, but – and as history soon proved, quite correctly – as one which 
involved forces that threatened the entire international order. Once the stakes were so 
high, it was not surprising that the traditional, effectiveness-based doctrines of 
international law regarding internal armed conflicts gave way to other approaches.
43
  
The Spanish conflict was eclipsed by the subsequent events of World War II, after 
which the world was fundamentally different, politically and legally. In this sense, the 
Spanish Civil War can be seen as the last major internal armed conflict taking place 
before the coming to being of the United Nations, and thus an event signifying the 
closure of an era. However, the responses to the Spanish Civil War did foresee a major 
development in international law: the emergence of collective reactions to internal armed 
conflicts. It was novel at being virtually the first internal armed conflict in which 
international institutions – whether ad hoc or permanent – played a role, although these 
had a limited effect in practice.
44
  
The Spanish Civil War erupted in July 1936, after the assassination of right wing 
leader Jose Sotelo, and the subsequent seizure of a government radio station in Valencia 
by rebelling military forces. By July 17
th
 widespread conflict spread. Soon enough, the 
rebels controlled half of the country.
45
 The root of the conflict was the Republican 
government’s determination to pursue reforms, thereby aggravating a coalition of 
conservative forces – ranging from monarchists to fascists, led by Spanish Army general 
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Francisco Franco and supported by most of the Spanish army, the industrialists, the 
middle class, landowners and aristocrats (The Nationalists).  
Soon after the beginning of the conflict, in October 1936, Franco appropriated for 
himself the title of chief of the Spanish state.
46
 The Republicans, in an effort to counter 
the military might of the Nationalists, turned to arm peasants and workers, leading to full 
blown chaos in which each group fought for its own interests. The Nationalists adopted a 
narrative according to which they were engaged in a fight against communism; the 




The international community’s reactions to the Spanish Civil War were diverse 
and novel. More than anything, they reflected a system in transition, in which traditional 
doctrines for the international regulation of internal conflicts, such as the belligerency 
doctrine, were set aside.
48
 In general, and as we shall see, in the discussion of the Spanish 
conflict one could identify several views that underlie the inherent dilemmas regarding 
the law on consensual intervention. One approach, as suggested by Lauterpacht, espoused 
an obligation amounting to mandatory neutrality, a concept that was now logically 
possible as a prohibition on the use of force was in place, and was based on a stringent 
perception of the principle of self-determination; another, as was unsurprisingly set forth 
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by the Spanish government and its few allies, argued for a mandatory preferential 
treatment of recognized governments, a claim augmented by the nascent laws on the use 
of force; yet another view, as presented by Mexico, argued for a substantive preference 
for the Spanish government, based on its democratic credentials.  
The inconsistencies of the international reaction, in comparison to the previous 
known practice, led frustrated commentators to argue that the time has arrived for the 
abandonment of old doctrines and the establishment of mechanisms that allowed for 
collective action and decision-making regarding internal armed conflicts. For instance, it 
was definitely demonstrated that the application of the belligerency doctrine was prone to 
opportunism, since it imposed on third parties inconveniences while barely benefitting 
them.
49
 Others heralded traditional international law, and claimed that the approach of 
many states to the Spanish conflict was illogical, and highly contradictory to previous 
practice. Smith lamented this “anomaly” of practice, warning – with ample clairvoyance 
– that this deviation will be regarded, in the future, as a precedent, and will ultimately 





IV.1 CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
During the course of the war, the Nationalists requested the support of the fascist nations 
of Europe – Italy and Germany. By the end of July 1936, both powers were involved in 
the conflict, by transfer of arms as well as by direct participation of their fighting units, 
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which were concealed as “volunteers.”
51
 Authoritarian Portugal too supported the 
Nationalists with “volunteers” and arms, and allowed them to use Portuguese ports, inter 
alia, for the transport of German aid.
52
 The Republicans’ calls for aid, however, fell on 
deaf ears. France refused to a July 1936 request for aid, since Britain did not approve of 
the idea; instead, it consoled its left-leaning constituency by emphasizing that neutrality 
law does not prohibit private dealers to provide arms to the Spanish government. Britain, 
too, refrained from transferring arms to either side, but initially did not prohibit private 
parties from doing so.
53
 As we shall see, this policy soon changed further to the detriment 
of the Spanish Government.  
The U.S.S.R. covertly assembled international brigades to assist the Republicans 
through the Communist International (Comintern). However, no citizens of the U.S.S.R. 
were allowed to participate. Comintern also used its network to provide military 
equipment. Moreover, The U.S.S.R. directly sent heavy military equipment to the 
Republicans, but not on a large scale.
54
 The Soviet support did not amount, however, to 
the direct involvement of Germany and Italy. By mid-1938, Stalin realized that absent 
full Soviet commitment, the cause was hopeless. Deciding to concentrate on protecting 
his front against the impending German and Japanese danger, Communist aid to the 
Republicans all but ceased. By early 1939 the Republicans were on the brink of defeat. 




 and the 
                                                 
51
 Thomas, supra note 44, at 113. 
52
 Id. at 114. 
53
 Id. at 114–115. Recall that international neutrality law, in general, did not restrict private parties in their 
dealing with belligerents, but only states. Thus, states were not obliged to prevent individuals from 
transferring arms to belligerents. See Chapter 4, sec. III.1. 
54
 Thomas, supra note 44, at 118 –119. 
55
 Thomas, supra note 44, at 160.  
 213 
Republican forces finally capitulated on March 31, 1939.
56
 Since the Spanish Civil War 
took place in an era in which aggression was already deemed illegal, it was possible at 
this stage to speak of the illegality of the German and Italian intervention, assuming their 
recognition of the Franco regime, which was awarded in late 1936, was premature and 
invalid. 
A salient feature of the Spanish Civil War was the use of “volunteers” as a mean 
utilized by states to circumvent the adverse consequences they might have otherwise 
suffered, if intervening directly in the conflict. As we shall see, a Non-Intervention 
Agreement, concluded by the European powers, did not initially oblige states to prevent 
their citizens from volunteering in the Spanish conflict. Indeed, the duty of neutrals to 
prevent volunteering, as understood at the time, required the prevention of “organized 
expeditions” from the neutral’s territory, but did not concern actions by individuals. This 
loophole was used by all intervening parties, and most notably by Germany and Italy, to 
conceal their direct intervention,
57





IV.2 THE NON-INTERVENTION AGREEMENT : COLLECTIVE NON-INTERVENTION 
The Spanish Civil War was unique in the fact that a Non-Intervention Agreement 
between numerous states was formed, prohibiting states to intervene in favor of both 
parties to the conflict – opposition and government. The agreement was unprecedented in 
two main aspects: institutional and legal. From an institutional standpoint, it set up a 
collective framework to govern the relations of external parties regarding an internal 
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conflict, perhaps signifying the general movement towards the collectivization of the 
international system.
59
 For instance, a Non-Intervention Committee was established in 
London to inquire violations of the agreement, upon receipt of complaints by 
participating governments.
60
 From a legal point of view, the agreement was novel, as we 
shall see, in its approach towards the law of internal armed conflict as previously 
understood. As such, its legality was heavily debated at the time.
61
 Although the 
agreement was thoroughly defied, notably by Portugal, Italy, Germany and the Soviet 
Union, it represented, de jure, a novel approach regarding international law of internal 
conflicts, and consensual intervention at that. 
In August 1936, Britain and France initiated the Non-Intervention Agreement, 
which was, in fact, comprised of declarations and exchanges of notes between states that 
wished to participate. The agreement included a preamble, in which the states pledged to 
abstain from all interference, direct or indirect, in the conflict, and three articles, in which 
they declared that they will prohibit all exportation of “arms, munitions and materials of 
war, as well as all airplanes … and all ships of war” to Spanish territories. Furthermore, 
they agreed that governments participating in the agreement will inform each other on 
steps taken to enforce the prohibitions.
62
  
27 governments made similar declarations. However, the declarations varied from 
each other. Some states, Italy and Germany notably among them, joined the agreement, 
but omitted from their declarations the preamble which prohibited all interference, thus 
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allowing them to undertake all forms of intervention not specifically prohibited.
63
 Both 
states promptly violated their declarations nonetheless; the U.S.S.R. also eventually 
violated its declaration.
64
 Portugal, seeking too to intervene in the Spanish conflict, set 
forth a heavily qualified declaration. It set conditions in which what it described as “the 
thought of non-intervention” could be realized. Moreover, it declared that the recognition 




The wide variety of interpretations of the agreement caused it to be described as 
less of an “agreement” in the formal sense, and more of a “concert of policy.” Indeed, it 
lacked a coherent binding interpretation or enforcement mechanism, its application 
effectively becoming contingent upon the good-will and initiative of each state.
66
 
Moreover, a key legal weakness of the Non-Intervention Agreement was in the fact that it 
did not explicitly prohibit withdrawal, and it is unclear to what extent it was legally 
binding, as it was based, in general, on unilateral declarations by states.
67
 Nevertheless, 
15 of the declarations were similar enough to form a common basis,
68
 essentially, by 
imposing an arms embargo on both sides, amounting to an instrument of negative non-
forcible intervention.  
As aforementioned, one of the main loopholes of the agreement could be found in 
the fact that it did not explicitly address the question of foreign volunteering on behalf of 
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the parties. By the end of 1936, Britain and France became alarmed at the influx of 
volunteers crossing into Spain. In January 1937 Britain called for national prohibitions on 
volunteer recruitment, and on January 10
th
 Britain invoked the Foreign Enlistment Act for 
that purpose. France followed suit by enacting its first act dealing sufficiently with this 
issue. In mid-February, all the powers in the Non-Intervention Committee agreed to 
widen the Non-Intervention Agreement to include an explicit ban on volunteering and 
pledged, to some extent, to station observers in the territories bordering Spain to 
supervise the agreement.
69
 The new understanding was consolidated in a March 8 
resolution by the Non-Intervention Committee that set up an Observation Scheme, 
consisting of eight international agencies augmented, inter alia, by an international naval 
patrol, authorized to inspect merchant vessels of participating states.
70
  
In general, and notwithstanding its novelty, the agreement did not succeed in 
preventing aid to be rendered to either side, not least because the definition of the term 
indirect interference was not agreed upon; the Committee dropped virtually all charges of 
violations brought in front of it; the Observation Scheme could be easily circumvented 
through ports of non-participating states; and at large, the Observation Scheme – as the 
agreement in general – relied heavily on good will and cooperation of states, which were 
not, by way of understatement, well meaning partners.
71
 More than anything, the Non-
Intervention Agreement was made a travesty, as Italy and Germany relentlessly continued 
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to send troops to aid the Nationalists, at the same time that they participated in the naval 
patrol ostensibly charged to prevent such actions.
72
 
From a purely legal point of view, the Non-Intervention Agreement could be seen 
as an undertaking by states to adopt an “enhanced” status of neutrality without 
recognizing the positive belligerent rights of the conflicting parties, including those of the 
incumbent government.
73
 This attitude was indeed novel, as the understanding of prior 
practice pointed out that a declaration of neutrality amounted to recognition of 
belligerency.
74
 Therefore, the agreement was not well received by many commentators of 
the time. Smith labeled the Non-Intervention Agreement as recognition of an “existence 
of a war,” but disregarding its “logical consequences.”
75
 He saw the agreement as a 
“collective declaration of neutrality” that amounted to recognition of belligerency, 
without granting the parties belligerent rights, something which he found legally 
“difficult to understand.”
76
 Moreover, the Non-Intervention Agreement went further of 
what neutrality required, in that besides its requirement that states adopt a neutral stance 
vis-à-vis the parties, it called for the prevention of actions of private individuals – both 
regarding arms transfers and volunteering – while international neutrality laws, at large, 
applied only to government action.
77
  
However, the major legal controversy spawned by the agreement concerned the 
fact that it did not distinguish between the recognized government and the opposition. 
Indeed, some states, and as we shall see, also commentators, were uncomfortable by this 
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approach. Therefore, for instance, Turkey and Yugoslavia emphasized that in their view, 
the Non-Intervention Agreement will “not constitute a precedent, or result in even the 
implicit recognition of a principle that a government can not render to a legal government 
… aid in the struggle against rebellion.”
78
 The Spanish government’s main legal 
argument against the Non-Intervention Agreement concerned this issue, as it claimed that 
the agreement was in itself an act of intervention. It lamented the agreement’s equal 
treatment of the rebels and the government, and its denial of lawful aid from an 
established government. The U.S.S.R., despite being a party to the agreement, partly 
joined this view, peculiarly arguing that it is a “breach of the principles of international 
law.”
79
 The same argument could be made, in principle, against the unilateral neutrality 
policy of the United States.
80
  
A prevalent view among the commentators of the time was that the agreement 
was indeed a deviation from international law, as it prohibited exports of arms to a state 
which was at peace with the participating parties, absent recognition of the conflict’s 
belligerency. Padelford, for instance, argued that a distinction must be made between 
neutrality and non-intervention in the context of internal and international conflicts, when 
the internal conflict is an unrecognized insurgency. As he argued, “[t]o apply to 
unrecognized and irresponsible rebels the same principles that are applicable to sovereign 
states and established governments is to encourage rebellion and disorder and to weaken 
public law and authority.”
 81
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O’Rourke concurred, referring to the Convention on Civil Strife, which 
supposedly allowed transfer of arms only to governments, prior to the recognition of 
belligerency.
82
 Smith presented a similar view, arguing that in absence of recognition of 
belligerency, if the states saw the Spanish conflict as “no more than an internal disorder,” 
then the Non-Intervention Agreement was a “grave act of intervention” against the 




It seems that these positions were imprecise, since they did not distinguish 
sufficiently between international law’s approach towards negative and positive 
interventions.
84
 As noted by Lauterpacht, in an absence of a specific treaty, there was 
never an obligation on states to freely trade with others, whether they were involved in an 
internal armed conflict or not. Therefore, it is difficult to consider the Non-Intervention 
Agreement, being a case of negative intervention, as a violation of international law.
85
 
This is a conclusion that is relevant also today: there is no general rule of international 
law that prohibits states from preventing aid to beleaguered governments.  
More controversially, and perhaps loyal to his general dislike of the “preferential 
treatment” of governments and support of the concept of self-determination, Lauterpacht 
saw the Non-Intervention Agreement as an evolvement towards a “workable rule of 
international law,” that requires neutrality towards both parties to an internal armed 
conflict, regardless of recognition of belligerency or lack thereof.
86
 This position too, on 
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its face, and as we shall see, did not take hold in modern international law as it was 
formed in the U.N. Charter.   
The debate regarding the Non-Intervention Agreement represented the ubiquitous 
dilemmas that arise in the modern law regarding consensual intervention. Notably, it 
highlighted the question whether governments should always receive preferential 
treatment; and how is the question of the rights of parties in internal armed conflict 
affected by substantive considerations such as the principle of self-determination.  
 
IV.3 U.S. NEUTRALITY: UNILATERAL NON-INTERVENTION 
The American approach towards the Spanish Civil War was not different, in essence, 
from the one reflected in the Non-Intervention Agreement, although the U.S. was not 
party to it. American public opinion of the 1930s was dominated by pacifist sentiment, 
and isolationism was a key feature of American foreign policy. Therefore, the support of 
either party to the conflict was not looked upon positively. However, the 1817 Neutrality 
Act, potentially applicable in the case of the Spanish Civil War, was narrow in its scope: 
it did not cover the transfer of arms by private entities. The Neutrality Act of 1935
87
 
expanded the prohibition to private “export of arms, ammunition and implements of 
war,”
88
 by thus going further than what was required by international neutrality law.
89
 
However, the Act explicitly applied only to “belligerent countries,” and thus did not 
prohibit export of arms to states involved in internal armed conflict, at least absent 
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recognition of belligerency. In January 1937, this “loophole” was closed by the Neutrality 
Act of 1937,
90
 which provided that - 
 
Whenever the President shall find that a state of civil strife 
exists in a foreign state and that such civil strife is of a 
magnitude or is being conducted under such conditions that 
the export of arms …  would threaten or endanger the 
peace of the United States, the President shall proclaim 
such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export, or 
attempt to export, or cause to be exported, arms, 
ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the 




Unlike the opinion of the U.S. Attorney General many decades before,
92
 and in a 
manner similar to the requirements of the Non-Intervention Agreement, the act of 1937 
prohibited interactions not only with the opposition but also with the government. 
Furthermore, it implied the assumption of a neutral status, without recognition of active 
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IV.4 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: BELLIGERENCY, INSURGENCY AND GOVERNMENTAL 
RECOGNITION 
Soon after the eruption of the conflict, the Spanish Government declared that Nationalist 
prisoners will be treated as prisoners of war, and that areas under control of the 
opposition were “zones of war;” it accordingly declared that these areas were under 
blockade.
94
 Padelford argued that although the Spanish Government failed, in practice, to 
treat Nationalist prisoners as prisoners of war, its declarations nevertheless amounted to 
recognition of the opposition’s belligerency.
95
 O’Rourke agreed, recalling the fact that 
Lincoln’s proclamation of blockade of the Confederate ports in 1861 was understood by 
powers as recognition of the latter’s belligerency.
96
 Smith held a similar position, in 
general, but pointed out that neither of the parties set up prize courts, published 
contraband lists or attempted seriously to establish a blockade in conformity to 
international law.
97
 Moreover, neither party respected the laws of war, as atrocities of 
many kinds were widespread.
98
 Intervening parties, notably Nazi Germany, also 
frequently violated the laws of war. For instance, the German air force was involved in a 
deadly raid on April 26, 1937, destroying the town of Guernica and killing 1,654 
people.
99
 On November 17, General Franco declared that the “National Government” was 
determined to end shipping of arms to the Republican port of Barcelona, in what was 
understood as a an attempted proclamation of blockade by the Nationalists.
100
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 Padelford, supra note 45, at 227. In practice, the blockade proclamation was an attempt to close the 
rebels’ ports by decree, rather than a blockade. Id. at 231. 
95
 Id. at 229–230; see also Thomas, supra note 44, at 122.  
96
 O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 412; see also Thomas, supra note 44, at 152.  
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 Smith, supra note 42, at 25, 27, 29.  
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 Thomas, supra note 44, at 124–140. 
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 Id. at 137–138. 
100
 Padelford, supra note 45, at 232; Thomas, supra note 44, at 153. 
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In any case, despite the conflict’s magnitude, recognition of belligerency was not 
extended by third parties, although the question was much debated in the literature as 
well as in diplomatic efforts.
101
 Britain claimed that neither party was a lawful 
belligerent,
102
 advancing, perhaps inconsistently, the claim that recognition of 
belligerency was strictly a matter of discretion,
103
 along with the argument that the 
government’s blockade is not effective and therefore was to be ignored.
104
 The U.S. held 
similar positions.
105
 The same approach was adopted regarding the blockade presumably 
declared by the Nationalists.
106
   
The denial of belligerent rights did not prevent Britain, however, from concluding 
a commercial agreement with the Franco regime in February 1937;
107
 or from dealing 
with Franco’s representatives, without granting them diplomatic status (a usual trait of 
belligerency).
108
 Moreover, British courts ruled that the British government accorded de 
facto recognition to Franco (while maintaining the de jure status of the Spanish 
Government).
109
 This de facto status resulted, inter alia, in recognition of Nationalist 
legislation, and – conversely – the nullification of Republican legislation in territories 
                                                 
101
 O’Rourke, supra note 49, 404 –405. The question of belligerency recognition surfaced in the 
negotiations between the parties to the Non-Intervention Agreement. For instance, following claims that 
their patrol warships, commissioned by the Observation Scheme, were attacked by Spanish forces, 
Germany withdrew on June 1937 from the naval patrol, followed by Italy. Germany and Italy subsequently 
proposed to recognize the belligerency of the parties; they argued that this will strengthen the policy of 
non-intervention by triggering the application of international neutrality law, and the enforcement of 
maritime belligerent rights by the Spanish parties. This proposal was rejected. Britain, however, proposed 
that a new form of “qualified” belligerency of the parties will be recognized, if both parties to the conflict 
agree. These proposals never materialized. See Padelford, supra note 60, at 599 –600. 
102
 The denial of belligerent rights from a government that itself employs belligerent means such as a 
blockade – thereby admitting the existence of a “war” – was contradictory to previous state practice. See 
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 193–199.  
103
 O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 401–402; Thomas, supra note 44, at 153. 
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 Smith, supra note 42, at 27; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 250. 
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 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 250. 
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 Padelford, supra note 45, at 232; Thomas, supra note 44, at 153. 
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 Smith, supra note 42, at 28.  
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 Herbert W. Briggs, Relations Officeuses and Intent to Recognize: British Recognition of Franco, 34 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 47, 48. (1940). 
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 Id. at 47; Thomas, supra note 44, at 158–159.  
 224 
beyond their de facto control.
110
 Regardless of the absence of belligerency recognition, 




The Nationalists enjoyed privileges also in the realm of maritime actions. When 
confronted with harassment of its merchant fleet, the U.S. claimed – perhaps loyal to the 
insurgency doctrine – that the Spanish Government could not decree ports under 
Nationalist control close, absent an effective blockade, notwithstanding the lack of 
belligerency recognition on part of the rebels.
112
 By November 1936, states recognized 
the de facto power of the Nationalists over neutral merchant vessels within the territorial 
water of Spain,
113
 while rejecting such powers on the high seas.
 114
  
All in all, it was convincingly argued that, in essence, Franco’s forces were 
recognized by most powers as insurgents.
115
 Indeed, the aggregation of the characteristics 
of the approaches relating to the Spanish Civil War could be interpreted as recognition of 
insurgency, if one subscribes to a flexible perception of the doctrine.
116
   
Germany and Italy, on their part, avoided these dilemmas. On November 19
th
, 
1936, they recognized the opposition as the lawful government of Spain, “skipping” the 
intermediate status of belligerency or insurgency,
117
 and negating any belligerent rights of 
the Republicans. For instance, Germany did not recognize as legal the December 1936 
                                                 
110
 For a concise summary of these cases see LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 273.  
111
 Thomas, supra note 44, at 142 –143. 
112
 International Law and the Spanish Civil War, supra note 45, at 230 –233. 
113
 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 272–273. 
114
 International Law and the Spanish Civil War, supra note 45, at 237. 
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 O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 404.  
116
 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 272–274 (claiming that the Spanish Civil War represents an 
instance of recognition of insurgency). 
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 International Law and the Spanish Civil War, supra note 45, at 236 –237. Portugal, El Salvador and 
Albania also recognized the Nationalists as the lawful government of Spain. See O’Rourke, supra note 49, 
at 411–412. It is argued that Germany and Italy were premature in doing so, and by thus committed an 
international wrong against the Spanish government. Guatemala also recognized the Franco regime, as well 
as the Vatican. See Thomas, supra note 44, at 160–161. 
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capture by a Republican vessel of a German ship, allegedly for carrying contraband and 
Spanish insurgents, labeling these acts as “piracy.”
118
  
Lauterpacht held a distinctive position, in an effort to explain the non-recognition 
of belligerency in the context of the Spanish conflict. He claimed, essentially, that once 
an external forcible intervention has taken place, the doctrine of belligerency was no 
longer relevant since the conflict was no longer a civil war, but an international one.
119
 
However, he did not elaborate upon the consequences of such distinction, beyond noting 
his aforementioned view that the recognition of belligerency required strict neutral 
conduct, which was blatantly violated by Germany and Italy.
120
  
In sum, the issue of the recognition of belligerency in the Spanish Civil War has 
to be read in light of the unique approach formulated in the Non-Intervention Agreement. 
It reflected a movement from the old, stringent approach regarding the regulation of 
internal armed conflicts towards the adoption of flexible and collective ad hoc responses. 
This trend highlighted the fact that the old doctrines have become, at large, irrelevant.     
 
IV. CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AS AN ILLEGAL USE OF 
FORCE AND THE CALLS FOR SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF PARTIES 
 Throughout the conflict, the Spanish government repeatedly appealed, largely to no 
avail, to the Council of the League of Nations, requesting it to act in the face of the 
German and Italian forcible intervention. On November 27, 1936, Spain appealed to the 
                                                 
118
 Padelford, supra note 45, at 237–239; O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 398. It must be said, that it is quite 
awkward to analyze the practice of Nazi Germany as indicative of any kind of international law, not least 
considering the fact that Nazi Germany’s theories of international law were intermingled with its racial and 
social-Darwinist theories. See Virginia L. Gott, The National Socialist Theory of International Law, 32 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 704, 704 –709 (1938).  
119
 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 34, at 251 –252. 
120
 Id. at 252–253. 
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Council, invoking Article 11 of the Covenant, labeling the German and Italian actions a 
“new form of aggression,” whereby a state engaged in “war to all intents and purposes, 
but without declaring war, by … giving military assistance to the rebels.”
121
 Reflecting 
the general notion of the time, in which internal conflicts were not per se the interest of 
the international community, the Spanish representative went to great lengths to convince 
the members that the war in Spain is indeed a threat to international peace, beyond the 
destruction suffered in Spain itself.
122
 The League, however, failed to take significant 
action besides adopting a resolution supporting the Non-Intervention Agreement.
123
  
Other Attempts to invoke article 11 were made by Spain in May and August 
1937, in which Spain presented evidence for forcible action by Germany and Italy on its 
soil. Again, the Council refused to take significant action.
124
 In September 1937, Spain 
managed to convince a majority of the Council to vote for a resolution recognizing that 
foreign forces were operating in Spain in violation of international law and calling for 
their withdrawal, but lack of unanimity curtailed its adoption.
125
 Further attempts by 




All in all, it is clear that the League of Nations had no serious legal ground to 
abstain from triggering the mechanism enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the Covenant. 
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 League of Nations Official Journal, Jan, 1937 p. 8, cited in Padelford, supra note 60, at 588.  
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 Id; O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 410; Official Journal, supra note 121, at 18–19. 
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However, political considerations, namely the preference of Britain and France to deal 
with issue in the framework of the Non-Intervention Agreement, took precedent.
127
 
After the war ended, most states recognized the Franco regime. Mexico was one 
of the few exceptions.
128
 From the outset of the conflict, Mexico maintained that a 
substantive view of the principle of non-intervention actually condones providing support 
for the Spanish government, since it was democratically elected. Therefore, it claimed 
that the European non-intervention pact was in itself a violation of the principle of non-
intervention: in its denial of the rights of the Spanish government, it constituted an 
indirect support for the Nationalists. Mexico’s approach differed from that of other 
aforementioned opinions that condemned the Non-Intervention Agreement, by 
emphasizing the democratic nature of the Spanish government as a justification for its 
preferential treatment. 
Mexico furthermore argued that since the intervention by Germany and Italy 
constituted an aggression,
129
 and also violated the principle of self-determination, the 
Franco regime could not be recognized – since it came to be by means contrary to the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. China, the U.S.S.R. and 
New Zealand supported the Mexican view.
130
 It could be said that the Mexican point of 
view was a harbinger of a new, substantive approach towards the law of internal armed 
conflicts and the law of consensual intervention in particular. Having this in mind, we 
shall now turn to examine these issues in the era of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.  
                                                 
127
 Germany was not a member of the League by the time the conflict erupted. Italy withdrew its 
membership in December 1937. See id. at 178. 
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 Id. at 161. 
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Table 2 – Summary of Rights and Powers of Parties to Internal Armed Conflicts in 
the War-Prerogative Era: The Belligerency Doctrine 
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PART 3: INTERVENTION AND CONSENT IN THE ERA OF THE 
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE 
 
CHAPTER 8 
THE PREFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTS: FROM DICHOTOMY TO 
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION 
 
I. ENTER THE U.N. CHARTER: STATE CONSENT AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE 
After the Spanish Civil War, the belligerency doctrine has virtually disappeared from the 
international-legal discourse, leading some scholars to maintain that it has fallen into 
desuetude.1 The subsequent catastrophe of World War II has further – and dramatically – 
changed the international system. Significantly, the tragedy led to the abolishment of the 
war prerogative. Accordingly, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter famously states that  
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations. 
 
                                                 
1Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 
BRIT. Y’BOOK INT’L L. 189, 197 (1985); ROSCOE R. OGLESBY, INTERNAL WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR 
NORMATIVE ORDER 100 –108 (1971). 
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Once a prohibition on the use of force was firmly set forth, the question of 
consensual intervention has gained substantive legal importance: if the use of force is 
prohibited in general, does consent provide for an exception to this rule? When 
addressing this question, is it imperative to recall that the prohibition on the use of force 
serves two mutually-enforcing interests. It serves to minimize the catastrophes of war; 
but also to enforce the norm of non-intervention and to protect sovereignty, however we 
interpret the contents of these principles.2  
Article 2(4), thus, prohibits the use of force “against the territorial integrity or 
political independence” of the state. Therefore, in theory, when an external actor uses 
force in the territory of another state in circumstances in which it is not acting against the 
latter’s territorial integrity or political independence, it is not, in general, in violation of 
article 2(4).3 Consensual intervention in favor of the “state” can thus be a rare case in 
which use of force is not against its territorial integrity or political independence, and as 
such can serve as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force.4  
The construction of the Charter’s text as providing for such an exception can be 
deduced, nowadays, from four main sources: the General Assembly’s Definition of 
Aggression; the Kampala Definition of the Crime of Aggression; the Articles on State 
Responsibility; and the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations 
(DARIO).  
                                                 
2 See Chapter 3, sec. III.2. 
3 See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV 1620, 1625 –1626 (1984) 
(discussing the ambiguity of article 2(4) of the Charter).   
4 The same interpretation was used by some to justify unilateral humanitarian, absent state consent. 
However, this view is generally rejected. See Chapter 12, sec. IV.2. 
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Article 3(e) of the Definition of Aggression, which quite possibly reflects 
customary international law5 – and in particular considering the fact that it was adopted 
as part of the Kampala Definition of the Crime of Aggression –6 excludes from the term 
“aggression” the following actions:  
 
[t]he use of armed forces of one State which are within the 
territory of another State with the agreement of the 
receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided 
for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in 
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement. 
 
Thus, the article recognizes, albeit indirectly, the jus ad bellum legality of forcible 
actions undertaken in accordance with the agreement of the “receiving” state – and could 
thereby exclude – from the term “aggression” and arguably also from being an unlawful 
violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter – also instances of consensual interventions in 
internal conflicts. 
 Article 20 of the Articles on State Responsibility complements the Definition of 
Aggression, by precluding, in general, the wrongfulness of acts conducted with state 
consent: 
 
Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act 
by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in 
                                                 
5 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), ¶3(e), U.N. Doc A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). Article 3(g) 
of the Definition, which is addressed in Chapter 4, sec. I.3, was deemed by the ICJ as reflecting customary 
international law. can serve as an indication for the customary nature of the other sub-articles of the 
Definition. 
6 The Crime of Aggression, art. 8bis(g), Resolution RC/Res.6, RC/11 (Jun. 11, 2010). 
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relation to the former State to the extent that the act 
remains within the limits of that consent.7 
 
A similar provision is included in article 20 of the 2011 Articles on Responsibility of 
International Organizations,8 stipulating that valid consent by a state to an act committed 
by an international organization precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the 
consenting state. This provision might apply to interventions by regional organizations 
with “internal collective security” arrangements – or forward-looking intervention 
treaties – as these will be discussed later on.9  
The term valid consent connotes two different meanings.10 The first refers to free 
and genuine consent – meaning, that the consent is not coerced.11 The second requires 
that the consent be expressed by a competent entity. Thus, a fundamental question 
concerns the determination of the entity speaking for the state in extreme situations, 
where a consensual forcible intervention is sought. Essentially, it asks whether 
intervention upon the consent of a beleaguered government is not actually per se 
conducted against the political independence of the state – under the assumption that the 
state is a “black box,” the character of which must be determined only by its internal 
parties.12 It is here where the normative duality of forcible interventions – meaning, their 
                                                 
7 U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, art. 20 in Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/56/20 
(2001),. 
8 U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Y’book Int’l 
Law Comm’n (2011).   
9 See Chapter 10.  
10 One these two meanings we will elaborate later on in this chapter. 
11 See Chapter 1, Sec. II.1. 
12 On the “black box” approach to sovereignty see HELEN STACY, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
SOVEREIGNTY, CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE 86 –88 (2009). 
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regulation by both the laws on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention – is 
at its most prevalence.  
Two main approaches to this problem can be identified. The first, which is 
dominant mainly in the literature – and reflects a genuine will to limit the international 
use of force –13 interprets the norm of non-intervention, and the related principle of self-
determination, as entailing complete abstention from any intervention in internal strife, 
without much elaboration regarding the threshold of conflict required for such an 
obligation to apply. We shall call this view strict-abstentionism.14 In fact, some strict-
abstentionists set forth a very simple argument: they maintain that a mere request for 
assistance, on its part, is sufficient to indicate that a government can no longer speak for 
the state.  
The other approach, prevalent in practice and in international jurisprudence, 
identifies a government preference, recognizing, in principle, the power of governments 
to consent to forcible interventions, and delegitimizes opposition consent. However, 
some of the proponents of the latter approach limit the government preference, in 
practice, in such a manner that it virtually merges with strict-abstentionism.  
In this chapter, instead of subscribing to a dichotomist abstention/preference 
distinction, we will revisit the approach suggested by Lauterpacht, identifying a 
rebuttable “presumption” in favor of governments.15 This seems to be the conceptually 
clearest prism through which to evaluate the question of consensual intervention. Indeed, 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Quincy Wright, Editorial Comment: United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 112, 122 (1959) (opining that “[t]he expediency of this rule is manifest not only to preserve the 
independence of states but also to prevent civil war from spreading into international war.”)  
14 I do not label this approach as “non-interventionist” since even supporters of intervention, in the physical 
sense, will not claim that intervention in favor of governments is an intervention in the normative sense.  
15 According to Lauterpacht, as we shall see, this presumption is very narrow. See also Schachter, supra 
note 3, at 1642. 
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the mechanism of a “presumption” provides a framework that is not only doctrinally 
clearer, but practically more flexible – and thus more workable in the real world – than 
stringent formalistic ones.  
However, we will not yet address here the circumstances that lead to the rebuttal 
of this presumption, whether based on tests relating to effective control or otherwise. We 
will only demonstrate, in this chapter, that such presumption is indeed reasonable, and is 
recognized in contemporary international law. The scope of this presumption will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters. 
However, in order to understand the approach towards the 
abstentionist/preference debate in the U.N. Charter era, it is helpful to first survey, rather 
briefly, the zero-sum cold-war dynamics that shaped the discourse on intervention 
throughout the first four decades of the Charter. The aspiration to “tame” these dynamics 
– and especially their often malicious nature – has greatly influenced the motivations of 
both the proponents of strict-abstentionism and of the government preference.  
     
 II. CONTAINMENT, DÉTENTE, ROLL-BACK: COLD-WAR DOCTRINES OF 
INTERVENTION 
Since World War II, the principle of effective control has been constantly challenged by 
competing, substantive doctrines for the evaluation of internal armed conflicts. For 
instance, in the context of decolonization, substantive analysis of conflicts – based on the 
principle of self-determination – led to the qualification of colonial struggles as closer to 
international conflicts, in contrast to the approach towards colonial wars of the 19th 
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century, which were treated, as we saw in previous chapters, as internal conflicts 
controlled by the belligerency and insurgency doctrines.16  
At the same time, owing to the cold-war dynamics, the general concern regarding 
the issue of intervention related to the attempts, by both sides, to minimize their 
adversary’s influence. Indeed, even before the dust settled from World War II, the 
international community faced a bloc-related conflict in Iran (1946), in which the Soviet 
Union intervened in favor of Kurdish nationalists;17 a complex conflict in French 
Indochina between multiple armed groups, states and interveners, which lasted from 1946 
until 1954, and sowed the seeds for the Vietnam War;18 and a dramatic conflict in China, 
in which the nationalist government of the Republic of China (ROC) was ousted by 
communists revolutionaries, in 1949, to settle in the Island of Taiwan (the birth of the 
“Two China Problem.”)  
In the latter struggle the U.S. favored the ROC,19 and maintained its recognition 
as the lawful government of all of China; concluded a mutual defense treaty with it in 
1954;20 and conducted joint training with its armed forces. The U.S. has withdrawn its 
                                                 
16 See Chapter 11, Sec. II.1. 
17 The U.S.S.R. occupied, at the time, Northern Iran. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, supported by 
the U.S.S.R., collapsed after the U.S.S.R. withdrew in mid-1946. See MASSOUME PRICE, IRAN’S DIVERSE 
PEOPLE 185–188 (2005); Archie Roosevelt, Jr. The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, in A PEOPLE WITHOUT A 
COUNTRY 122, 125 –129 (Gerard Chaliand ed., 1980). For the international reaction see S.C. Res. 2, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2 (Jan. 30, 1946); S.C. Res. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/3 (Apr. 4, 1946); S.C. Res. 5, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2 (May 8, 1946). 
18 See, generally, RONALD IRVING, THE FIRST INDOCHINA WAR: FRENCH AND AMERICAN POLICY, 1945-
1954 (1975).  
19 However, it seems that the U.S. has recognized, at least initially, the insurgency status of the communists 
(The People’s Republic of China), as it denied the 1949 attempt by the ROC to impose a “paper-blockade” 
by decreeing all Chinese ports closed. See L.H. Woolsey, Editorial Comment: Closure of Ports by the 
Chinese Nationalist Government, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 350 (1950). 
20 Mutual Defense Treaty between The United States of America and the Republic of China (Dec. 2, 1954).  
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recognition of the ROC only in 1979, and the legal status of the Republic of 
China/Taiwan remains controversial and ambiguous to this day.21  
The advent of cold-war related conflicts has clarified that the zero-sum reality of 
the post-war system, and the overwhelming bloc-interests at stake, could not be 
sufficiently addressed by traditional frameworks of neutrality, whether pursued through 
individual state choice, or by collective arrangements such as the Spanish Civil War’s 
non-intervention agreement.22 Accordingly, in the subsequent decades, American policy 
regarding the Soviet Union swung between containment, détente and roll-back, each 
influencing the U.S. doctrines of intervention in their respective periods. These strategies 
were mirrored, at large, by like doctrines adopted by the Soviet Union. The practice of 
these doctrines, by both parties, frequently took the form of interventions and counter-
interventions for the purpose of support or subversion of allied or opposing governments. 
In turn, the parties crafted – often ex post – legal arguments to justify their actions. As 
such, the cold-war ushered an era of international law in which the line between legality 
and narrow bloc-interests was notoriously blurry.   
The containment strategy, which endured, on-and-off, for decades, involved the 
support of governments allegedly challenged by pro-Soviet movements.23 It can be best 
exemplified in the Truman Doctrine, designed, as phrased by President Truman himself, 
to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or 
                                                 
21 See ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 255 –258 (1997). For an in-depth analysis of 
the Taiwan question see, generally, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER: 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (Jean-Marie Henckaerts ed., 1966). 
22 See Chapter 7, sec. IV.  
23 Containment was based on deterrence and alliances with supporting governments. See Earl C. Ravenal, 
The Requisites of Containment, in COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OR STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE? ALTERNATIVE 
STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE 273 (Ted Galen Carpenter ed., 1989).  
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by outside pressures.” 24 Containment was constantly rivaled by the détente and roll-back 
strategies, urging, respectively, the easing of tensions on the one hand versus positive, 
proactive support to anti-communist insurgents on the other.25 The roll-back strategy was 
radical, in its explicit embrace of granting forcible aid to opposition groups, based on 
ideological considerations.26 
The roll-back approach, although it had earlier manifestations,27 is famously 
associated with the Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s. Never formalized as a comprehensive 
doctrine, the Reagan Doctrine was mainly articulated by commentators,28 based on 
President Reagan’s pledge that the U.S. will “stand by” its democratic allies to “defy 
Soviet supported aggression,” while asserting that “support for freedom fighters is self-
defense.”29 It was summarized, by Jeane Kirkpatrick –one of its chief ideologues – as 
condoning support for insurgencies, including by military means, under certain 
circumstances:  
. . . where there are indigenous opponents to a government 
that is maintained by force, rather than popular consent; 
where such a government depends on arms supplied by … 
                                                 
24 See Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine (Mar. 12, 1947); The 
Truman Doctrine was the rationale for granting economic and military aid to the Greek government in 
1947, in its struggle against pro-communist elements; it was also the basis for  support granted to Turkey.  
25 The Détente period usually refers to the relaxation of the American-Soviet tensions during the 1970s, 
ending in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See generally RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, DÉTENTE AND 
CONFRONTATION: AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (1994). For the facts and effects 
of the Afghanistan invasion see id at 977–1081. 
26 Anthony S. Winer, The Reagan Doctrine, the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, and the Role of a Sole Superpower, 
22 LAW & INEQ. 169, 189 –190 (2004).  
27 For instance, the restoration of the Iranian Shah in 1953. See generally Malcolm Byrne, Introduction, in 
MOHAMMAD MOSADDEQ AND THE 1953 COUP IN IRAN xiii (Mark J. Gasiorowoski & Malcolm Byrne eds., 
2004). Early manifestations of the roll-back approach can be found in the position of John Foster Dulles as 
expressed in 1949. See FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, 29 FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN 5 (1949). 
28 Winer, supra note 26, at 182 –186. 
29 President's Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 1985 Pub. Papers 135 
(Feb. 6, 1985); cited in Winer, supra note 26, at 178. 
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foreign sources; and where people are denied a choice 
regarding their affiliations and future.30 
 
Understood as such, the Reagan Doctrine was essentially one of consensual, 
ostensibly pro-democratic counter-intervention in internal armed conflicts, in favor of 
opposition groups. It was consensual, in the sense that it was partial: which means, that 
an intervention, a priori, must have received some consent of an indigenous party. As 
such, the Reagan Doctrine went further than the traditional counter-intervention doctrine 
– which we address later on – which seems to have been to justify intervention in favor of 
governments. The Reagan Doctrine was thus, seemingly, behind the U.S. military aid to 
the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, to UNITA in Angola and the invasion of Grenada (to the 
extent that it was not conducted with governmental consent).31 Perhaps the quintessential 
case of the Doctrine was the U.S. aid to the Contras in Nicaragua.32  
The American containment and roll-back approaches were paralleled, at large, by 
the Soviet Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified intervention to protect socialist regimes 
from internal challenges, and was sometimes extended to support for “national liberation 
movements” confronting non-socialist regimes.33 In essence, like the Reagan Doctrine, it 
                                                 
30 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights and International Law, in 
RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 19, 20 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1991) 
31 Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 30, at 19 –20.  
32 On these cases and others see JAMES M. SCOTT, DECIDING TO INTERVENE: THE REAGAN DOCTRINE AND 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1996). On the Reagan Doctrine, its neo-realist underpinnings and 
international law see David J. Scheffer, Introduction, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, supra note 30, at 1, 11. It should 
be noted, that Jeane Kirkpatrick, a member of the Reagan cabinet and a chief ideologue of the Reagan 
Doctrine, saw the Doctrine asnot applying to the Grenada context since it was an intervention with the 
consent of what the U.S. saw as a legitimate authority. See Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 30, at 19.  
33 For comparisons of the doctrines see William D. Rogers et al., The Brezhnev Doctrine and the Reagan 
Doctrine: Apples and Oranges? 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 561 (1987); W. Michael Reisman, 
Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and 
Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 26, 34 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David 
J. Scheffer eds., 1991); Winer, supra note 26, at 182; for a scathing critique of the comparison see See, e.g., 
Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 30, at 28–33. 
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was a substantive approach towards internal strife, concerned not with democracy but 
with the promotion of the Soviet-style socialism, which Brezhnev also linked to the 
principle of self-determination.34 Soviet containment doctrine was employed in several 
instances until the early 1980s.35  
These cold-war doctrines reflected a significant departure from traditional law, 
since by relying on substantive justifications – such as the promotion of democracy or 
socialism – they were contrary to the effectiveness principle and closer to legitimist 
approaches. However, considering the zero-sum character of the international system of 
the time, it comes as no surprise that rather than being conducted on a principled level, 
the contemporaneous legal debate regarding this issue was often merely a hollow pretext 
meant to justify these doctrines in specific instances.36  
Accordingly, at different times, different legal justifications were tailored to 
match cold-war interventions. Containment interventions, such as the 1958 Lebanon 
intervention, and perhaps the 1983 Grenada invasion, were justified by the U.S. on counts 
of government consent, enhanced by claims of counter-intervention. The latter was also 
justified on counts of the need to protect American nationals.37 The Soviet Union 
explicitly cited government in order to justify its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia; it 
went even further by arguing, along with its allies, that interventions upon request are not 
at all an issue to be discussed in the Security Council.38 Support of opposition groups, 
                                                 
34 See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 118–119 (1995).  
35 See generally MATTHEW J. OUIMET, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN SOVIET 
FOREIGN POLICY (2003).  Notably, the doctrine was at work in the Hungarian invasion of 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. See id at 4, 9 –16. 
36 See, e.g., the remarks by Louis Henkin in Annual Dinner, American Society of International Law 
Proceedings, April 1–4 1992, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 501, 508 (1992); Louis Henkin, The Invasion of 
Panama under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 293 (1991).  
37 See sec. IV.2. 
38 1967 Y’BOOK U.N. 298 –299. 
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and namely the American roll-back intervention in Nicaragua, was justified on counts of 
a wide interpretation of the right of individual and collective self-defense (recall 
President Reagan’s assertion that “support to freedom fighters is self-defense.”39 Such 
interventions were also vindicated, by American commentators, through a narrow 
construction of the prohibition on the use of force set forth in Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter.40 We shall address the concepts of counter-intervention and collective self-
defense later on.  
Interestingly, with regards to the intervention in Nicaragua, a split can be 
identified between the high-discourse of the Reagan Doctrine, in its support to “freedom 
fighters,” and the actual legal justifications presented in front of ICJ in the Nicaragua 
case. As we shall see, the U.S. did not rely there on opposition consent or on democratic 
legitimism, but rather chose to set forth a less controversial claim: it advanced, mainly, a 
wide interpretation of the right to collective-self-defense in favor of neighboring El-
Salvador, rather than invoking a novel theory of intervention.41 This raises doubt as to the 
extent the U.S. itself saw the Reagan Doctrine – at its most extreme understanding – as 
compatible with positive international law. Indeed, as we shall demonstrate later, the 
Reagan Doctrine was deemed unlawful by the ICJ, whether it was based on opposition 
consent or on a wide interpretation on the right of collective self-defense.42  
                                                 
39 Supra, n. 29. 
40 See W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 
642 (1984); Anthony D’Amato, The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 520 (1990); compare Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, “You, the People”: Pro-Democratic 
Intervention in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 259, 261–269 
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).  Kirkpatrick and Gerson even interpreted the U.N. Charter in 
light of the American Declaration of Independence. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 30, at 22–23, 25 –26. 
41 See Sec. IV.3.  
42 See Onder Bakircioglu, The Right to Self-Defense in National and International Law: The Role of the 
Imminence Requirement, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 36 –37 (2009); HENKIN, supra note 34, at 119; 
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The Brezhnev doctrine, on the face of it, was also rejected by the international 
community, in light of the general condemnation of the Czechoslovakia invasion of 
1968.43 A Security Council Resolution condemning the invasion was rejected only on 
counts of a Soviet veto.44  
While the collapse of the Eastern Bloc necessarily brought an end to the Brezhnev 
doctrine, the Reagan Doctrine can be linked to contemporary views supporting forcible 
unilateral pro-democratic intervention based on a “democratic entitlement,” a concept 
which we discuss later.45 The difference being that in the contemporary system, arguably, 
there is more space for principled application of international norms. Nonetheless, during 
the cold-war, international lawyers had to struggle – perhaps in a “fighting retreat” – in 
their attempts to breathe order and principle into the blatantly self-interested dynamics of 
the time.  
 
III. THE STRICT ABSTENTIONIST APPROACH  
III.1 STRICT-ABSTENTIONISM 
Article 3(e) of the Definition of Aggression as well as Article 20 of both the Articles on 
State Responsibility and on the Responsibility of International Organizations, refer to the 
consent of states as precluding aggression or wrongfulness. In the same vein, Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force against states. This is not surprising, as the 
state is the basic legal personality in international law. However, it is not specified who is 
entitled to speak for the state and thus express valid consent to a forcible intervention, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
David Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Intervention in Internal 
Conflict, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435, 457 (1996). 
43 See Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, supra note 30, at 43–44. 
44 1968 Y’BOOK U.N. 301 –302. 
45 HENKIN,, supra note 34, at 118 –119; Winer, supra note 26, at 186 –188. 
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a certain instance. As we shall see, the state is usually represented, in the international 
realm, by a government.46  
However, a state and its government are not synonymous.47 For this reason, it is 
equally unsurprising that in parallel to the understanding of Article 2(4) of the Charter as 
allowing for a “government preference,” there has been a longstanding and persistent 
view suggesting that the norm of non-intervention requires strict abstention in cases of 
purely internal armed conflicts (as opposed to conflicts fomented and assisted by external 
“subversive intervention,” in which counter-intervention was looked favorably also by 
strict-asbtentionists).48  
Strict-abstention was viewed as necessary both to ensure that the conflicting 
community will determine its own fate without external interference, and in order to 
minimize international use of force. The connection (or its absence) between this idea and 
the belligerency doctrine has been addressed thoroughly in Chapter 5, where we 
discussed the concept of the recognition of belligerency and mandatory neutrality; we 
have also discussed at length why such a perception, in the era of the war-prerogative, 
was very difficult to justify. Nevertheless, strict-asbtentionism stresses, when evaluating 
internal armed conflicts, the uncertainty of the outcome of the conflict as the driving 
force of abstentionism, rather than relying on formal distinctions such as the belligerency 
doctrine.49 Indeed, once a prohibition on the use of force was set forth, a logical legal 
claim could be that in times of internal armed conflict, neither the government nor the 
opposition fully represent the state; and therefore forcible intervention on behalf of either 
                                                 
46 See Settlers of German Origin in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. 22 (ser. B) No. 6 (sept. 10); 
cited in Doswald-Beck, supra note 1, at 190.  
47 LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW §75. 77 (2rd ed., 1912). 
48 Wright, supra note 13, at 124.   
49 Id. at 122. 
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party constitutes a “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence” 
of the state, as well as a violation of the norm of non-intervention.50  
If one subscribes to strict-asbtentionism, the question of threshold immediately 
arises: its is necessary to identify the circumstances in which such a duty of abstention 
materializes. Some strict-abstentionists provide a simple answer – the mere request for 
assistance establishes an irreversible presumption that the government is no longer 
effective, and therefore does not possess the sovereign power to express valid consent.     
The allure of strict-asbtentionism to international lawyers in the cold-war zero-
sum system was clear. However, it should be noted that the theoretical background of the 
approach is an orthodox – perhaps almost Darwinist – understanding of the concepts of 
non-intervention and self-determination, very much rooted in the idea of effective control 
over territory the prime source of sovereignty.51 As such, it derives from the works of 
classic theoreticians of the latter concept. One of the most eloquent manifestations of this 
approach could be found in an 1860 work by Montague Bernard.52 It is worthwhile to 
examine it in some detail, as it provides a clear rationalization for a robust approach of 
strict-abstentionism.53 Bernard’s argument retains its relevance, as his core claims have 
remained virtually unaltered in later works of strict-abstentionists.  
Thus, Bernard saw non-intervention as a cardinal condition for the existence of a 
system of states,54 and also as a utilitarian requirement: 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 371 (2005). 
51 For a summary of strict-abstentionist and close approaches see John A. Perkins, The Right of 
Counterintervention, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 171, 183–195  (1987). 
52 MONTAGUE BERNARD, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION (1860). The theoretical argument 
underlying Bernard’s work is of contemporary interest, although, as discussed in Chapter 5, Bernard did 
not substantially explain the legal discrepancy between his rigid perception of non-intervention and the 
war-prerogative.   
53 Id. at 5–8. 
54 Id. at 9. 
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… it [intervention] has a direct tendency to produce 
mischiefs worse than it removes. It encourages a proneness 
to resort to violent measures … It destroys national self-
respect and self-reliance. It interrupts the natural process by 
which political institutions are matured through the 
ripening of political ideas and habits. What it plants does 
not take root; what it establishes does not endure.55 
 
Much of Bernard’s reasoning dealt with the rejection of consent, in its various 
forms, as a justification for intervention. First, he rejected the legality of forward-looking 
intervention treaties – not a rare occurrence throughout history –56 which are concluded 
in advance for the “maintenance of a particular dynasty or of particular institutions.”57 
Loyal to the understanding of governments as separate entities from states, he concluded 
that “no Government is authorized to degrade by compact the country it rules into a 
condition of real vassalage,” unless it agrees, essentially, to waive its independence 
altogether.58 He then proceeded to address the question of ad hoc intervention requested 
by a “legitimate” sovereign. Such cases, according to Bernard, could not exist since there 
was no such thing, in international law, as a “legitimate” sovereign.59 Furthermore, since 
he perceived sovereignty as a corollary of territorial effective control, the mere request 
for assistance indicated, in his eyes, the lack of effectiveness:  
                                                 
55 Id. at 9–10.   
56 Bernard gives the examples of “ancient treaties” between Britain and Portugal, that were invoked in 1828 
by Brazil (perhaps by a claim of succession), to secure British intervention in an internal struggle against 
Don Miguel; another example was the 1815 treaty between Austria and The King of the Two Sicilies. Id. at 
14.     
57 Id. at 11.  
58 Id. at 14 –15. 
59 Id. at 15. The term “legitimate,” used here by Bernard, should be read in the context of the 19th century 
debate between the legitimism doctrine and the effectiveness approach to sovereignty. See supra, at p. X. 
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[w]hat rights does he thus to act as sovereign who admits 
that he has ceased to be so, or that his sovereignty is (to say 
the least) in abeyance? How can he impersonate his 
people[,] who is begging the assistance of a foreign Power 
in order to reduce them to obedience?60  
 
If intervention by sovereign consent was unlawful, does the right of consent 
belong to the “people” of the state? Here Bernard takes up an argument with Grotius, 
who argued, from a classical just war perspective, that a manifest tyrant, committing 
atrocities against his own people, can be overthrown with the assistance of foreigners, but 
not in case of doubt.61 Bernard rejected this position, claiming that it is based on 
“morality” rather than law, contending that it can never be objectively ascertained when a 
sovereign is beyond doubt a “manifest” tyrant.62 He further rebuked the claim that this 
problem can be solved by relying on the decision of the people, since it is never clear 
who the “people” are. Bernard’s cold logic deduced that if by “people” we mean the 
“majority,” the intervention would essentially be in favor of “a majority that is not strong 
enough to have its way” by imposing its will on the minority, a fact that contravened the 
principle of effectiveness.63 Bernard thus directly challenged the majoritarian-democratic 
principle, first by pointing out the difficulty of ascertaining the majority’s view, and even 
questioning whether a majority is entitled to “control the destiny of a nation” to begin 
                                                 
60 BERNARD, supra note 52, at 16. 
61 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, Book  2, Ch. 25, §8 (William Whewell, trans. 1853) 
(“But the case [regarding intervention] is different if the wrong is manifest. If a tyrant like Busiris, Phalaris, 
Diomede of Thrace, practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of 
human social connexion is not cut off … in such cases, what is not lawful to one person [the subject] may 
be lawful to another for him [the intervening power], if it be a case in which one can help another.”) 
62 BERNARD, supra note 52, at 17.  
63 Id. at 17. 
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with, again maintaining that governing power should be based strictly on effective 
control.64  
Lastly, Bernard confronted the possible position that in the case of “civil war” 
states are free to intervene in favor of both parties, and specifically the position endorsed 
by Vattel, according to which the intervention must be conducted in favor of the just 
party.65 To this approach Bernard responded by adopting a highly abstract view of the 
state, emphasizing that a state undergoing a “civil war” does not cease to be an integral 
state; and that the fact that it has no functioning sovereign does not mean that it is no 
longer “independent” in relation to other states. He thus concluded that foreign 
intervention, on counts of either side, “gives superiority to the side which would not have 
been uppermost without it, and establishes a sovereign, or a form of government, which 
the nation, if left to itself, would not have chosen.”66 
Bernard’s approach was clearly echoed in the works of later scholars. Hall and 
Wilson followed Bernard’s logic – the former arguing that the mere fact “that it has been 
necessary to call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue of the conflict without it 
be uncertain,”67 and the latter adding that in such cases the government is not the de facto 
power in the state.68  
                                                 
64 Id. at 17 –18. Bernard seems to parallelize effectiveness with “success achieved by unassisted effort.”  
65 Id. at 20 –21; EMMERICH DE VATELL THE LAW OF NATIONS §§294–296 (1797), available at 
http://books.google.com/. 
66 BERNARD, supra note 52, at 21. According to Bernard, one possible exception to this reasoning occurs 
when succession occurs – effectively creating two states – and thus the intervention ceases to be in the 
internal affairs of a state. Id at 22. 
67 W.E. HALL, A TREATIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (8TH ed. 1924); cited in Doswald-Beck, supra note 
1, at 196; Wright, supra note 13, at 121–122. 
68 GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 –94 (8th ed. 1922) (“The principle may now be 
regarded as established by both theory and practice that the invitation of neither party to a domestic strife 
gives a right to a foreign state to intervene, and that no state has a right to judge as to the merits of the 
contest …”)  
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Almost a century after Bernard, Lauterpacht presented a developed – and indeed 
sophisticated – version of the strict-abstentionist principle, based on the principle of self-
determination. Lauterpacht accepted, in general, the principle of government-preference, 
which he saw as applying “so long as the lawful sovereign authority has not been 
definitely supplanted,”69 and manifested through a “presumption in favour of established 
governments,” which applied so long as the conflict was in progress.70  
However, as he saw the practical effects of the presumption in favor of the 
government as very limited, and in any case not extending beyond the duty of states not 
to prematurely recognize the opposition as a government, and the obligation not to permit 
hostile operations against the government from their territories.71 Lauterpacht viewed any 
intervention beyond this narrow preference as a “denial of the right of the nation to 
decide for itself – by a physical contest, if necessary, between rival forces – the nature 
and the form of its government.”72  
Of particular interest to us is the fact that Lauterpacht injected substantive 
considerations into his limited, effectiveness based view of the government-preference 
principle, arguing that limitations on consent power of governments are due “so long as 
the international community has no such control over them as to secure effectively the 
fundamental rights of the individual and decent administration of the law.”73 This 
position can be understood as willing to recognize a more robust presumption in favor of 
governments, contingent upon the development of international human rights institutions. 
                                                 
69 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 233 (1948). 
70 Id. at 93 –94. 
71 Id. at 233. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 234.  
 248 
The reliance on the idea of self-determination as a rationale for strict-
abstentionism has understandably found its way into the works of predominant scholars 
of the cold-war and decolonization era. Brownlie, Bowett, and Wright saw every external 
intervention in civil strife as contradicting the right to self-determination.74 Wright went 
as far as arguing that if intervention on part of any party be allowed, the “’right of 
revolution’ implicit in the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination would be 
denied,” and that therefore, “[a] government beset by civil strife is not in a position to 
invite assistance in the name of the state.”75  
An approach similar to Lauterpacht’s, endorsing strict-abstentionism while 
hinting to a substantive analysis of the parties, was reflected in a 1975 resolution by the 
Institut de Droit International.76 In its resolution, the Institute opined that in any case of 
internal armed conflict, “[t]hird States shall refrain from giving assistance” to the 
parties,77 and enumerated the actions that constituted such assistance.78 However, two 
significant qualifications have been made to this resolution, perhaps challenging its 
distinction as strict-abstentionist.  
First, the resolution excluded from the definition of civil wars “conflicts arising 
from decolonization.”79 The exclusion of colonial wars from the internal sphere is a 
generally accepted approach in international law, but this exclusion, in itself, was a 
                                                 
74 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES  327 (1963); Derek Bowett, The 
Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 
38 (John Norton Moore ed. 1974); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
ELIMINATION OF WAR 61 (1961); all cited in Doswald-Beck, supra note 1, at 200; see also  Wright, supra 
note 13, at 120 –121.   
75 WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 61, quoted in Doswald-Beck, supra note 1, at 200. 
76 Institut de Droit International, The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars (Aug. 14, 1975). 
77 Id. art. 2(1). 
78 Id art. 2(2). Dinstein viewed this resolution as inconsistent with the understanding of international law 
and with state practice. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 119–120 (5th ed. 2011) 
79 The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars Art, supra note 76, art. 1(2)(c). 
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development of the U.N. era – nowadays taken for granted – that reflected a movement 
away from effectiveness based views of the international system.80 Second, the resolution 
seems to have restricted its application to certain internal armed conflicts only, alluding 
to the need for a substantive analysis of conflicts. This was reflected in the preamble, 
stating that the Institute was “[r]eserving the study of issues arising from the danger of 
extermination of ethnic, religious or social groups or from other severe infringements of 
human rights during civil war.”81   
Cassese also adopted a rather complex approach. On the one hand, he conceded 
that “[s]tate practice makes extensive use of the consent exception;” on the other, he saw 
this practice as “hardly” conforming to present day international law.82 He accepted that 
there are situations in which a government can authorize the deployment of forces on its 
territory, but qualified that “a State may not authorize another State to use force on its 
territory with a view to establishing control over the population of the consenting 
State.”83 Whether or not Cassese’s approach can be described as strict-abstentionist 
depends on our interpretation of the phrase “establishing control.” To the extent that 
Cassese meant any loss of control, he alluded to a strict-abstentionist approach. However, 
if by “establishing control” he implied, for instance, to extreme circumstances of state-
failure, then he indeed accepted a qualified principle of government-preference.   
Strict-abstentionism has resurfaced, rather recently, in the report of the 
Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the 2008 Conflict in Georgia. Here, among its other 
claims, Russia argued that it had intervened in Georgia by invitation of South Ossetia – 
                                                 
80 As discussed in Chapters  –6, colonial wars of the 19th century were viewed as internal armed conflicts. 
81 Id, prmbl. For an analysis of the resolution, see Schachter, supra note 3, at 1643. For an updated 
resolution by the institute see Institut de Droit International, Military Assistance on Request (Sept. 8, 2011). 
82 ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 50, at 370. 
83 Id. at 371.  
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the secession seeking party.84 The report noted that in “traditional writing,” only the 
established and internationally recognized government could consent to forcible 
intervention. It argued, however, that the government-preference approach was 
problematic, since it could lead to the “undesirable” result of states recognizing 
governments wantonly, as pretext for forcible intervention.85 The report then proceeded 
to present a “new doctrine” – that as we seen, is hardly a novel one – according to which: 
 
 . . . in a state of civil war, none of the competing fractions 
can be said to be effective, stable and legitimate. Therefore, 
it is argued that the principle of non-intervention and 
respect of the international right to self-determination 
renders inadmissible any type of foreign intervention, be it 
upon invitation of the previous “old” government or of the 
rebels.86 
 
The report based this claim on the principle of self-determination, which it saw as 
“incumbent on peoples, and not on governments or on competing factions.”87 It then 
concluded that this approach is “prudent from a policy perspective” and that it is 
confirmed by state practice (without exemplifying,) and accordingly, that South Ossetia’s 
invitation could not have legalized the Russian intervention.88 Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that the report was careful not to unequivocally legally endorse either of 
the competing positions, since both the position of government preference and of strict-
                                                 
84 Independent Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report (Vol. 2), at 276 (Sept. 30, 
2009) (hereinafter Georgia Report). 
85 Id. at 277.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. n. 180.  
88 Id. at 279. 
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abstentionism deny, in general, forcible intervention in favor opposition parties. Thus, the 
report could avoid making a clear decision favoring one of the approaches over the other. 
 
III.2 A CRITIQUE OF STRICT-ABSTENTIONISM 
While the strict-abstentionist position might seem initially compelling, it does not remain 
sound after a closer analysis. Barring the reference in the Report on Georgia, most of the 
positions expressly favoring this approach are products of the era of decolonization and 
the cold-war. As such, these opinions must be understood in light of their historical 
context. At the time, the international discourse was especially sensitive to attempts of 
colonial or ex-colonial powers to prop-up illegitimate governments in their present or 
former colonies, or to the manipulations of the rivaling blocs competing for global 
influence.89 With the end of the cold-war, and considering the transformation of the 
principle of self-determination in the decolonized world – from one primarily concerned 
with achieving the independence of colonies to one which connotes some form of 
democratic deliberation or political participation –90 it is doubtful whether strict-
abstentionist positions, as such, can remain unaltered. 
Furthermore, even if one still subscribes to the effectiveness doctrine as the main 
source of sovereign power, the mere request for assistance is not an absolute proof that 
the government does not exercise effective control. For instance, one can imagine a 
situation in which a government requests the aid of a neighboring state, perhaps because 
the latter possesses capabilities that can help it quash the insurgency faster, or with less 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., THE INDEPENDENT INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 188–189 (2000). 
90 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance 86 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 46, 52 –
56 (1992) (highlighting the post decolonization development of the principle of self-determination into a 
“general notion of internationally validated political consultation” to be applied to all states). See also 
Chapter 11. 
 252 
casualties; there are a myriad other possibilities in which a request for assistance will not 
necessarily connote that the government is no longer the de facto power. Perhaps, in legal 
terms, the mere request for assistance can serve as evidence for lack of effectiveness, but 
not more.  
Strict-abstentionism seems to have also envisioned, in general, a simplistic 
understanding of internal armed conflicts, corresponding mainly to the classic scenario of 
a struggle for control over the state apparatus. In such cases, presumably, a coherent case 
can be made for non-intervention for the sake of fulfillment of the right to self-
determination. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, the sheer complexity of contemporary 
internal conflicts rarely coincides with such simple models. Indeed, beyond the classic 
recognition of a counter-intervention exception,91 strict-abstentionism does not address 
other complex scenarios.  
For instance, strict-asbtentionism does not provide a satisfactory answer to 
struggles of secession, which challenge interests of the international system, such as the 
principle of territorial integrity, that clash with strict-abstentionism’s simplistic model of 
non-intervention. Moreover, it does not clarify the theoretical basis for abstention in 
instances where the conflict contains an element of irredentism. It further fails to lay-
down a rational position regarding situations in which opposition groups are comprised of 
non-citizens whose actions cannot be imputed to external states – for instance, such as the 
PLO in Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War or the FDLR militias in Eastern DRC – 
cases in which the principles of non-intervention and self-determination lose much allure, 
being that some of the involved parties are external to the state’s citizenry. It certainly 
cannot justify abstentionism in cases in which the opposition itself seeks to deconstruct 
                                                 
91 See Chapter 9 sec. III. 
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the international order of states, such as when it is a part of a transnational network 
seeking to dismantle the state altogether (such as in the context of struggles against Al-
Qa’ida and comparable groups).      
Moreover, the concept of strict-abstentionism is questionable also in terms of its 
inner logic: while hailing its supposed neutrality, strict-abstentionism does not amount to 
non-intervention in the true sense. On the contrary, it is tantamount to the complete 
preference of the party which is militarily stronger, which is not a less of a moral 
judgment than positive forcible intervention. In an era in which the international 
community is preoccupied with the protection of civilians, as discussed in Chapter 10, 
strict-abstentionism amounts to indifference, not to non-intervention. As such, strict-
abstentionism is directly contradictory to emerging practice of the international system. 
For instance, the Responsibility to Protect concept, which is addressed later on, is built on 
the exact opposite premise – according to which the international community should be 
encouraged to assist a state that requests help in the face of mass atrocities, in order to 
allow it to exercise its responsibilities.92  
Thus, and most importantly, the strict-abstentionist principle reflects a harsh 
interpretation of the right of self-determination and the norm of non-intervention, which 
perhaps was reasonable in the era of decolonization, but seems unfitting in contemporary 
international law. In particular, this is evident considering the disastrous consequences of 
the ostensible “neutrality and impartiality” assumed by the international community in 
the face of the mass atrocities in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995).93 In essence, 
therefore, strict-abstentionism condones the view that the fulfillment of self-
                                                 
92 Under the “RtoP pillar” of “international assistance and capacity building. See Chapter 10, sec. II. 
93 See ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 8 (2011). 
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determination is a corollary of a party’s capability to effectively use violence, while the 
principle is conversely understood, nowadays, to connote political participation.94 In this 
context, strict-abstentionism can lead to undesirable results in instances where atrocities 
are committed and the Security Council fails to act, or when it acts insufficiently.95  
In light of all of the above, it is safe to say that the contemporary international 
system, with its various instruments that regulate intra-state conduct, is one in which “the 
impossibility of neutrality” prevails,96 possibly rendering obsolete the concept of strict-
abstentionism.    
 
IV. THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENTS 
IV.1 THE GOVERNMENT AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STATE 
While the strict-abstentionist approach has been adopted by prominent scholars of 
international law, it is strikingly scarce in the opinio juris of states. This fact has been 
true, of course, in the pre-Charter era, when the discourse of belligerency emphasized the 
element of choice; as we shall see, this is also the case in contemporary practice. This is 
perhaps unsurprising, as the opinio juris of states is conveyed primarily by governments; 
accordingly, any government that would advocate strict-abstentionism would thereby 
negate also its own ability to request external support, in time of need, and all this without 
any visible reciprocal advantage. This notion is reflected in the fact that U.N. General 
Assembly declarations that have addressed the issue of intervention, have expressly 
                                                 
94 For a comparable argument see David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and 
Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 220 (1996). 
95 GEORG NOLTE, EINGREIFEN AUF EINLADUNG  607 –628 (1999) (German). For an overview in English of 
Nolte’s approach to consensual intervention see Bernd Martenczuk  Book Review: Eingreifen auf 
Einladung 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941 (2000).  
96 See ORFORD, supra note 93, at 192– 199. 
 255 
referred to the prohibition on supporting opposition groups, while leaving the question of 
aiding governments, at most, vague.97 Indeed, while governments, and in particular the 
non-aligned bloc of the cold-war era, frequently referred to the principle of non-
intervention – for instance, as we shall see, in the case of Grenada – they did not develop 
this principle so far as to negate the principle of government preference altogether.  
The strict-abstentionist approach, thus, is usually countered through the 
recognition of a “qualified” principle of government preference. Following Lauterpacht, I 
refer to this preference as a presumption, since virtually no contemporary source of 
international law condones an unlimited preference of governments in the context of 
external forcible assistance. We shall elaborate on the scope of the preference of 
governments – or the grounds for the rebuttal of the presumption – in later chapters.  
The presumption in favor of governments is thus structured around the basic 
premise of international law that the entity that speaks for the state is the recognized and 
established government. The government is but the “human agent” of the abstract 
juridical personality which is the “state,”98 and as such, it represents the latter in the 
international sphere.99 When reading this principle in light of article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter, Article 3(e) of the Definition of Aggression and article 20 of the ILC Drafts, it 
                                                 
97 See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty G.A. Res 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965); 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc.  A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (Dec. 9. 1981); for an 
analysis of these declarations see Doswald-Beck, supra note 1, at 207–212. 
98 M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS 20 (1997); see also HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY 
OF LAW AND STATE 228 (1945).  
99 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at 87. 
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merits at least the prima facie presumption that a government speaks for the state when 
expressing consent to forcible intervention.100  
Indeed, the International Law Commission understood Article 20 of the ILC Draft 
precisely in this way. In its deliberations regarding the potential of consent as precluding 
the wrongfulness of an act, the Commission analyzed state practice regarding consensual 
intervention in favor of governments, and concluded that such consent has "nearly 
always" been invoked as justification for interventions;101 and that in the ensuing U.N. 
discussions, "no State contested the validity of the principle that the consent of the 
territorial State precluded – as a general rule – the wrongfulness of the sending of foreign 
troops into its territory." Rather, the disagreement usually revolved around the application 
of the principle in the specific circumstances.102 
 It is therefore well established that beleaguered governments can, in principle, 
consent to an external forcible intervention,103 whether it amounts to a full-scaled 
                                                 
100 See Ademola Abass, Consent Precluding State Responsibility: A Critical Analysis, 53 INT'L & COMP. L. 
Q. 211, 223 –224 (2004). 
101 Roberto Ago, 8th Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n on State Responsibility, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm. 31 (1979), 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1979/Add.l [hereinafter ILC Report] 
102 Id. at 32; see also NOLTE, supra note 95, at  634. 
103 See, generally, id. at 629 –640 (1999); James W. Garner, Editorial Comment: Questions of International 
Law in the Spanish Civil War, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 66, 67 (1937); Pitman B. Potter, Editorial Comment: 
Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, 52 AM. J. INT’L L. 727, 727–728 (1958); David Wippman, Pro-
democratic Intervention by Invitation, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 40, at 293, 294 –297; DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 119–120; Abass, supra note 100, at 223–225; BRAD 
R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 181, 185 –186, 284 (2000); Byers & 
Chesterman, supra note 40, at 287–288, 291; Schachter, supra note 3, at 1645; Jean d’Aspremont, 
Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 877, 906 –907 (2005); 
THE KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 89, at 193; Terry D. Gill, Military Intervention at the Invitation of a 
Government, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 229, 229 (Terry 




invasion such as the case was in the DRC,104 as well as when it is limited to relatively 
narrow operations such as cross-border drone attacks. 105   
 
IV.2 THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENTS IN PRACTICE 
When analyzing the practice of states regarding consensual intervention in the U.N. 
Charter era, it is helpful to distinguish between the period of the cold-war era and the 
subsequent decades. During the cold-war, states did not object to the government 
preference principle, precisely because members of both blocs utilized it for their own 
benefit. After the cold-war – and a fortiori after decolonization – the eradication, at large, 
of the bloc-rivalry, as well as the contemporary scarcity of “national liberation” struggles, 
significantly reduced the motivation of states to oppose consensual interventions to begin 
with.  
Furthermore, the proliferation of internal conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and Africa, 
and the accompanying mass atrocities, shifted the international attention to the pursuit of 
stability. Attempts to mitigate the catastrophic results of internal strife were undertaken, 
many times, through active regional and international cooperation with beleaguered or 
transitional governments, or by international acquiescence to such actions when 
conducted by individual states. In a sense, in the post cold-war world, the preference of 
governments has virtually come to be taken for granted.   
                                                 
104 See CHRISTINE D. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 70 –71 (2008) (demonstrating 
that in general, in its approach towards the Second Congolese Conflict, the Security Council “took a clear 
position: aid to the government was permissible, intervention or force to overthrow the government was 
not.”) See also id. at 73–74. 
105 See, e.g.,Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted 
Killings, Hum. Rts. Council, ¶¶35, 37, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); 
Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the ‘Fog of Law’ 13 
Y’BOOK OF INT’L HUM. L. 311, 315 (2010). 
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Indeed, the understanding of international law as generally permitting consensual 
intervention in favor of governments, has been prevalent in state practice in the first 
decades of the U.N. system, although – and especially in the era of decolonization and in 
the height of the cold-war – frequently abused. However, interestingly, even in the most 
controversial cases of intervention, the grounds for objection by other states did not focus 
on the principle of government preference. In 1957 the U.K. justified its intervention in 
Muscat and Oman, in favor of the ruling Sultan and against the seceding Imamate,106  as 
being "at the request of a friendly ruler."107 The Arab states requested that the Security 
Council consider the British intervention, but not on counts of their rejection of the 
principle of government consent. They claimed, rather, that the secession seeking 
Imamate of Oman was an independent state, and therefore the British intervention 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. The U.K. argued that the Sultan of 
Muscat was sovereign over Muscat as well Oman, and therefore was entitled to support 
in an “internal” issue.  The Security Council refused to place the issue on the agenda.108 
Similar justification was made by the U.K. in relation to its 1958 intervention in 
Jordan.109 
The 1958 American intervention in Lebanon was justified on counts of the 
explicit consent of Lebanese President Chamoun, ostensibly in his struggle against pro-
Nasserite elements in Lebanon.110 As such, this intervention was supplemented with the 
common cold-war era claim of “counter-intervention” as a supporting justification for 
                                                 
106 See HUSAIN M. ALBAHAMA, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABIAN GULF STATES 239 –247 (1968). 
107 ANTONIO TANCA, FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 150 –151 (1993); ILC Report, 
supra note 101, at 31 n. 132. 
108 1957 Y’BOOK U.N. 56–58. 
109 ILC Report, supra note 101, at n. 133. 
110 See S.C. Res. 128, U.N. Doc. S/4023 (Jun. 11, 1958); 1958 Y’BOOK U.N. 36–38. 
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government consent. This justification was controversially bound, in this case, to the 
invocation of “collective self-defense” arguments.111 Nonetheless, in an emergency 
meeting of the Security Council, the American and Lebanese representatives clarified that 
the U.S. forces were invited by Lebanon. Two conflicting draft resolutions by the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R were rejected by mutual veto; however the U.S. resolution enjoyed a large 
majority of supporters.112  
Further cold-war and colonialism-related examples of interventions justified, inter 
alia, on counts of government consent, are abundant. Such was the 1962 Egyptian 
intervention in Yemen;113 the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary and the 1964 
interventions of Belgium in Congo114 and of France in Gabon;115 France also invoked the 
consent justification in its 1958 Chad intervention, and in its 1979 operation in the 
Central African Republic.116 The later cases were part of a general French policy of 
consensual interventions in former colonies, usually in favor of challenged governments. 
France’s interventions were, in general, based on forward-looking intervention treaties 
concluded with ex-colonies.117 Even the recent French participation in the 2011 operation 
in Cȏte D’Ivoire can be traced to such an agreement, in addition to a Security Council 
authorization.118 The same principle can be found also in the Security Council’s reaction 
                                                 
111 See Wright, supra note 13, at, 113, 120. The U.S. claimed that the 1958 Lebanon affair was an indirect-
aggression, related to “communist” policies in Greece (1947), Czechoslovakia (1948), China (1949), and 
Korea and Indochina (1950). See id. As we saw in Chapter 4, indirect aggression has been rejected by the 
ICJ, in the Nicaragua case, as a justification for collective self-defense, since it was not viewed by the 
majority as an “armed attack”. See also CASSESE, supra note 50, at 364–365, 370.  
112 1958 Y’BOOK U.N. 38–43; see also TANCA, supra note 107, at 153–154; ILC Report, supra note 101, at 
31 –32, n. 134. 
113 ARTHUR MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II 184 –186 
(1997).  
114 ILC Report, supra note X, at 32. 
115 GRAY, supra note 104, at 85. 
116 Id. at 85–86. 
117 NOLTE, supra note 95, at 297–364, 635 –636 (surveying French practice of consensual intervention). 
118 See Chapter 11, sec. I.3.  
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to the multiple mid-1970s interventions in Angola, where a clear and explicit preference 
was given to the consensual (counter) interventions in favor of the MPLA government.119 
The consent justification could be found also in the context of operations 
undertaken by regional powerbrokers. Syria, for instance, justified its 1976 intervention 
in Lebanon on counts of an invitation by the Lebanese president.120 India’s massive 
1987–1990 intervention in Sri Lanka, ostensibly to assist the government against the 
Tamil Tigers, was justified on counts of consent, “in response to a specific request from 
the Government of Sri Lanka, and in full conformity with international law,”121 to the 
general acquiescence of the international community.122 
Indeed, some interventions were widely condemned. However, the 
condemnations did not explicitly negate the notion of government preference, but rather 
focused on the specific circumstances. In April 1965, American forces intervened in the 
Dominican Republic, following heavy fighting between two contending governments. 
The American operation was endorsed by states party to the Organization of American 
States (OAS,) but explicitly supported in the Security Council only by the United 
Kingdom.123 The U.S. justified its intervention mainly on counts of protection of 
nationals, but also argued that it had been “informed by the military authorities” that its 
                                                 
119 S.C. Res. 387, U.N. Doc. S/RES/287 (Mar. 31, 1976) (“[r]ecalling also the inherent and lawful right of 
every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance from any other State or group of 
States;”) ROTH, supra note 103, at 285–289; see also 1976 Y’BOOK U.N. 171.  
120 See NAOMI JOY WEINBERGER, SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON – THE 1975-1976 CIVIL WAR 
206–229 (1986). 
121 Letter Dated 17 December 1987 from India to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/19354 
(Dec. 17, 1987). 
122 GRAY, supra note 104, at 86 –87. 
123 Id. at 91; 1965 Y’BOOK U.N. 140–155.  
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military assistance was required.124 It further stressed the need to prevent the emergence 
of a communist government.125  
In the discussions of the matter in the Security Council, the U.S.S.R. –  supported 
by its allies – argued that the intervention was, in essence, an attempt “to keep in power a 
dictatorship” which aimed to suppress a national liberation movement.126 Other 
condemning states, it seems, denied the existence of consent, alleging that the U.S. acted 
upon its “own assessment of the situation.”127 To conclude, the colliding American, 
Soviet and non-aligned positions, as they were presented, were based on the nature of the 
ostensibly consenting party, or on the question of existence of valid consent, but not on a 
principled negation of the presumption in favor of governments. The resulting resolutions 
203 and 205, laconically called for a “strict cease-fire” without clarifying this matter.128   
Similar positions were advanced regarding the 1968 Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, although it was not an intervention in an internal armed conflict per se. 
Among other claims, the U.S.S.R. has justified its actions on counts of government 
consent. While the invasion was condemned by many states, the positions of the U.S., 
Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia and the U.K. involved the claim that the U.S.S.R. has 
failed to “document” the Czechoslovak consent.129 The Czechoslovak representative also 
denied the existence of consent.130 A draft resolution submitted by Denmark expressed 
                                                 
124 Letter Dated 29 April 1965 from the U.S. to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/6310 (29 
Apr. 1965). In the Security Council, the U.S. changed the “requesting” entity from “military authorities” to 
“Dominican authorities.” See 1965 Y’BOOK U.N. 141.  
125 See Id.  
126 Id. at 140 –141. 
127 See, e.g., the statement of Jordan, id. at 143.  
128 S.C. Res. 203, U.N Doc. S/RES/203 (May 14, 1965); S.C. Res. 205, U.N. Doc. S/RES/205 (1965). 
129 1968 Y’BOOK U.N. 300. 
130 Id. at 298–299. 
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“grave concern” that the Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia “without the 
knowledge and against the wishes of the Czechoslovak Government.”131 
The 1983 American-led, post-coup intervention in Grenada –which was justified, 
inter alia, on counts of an invitation by the island’s head-of-state, the Governor General –
132 was again widely condemned.133 However, once more, the condemnation did not 
expressly involve a negation the general principle of government-preference.134 This 
might be explained, to some extent, by the fact that the eastern bloc, which led the 
condemnation of the invasion, could not seriously deny that Cuban troops were also 
present on Grenadian soil, themselves with the consent of the ousted government of 
Grenada.  
Thus, France, for instance, argued that intervention was allowed “in response to a 
request from the legitimate authorities,” but that such justification was not admissible in 
                                                 
131 1968 Y’BOOK U.N. 300. 
132 1983 Y’BOOK U.N. 213. It was doubtful whether the Governor General, formally the viceroy of the 
Queen of England, was actually capable of speaking for the state. See Byers & Chesterman, supra note 40, 
at 271 –272. There was also doubt whether the invitation was genuine, see Schachter, supra note 3, at 1644 
–1645; or whether it had any effect on the American decision to intervene to begin with. See Robert J. 
Beck, International Law and the Decision to Invade Grenada: A Ten-Year Retrospective 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 
765, 789 –790 (1993). 
133 The Security Council failed, in October 28, to adopt a draft resolution condemning the action in Grenada 
only due to a U.S. veto. Y’Book U.N. 211 (1983). The General Assembly, conversely, condemned the 
action as a “flagrant violation of international law.” G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/7 (Nov. 2, 1983); 
see also Byers & Chesterman, supra note 40, at 273.  
134 The American operation in Grenada raises an interesting question regarding the relations between 
regional organizations and external parties. The U.S. justified its intervention, besides on counts of 
Grenadian invitation, inter alia on a request by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). See 
1983 Y’BOOK U.N. 213. Assuming arguendo that the OECS had authority to forcefully intervene in a 
member state (which was heavily debated,) it is still questionable whether such authority allowed the 
regional organization to request assistance from an external party (here, the U.S.). On the authority of the 
OECS see Byers & Chesterman, supra note 40, at 271–272; for the position of Mexico and an interesting 
statement by Nicaragua, see U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2487th mtg. at 1–5, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2487 (Oct. 25, 
1983); for the position of Grenada see id., at 10. For the U.S. position see id., 19 –20; Letter Dated 25 Oct. 
1983 from the Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the U.N. Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/16076 (Oct. 25, 1983).   
 263 
the specific case.135 Seychelles recognized the “unquestionable right of any country to 
call on partners of its own choice for assistance” but emphasized that external states 
cannot intervene “if not requested to do so.”136 Grenada itself agreed that “intervention 
can come only if there is a request from a [OESC treaty] member Government.”137 Even 
Cuba, in an attempt to justify its own activities in Grenada, admitted – thus reinforcing 
the principle of government preference – that there was a presence of a “small military 
mission advising the Grenadian defense forces and giving assistance to the country.”138 
To this claim, Jamaica answered that Cuban troops were not “properly there at the 
request of a legitimate government.”139 Indeed, many states invoked the general 
principles of non-use of force, non-intervention and self-determination in their statements 
regarding the Grenada issue,140 but it is impossible to isolate these positions from the fact 
that the U.S.-led intervention took place after a coup d’état was effectively completed – 
and against the will of the self-appointed junta – the consent of the Governor General 
notwithstanding.141  
As aforementioned, when the cold-war ended, the discussion of intervention was 
largely freed from traditional bloc-influences, and the idea of government preference 
seems to have become taken for granted – subject to limitations that will be explored in 
Chapter 9.  Indeed, when ECOWAS decided to intervene in Liberia in 1990, it cannot be 
                                                 
135 Y’BOOK U.N. 212 (1983); U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2489th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2489 (Oct. 26, 
1983).  
136 Id. at 8. 
137 S/PV.2487, supra note 134, at 10. 
138 Id. at 13. 
139 S/PV.2489, supra note 135, at 5. 
140 1983 Y’BOOK U.N. 211–217. 
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disregarded that consent was expressed by the beleaguered (but still recognized) 
president, Samuel Doe.142 Similarly, the ECOWAS 1997 intervention in Sierra Leone 
was, essentially, a unilateral intervention on behalf of what was perceived by the 
international community as a consenting government. The ECOWAS operation was 
authorized, ex post by the Security Council.143 Similarly, Senegal intervened in favor of 
the government of Guinea-Bissau in 1998, and was subsequently replaced by an 
ECOWAS force.144 
In the year 2000, the presumption in favor of governments has been enshrined in 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 4(j) entrenches, as a principle of the 
African Union, “the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in 
order to restore peace and security.”145 This, indubitably, serves as powerful opinio juris 
regarding the principle of government-preference, or, at least, a firm denial of the strict-
abstentionist approach.  
Examples of the presumption in favor of governments can also be found in the 
recent decade. Thus, the U.K. justified its 2000 intervention in Sierra Leone, inter alia, 
on its support of a “democratically elected government” against rebel forces.146 The 
justification of government consent, in this context, was viewed favorably in a 2009 
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 See David Wippman, Liberia, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL 
CONFLICTS (Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., 1993) 157, 189; IKECHI MGBEOJI, COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE 
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144 GRAY, supra note 104, at 86.  
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report by the U.N. Secretary General, which also implied that the consent justification is 
indeed a legitimate alternative to Security Council authorization.147 Similarly, the 
Security Council welcomed the 2002 intervention by France in Côte D’Ivoire, to the 
extent that it was conducted in favor of the government.148 Moreover, as we shall 
demonstrate in Chapter 9, the international community clearly afforded preferred 
treatment to Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in favor of the Transitional Federal 
Government in Somalia, versus the negative approach towards Eritrea’s involvement on 
behalf of the opposing Islamic Courts Union.149 
In the multi-party conflict in DRC, the Security Council distinguished, at least 
most of the time, between the interventions on behalf of the government and those 
conducted, notably by Rwanda and Uganda, in support of the rebels.150 For instance, in 
January-February 2009, Rwanda received the consent of the DRC to act against Hutu 
militias (FDLR) in East Congo, in a deal in which Rwanda was to cease supporting the 
Laurent Nkunda of the CNDP. The joint operations resulted in Nkunda’s arrest and the 
neutralization of the CNDP as a fighting force.151 U.N. officials saw these actions 
positively: the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs viewed the joint 
operations as creating “created a new dynamic, which could have a significant and 
favourable impact.”152 The Special Representative of the Secretary General celebrated the 
“remarkable turnaround” in the DRC, commending the governments of the DRC and 
                                                 
147 See U.N. Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary General, 
¶42, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“In 2000, with the consent of the Government, a modest British-
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149 See Chapter 9, sec. II.4. 
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Rwanda for their “courageous decision to overcome their previous distrust and to focus 
on common interests of the future.”153 There is no doubt that this generally supportive 
view of the operations was affected by the fact that they were conducted, inter alia 
against “ex-génocidaires.”154 However, this alone does not negate the acceptance of the 
presumption in favor of governments, but rather hints at its substantive application, as we 
discuss later on. It is worthwhile to mention, in this context, that the forcible Chapter VII 
operations of the U.N. mission in Congo, MONUC, were conducted with the consent of 
the DRC’s government and in “close cooperation” with it, suggesting that governmental 
consent plays a certain role even in extreme situations of state-failure.155 In this context, it 
is worthwhile to mention also the 2011 intervention by Kenya in Somalia – discussed in 
detail in Chapter 1 – arguably conducted pursuant to a joint communiqué between the 
two countries.156  
The principle of government preference is also a key premise of American 
counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, the Security Council recognized the Coalition Provisional Authority as the 
temporary de facto administrator of Iraq,157 until a representative Iraqi government 
assumed responsibility.158 The Security Council saw the establishment of an interim Iraqi 
government on June 30, 2004 as “the end of the occupation” and therefore the end of the 
administrative powers of the Coalition Authority.159 On June 5th 2004, the prime minister 
of the interim government delivered a letter to the Security Council requesting the 
                                                 
153 U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6104th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6104 (Apr. 9, 2009). 
154 S/PV.6083, supra note 152, at 2. 
155 Chapter 1, Sec. III.3. 
156 Chapter 1, Sec. I.2. 
157 S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). 
158 S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003). 
159 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (Jun. 8, 2004).  
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multinational force to stay in Iraq, thereby inviting coalition forces to support the Iraqi 
government in the face of the various insurgent groups. Accordingly, the Security 
Council authorized the presence of the coalition forces on Iraqi soil.160  
In December 2008, a Status of Forces Agreement was concluded between Iraq 
and the U.S., Article 4 of which provided that “[t]he Government of Iraq requests the 
temporary assistance of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its 
efforts to maintain security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of 
operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of 
the former regime.”161 In essence, the agreement changed the status of U.S. forces in Iraq 
from operating under U.N. auspices to forces invited bilaterally to assist Iraq in its 
internal conflict.162  
Furthermore, consent has been cited as a lawful potential justification for the 
American intervention in Afghanistan, even by those who are generally reluctant to grant 
a carte-blanche for forcible operations within the context of the so-called “war on 
terror.”163 It could be said, thus, that the recognition of the principle of government-
preference plays a key role in the legal justification for COIN operations, a central 
                                                 
160 Letter annexed to resolution 1546, supra note 159. Further Iraqi requests for the extension of the 
multinational forces’ mandate were authorized  in S.C. Res. 1637, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 8, 2005); 
S.C. Res. 1723, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 
2007); See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Status of U.S. Forces in Iraq From 2003-2008, 11 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 7 (2010-2011) (“The Council adopted these resolutions, however, on the basis of the Iraqi 
government's successive requests, which U.S. Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice 
responded to in letters. The fact that the Council acted pursuant to a request by a member-state meant the 
foreign occupying forces became forces invited by a host state, thus giving their presence legitimacy under 
international law.”) 
161 Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of the 
United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary Presence in 
Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Dec. 14 2008; on the negotiation and content of the SOFA see Bassiouni, supra note 160, at 
9–20. 
162 See letter dated 7 December 2008 from the Prime Minister of Iraq addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, annexed to S.C. Res. 1859, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1859 (Dec. 22, 2008).  
163 See, e.g., Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. On Nat’l Sec. & Foreign Aff., 111th Cong. (2010) (Statement of Mary Elen O’connell) at 19.   
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operational pillar of which is the consent of local authorities.164 It is in the context of all 
of the above, it is hardly surprising that a 2010 U.N. report on the legality of “targeted 
killings,” unequivocally stated that “[t]he proposition that a State may consent to the use 
of force in its territory by another State is not legally controversial.”165  
 
IV.3 THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENTS IN ICJ DECISIONS: A THIN DOCTRINE 
OF GOVERNMENT-PREFERENCE 
The presumption in favor of governments has also resonated in the rulings of the ICJ. 
However, the treatment of this question has been rather thin and in no way reflects a 
comprehensive doctrine of consensual intervention. In the Nicaragua case, the Court 
rejected the Reagan Doctrine by denying the possibility that aid to opposition groups 
could be justified on counts of the consent of the latter. Accordingly, it ruled that the 
customary principle of non-intervention did not prescribe a general right for states to 
“intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal 
opposition in another State, whose cause appeared particularly worthy by reason of the 
political and moral values with which it was identified.”166 Conversely, the Court held 
laconically that such intervention on behalf of governments was permissible: 
 
it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of 
non-intervention in international law if intervention, which 
is already allowable at the request of the government of a 
                                                 
164 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY ¶1-147, 2-36 (2006) (“U.S. forces committed to a COIN 
effort are there to assist a HN [host nation] government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able 
to stand by itself.”) 
165 See, e.g., Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 105, ¶35, 37. 
166 Military Aid and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27), ¶206. 
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State, were also to be allowed at the request of the 
opposition. This would permit any State to intervene at any 
moment in the internal affairs of another State, whether at 
the request of the government or at the request of its 
opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court's view 
correspond to the present state of international law.167  
  
This position was expressed while the Court was entirely aware that an internal 
armed conflict “has continued and is continuing” in Nicaragua,168 thereby clearly 
rejecting strict-abstentionism. However, while this treatment of the question sufficed to 
express the Court’s recognition of the presumption in favor of governments, it cannot be 
understood as recognizing that consent power is limitless. In order to understand this fact, 
it is helpful to grasp the wider context of the ruling. 
Nicaragua brought charges against the U.S. for supporting, since late 1981, 
Nicaraguan rebel groups known collectively as the Contras. The Contras were involved 
in an armed campaign against the Sandinista Government – which took power after the 
1979 ousting of the Somoza Government. Nicaragua alleged that the U.S. supported the 
Nicaraguan opposition by various positive and negative means of intervention,169 
including by direct military intervention,170 and thus violated, namely, the prohibition on 
the use of force and the norm of non-intervention.171 It should be noted, that the U.S. 
decided not to participate in the proceedings after its jurisdictional objections were 
                                                 
167 Id. ¶246.. For an analysis of the ruling see GRAY, supra note 104, at 75–78. 
168 Nicaragua, supra note 166, ¶58.  
169 Id. ¶¶20–22. 
170 Id. ¶¶75-76, 81. 
171 Id. ¶23. 
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rejected.172 The Court thus referred to the American position only as it was expressed in 
the preliminary hearings.  
The main American claim was that to the extent it intervened in Nicaragua, it did 
so in collective self-defense in response to Nicaragua’s actions in El-Salvador, Honduras 
and Costa Rica.173 In particular, the U.S. focused on the alleged support given by the 
Sandinistas to guerillas in neighboring El Salvador.174 It did not directly rely on the 
consent of the Contras, although such consent was a definite condition for the American 
actions, at least in the practical sense. 
The Court held that the U.S. has been directly involved in attacks in Nicaragua, 
ruling that “agents of the United States participated in the planning, direction, support 
and execution” of such operations;175 and that American aircraft conducted 
reconnaissance flights over Nicaragua and caused “sonic booms” in its airspace.176 It also 
found that the U.S. provided financial aid to the Contras;177 as well as military aid in 
various forms.178 However, it rejected the claim by Nicaragua that the Contras, as a 
whole, were nothing more than an organ of the U.S., by setting forth a narrow test of 
state-attribution, requiring effective control over specific operations for attribution to 
materialize.179  
The Court conceded that, for a short time, certain Nicaraguan support was given 
to rebels in El Salvador, but saw most of it as either insignificant, or not attributable to 
                                                 
172 Id. ¶¶9–10. 
173 Id. ¶24, 74, 126. 
174 Id. ¶18, 128, 130.  
175 Id. ¶¶84–86. 
176 Id. ¶91. 
177 Id. ¶¶95–99, 107. 
178 Id. ¶101, 104, 106. 
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the government of Nicaragua.180 In any case, it ruled that such actions did not amount to 
an “armed attack” that could justify forcible collective self-defense measures by the U.S, 
on behalf of El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica.181 It further emphasized that collective 
self-defense requires, as a precondition, a request by the attacked state, which did not 
exist in this case.182 Having reached this conclusion, the Court held that the U.S. has 
violated namely the prohibition on the use of force,183 the norm of non-intervention184 
and the principle of territorial sovereignty.185 
However, the Court was careful not to craft a comprehensive doctrine of 
intervention. For instance, it noted that regarding the contents of the principle of non-
intervention, it would only “define” the aspects that were relevant to the specific 
dispute.186 It furthermore noted that the case did not concern “the process of 
decolonization,”187 alluding, as emphasized critically in the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Schwebel, that certain situations might be subject to different norms.188 It moreover noted 
that in addition to the fact that it did not find in state practice a “new” exception to the 
principle of non-intervention, it was the parties themselves that did not argue for a new 
interpretation of the concept, but chose to focus on “classic” concepts such as “self-
defense.”189 Thus, the court in Nicaragua was bound, to a large extent, by the limitations 
of the adversarial process – especially limited in this case, since the U.S. did not 
participate in the main proceedings.  
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181 Id. ¶195, 23(On this issue see Chapter 4, Sec. I.2)  
182 Id. ¶199, 232 –234. 
183 Id. ¶238. 
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Accordingly, the Court’s address of the question of consensual intervention, as an 
issue independent from collective self-defense, was a one-paragraphed treatment 
concealed in a ruling of 292 paragraphs.190 It is worthwhile to note, in this context, that 
the Court did not have to deal with the substantive question of the identification of the 
government capable of expressing consent, since this question was not in dispute.  
Therefore, the Court could not, and did not intend to, lay down a comprehensive doctrine 
of consensual intervention. It merely set forth the prima facie law of government 
preference. The ruling cannot be seen as condoning the unlimited consent power of 
governments, nor as laying down a general theory of sovereignty or recognition.  
If there could be any doubt that in the post cold-war world, consensual 
intervention in favor of a government can, in principle, serve as an exception to the 
prohibition on the use of force – and even one that is taken for granted – it must be 
resolved by the 2005 decision of the ICJ in the DRC v. Uganda case.191 There, the DRC 
argued that Uganda has violated the laws on the use of force and the norm of non-
intervention in its operations in the DRC, in the course of the Second Congolese Conflict. 
In short, Uganda claimed that it was operating on Congolese soil since May 1997 with 
the consent of the DRC’s government, while the latter claimed, conversely, that its 
consent was withdrawn in July 1998.192  
The Court accepted, in general, that the DRC has withdrawn its consent to the 
presence of Ugandan forces, and thus held that Uganda violated international law by not 
removing its forces from the DRC’s territory.193 In its consideration of this issue, the 
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191 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (December 19). 
192 Id. ¶43. 
193 Id. ¶¶51–54. 
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Court must have, even if implicitly, accepted the perception that consensual forcible 
intervention in favor of governments, in the course of an internal armed conflict, is not 
generally unlawful.194 Arguably, had the Court subscribed to a strict-abstentionist 
approach, it would have had to treat any intervention by Uganda as a violation of jus 
cogens, which it would then have to consider as one which is based on invalid consent.195 
Indeed, the treatment of this issue in this ruling reflects the notion that government-
preference has become an almost trivial principle in the contemporary international 
system.   
                                                 
194
Id. ¶¶42–54. It should be noted, to complete the picture, that the fact that the DRC could consent to 
foreign intervention was not challenged by any party in this case; but from the language of the case it seems 
that it is a given that such intervention would not have been deemed illegal by the Court.  
195 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; ILC Draft & 
Commentaries, supra note 7, arts. 40–41. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT CONSENT POWER: GENERAL THRESHOLDS 
 
I. INTERVENTION AND CONSENT IN THE 21
ST
 CENTURY: TERRITORIAL EFFECTIVENESS 
IN LIGHT OF MASS ATROCITIES AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
Having established that a presumption in favor of governments exists, we shall now turn 
to discuss the scope of this presumption, and accordingly, the principles that strengthen it 
or lead to its rebuttal. Recall, that the debate regarding the non-intervention agreement of 
the Spanish Civil War has clarified that the refusal by states to assist to a beleaguered 
government does not in itself constitute a violation of the norm of non-intervention.
1
 A 
further question is under what circumstances states are obliged not to assist such a 
government. In the era of the prohibition on the use of force, an intervention, in such 
cases, becomes both an illegal use of force and, in general, an unlawful intervention in 
internal affairs. While a possible approach to the limitations on government consent 
power would be to read the traditional considerations of territorial effectiveness into the 
contemporary prohibition on the use of force, it seems that this has not been entirely the 
case. 
Qualifications of the presumption in favor of governments, based on territorial 
effectiveness considerations, have been justified, throughout the 20th century, on counts 
of the challenged regime’s incapacity to represent the state, and on the principles of self-
determination and of non-intervention.
2
 In terms of the government’s ability to represent 
                                                 
1
 Chapter 7. sec. IV.2. 
2
 See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 
56 BRIT. Y’BOOK INT’L L. 189, 189 (1985).   
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the state, some equated the tests for the validity of consent with the classic, territorial 
effectiveness-based tests for government recognition, asserting that “a regime may only 
be legally entitled to invite outside military help if it’s a ‘government’ within the meaning 
of international law, and must therefore be in de facto control.”
3
 The scope of loss of 
territorial effectiveness that supposedly merits the loss of consent power is a complex 
threshold question, which seems to have remained largely unsolved. The problem is 
further exacerbated since, traditionally, loss of control over a significant part of a state’s 
territory has not resulted in the withdrawal of recognition from beleaguered governments, 
as the latter, at least in the past, have normally retained recognition until a new regime, 
which has gained control over the territory, has emerged.
4
  
However, it should be noted that the relation between the scope of consent power 
and the question of government recognition is rather complex. While loss of recognition 
necessarily entails also the loss of consent power, the same is not true vice versa. When a 
government is in violation of international law, and for the purpose of maintaining that 
violation it requests external assistance, its request can be powerless although the 
government retains recognition for other purposes.
5
 Loss of recognition, however, might 
result in graver consequences for the previous government, as in such case it does not 
only lose consent power (negative result) but such power might be transferred to other 
groups (positive result). In the following chapter, as well as in Chapters 10 and 11, 
attention will be largely given to the former situation, while the latter will be addressed in 
Chapter 12.  
                                                 
3
 Id. at 195 –196.  
4
 Id. at 197 –200. 
5
 See David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 215 –216 (1996).  
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Recent practice casts doubts regarding the centrality of loss of territorial 
effectiveness in the assessment of consent power. This is process corresponds with two 
major intertwining – but distinct – processes that characterize the contemporary 
international system. The first concerns the increasing preoccupation of the international 
community with the protection of civilians, in light of the tragic internal conflicts of the 
past two decades. This notion will be extensively discussed in Chapter 10. The second 
concerns the struggle against transnational terrorist entities, which dominated the first 
decade of the millennium. The latter’s relation to consent power is manifested in 
contemporary counterinsurgency operations, and in cases where transitional governments 
are formed following international, internal or mixed armed conflicts.  
For instance, the Bonn Agreement, concluded under U.N. auspices in order to set 
up an interim authority after the fall of the Taliban, included a request by the Afghan 
delegations for an establishment of an international security force.
6
 The Security Council 
endorsed the Bonn Agreement as a whole, and specifically noted the Afghan request in 
Resolution 1386, establishing the International Security Assistance Force, which was 
mandated to work in “close consultation” with the Afghan authorities.
7
 Similarly, 
Coalition forces have received the consent of the interim Iraqi government with regards 
to their operations against various opposition groups in June 2004. Iraq’s consent was 
granted once again, with the conclusion of a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement in 2008 
with the U.S.
8
 Although arguments could be made that the Iraqi and Afghan authorities 
                                                 
6
 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions annex I ¶3, U.N. Doc S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001); see also Letter Dated 19 
December from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan, U.N. Doc.  S/2001/1223 (Dec. 19, 2001). 
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8
 See Chapter 8, sec. IV.2.  
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were coerced, or that they did not exercise territorial effectiveness, the matter passed with 
general international acquiescence.  
In the same vein, arguably, loss of significant territorial control does not hinder 
the apparent tacit consent, although currently not publicly admitted, given by Pakistan to 
intensifying U.S. drone attacks conducted on its territory since 2008 in the context of 
Pakistan’s conflict with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the American struggle against 
Al-Qa’ida.
9
 Furthermore, it seems that Yemen has retained in its consent power, vis-à-vis 
Saudi Arabia, in 2009’s “Scorched Earth” campaign against Houthi rebels, although the 
former have gained control over territory in Northern Yemen.
10
 In sum, in the context of 
the international struggle against terrorism, government consent power seems to have 
become taken for granted. In other contexts, we saw – for instance – in the conflicts in 
Congo, that territorially ineffective regimes have not only consented to interventions, but 
have also emerged victorious in litigation conducted on the basis of alleged breaches of 
such consent.
11
    
In light of the above, it seems that another set of considerations constitute the 
“active agents” that circumscribe the limitation of government consent power. Whatever 
these may be, an underlying notion of our analysis is that any such rule  should not, in 
general, aspire to predetermine the regime of the target state, nor, a fortiori, to set up a 
utopian society. Rather, a workable, relatively objective and agreed upon standard to 
assess consent power – as discussed in Chapter 10 – could be principle of protection of 
                                                 
9
 Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, Characterizing U.S. Operations in Pakistan: Is the United States 
Engaged in an Armed Conflict? 34 FORD. INT’L L. J.  151, 154 –159, 183 –184 (2010).  
10
 Ian Black, Arab Governments Move to Ease Yemen Crisis, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 5, 2008, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/05/arab-governments-yemen-crisis; on the Houthi conflict in 
general see Int’l Crisis Group, Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb 2–4, ICG Mid. East Report No. 86 
(May 27, 2009). 
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 See Chapter 8, Sec. IV.3. 
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civilians. Any further goal, such as the establishment of a democratic system, can and 
should be the concern of the post-conflict construction process. 
 
II. THRESHOLD QUESTIONS 
II.1 THE EXISTENCE OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT AS A GENERAL PRECONDITION FOR 
FORCIBLE INTERVENTION: INTERNAL JUS AD BELLUM  
For the presumption in favor of governments to materialize, there is a general threshold 
question that first has to be answered. Simply put, the question is whether the internal 
resort to force by the territorial government is legal. Indeed, the term jus ad bellum has 
been traditionally understood to connote the legality of the resort to force in the 
international realm. Hence, article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter applies to the use of force 
between states. Internal armed conflicts, on the other hand, were traditionally viewed as 
actions controlled by a state’s domestic legislation.
12
 Thus, a state’s resort to force 
against its nationals – in contradistinction, to some extent, to the jus in bello of internal 
armed conflicts –
13
 was not considered a subject of international law. Accordingly, it was 
impossible to suggest that there was an international law of jus ad bellum governing the 
internal resort to force. 
However, since the conclusion of the main instruments of the international law of 
human rights – namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
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 the relations between the state and individuals under its control, in all aspects, has 
become a concern of international law. Significantly, the ICCPR enshrines the inherent 
and non-derogable right to life, which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life;
15
 in 
addition, it prescribes various “due process” conditions for the administration of criminal 
law,
16
 which are derogable, “to the extent strictly required,” only “[i]n time of public 




International human rights law thus regulates the use of state violence against 
those within the state’s territory or subject to its jurisdiction.
18
 As such, it can be viewed 
as establishing an international law of jus ad bellum – or perhaps, jus contra bellum – 
within the boundaries of the state. However, since human rights law does not pinpoint the 
“vanishing point” in which a state’s resort to internal force is permissible, the logical 
conclusion is that states cannot resort to extrajudicial military force against members of 
their populations absent circumstances that amount to internal armed conflicts, as these 
were discussed in Chapter 2. In instances that do not amount to internal armed conflicts, 
the conduct of the state is regulated by the law of human rights alone, in which lethal use 
of force is regulated by rules of engagement applicable in the context of law 
enforcement.
19
 When an internal armed conflict exists, “internal” jus in bello applies,
20
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allowing the government to use lethal force against members of organized armed groups 
and civilians directly participating in hostilities, while accepting proportional incidental 
harm inflicted on non-participating civilians.
21
 In essence, thus, only in the context of an 
internal armed conflict, could article 6(1) of the ICCPR’s prohibition on arbitrary 




The determination of the circumstances in which non-international armed conflict 
exists, has been an exceptionally controversial issue in the recent years, especially in the 
context of the American “global war on terror.”
23
 In this context, for instance, an 
extremely difficult question is whether – or when – a mere “first strike” by a state, in the 
context of an internal armed conflict (as opposed to in international armed conflict), 
transforms the situation from one which is regulated by human rights law to one 
regulated also by international humanitarian law.
24
  
Of special significance to the analysis of the question of consensual intervention 
is that the legality of the resort to force by a government necessarily affects the legality of 
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forcible actions conducted by an external, consensual intervener. It is a fundamental 
principle of law, and therefore of the regulation of consensual intervention, that a state 
cannot abrogate its international obligations by inviting a third-party to act in its 
territory;
25
 and, accordingly, that an external intervener cannot conduct activities that the 
territorial state is prohibited from undertaking itself.26 In cases where human rights law 
prohibits the internal use of force – for instance, in absence of an internal armed conflict 
between at least two organized armed parties – then, it necessarily follows that 
consensual forcible intervention is also prohibited. This is a necessary corollary of the 
understanding of consent as creating a principal-agency relationship between the parties. 
This distinction is especially evident in instances, such as have taken place in the 
events of the Arab Spring, in which some states resorted to military force against largely 
unarmed and non-violent protesters, in gross violation of international human rights 
law.
27
 In at least one case, a forcible consensual intervention took place. In February 
2011, protests erupted in the Gulf state of Bahrain, immediately facing harsh repression, 
including by the Bahraini military.
28
 Since it is obvious that the Bahraini situation did not 
amount to internal armed conflict, it is reasonable that according to international human 
rights law, the use of force by Bahrain – to the extent that it exceeded law enforcement 
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“Fire on Crowds,” B.B.C. NEWS , Feb. 18, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
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operations – was unlawful. On March 15, after a request by the Bahraini government, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sent forces into Bahrain, comprised predominantly of 
Saudi troops.
29
 Assuming that the resort to force by Bahrain was illegal, any support 
rendered by GCC troops to Bahraini operations was unlawful as well.
30
 Perhaps, without 
exhausting the argument on this specific case, the most that the GCC could do is assist 
the Bahraini government in law enforcement operations, subject to international human 
rights law. 
Therefore, when assessing the legality of consensual interventions, it must be 
determined a priori that an internal armed conflict exists in the state to begin with, and 
that an “armed conflict” is not proclaimed by the territorial state as pretext to abrogate its 
obligations under human rights law and to suppress non-violent dissent. The linkage 
between the existence of internal armed conflict and consent power was summarized 
succinctly by Mary Ellen O’connell, in a 2010 statement in front of the House of 
Representatives: 
 
Even in places like Yemen and Pakistan, where there is 
armed conflict going on, the United States would only have 
the right to use combat drones in the armed conflicts that 
those governments are participating in, and not in some 
rogue operation of our own that has nothing to do with 
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 Sess. (2010) 19 (Statement of Mary Elen O’connell).  
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And elsewhere, in a similar vein:  
 
There is a very key and often overlooked distinction. The 
invitation has to be to participate in the armed conflict that 
the government of the country is participating in. So 
Yemen right now is facing insurgencies … If they had 
asked us, the United States, to be also involved, we could 
use military force there, on their invitation, in their armed 
conflict. But what we have done [in 2002] … this attack 
was not part of any armed conflict that the Yemeni 
authorities were involved in. It was six individuals in a 
vehicle in a remote area, and we killed all six persons, 
including a U.S. citizen. That is not an armed conflict that 





This position is of course without prejudice to the question whether a state, not 
involved itself in an internal armed conflict, can consent to external attacks conducted 
against elements in its territory, as part of some paradigm of self-defense exercised by the 
attacking state – provided that we are willing to view such instances as lawful self-
defense to begin with. This justification – of self-defense actions enhanced by host-state 
consent – has been cited by the Obama administration as a legal basis for transnational 
drone attacks against individuals.
33
 In practice, however, it seems that in many of these 
                                                 
32
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33
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cases, when the non-state actor operates from within the target-state’s territory against the 
latter’s will, it is reasonable that the latter will find itself, at some stage, itself involced in 
an internal armed conflict against the targeted entity. This has been the dynamic 
concerning American drone strikes in Yemen and Somalia, and also in Pakistan – to the 
extent that it consented to such strikes. 
Indeed, the claim that the existence of an internal armed conflict is a precondition 
for the legality of consensual intervention seems to be in exact opposite to some 
traditional writing according to which intervention was prohibited when strife amounted 
to a “civil war.” However, closer scrutiny reveals that these claims are actually on 
different levels. While the precondition of the existence of an internal armed conflict is 
based on considerations of human rights, the “civil war” limitation, as we shall see, was 
actually concerned with lack of the government’s territorial effectiveness, and therefore 
its lack of sovereign power. This shift in focus can be explained by the fact that in 
contemporary law, human rights and the protection of civilians have moved to the center 
stage, shifting the understanding of sovereignty from territorial effectiveness in favor of 
other, substantive considerations. If we interpret the concept of effectiveness in light of 
the principle of protection of civilians, this incompatibility, to some extent, is reconciled. 
We shall elaborate more on this in our discussion of the concept of effective protection in 
Chapter 10. 
   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
¶¶15–26; Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the ‘Fog 
of Law’ 13 Y’BOOK OF INT’L HUM. L. 311, 315–318 (2010). 
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II.2 THE LEGAL IRRELEVANCE OF THE TERM “CIVIL WAR” AS NEGATING CONSENT POWER 
The most common restriction, in the literature, on government consent power relies on 
some ambiguous notion of loss of territorial effectiveness. A common approach towards 
the issue of consensual intervention is thus to accept the “theoretical” right of 
governments to consent to forcible intervention, but to immediately qualify this right in 
light of considerations of territorial effectiveness. This approach is sometimes expressed 
through the use of the term “civil war,” to connote situations in which consent power is 
negated, as opposed to situations of “local unrest,” in which consent power stands.  Gray, 
for instance, concedes that government consent power exists, and has been “taken for 
granted” since 1945. However, she restricts this power only to instances of “domestic 
unrest,” arguing that the norm of non-intervention negates such power in instances of 
“civil wars.”
34
 The position expressed by Gray was based, inter alia, on a 1984 U.K. 
Foreign Policy Document, in which the same position was taken, which denied 
government consent power in instances of civil war in which control over the state’s 
territory is divided between the parties.
35
 A similar position was adopted by Thomas and 
Thomas;
36
 and elsewhere by Schachter, who distinguished between civil wars and 
situations “in absence” of civil wars, in which governments are entitled to receive 
military aid.
37
   
It is possible that the term “civil war” is used, in these instances, strictly in the 
generic sense. However, since it had, at least in the past, significant legal meaning (as 
expressed in the belligerency doctrine), the use of the term can lead to confusion. 
                                                 
34
 GRAY, supra note 12, at 80, 85. 
35
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 ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & AARON JOSHUA THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT 
IN THE AMERICAS 94 (1956), cited in Doswald-Beck, supra note 2, at 196. 
37
 Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV 1620, 1645 (1984). 
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Furthermore, it seems incompatible with modern law.  Indeed, the preconditioning of 
government consent power on the absence of “civil war” seems to contradict the 
approach of the Nicaragua court, where the preference of governments was manifest – 
although it was clear that the Nicaraguan situation was definitely beyond the threshold of 
“domestic unrest.” The Contras operated an armed force of 30,000; the conflict in 
Nicaragua has resulted, between 1980 and 1989, in over 40,000 casualties; it had major 
internal and external effects.
38
 And still, the Court did not at all imply that consent power 
was annulled only on counts of the scale of the conflict.  
Indeed, Gray concedes that the “civil war” threshold is a difficult test to apply, 
since states – involved and uninvolved alike – are reluctant to admit that the “legal” 
threshold of “civil war” has been crossed.
39
 As we saw in Part II, this has been a constant 
feature of the treatment of internal strife since the 19
th
 century. Thus, in essence, relying 
on the distinction between “domestic unrest” and “civil war,” reverts international law to 
the largely unhelpful discourse of the belligerency doctrine. Just as recognition of 
belligerency was an extremely rare occurrence, so it is expected that a positive 
recognition that a “civil war” exists, in its traditional legal sense, will rarely be made.
40
  
Furthermore, the distinction between situations of “war” and those that do not 
amount to war seems foreign to contemporary law, which emphasizes the factual terms 
use of force and armed conflict rather than the technical-legal term of “war.”
41
 This is a 
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prominent feature in both the spheres of jus ad bellum
42
 and of jus in bello.
43
 It is a 
product of the attempt to prevent the circumvention of legal obligations through the 
denial that a state of war exists.
44
 In light of this development, it is unreasonable that 
“war” remains a dominant legal term only when assessing the question of consensual 
intervention.  
However, it is possible to reconcile this anomaly, with a slight adjustment of the 
terms. It seems that when commentators use the term “civil war” as a limitation for 
consent power, they actually allude to the loss of effective control that “civil war” 
supposedly entails, rather than to the term “war” in the technical sense. For instance, 
Schachter uses the term “civil war” interchangeably with terms alluding to territorial 
effectiveness. Thus, while sometimes using the “civil war” threshold, he also suggests a 
clearer contention, asserting that when conflict occurs “on a large scale involving a 
substantial number of people or control over significance of the country” the preference 
of government should be revoked.
45
 Therefore, in essence, the “active agent” in the 
negation of consent power, according to this approach, is the loss of territorial control. 
Thus, limitations on government consent power of this kind should be framed as 
limitations based on territorial effectiveness, rather than limitations based on the 
confusing classification of a conflict as a “civil war.” 
In this sense, the position of Wright, according to which “a government, even if 
generally recognized, cannot speak for the state if it is not in firm possession of the state’s 
                                                 
42
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 represents a doctrinally clearer phrasing, since it highlights territorial 
effectiveness rather than the technical definition of the conflict as a “war.” This is not to 
say that the territorial effectiveness test is in itself coherent. On the contrary: it can prove 
quite paradoxical. For instance, as aforementioned, under the territorial effectiveness tests 
governments could request assistance in the face of “unrest.” However, it is unclear why 
a state, which cannot even deal alone with mere unrest, would be deemed more effective, 
in the territorial sense, than a state that requires assistance in the face of a major 
insurrection.   
 
II.3 THE FAILED STATE THRESHOLD: NO GOVERNMENT – NO PREFERENCE 
A possibly workable threshold – related but distinct from traditional territorial 
effectiveness tests – is the “failed state” standard. Such a test, at least, provides relatively 
tangible parameters – although these too suffer from ambiguity, as there is no formal 
legal definition of the term “failed state.” However, at least for the purpose of the 
assessment of consent power, a failed-state can be identified as one in which there is a 
total or near total breakdown of the institutions guaranteeing law and order, even within 
territories controlled by different factions; moreover, a failed state does not have a body 
capable of representing it internationally in terms of any form of legitimacy, be it based 
on territorial effectiveness, democratic representation or otherwise.
47
 In this sense, a 
failed state is different than the traditional case of “civil war” in which some territorial 
effectiveness is lost in favor of opposition groups.  
                                                 
46
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Indeed, in a situation where it is obvious that there is simply no functioning 
government at all – which is at least capable of expressing a coherent position regarding 
the conflict – and the state is torn by fluid and unstable warring factions, it is a necessary 
logical and legal consequence that – absent unique circumstances – there will be no 
government preference. If there is no entity that is even physically capable of 
representing the state internationally, there is no entity that can conclude agreements that 
form the basis for consensual interventions (or to withdraw from such agreements). 
 Note, that this approach does not attribute significant normative value to 
territorial effectiveness: it merely argues that in a “true” failed-state scenario there is 
absolutely no party that can physically express coherent will. In such cases, it is 
reasonable that the question of intervention be resolved by the U.N. or regional 
organizations, either with Security Council authorization in accordance with article 53 of 
the Charter,
48
 or in, absence of Security Council authorization, by relying on forward-
looking intervention treaties, assuming that these are generally valid.
49
 A failed state, in 
this sense, can be roughly analogized to an unconscious patient undergoing an operation: 
she has previously authorized the encroachment of her personal autonomy manifested in 
the operation, but does not possess, in real-time, the physical capacity to withdraw her 
consent.  
Interventions in failed state scenario – whether based on Security Council 
authorization or forward-looking treaties – should aim immediately to provide protection 
to civilians.
50
 In parallel to achieving this goal – as might be deduced from state practice 
– the interveners, in such cases, seek to identify the parties that are capable of concluding 
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 290 
an agreement that would reasonably reflect the collective will of the state,
51
 thereby, at 
least de jure, rescuing the state from its “failed” status and initializing a transitional 
period. This is not merely a descriptive analysis of practice: it also seems to best promote 
the norm of non-intervention. An example for such a role played by a regional 
organization, in relation to a failed-state situation, could be the actions undertaken by 
ECOWAS in Liberia, after the assassination of President Samuel Doe.
52
 
A different but related situation can take place when there are, in principle, 
functioning institutions, but the various functions of government are split between 
warring factions, resulting in a conflict between the state institutions themselves. An 
example for this scenario could be when a President and a Prime Minister head different 
factions (for instance, the 1960 Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict in Congo, and to an extent, 
the Lebanese Civil War of 1975 –1976).
53
 Such situations result, much like in the failed-
state scenario, in the default of the de jure entity of government and thus require a 
flexible, case-by-case approach by the international community,
54
 in which some analysis 
of the internal-constitutional order of the state cannot be avoided.  
In any case, it should be taken into account that – whether pursuing an 
intervention or not –  the contemporary international system does not in practice permit, 
for long, the de jure situation of “failed states;” instead, it prefers to grant recognition to 
transitional governments, even if – as we shall see – the latter do not exercise territorial 
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effectiveness. It seems that the international legitimacy of such entities rests on the fact 
that they are products of multilateral reconciliation processes, or otherwise have future 
prospects to end the conflict and thus promote the protection of civilians. Especially 
relevant for us is the fact that such governments have also been recognized as possessing 
consent power. We shall demonstrate this notion in the context of the quintessential failed 
state – Somalia.  
 
II.4 BEYOND THE FAILED STATE THRESHOLD: RECOGNITION, INTERVENTION, AND THE 
ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN SOMALIA 
After the 1991 ousting of Somalia’s longstanding autocrat Siad Barre, Somalia has 
descended into total anarchy. The fractioning of the various militias led, by 1992, to mass 
killings, starvation and other atrocities.
55
 After failing to secure peace and having 
suffered heavy losses, U.N. forces withdrew from Somalia in March 1995, in a rare 
admission of defeat.
56
 Somalia remained in chaos. Ceasefires and transitional 
governments did not hold. A regionally sponsored effort, the National Reconciliation 
Process, resulted in the October 2004 establishment of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG). Exercising no control over Somali territory, but supported by 
regional powers Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, the TFG was initially based in Kenya.  
The TFG was controversial from its inception, as the transitional parliament 
elected a warlord, Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, as interim president. Yusuf established a 
loyalist cabinet, marginalizing and alienating other power wielders – especially those 
                                                 
55
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related to Islamist movements shunned by Ethiopia.
57
 Soon after his election, while his 
government was still in Kenya, Yusuf appealed for forcible intervention by the African 
Union and the United Nations in order to allow him to enter and gain control over the 
territory of Somalia. The international community, at that stage, was reluctant.
58
 In the 




The TFG entered Somalia in June 2005, amidst a rift along its members, between 
President Yusuf and representatives of local Mogadishu groups, themselves very loosely 
aligned, and united only in their rejection of Ethiopian involvement. Because of this split, 
the TFG could not enter Mogadishu – the traditional capital of Somalia – and had to settle 
in the city of Jowhar.
60
 One of the disputes between the parties related to Yusuf’s appeal 
to the African Union (A.U.) and the Horn of Africa’s regional organization, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), for assistance. Needless to say, 
the TFG was completely ineffective at the time. Nevertheless, Yusuf’s request was 




However, any intervention in Somalia required U.N. authorization, because of the 
long-standing comprehensive arms embargo imposed on the country by the Security 
Council.
62
 Accordingly, in July 2005 the A.U. requested the Security Council to grant an 
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exemption from sanctions regime, a request that was, at that stage, denied. This 
demonstrates that consensual intervention can be thwarted by a pre-existing U.N. 
sanctions regime, however ineffective,
63
 and reflects a significant limitation on the 




From the ranks of the Mogadishu groups emerged the major threat to the TFG, the 
union of Islamist movements known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and the radical 
jihadist elements within them.
65
 The ICU has emerged in 2005 as a reaction to the Somali 
governance vacuum, and was comprised of a union of local clan-based Shari’a 
mechanisms that represented the major source of power in South Somalia since the 
state’s collapse in the early 1990s. In June 2006, following heavy fighting in Mogadishu 
– and while the ranks of the TFG were split – the ICU took control over most of the 
capital and its surroundings, defeating the U.S.-backed and short-lived Alliance for 
Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT), which was composed, inter alia, 
of non-Islamist elements of the Mogadishu groups. The ICU’s victory has placed 
Mogadishu, for the first time since 1991, under a unified authority.
66
  
At the time of the ARPCT defeat, the TFG controlled virtually no territory in the 
state, and barely had any reasonable prospects to attain such control by itself.
67
 By this 
time more and more calls were made by the international community to lift the sanctions 
regime, in order to allow assistance to the TFG and the deployment of international 
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forces – disregarding the fact that it was rather the ICU that was the most powerful and 
effective force in South Somalia. In parallel, Ethiopian troops were starting to be seen in 
the Baidoa area (then seat of the TFG), and more were amassed on the border.
68
  
As the TFG and its Ethiopian allies were poised for a decisive battle against the 
ICU, the Security Council authorized international intervention by IGAD (IGASOM), 
while urging dialogue between the TFG and the ICU, and stressing that the Traditional 
Federal Institutions offer the only route to achieve peace and stability in Somalia. While 
attempting to maintain a neutral language, IGASOM was mandated to protect the seat of 
the TFG and to train its security forces. Strictly for that end, the Security Council lifted 
the arms embargo.
69
 It did not explicitly call for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. 
In December 2006, the Ethiopian army, acting without Security Council 
authorization and claiming inter alia that it is acting in self-defense against “terrorists,”
70
 
scored a dramatic military victory overt the ICU, with the consent of the TFG and in 
cooperation with its forces, leading to the ICU’s dissolve and to the entrance of the TFG 
to Mogadishu. However, the victory resulted in the ICU’s splintering into several groups, 
including Al-Shabaab, a radical group allegedly associated with Al-Qa’ida.  
The TFG thus achieved a limited victory with the support of Ethiopia. However; it 
did not have the capacity to substitute the ICU in terms of effective control.
71
 In February 
2007, the Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy troops in Somalia 
(AMISOM), instead of IGASOM, with a similar mandate – essentially, to support the 
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 Soon enough, the Somali situation deteriorated, as a decentralized Islamist 
insurgency spread against the TFG and the intervening Ethiopian troops. By 2009, the 
TFG had control only over Baidoa and certain parts of Mogadishu – and that too 
depended on strong Ethiopian support. The Islamist splinter groups gradually returned to 
control almost as much territory as they did prior to the Ethiopian intervention. Under 
these circumstances, Ethiopia withdrew in 2009, leaving the TFG to rely only on the 
limited capacity of AMISOM for support.
73
  
The international response to the intervention by Ethiopia was largely one of 
acquiescence. During the height of the fighting, in the end of December 2006, the 
Security Council issued a Presidential Statement urging dialogue, in which Ethiopia was 
not condemned nor even mentioned.
74
 Furthermore, the Security Council’s December 
2006 decision (in Resolution 1725)
75
 to lift the arms embargo on Somalia in order to 
enable IGASOM – in which Ethiopia is a dominant member – to operate in the country 
can be seen as a tacit encouragement for Ethiopia’s actions. The first action by the 
Security Council regarding Somalia, after the major battles of late 2006, was two months 
later:  in resolution 1744, the Council mandated AMISOM, “welcomed” Ethiopia’s 
decision to withdraw its troops, and “underlined” that AMISOM will create the 
conditions for a full withdrawal.
76
 It seems reasonable to assume that Ethiopian forces, to 
a large extent, paved the way for the deployment of the A.U.s forces that still, as of 
March 2012, uphold the existence of the TFG. 
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Eritrea, which supported the TFG’s opponents, received a wholly different 
treatment. A traditional enemy of Ethiopia, Eritrea sought to curb the latter’s ambitions in 
Somalia by supporting the ICU, and after its dissolution – the Islamist factions. For 
instance, during 2005 and 2006, Eritrea delivered arms shipments to the TFG’s rivals.
77
 
Recall, that in international law, arms transfers to opposition groups can amount to 
forcible intervention (while not necessarily to an armed attack, at least in the eyes of the 
Nicaragua Court), and thus it is possible to label the Eritrean actions as a forcible 
consensual intervention in favor of an opposition group.
78
 The Security Council, in 
Resolution 1907, demanded that “Eritrea cease all efforts to destabilize or overthrow, 
directly or indirectly, the TFG” and imposed sanctions on it.
79
 
Despite its lack of control, the TFG continues to entrench its position vis-à-vis the 
international community as the only viable and recognizable government of Somalia. As 
the TFG’s foreign minister remarked earnestly, while expressing his support for the 
bolstering of AMISOM, “It can be argued that the very existence of the TFG, under the 
circumstances, is a clear plus.”
80
 It is doubtful that the “very existence” standard is 
suitable, in all cases, to replace the territorial effectiveness test in the context of 
recognition and consensual intervention. What is clear, however, is that territorial 
effectiveness was entirely absent from the discourse of government recognition in the 
Somali context, nor in the analysis of the capacity of the rival forces to request, consent 
or acquiesce to external forcible support.
81
 It follows that simple territorial effectiveness 
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thresholds are not sufficient to explain the modern international practice regarding 
government consent power, and that other considerations come into play.   
 
III. COUNTER-INTERVENTION: A DEFENSE CLAIM FOR LOSS OF TERRITORIAL 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Even those that limit consent power to situations that do not amount to “civil wars,” or 
otherwise base such limitation on territorial effectiveness standards, usually concede that 
when a civil war, or loss of territorial effectiveness, is fomented by external intervention, 
the government too is entitled to receive assistance.
82
 This is the well-established doctrine 
of “counter-intervention” which, as noted in Chapter 8, has been frequently invoked (and 
abused) in the cold-war era.
83
 Indeed, even when one subscribes to the very strict 
understanding of the concept of consensual intervention – meaning, to strict-
abstentionism – there is merit in the idea of counter-intervention. This is because when 
the opposition receives external assistance, it could be said that the first interveners – and 
the opposition, should it gain control over the state – are estopped from invoking the 
principle of non-intervention against other intervening powers. In addition, from the 
internal standpoint, the political independence of the peoples in the conflicting state has 
already been compromised by the first intervention, and therefore the counter-
intervention cannot be seen, in itself, as a violation of the norm of non-intervention. 
The counter-intervention doctrine is usually understood as permitting intervention 
in favor of governments. However, approaches such as the 1980’s Reagan Doctrine, as 
                                                 
82
 See GRAY, supra note 12, at 92–98; see generally Wright, supra note 4. 
83
 See, generally, John A. Perkins, The Right of Counterintervention, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 171, 171 –
173 (1987); For a summary of some cold-war era consensual interventions augmented by claims of counter-
intervention see Doswald-Beck, supra note 2, at 213–242. 
 298 
discussed in Chapter 8, sought to expand it to justify counter-intervention on behalf of 
opposition groups.
84
 As aforementioned, this idea is in direct contravention to the 
prohibition on the use of force, and was rejected in the Nicaragua ruling.
85
     
While the counter-intervention doctrine certainly maintains its theoretical vigor, 
in practice, it was particularly important in the colonial and cold-war eras, in which many 
internal armed conflicts were actually proxy wars in the struggle between the main 
powers, or concealed attempts to preserve colonial rule.
86
 Nevertheless, in legal terms, 
the claim of counter-intervention can still be raised both by beleaguered governments and 
intervening powers as a defense-claim, when confronted with effectiveness-based 
rebuttals of the presumption in favor of governments.
87
 
It should be added here, that a formalistic reading of the counter-intervention 
principle might lead to the conclusion that any such action must be proportional to the 
original intervention.
88
 On the ethical level, as suggested by Walzer, counter-intervention 
aims at “preserving the balance, restoring some degree of integrity to the local 
struggle.”
89
 For instance, according to this logic, if the first intervention included a non-
forcible act such as transfers of funds, so must the counter-intervention be limited to such 
acts. The Nicaragua Court alluded to this principle.
90
 However, it did so in the context of 
cross-border counter-interventions – instances in which a state, or its ally, claims the 
right to intervene in another state, in response to an intervention by the latter in another 
                                                 
84
 See also Perkins, supra note 83, at 221–224 (supporting counter-intervention in favor of insurgents). 
85
 Chapter 8, Sec. IV.3. 
86
 On the cold-war “proxy-war” phenomenon see ANN HIRONAKA, NEVERENDING WARS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WEAK STATES AND THE PERPETUATION OF CIVIL WAR 104–130 (2005). A 
classic case for an attempt to preserve colonial domination through “internal” conflicts is the Katanga affair 
of 1960. See ORFORD, supra note 53, at 69–79.  
87
 But see Schachter, supra note 37, at 1642. 
88
 See Perkins, supra note 83, at 178 –180.  
89
 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 97 (4
th
 ed, 2006). 
90
 Nicaragua, supra note 78, at ¶210 
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state’s internal affairs. This differs from situations in which a counter-intervention is 
pursued strictly within the territory of the victim state.  
In instances where the first intervention amounts to a “less-grave” use of force, 
such as arms transfers, the Court took an even narrower approach, ruling that “less-
grave” forcible interventions, which are not “armed attacks,” do not justify a collective 
response consisting of “less grave” forcible interventions by the victim state or its allies 
into the territory of the first intervening state; the rationale for this ruling being that any 
use of force, grave or less grave, is conditioned upon the occurrence of an “armed 
attack.”
91
 In essence, such understanding of the counter-intervention doctrine results in its 
complete merger with the idea of collective-self defense, since it allows for forcible 
cross-border counter-intervention only when the first intervention amounts to an armed 
attack by the intervening state.   
It is doubtful, however, whether the rationale requiring strict proportionality in 
counter-intervention can unequivocally apply also to counter-interventions that take place 
strictly within the territory of the victim state. This is so, since such a limitation will 
essentially terminate the presumption in favor of governments, by effectively equalizing 
its position to the externally-supported opposition. Furthermore, there is also no 
conclusive evidence in state practice that counter-interventions have been required to 
mirror the scope of the first intervention.
92
  
The territorial-limitation on counter-intervention, set forth by the Nicaragua 
majority, was heavily challenged in the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, not only 
                                                 
91
 Nicaragua, supra note 78, at ¶¶211, 247 –249. For a similar view see Schachter, supra note 37, at 1643; 
but see John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 43, 105 –106 (1986).  For the distinction between “grave” and “less-grave” uses of force see 
Chapter 4. 
92
 Schachter, supra note 37, at 1644.  
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on counts of his objection to the characterization of “indirect aggression” as an act not 
amounting to an “armed attack,”
93
 but also by his understanding of state practice as 
allowing counter-interventions to “spill” over to the territory of the first intervener.
94
 The 
gist of this controversy is rooted in the understanding of the distinction between the 
related – but different – claims of counter-intervention and collective self-defense.  
The right of collective self-defense, as enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter, is usually understood as the right of a state to request assistance against an 
external armed attack, whether it is committed by a state or, possibly, by a non-state 
actor.
95
 The counter-intervention doctrine, conversely, connotes a situation in which a 
government requests external intervention to suppress an internal element supported by 
an external party, perhaps through “less grave” uses of force. To the extent, however, that 
the involvement of the external party in the actions of the internal element amounts to an 
armed attack, and is of such character that it creates state-attribution, then the claim of 
counter-intervention merges with the claim of collective self-defense.
96
 In such cases, it is 
both logical and reasonable, that the assisting state, as part of the collective self-defense 
operations, can attack the territory of the external state.
97
 It is plane that such operations, 
legally based on self-defense, must adhere to the proportionality and necessity limitations 
                                                 
93
 Nicaragua, supra note 78, at ¶¶174–176. 
94
 Id. at ¶¶217–220 (Scwebel, J., dissenting).   
95
 The question of the right to self-defense, as enshrined in Article 51, against armed attacks by non-state 
actors in the course of a transnational armed conflict, is controversial. The majority opinion of the ICJ, in 
the Wall advisory opinion, was that such right against non-state actors does not exist. Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 
¶139 (Jul. 9) (Koroma, J.) Judge Higgins, in her separate opinion, rejected this interpretation. Id, ¶¶33–34 
(Higgins, J.) For a critique of the reasoning of the majority see Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the 
Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ? 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62 (2005).  
96
 See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 159 (1991).  
97
 See Perkins, supra note 83, at 207 –209. 
 301 
on the exercise of self-defense enshrined in customary international law.
98
 Thus, the 
legality of a counter-intervention that “spills” to the first intervening state’s territory is 
influenced by our perception of what constitutes an armed attack.   
Another parallel that can be drawn from the proximity of collective self-defense 
and counter-intervention is the requirement of consent. Just as collective self-defense, as 
held in Nicaragua, requires consent by the attacked state, the question of counter-
intervention must be analyzed in the framework of consent: a state that embarks on a 
counter-intervention must also have the genuine consent of the “victim” government. 
Indeed, this notion runs contrary to the perception of counter-intervention as a “right” or 
“entitlement” of third states.
99
 However, such reasoning belongs to an era in which 
internal conflicts were analyzed mainly according to their effects over external parties, or 
on counts of some vague normative meaning attributed to the “global balance of 
power.”
100
 Nowadays, in the era of the prohibition on the use of force, intervention can be 
judged only in terms of conferral of authorization, or, as will shall see, on counts of 
“responsibility” – and not in terms of a “right” of an intervener. Since the legality of 
intervention, almost always,
101
 must be a corollary of the rights of the internal entities, a 
“right” of counter-intervention cannot be asserted in a paternalistic fashion, independent 
from the consent of the internal actors.
102
 As such, intervention should always be 
                                                 
98





 Compare Perkins, supra note 83, at 171–173 (and the sources cited therein). 
100
 Compare id. at 180–183, 195. 
101
 A possible exception is the right to intervene for the protection of nationals abroad, which is based on 
the interests of the intervener rather than on those of the territorial state; and the right of self-defense 
against non-state actors. 
102
 Compare Wippman, supra note 5, at 220–221. Moreover, a violation of the balance of power cannot be 
viewed, in itself, as a breach of an erga omnes obligation entitling external parties to intervene when not 
requested to do so. Compare Perkins, supra note 83, at 211–212.  
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analyzed in terms of principal-agency relationship, rather than as a relationship between 
two (or more) parties bearing equal contractual “rights.”
103
 
Last – and importantly – the traditional doctrine of counter-intervention cannot be 
used as a valid defense claim when the challenges to the government preference are based 
on substantive issues, as opposed to claims based on the technical loss of territorial 
effectiveness. For instance, if a government commits mass atrocities, it would not be able 
to rely strictly on the doctrine of counter-intervention as a source of consent power. This 
conclusion is augmented, of course, when the first intervention was authorized by a 
Chapter VII resolution – as was in the case of Libya in 2011.
104
  
                                                 
103
 See Chapter 1, Sec. II.1. 
104
 See Chapter 12.  
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CHAPTER 10 
FROM EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER TERRITORY TO EFFECTIVE 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 
 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
With the collapse of the iron-curtain, and the initial embrace of liberal-democracy by the 
ex-eastern bloc states, the promotion of “democracy” has become the predominant theme 
of the international discourse on intervention.
1
 Gradually, however, the mass atrocities of 
the 1990s forced a robust preoccupation with the protection of civilians, a concept more 
basic and primordial than democracy.
2
 The question of democracy and intervention shall 
be mainly addressed within our debate of the “democratic entitlement” in Chapter 11. 
However, we will do so in light of the realization explored in this section: that the 
principle of protection of civilians (hereinafter – the principle of protection) has been 
elevated, in the last two decades, to a paramount principle of international law.  
The rise of the principle of protection is mainly a product of recent decades. For 
instance, a striking aspect of the early instruments of international humanitarian law 
(IHL), such as those adopted in the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, is the absence 
of explicit reference to the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. However, the reality 
                                                 
1
 See Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy and its Implications 
for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1–25 (Gregory H. Fox 
& Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Tom J. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 53, 56 (J.L. Holzgrefe & 
Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).  
2
 This is of course reflected also in legal scholarship: the term “protection of civilians” appeared in 237 
articles before 1999, in all law reviews available in Westlaw.com; it appeared in 791 articles since (as of 
April 2012).   
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of warfare throughout the 20
th
 century has changed radically. The percentage of civilian 
deaths in armed conflicts – and particularly in internal armed conflicts – steadily climbed 
up to an overwhelming majority by the 1990s.
3
 The increasing practical need for 
protecting civilians in armed conflict has been supplemented by changes in the 
understanding of different international norms. These changes have been labeled as the 
“humanization” of law – a process in which humanitarian considerations have gained 




Over the course of the 20
th
 century, and in particular in the last decades, this 
process can be exemplified in several milestones. First, the principle of protection has 
been enshrined in the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and significantly in the 
additional protocols of 1977,
5




Second, the binding nature of IHL in the context of all internal armed conflicts 
has been clearly established. Traditionally, the application of the “laws of war” in internal 
armed conflict has been seen as voluntary, to be applicable only on counts of “reciprocity 
and reason,”
7
 or as binding only in cases of belligerency recognition.
8
 Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions, supplemented by (the narrowly applying) Additional 
Protocol II, have entrenched the binding application of at least the basic norms of IHL to 
                                                 
3
 Simon Chesterman, Introduction: Global Norms, Local Contexts, in CIVILIANS IN WAR 1, 1 –2 (Simon 
Chesterman ed., 2001).  
4
 See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 (2000). 
5
 See Karma Nabulsi, Evolving Conceptions of Civilians and Belligerents: One Hundred Years After the 
Hague Peace Conferences, in CIVILIANS IN WAR, supra note 3, at 9.   
6
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Jun. 8, 1977, arts. 50–51, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
7
 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 667–669 (1862). 
8
 See supra, Chapter 5, Sec. I.3.  
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all internal armed conflicts.
9
 In this context, although Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II are thin instruments in comparison to those regulating international armed 
conflicts, there is growing convergence between the customary norms covering all kinds 
of conflicts – international, transnational or internal.
10
 This convergence is evident, for 
instance, in the ongoing study of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 
customary IHL, where many of the customary rules have been found, in essence, equally 
applicable to international as well internal armed conflicts.
11
   
Third, since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, more 
significantly, since the coming into force of major human rights conventions (the ICCPR 
and ICESCR), the binding obligation to protect human rights has for the first time 
enshrined the protection of individuals – rather than sovereigns – in the international 
realm.
12
 In this context, and supplementing the convergence between the jus in bello 
applicable to international and internal conflicts, another normative convergence has 
emerged: the drawing closer of IHL and international human rights law (IHRL).
13
 In the 
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ has ruled that IHL and IHRL are not 
mutually exclusive, and that international human rights law, as the lex generalis, also 
                                                 
9
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction ¶¶96–97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); ANTHONY CULLEN, THE 
CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 25–113 
(2010). 
10
 On the convergence between regimes regulating international and internal armed conflicts see Tadic, 
supra note 9, ¶¶100–127; on transnational armed conflicts, see NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF 
FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 131–134 (2010). 
11
 See, generally, JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2007); see also Meron, supra note 4, at 261 –263. 
12
 See, e.g.,THE INDEPENDENT INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 168–169 (2000). 
13
 For an in depth analysis of this process See Meron, supra note 4, at 244–247, 266–273. 
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during armed conflict. The same notion was expressed, in the context of occupation, in 
the Wall advisory opinion and the case of DRC v. Uganda.
14
  
Recent literature points out the difficulties in the application of the lex 
generalis/lex specialis distinction, and suggests that IHRL be seen instead as 
complementary to IHL, either by filling gaps in IHL; through the use of IHRL’s 
enforcement mechanisms in cases of IHL violations; or through the interpretational 
realization that both bodies of law seek to advance the same goals.
15
 However we see the 
specific nature of the relation between IHL and IHRL, it is clear that the dual-application 
of these bodies of law reflects that the protection of individuals has become an integral, 
predominant part of the law of armed conflict at large; and accordingly – and perhaps 
more obviously – also to the law of internal armed conflict.
16
  
Fourth, the preoccupation with the protection of civilians is expressed in the 
development of international criminal law, through the establishment of ad hoc 
international tribunals in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), and the 




                                                 
14
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶25 (July 8); 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9); Armed Activity on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of 
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 216-220 (December 19). 
15
 Noëlle Quénivet, The History of the Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW 
MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 9-10 (Roberta Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008). 
16
 For an analysis of IHRL and IHL in internal armed conflicts see LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 193–210 (2003). I argue that such dual-application is more “obvious” in internal armed 
conflicts since in such contexts the question of extra-territorial application of human rights law, and its 
scope does not surface. See, e.g., Wall Opinion, supra note 14, at ¶¶109 –112. 
17
On the International Criminal Court, see generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2011).  
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Fifth, since the 1990s, U.N. Security Council practice has reflected a wide 
interpretation of the Council’s mandate – authorizing the imposition of enforcement 
measures in cases that threat international peace and security – as extending to situations 
that are largely confined to the borders of a single state, such as internal armed 
conflicts.
18
   
Sixth, in the last decade, African regional organizations – that operate in the most 
strife-torn parts of the world – have increasingly stressed the concept of “non-
indifference” to mass atrocities, as supplementing the norm of non-intervention. For 
instance, as discussed in Section III.3, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, and its subsequent protocol, authorize the Union to intervene in member states in 
cases of mass atrocities.
19
 
By the late 1990s, thus, the principle of protection has broken the boundaries of 
IHL, and began to emerge as a general principle of the international system. The 
atrocities in Iraq (1991), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (Srebrenica, 1995) and Kosovo (1998)
 20
 
– the latter resulting in NATO’s controversial unilateral intervention – have brought the 
concept of protection, and its means of implementation, to the forefront of international 
concern. Indeed, NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo has been a watershed moment 
                                                 
18
 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶4.23, 6.16 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report]; Georg Nolte, Secession and 
External Intervention, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 65, 67 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 
2006); ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 168–169 
(2011). 
19
 See also U.N. Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary 
General, ¶8 U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
20
 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict ¶31 U.N. DOC. S/1999/957 (Sept. 8, 1999). 
 308 
regarding the principle of protection.
21
 After Kosovo, it became obvious, in light of the 
previous failures of the international system,
22
 that a robust international consideration of 
the question of civilian protection must take place; and that otherwise, the entire order of 
the U.N. Charter would be put at risk. This development was the backdrop to the intense 
debate regarding the concept of unilateral humanitarian intervention, which will be 
addressed in Chapter 12. Significantly, the atrocities committed in the 1990s have 
compelled the international community – now largely free from zero-sum Cold-War 
considerations – to distance itself from the idea that “impartiality” towards internal crises 
was an absolute value, and to recognize that there are indeed instances in which local 
parties are not moral equals, but can be identified as aggressors and victims.
23
 The 
decline of the notion of impartiality has intertwined with the gradual shift in the 
international function of collective bodies, taking place since the 1960s, from serving 
mainly as treaty-making forums to resembling, to some extent, an international executive 
or administrative system.
24
 In recent years, literature has taken this process a step further: 
identifying the emergence of similar transnational “administrative” relations between 
states themselves and between states and citizens of other states.
25
  
In light of the processes outlined above, the U.N. Security Council has 
considered, since 1999, the protection of civilians in armed conflicts as a thematic issue, 
                                                 
21
 See THE KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 12, at 191; see also Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian 
Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL DILEMMAS, supra note 1, at 232, 232 –233.   
22
 See, e.g., Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999); U.N. Secretary General, Report of the 
Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999). 
23
 See ORFORD, supra note 18, at 8; see also THE KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 12, at 189 –190; Jennifer 
Welsh, Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP, 25 ETHICS & 
INT’L. AFFAIRS 1, 4 –6 (2011). 
24
 For a detailed account of this process see generally ORFORD, supra note 18. 
25
 As part of the idea of Global Administrative Law See Sec. II.2.. 
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calling for a “comprehensive and coordinated approach by Member States and 
international organizations and agencies” in order to address the problem of the 
protection of civilians.
26
 Reports by the U.N. Secretary General (UNSG), submitted as 
part of the thematic discussions, have identified the principle of protection as a main tenet 
of international peace and security, and recommended various measures to be taken by 




The Secretary General’s reports have thus urged the promotion of a “culture of 
protection,” focused on the individual rather than the state, whose “primary function” is 
to ensure the security of the civilian population.
28
 They presented a “roadmap” for the 
promotion of protection,
29
 and have recognized that the principle of protection emerges 
from a wide body of positive international law, comprising of IHL, international criminal 
law, IHRL and refugee law.
30
 All in all, the UNSG’s reports contain over a hundred 
recommendations for the promotion of protection,
31
 which are categorized according to 
“five core challenges” required to be met in order to ensure the effective protection of 
civilians.
32
   
                                                 
26
 S.C. Prst.  U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1999/6 (Feb. 12, 1999). 
27
 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict ¶¶27–28, 35 –67, U.N. Doc. S/1999/957  (Sept. 8, 1999), S/1999/957; endorsed 
in S.C. Res 1265, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999).     
28
 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict ¶¶1 –5, 7, U.N. Doc. S/2001/331 (Mar. 30, 2001). For subsequent reports see 
U.N. Docs. S/2002/1300 (2002); S/2004/431 (2004); S/2005/740 (2005); S/2007/643 (2007); S/2009/277 
(2009); S/2010/579 (2010). 
29
 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict ¶6, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1330 (Nov. 26, 2002). 
30
 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict ¶34, U.N. Doc. S/2005/740 (Nov. 28, 2005). 
31
 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict ¶9, U.N. Doc. S/2009/277 (May 29, 2009). 
32
 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict ¶43, U.N. Doc. S/2010/579 (Nov. 11, 2010). 
 310 
Some of the UNSG’s recommendations were reflected in general and forward-
looking Security Council resolutions such as resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 
(2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009). Significantly, resolution 1296 affirmed that 
peacekeeping forces should be granted mandates to actively protect civilians in danger.
33
 
Accordingly, mandates of numerous peacekeeping operations were broadened to include 
such activities.
34
 Resolution 1674 reaffirmed the principle of protection, the broadening 
of mandates of U.N. missions, and for the first time, endorsed the “responsibility to 
protect” (RtoP) doctrine – which we shall discuss later on.
35
  
Since the principle of protection itself is largely free from “political” pretext (as it 
is not necessarily connected to a specific system of government), it enjoys relatively wide 
credibility across states with different political cultures and systems.
36
 Accordingly, the 
“primary” legal validity of the principle of protection – in distinction from the 
“secondary” methods to implement it, which remain controversial – has emerged as a rare 
normative consensus in the international community, notwithstanding the dire reality on 
the ground, in which violations of the principle are frequent.
37
 Indeed, there is wide 
agreement regarding the validity of the principle of protection in the Security Council’s 
discussions. The major disagreement does not concern the significance of the principle 
itself, but is reflected, for instance, in China and Russia’s persistent positions that the 
principle should not, in general, be promoted through forcible intervention.
38
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 S.C. Res. 1296, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1296  (Apr. 19, 2000) ¶13. 
34
 See U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict ¶8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/431 (May 28, 2004). 
35
 S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc, S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) ¶4.  
36
 Compare ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 26–57 (2009).  
37
 See Thomas G. Weiss, RtoP Alive and Well after Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L. AFF. 1, 5(2011); Jennifer 
Welsh, supra note 23, at 1. 
38




 mtg. at 14–15. 29–30U.N. Doc. S/PV.3977, 14–15, 29–30 (Feb. 
2, 1999).   
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In light of all of the above, it seems that collective opinio juris has elevated, in the 
last two decades, the principle of protection of civilians to the same plateau of basic 
principles of international law such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention 
and the prohibition on the use of force, effectively complementing and redefining them. 
Indeed, the principle of protection has affected Security Council authorized 
interventions conducted, in practice, in favor of beleaguered governments. As such, it has 
direct bearing on our understanding of the law of consensual intervention. For instance, 
in 2009, forcible support given to the DRC by U.N. Forces (MONUC) was heavily 
criticized, due to the Congolese military’s alleged involvement in serious IHL violations. 
In response, the UNSG instructed MONUC not to support DRC forces in operations 
where there are grounds to believe that IHL and IHRL violations will take place. 
MONUC was further required to support the DRC only in operations that were jointly 
planned, and to suspend support during operations if violations occurred.
39
 A subsequent 
Security Council resolution urged the DRC to “effectively protect” the civilian 
population;
40
 and mandated MONUC, in cooperation with the DRC, to ensure such 
effective protection, strictly conditioning MONUC’s support of the government on the 
latter’s compliance with international law.
41
  
In addition, the U.N. is undertaking a process to outline general “conditionality 
policies” regarding forcible support of governments by U.N. forces, in order to ensure the 
protection of civilians.
42
 This process implies that intervention, in contemporary 
international law, is intertwined with the concept of effective protection of civilians. This 
                                                 
39
 S/2010/579, supra note 28, at ¶¶63 –64.  
40
 S.C. Res 1906, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1906 (Dec. 23, 2009) ¶3.  
41
 Id. ¶22. 
42
 S/2010/579, supra note 28, at ¶65. 
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is indeed a positive development: beyond the obvious moral virtues of the principle, it is 
also a relatively definable, objective and tangible threshold for the assessment of internal 
armed conflicts.       
 
II. FROM EFFECTIVE CONTROL TO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION: PROTECTION AS A 
COMPONENT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
II.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
Until now, we have mainly demonstrated the international preoccupation with the 
principle of protection, and its resulting normative significance it. In parallel, however, a 
no-less important development has been taking place – effective protection has come to 
be viewed as an integral component of sovereignty, through the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).
43
  
The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo has not only invigorated the 
international consideration of civilian protection as a concept, but also the debate 
regarding the means for the principle’s enforcement – namely, concerning the legitimacy 
of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In response to pleas by UNSG Kofi Annan, the 
government of Canada established an International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), mandated to further the understanding of the connection between 
intervention, civilian protection and sovereignty.
44
 ICISS published its landmark report in 
2001, calling for the endorsement of the concept of RtoP.
45
 Echoing the influential ideas 
of Francis Deng, the report’s main premise was its reading of the U.N. Charter, and its 
                                                 
43
 On the nuances in the U.N. discourse between Protection of Civilians (PoC) and RtoP see Welsh, supra 
note 23, at 2–3.  
44
 For the background on ICISS and its discussions, see RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 36, at 35–
51. 
45
 ICISS REPORT, supra note 18, at  1–3.  
 313 
understanding of emerging state practice, as connoting a shift in the perception of 
sovereignty: “from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility.”
46
  
This “responsibility,” according to the ICISS report, is to “protect” human 
security; it lies first and foremost with the territorial state, but when the latter is unable or 
unwilling to fulfill it, or is itself perpetrating atrocities against individuals under its 
control, the responsibility shifts to the international community. The responsibility, 
according to ICISS, is comprised of three elements: the responsibility to prevent; the 
responsibility to react; and the responsibility to rebuild.
47
 These responsibilities, and in 
particular the responsibility to react, override the norm of non-intervention, in the strict 
understanding of the term, in cases of violence that “shock the conscience of mankind.”
48
 
Accordingly, the report laid down six criteria for military intervention, which correspond, 
at large, to classic just-war theory conditions.
49
  
Under the “just-cause” condition for intervention, the report referred to cases of 
large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended.
50
 Significantly, such 
cases include, inter alia, “state collapse” that leads to starvation or “civil war,” and 
overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes.
51
 Moreover, the ICISS Report 
stressed that causes for intervention do not distinguish between state action, deliberate 
inaction, or failure.
52
 However, the report excluded, as grounds for military intervention, 
                                                 
46
 Id. ¶2.14.  This concept was first proposed, in such words, in FRANCIS DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS 
RESPONSIBILITY 1– 2 (1996). For a wider discussion of the principles set forth in the ICISS Report see 
GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 
(2008).  
47
 ICISS REPORT, supra note 18, at ¶¶2.29–2.33. 
48
 Id. ¶4.13. 
49
 Id. ¶4.16 et seq. These criteria are right authority; just cause; right intention; last resort; proportional 
means and reasonable prospects.  
50
 Id. ¶4.19. 
51
 Id. ¶4.20. 
52
 Id. ¶4.22. 
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violations of human rights falling short of “outright killing or ethnic cleansing,” such as 
systematic racial discrimination, or the overthrow of democratic regimes.
53
 
The report acknowledged that forcible intervention as part of the RtoP concept 
must be authorized by a Chapter VII U.N. Security Council resolution.
54
 However, it 
recognized the problematic “capricious use” of the Permanent Five’s veto power as a 
major potential inhibition to international action.
55
 The report then proceeded to suggest 
modes of action “when the Security Council fails to act.” These included General 
Assembly actions under the “Uniting for Peace” procedures,
56
 which could add “a high 
degree of legitimacy” (in distinction from legal authorization) to military intervention;
57
 
and actions by regional organizations, that receive ex post authorization by the Security 




The Commission then issued two “important messages” to the Security Council:
59
 
first, that if it fails to discharge of its responsibility, it is inevitable that concerned states 
will act unilaterally, a process which will potentially lead to adverse results; and second, 
that if such interventions would be successful, the credibility of the U.N. as a collective 
system will be seriously damaged.
60
  
                                                 
53
 Id. ¶¶4.25–4.26. Interestingly, regarding cases of coup d’états against democratic government, the Report 
recognizes that in such cases the overthrown government may request forcible intervention. This situation 
is discussed in Chapter 11.   
54
 Id. ¶¶6.14–6.15. 
55
 Id. ¶6.20. 
56
 Id.; Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. Doc. A/377 (Nov. 30, 1950).  
57
 ICISS REPORT, supra note 18, ¶6.30. 
58
 Id. ¶¶6.31–6.35. It should be noted that nowadays, actions by regional organizations can be viewed as 
consensual interventions based on forward-looking intervention treaties, in regions where such are 
concluded. See sections III.3 –III.4. 
59
 ICISS REPORT, supra note 18, ¶6.38. 
60
 Id. ¶¶6.39–6.40. 
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Some of the ICISS Report’s recommendations were included in the conclusions 
of the U.N.’s High Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of 2004. In particular, the 
Panel endorsed “the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility 
to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last 
resort,” in cases of mass atrocities.
61
 The general idea of the RtoP concept has been 
endorsed unanimously in Paragraphs 138–139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document (WSO Document), adopted by the General Assembl.
62
 Paragraph 138 refers to 
the responsibility of the individual state, and Paragraph 139 refers to situations in which a 
state fails to fulfill its responsibilities, and these shift to the international community, 
acting through the U.N. 
Paragraph 138 thus recognizes that each state has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
(“the four crimes”); and that the international community should “encourage and help 
States to exercise this responsibility.” By focusing strictly on the four crimes, and 
excluding, for instance, “natural or environmental catastrophes,” the WSO Document has 
narrowed the concept as it was presented first in the ICISS report. Paragraph 139 
acknowledges that when states manifestly fail to protect their populations from the four 
crimes, this responsibility extends to the international community, acting through the 
U.N., including – as a last resort – by forcible measures authorized by the Security 
Council. As opposed to the ICISS Report, it seems that paragraph 139 excluded an 
explicit reference to apprehended failure to protect as a potential cause for intervention, 
                                                 
61
 Note by the Secretary General ¶203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565; see also U.N. Secretary General, In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All ¶135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 
2005).  
62
 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1 (Sept. 15 2005).  
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although it includes a pledge to assist “those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out.” Notably, paragraph 139 lacks any reference to the Security 
Council’s “capricious veto” problem, and thus reaffirms the Council’s monopoly over the 
authorization of forcible intervention.
63
  
Its limitations notwithstanding, the adoption of the WSO Document constituted a 
significant step towards the consolidation of the principle of protection through the RtoP 
concept, and solidified the understanding of sovereignty as the responsibility to 
effectively protect civilians.
64
 It is for this reason that it was heralded by the UNSG as a 
“cardinal achievement” of particular significance.
65
 However, this process was not 
uncontroversial. For instance, it was only after six months of intense debate in which 
reluctant states, such as China and Russia, expressed discomfort with the concept, that 
paragraphs 138–139 of the WSO Document were endorsed in Security Council 
Resolution 1674 of 2006.
66
 Moreover, in 2006–2007, the RtoP concept has been heavily 
questioned in U.N. forums, namely by some Arab and Asian states, in the context of the 
debated regarding the international reaction to events in Sudan.
67
 Nevertheless, the 
principle was reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 1706 concerning Darfur;
68
 and in 
subsequent years it seems that the door has opened, to the extent possible in the 
                                                 
63
 This reflects the concerns of many states that RtoP would be used to disguise the controversial claim that 
a “right” of extra-charter humanitarian intervention be recognized. See ORFORD, supra note 18, at 24 –25.  
64
 Implementing RtoP, supra note 19, at ¶10. 
65
 U.N. Doc. S/2007/643, supra note 28, ¶11. 
66
 S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 36.  
67
 See ALEX J. BELLAMY, GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 28 –31 (2011). 
Interestingly, it seems that the Arab States, acting through the Arab League, have in practice endorsed the 
idea of RtoP, for instance, when suspending Syria from the league and issuing an ultimatum to the Assad 
regime during the Syrian uprising of 2011-2012. See Arab League Deadline for Syria Action Passes, 
B.B.C. NEWS , Nov. 19. 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15802312.   
68
 S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (2006) (Aug. 31, 2006); See also Implementing RtoP, supra note 
19, ¶¶1–3. 
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international system, for renewed consensus regarding RtoP.
69
 In 2008, the UNSG 
created a new position – Special Adviser to the Secretary General on the Responsibility 
to Protect – to promote the implementation of the concept.
70
 In parallel, many states – 
both developed and developing, and in particular African states – began to refer to RtoP 
in their statements in front of various forums.
71
 In 2009, in resolution 1894 concerning 
the protection of civilians, the Security Council once again reaffirmed paragraphs 138–
139 of the WSO Document.
72
 
In the same year, the General Assembly debated the RtoP concept and called for 
its continuing consideration.
73
 The implementation of the concept was further discussed 
in “informal dialogues” in August 2010 and July 2011.
74
 As part of this process, the 
UNSG issued reports regarding the implementation of the RtoP concept. In his 2009 
report, UNSG Ban Ki-moon phrased RtoP as encompassing three pillars: (1) the 
protection responsibilities of the state; (2) international assistance and capacity building 
(which, of course, augments the concept of government consent power); and (3) the issue 
of timely and decisive response, which encompasses both non-forcible to forcible 
measures.
75
 A 2011 report further discussed the implementation of RtoP and the role of 
regional organizations in it promotion.
76
  
In 2011 RtoP has been first incorporated into significant, operational Security 
Council resolutions. Thus, RtoP has been referred to by the Security Council in its 
                                                 
69
 GLOBAL POLITICS, supra note 67, at 31 –36. 
70
  See ORFORD, supra note 18, at 17.  
71
 Id. at 17–19.   
72
 S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009). 
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 G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009).  
74
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75
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resolutions concerning the 2011 crisis in Libya, inter alia authorizing forcible 
intervention,
77
 as well as in its resolution reiterating the mandate for forcible actions in 
Côte d'Ivoire.
78
 These will be discussed later in this work. For now, suffice it to say that 
in both cases, the mandates granted for the protection of civilians were interpreted widely 
– too widely in the eyes of some –
79
 resulting eventually in the removal of an 
unrecognized leader (in Côte d'Ivoire),
80
 and the widespread withdrawal of recognition 
from a targeted regime, eventually leading to its ouster (in Libya).
81
 It is also of special 
significance that Resolution 1973, authorizing intervention in Libya, was the first time 
that forcible intervention in an internal armed conflict, for the sake of civilian protection, 
was authorized against the will of a functioning government.
82
   
 
II.2 THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF RTOP: AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS 
The RtoP concept undoubtedly presents a rather thin legal framework, surrounded by an 
environment of robust policy considerations. As noted by the UNSG, paragraphs 138–
139 of the WSO document reflect already existing principles and obligations of 
                                                 
77
S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) (imposing sanctions on Libya); S.C. Res. 1973, 
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in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 383 –391 (2012). 
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international law regarding protection of civilians.
83
 Moreover, the paragraphs do not 
challenge the monopoly or the wide discretion of the Security Council regarding the 
authorization of forcible action. As such, there is significant disagreement whether RtoP 
has any novel legal-normative significance.
84
 For instance, the responsibility of third 
parties to “prevent and to punish” genocide is already well established in international 
law;
85
 similarly, states are also already obliged to “ensure respect” for the laws of the 
Geneva Conventions.
86




Furthermore, RtoP has been criticized substantively from various angles. On the 
one hand, it has been labeled as ambiguous lip-service that will not serve to promote 
substantial international efforts against atrocities; on the other, it was attacked as a new 
cover for imperialist interventionism.
88
 Some have even blamed the concept for 
promoting genocide by creating a moral hazard.
89
 However, these critiques are not 
particularly well-based. The “lip-service” claim seems to contradict emerging 
international practice, such as in the case of Libya, and perhaps also in Kenya;
90
 the 
                                                 
83
 Implementing RtoP, supra note 19, ¶¶2–3.  
84
 See Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many 
Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CON. & SEC. L 191 (2008); Amrita Kapur, Humanity as the A 
and Ω of Sovereignty: Four Replies to Anne Peters, 20 EU. J. INT’L L. 560 (2009); for a summary of these 
claims see ORFORD, supra note 18, at 22–24. 
85
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. I,  Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277. 
86
 Common Article I, Geneva Conventions of 1949.  
87
 Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? 101 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 99 (2007); see also Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama 
Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L. AFFAIRS 1, 3 (2011). 
88
 ORFORD, supra note 18, at 22–23 (addressing such arguments); See generally RAMESH THAKUR, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NORMS, LAWS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ch. 10 
(2010).  
89
 For a critical response to the “moral hazard” claim see GLOBAL POLITICS, supra note 67, at 71–73.  
90
 See Serena K. Sharma, The 2007-08 Post-Election Crisis in Kenya: A Success Story for the 
Responsibility to Protect?, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE 27 (Andre 
Nollkaemper & Julia Hoffman eds., 2012). 
 
 320 
accusations of “imperialism” seem contradictory to the fact that African states – hardly 
the usual suspects for neo-imperialism – have been major supporters of RtoP;
91
 it also 
cannot serve to explain the Arab League’s support of the 2011 RtoP intervention in 
Libya;
92
 last, the moral hazard argument can serve to negate any form of international 
order which deviates from a laissez faire approach towards mass atrocities, and in any 
case has not been empirically validated.
93
 
Although novel legal obligations, in the strict sense, are not explicitly set forth in 
the various “official” RtoP documents, the concept still has potential for legal 
significance.
94
  First, it serves as a clear-cut statement by the international community 
that internal situations, even when lacking any tangible cross-border effects, are indeed of 
international interest, and are also within the mandate of the Security Council.
95
 As such, 
RtoP, although expressed in a non-binding General Assembly resolution, reflects an 
interpretation of the U.N. Charter that arguably ends the longstanding debate regarding 
the relations between Security Council authority, which extends to issues of international 
peace and security, and internal crises such as internal armed conflicts; and between 
enforcement measures and the norm of non-intervention, as enshrined in article 2(7) of 
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 In this sense, RtoP can be seen as a more practical response to 




Second, RtoP can serve to aggregate and consolidate the various existing 
international norms of civilian protection, under a common theoretical wing – where the 
concept of sovereignty as responsibility can be looked upon as a basic principle to which 
major interpretational value should be attributed.
98
 This interpretational value can serve, 
for instance, to advance the equal and like application of the principle of protection to all 
types of armed conflicts: international, internal or transnational.   
Third, RtoP explicitly shifts the debate from the permissive “rights” of external 
parties – namely, the “right to intervene” – to responsibilities accrued towards the civilian 
population of the target state. Thus, in contradistinction to the doctrine of “humanitarian 
intervention,” discussed in Chapter 12, RtoP focuses the attention on the rights of internal 
parties, and places these considerations in the forefront of the international system’s 
approach to internal crises.
99
 This is indeed an important development: even the 
proponents of the “right of humanitarian intervention” define it as an “imperfect right” 
possessed by the intervener,
100
 which is closer, in legal theory, to a “freedom” – since it is 
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not accompanied by parallel and tangible obligation owed by anyone.
101
 This definition 
of humanitarian intervention, as a “freedom” to intervene, seems inconsistent with the 
principled approach that should be the basis of any doctrine of intervention.
102
  
Therefore, although not imposing a legal obligation to intervene per se, RtoP’s 
emphasis on the term “responsibility” potentially provides a more principled framework, 
less responsive to the whims or self-arrogated “rights” of external parties.
103
 In essence, 
the use of the concept of “responsibility” reflects a transition from the perception of the 
international community as comprised of self-interested unitary actors, acting to fulfil 
their “rights” – perhaps in a manner similar to individuals acting in the realm of private 
law –
104
 to a system in which actors on the international level play a role which is closer 




Fourth, and most significantly in our context, RtoP solidifies the understanding by 
the international community that sovereignty means responsibility rather than the ability 
to exercise territorial effective control. As such, it can alter our understanding of the 
concept of recognition in international law, as well as other concepts of law that 
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traditionally attribute much importance to territorial effectiveness. Accordingly, it can 
explain and justify substantive preference given to one side over the other in an internal 
armed conflict.
106
 We shall explore this notion in the next sections. 
In short – RtoP, in its legal sense, is a concept that represents the aggregation of 
all the existing normative and institutional obligations stemming from the basic principle 
of protection of civilians, and serves to bridge between these obligations and the 
understanding of sovereignty, its traditional corollary of non-intervention, and the 
emerging “administrative” role of international bodies.    
 
II.3 ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND NEGATION OF GOVERNMENT CONSENT 
POWER  
Once our perception of sovereignty transforms – from a term connoting effective physical 
“control” over territory, which generates, in and of itself, a right to exercise further 
control, into a source of a responsibility to protect civilians – change must also follow in 
our view towards what constitutes normative effectiveness: meaning, control of the type 
that positively affects the recognition of rights and powers of entities engaged in internal 
armed conflicts.
107
 However, since effectiveness, as a technical term, is necessary for any 
entity’s mere physical capacity to protect civilians during armed conflict, the concept of 
sovereignty as responsibility compels us to reformulate the doctrine of effectiveness 
rather than to abandon it. Thus, the perception of effectiveness can be shifted from its 
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traditional understanding as connoting effective control over territory, to one which refers 
to the effective protection of civilians. In this sense, the effective control and effective 
protection principles share one characteristic: both focus chiefly on the way power is 
used rather on the way it was initially appropriated.
108
  
However, it should be emphasized, that the concept of effective protection does 
not substitute the consent of the governed as a source of sovereign legitimacy; as 
discussed in Section II.5, it is merely a key consideration at the moment when assessing 
the question of intervention in specific circumstances.  For instance, while autocracy was 
indeed a longstanding feature of the Assad regime in Syria, its international legitimacy, in 
the strict sense, was never substantially challenged. Only after its military crackdown in 
the context of the uprising of 2011-2012 – allegedly amounting to a violation of the 
protection principle –
109
 did the U.S., Canada and major E.U. powers assert that the 
regime has “lost its legitimacy,” and that Assad “can no longer claim to lead the 
country.”
110
 Turkey – previously a staunch ally of Assad – went further by issuing a stern 
warning to the latter, threatening that “[i]f these operations do not stop there will be 
nothing left to say about the steps that would be taken."
111
 Here, we see that the attitude 
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towards the Syrian regime was shaped, in general, by the way it has exercised its power 
rather than on counts of its longstanding autocratic nature.   
The same dynamic was prevalent also regarding the autocratic Qadhafi regime in 
Libya. Only during the 2011 internal armed conflict, and following the atrocities 
committed against civilians, Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. claimed that the Qadhafi 
regime has “lost legitimacy.”
112
 While these declarations did not amount, at the time, to a 
formal withdrawal of recognition – they nevertheless highlighted the role of effective 
protection as a main component of legitimacy.
113
 
Thus, effective protection can be a major factor considered when assessing the 
rights and powers of parties to internal armed conflicts;
114
 among these powers, the 
absence of effective protection can adversely affect the government’s legal capacity to 
express consent to external intervention. The perception of sovereignty as responsibility 
challenges therefore the traditional doctrines, discussed in previous Chapters, which limit 
government consent power strictly on counts of territorial effective control, while 
providing a relatively tangible standard for the analysis of governmental behavior. 
Territorial effective control, conversely, can affect consent power only to the extent that 
it reflects the actual or potential exercise of effective protection of the civilian population.  
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II.4 EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND AUGMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT CONSENT POWER  
The notions of effective protection and RtoP, it should be emphasized, do not serve only 
to limit governmental consent power. Pillar 2 of the RtoP concept (“international 
assistance and capacity building”), as suggested by the UNSG and reflected in paragraph 
138 of the WSO Document, revolves around the premise that states should assist other 
states in fulfilling their duties under RtoP.
115
 This notion was already implied in the 2000 
Kosovo Report, which viewed humanitarian intervention, when conducted with 
government consent, as raising “no legal problem.”
116
  
It is not hard to imagine a situation, for instance, in which a government that 
exercises, in general, effective protection – or at least shows reasonable prospects and 
motivation to do so – is confronted by an opposition group that is regularly engaged in 
atrocities, and has also caused the government to lose some territorial effective control.
117
 
In such cases, should a government request forcible support, the international community 
– separately and together – might acquire some responsibility to assist it.
118
 Some have 




Significantly, such responsibilities to assist may arise even before Security 
Council action. This is since Paragraph 138 deals with state responsibilities before U.N. 
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involvement. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that in the global consultations 
preceding the ICISS report, it was widely recognized that when the Security Council fails 
to act in the face of atrocities, host-state consent – and in particular when given to 
regional organizations – provides an alternative legal justification for intervention.
120
 
For the existence of such a consent-augmenting situation, in which external 
parties may accrue the responsibility to assist, the consenting government need not be a 
perfect democracy. It suffices that it protects civilians in the specific context. This is 
evident in contemporary dilemmas. For instance, in July 2011, the U.N. has declared that 
a famine exists in Somalia.
121
 However, since 2009, an opposition group – Al-Shabaab – 
has banned food aid from areas under its control.
122
 In these circumstances, and although 
Somalia is a failed state, ruled, de jure, by a territorially ineffective government, should 
the latter request help to secure the delivery of aid, it is reasonable that a claim regarding 
its territorial ineffectiveness will not be heard, since the issue of protection of civilians is 
at stake. This situation can be a prime example in which effective protection trumps 
territorial ineffectiveness. 
This notion constitutes, therefore, a complete reversal of the traditional territorial 
effective-control doctrine: if, in the past, lack of such effective-control was seen as a 
liability, in the contemporary system, in some cases, it might be understood as generating 
                                                 
120
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an entitlement for assistance.
123
 It all rests upon the question whether the government 
requests assistance for the purpose of fulfilling its protection responsibilities. 
 
II.5 EFFECTIVE PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: PROTECTION NOW, 
DEMOCRACY LATER 
In essence, the reliance on the principle of protection as a determinant of consent power 
is closely related to human rights and “democracy” thresholds. However, it remains 
significantly different. Indeed, human rights are indivisible, but most of them are not 
absolute. Some can be derogated from in times of emergency, providing that the 
derogation is proportional and non-discriminatory.
124
 Others are subject to intricate 
internal balancing with other rights and public interests.
125
 Because of their complex 
nature, it is almost certain that all states can be deemed, in certain aspects, violators of 
human rights. It is thus doubtful whether the general concept of “human rights,” as such, 
can affect the laws on the use of force. As noted by Henkin, in another context, “if it were 
permissible to remedy them [violations of human rights] by external use of force, there 
would be no law to forbid the use of force by almost any state against almost any 
other.”
126
 For similar reasons, the implementation of a human right in a specific instance 
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necessarily draws us into extensive debates about cultural and political context, whether 
we like it or not.
127
  
The principle of protection, conversely, focuses on the core values that law sets 
out to protect during armed conflict. In this sense, it is minimalist.
128
 In contrast to human 
rights law, it does not aspire to create an ideal society, or even an entirely decent society; 
it aspires to put an expedient end to atrocities. This should in no way be understood as a 
claim according to which protection trumps the consent of the governed as the main 
source of sovereignty. Indeed, effective protection, in the narrow sense, cannot and 
should not be viewed as the ultimate sought-after end result for the relevant internal 
order. It does not aim to establish an absolutist Hobbesian Leviathan designed to protect 
the lives of otherwise right-less subjects.
129
 It is merely the minimum result sought during 
an internal armed conflict, when the protection of civilians is the primary objective of the 
international community. Indeed, as phrased already in the 18
th
 century by Vattel, “the 
flames of discord and civil war are not favourable to the proceedings of pure and sacred 
justice: more quiet times are to be waited for.”
130
  
It is in this context that we should understand also the role of democracy and the 
question of consensual intervention, as opposed to the role of protection of civilians. 
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While the establishment of substantive democracy must be a main element of post-
conflict rebuilding, at the time of intervention, effective protection should be the main 
guiding principle.
131
 Indeed, effective protection can be also rationalized on the premise 
that those who protect civilians during conflict are more likely to establish or maintain a 
democratic, human rights protecting government afterwards. We shall elaborate more on 
the connection between these values in Chapter 11. 
The two-tiered, “protection now, democracy later,” approach of the international 
community can be clearly exemplified in the practice of the Security Council regarding 
the 2011 intervention in Libya. It is revealing, in this context, to compare between 
Resolution 1973, authorizing forcible intervention during the Libyan armed conflict, and 
Resolution 2009, adopted after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, which mainly dealt with 
the post-conflict period.
132
 Resolution 1973, while authorizing the use of all necessary 
measures to protect civilians (excluding occupation)
133
 did not bind – beyond vaguely 
referring to the need to respond “to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people”– the 
objectives of subsequent military operations with the enforcement of electoral 
democracy.
134
 Resolution 2009, conversely, greatly emphasized the promotion of 
democracy and human rights. It reaffirmed that the U.N. should “lead the effort of the 
international community in supporting the Libyan-led transition and rebuilding process 
aimed at establishing a democratic, independent and united Libya,” and further stressed 
                                                 
131
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Similarly, the 32-state Contact Group on Libya, in a July 2011 statement 
recognizing the opposition as the government of Libya, arguably granted its recognition 
on counts of considerations of civilian protection, while reserving the development of 
representative government to a later stage.
136
  It is thus clear that the Council, and the 
international community, saw the protection of civilians as the key factor in the moment 
of intervention, while leaving the question of democracy to the post-conflict 
environment, where deliberation and other non-forcible processes prevail.  
 
III. EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT 
III.1 WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT AS A NEAR-ABSOLUTE RIGHT 
The question of the scope of consent power necessarily entails also the analysis of the 
capacity to withdraw such consent. This issue is relevant when consent is given ad hoc, 
but is more acute in situations in which consent was given through a general, forward-
looking intervention treaty. As we shall see, the concept of effective protection – besides 
affecting consent-capacity – can also play a role in the assessment of withdrawal-
capacity.   
Recall, that Article 3(e) of the Definition of Aggression provides that the term 
aggression includes “[t]he use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory 
                                                 
135
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of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such 
territory beyond the termination of the agreement.”
137
 Thus, when consent is withdrawn, 
and absent other justifications such as self-defense, the principal-agent relation between 
the parties lapses, and the intervention becomes an act of aggression.  
An illustrative example of such an instance can be found in the events that 
unfolded in the Second Congolese Conflict in 1998. As discussed in Chapter 1,
138
 on July 
27
th
 1998, President Kabila “terminated” the consensual presence of Rwandan forces in 
the DRC, proclaiming that “[t]his marks the end of the presence of all foreign military 
forces in the Congo.”
139
 Rwanda and Uganda, present in the DRC since the First 
Congolese Conflict, refused to withdraw their forces, leading to the eruption of  major 
hostilities. On these counts, the DRC sued Uganda in the ICJ, and claimed, inter alia, that 
Uganda’s actions constituted aggression.
140
  
It was not contested that Kabila, first as the leader of the rebelling ADFL and 
since May 1997 the President, consented to the Rwandan and Ugandan intervention.
141
 
However, the parties were at odds regarding the existence of consent following Kabila’s 
July 27
th
 declaration. Uganda claimed that Kabila’s statement did not mention the 
withdrawal of Ugandan forces explicitly, but was only addressed only to Rwandan forces, 
and thus was not sufficient to constitute a withdrawal of the DRC’s consent.
142
 The ICJ, 
at large, rejected this claim, holding that absent any specific terms, “no particular 
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formalities” are required for a withdrawal of consent to forcible intervention.
143
 The 
Court also stressed that the original consent given to Uganda was not “open ended” and 
was given regarding restricted actions. Lastly concerning this issue, the Court held that 
“at the latest” the DRC’s consent was withdrawn by August 8, 1998 (two weeks after 
Kabila’s somewhat ambiguous declaration), when the DRC openly accused Uganda of 
invading its territory.
144
    
When reading the Court’s treatment of the issue of consent in DRC v. Uganda, the 
question arises whether a case exists, in which consent can indeed be “open ended.” The 
answer seems to be negative. Dinstein, for instance, argues that consent can always be 
withdrawn, even in breach of a previous treaty – as long as the state still has an effective 
government capable of withdrawing the consent (as opposed to the “failed state” 
scenario, discussed in Chapter 9). His conclusion is based on the peremptory jus cogens 
status of the prohibition on the use of force. Once the consent is withdrawn, the argument 
goes, a violation of Article 2(4) occurs notwithstanding any treaty, since treaty provisions 
cannot contravene jus cogens.
145
 A comparable claim was made, for instance, by Cyprus, 




Wippman follows a similar route, arguing that authorizations of forcible 
intervention are agreements of a special type: they concern the core of a state’s 
sovereignty and independence, and since they deal with the use of force, they also affect 
the interests of the international community as a whole. Thus, he concludes that in 
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general, an implicit “right of revocation” should be read into any intervention 
agreement.
147
 Indeed, these analyses are correspondent with the view expressed in 
Chapter 1, according to which intervention treaties, in essence, create a revocable 
principal-agent relationship.
148
 However, as we shall see in Section III.5, the principle of 
effective protection, just as it affects consent power, can also have bearing on withdrawal 
power.     
 
III.2 CONSENT AND FORWARD-LOOKING INTERVENTION TREATIES 
The question of withdrawal of consent is especially challenging in the context of 
forward-looking intervention treaties. Such agreements are ones in which states, whether 
acting bilaterally or within the framework of a regional organization, grant external 
parties a forward-looking permission to intervene forcefully in their territories, in the 
event that certain internal circumstances occur. It is important to distinguish between 
such agreements and collective self-defense agreements, such as NATO, which deal 
strictly with mutual defense in the face of external threats to a member state.
149
  
Forward-looking intervention treaties have been common since the 18
th
 century, 
shifting forms with the changes in the international system.
150
 Nowadays, the internal 
circumstances addressed by such treaties may refer, namely, to instances where a 
government commits mass atrocities; when a democratic regime is overthrown; when 
state-failure occurs; or, in rather rare cases, when parties seek an external guarantor for an 
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  In general, the rationale of such treaties is to allow the invocation 
of past-consent, in times of crisis, to justify forcible intervention – usually by a regional 
organization – absent Security Council authorization. 
Forward-looking intervention treaties differ from instances in which ad hoc 
consent to an intervention is given. They are special in the sense that as opposed to the 
latter, they are not concluded in relation to a specific event in real-time. They are 
potentially applicable to future, hypothetical events. As such, they purport to bind the will 
of current as well as future governments. Granted, this phenomenon is a common 
occurrence in treaties in general – indeed, the basic rule regarding the continuity of 
international obligations is founded on this premise –
152
  however, it raises unique 
problems in the context of agreements that address the use of force.   
To be sure, there is considerable debate regarding the legal validity of forward-
looking intervention treaties, and in particular concerning the question whether they are 
void ab initio as violations of jus cogens norms.
153
 The debate recognizes that states have 
the power to limit their sovereignty by treaty – and can even agree to cease to exist as 
separate entities by merging with other states. However, the critics ask, does it follow that 
states can also limit their sovereignty by granting a forward-looking permit for 
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intervention, irrespective of the will of a later government in real-time?
154
 Indeed, by 
utilizing past consent to intervene forcibly against the ostensible will of the state in real-
time, such agreements can be criticized as condoning, in advance, a breach of Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter, and by thus they are contrary to the law on the use of force. Any past 
consent notwithstanding, these treaties envision a situation in which a forcible 
intervention will take place absent real-time consent.
155
 Hence, the argument goes, the 
treaty itself is null and void, as a contravention of jus cogens.
156
 Furthermore, the critics 
claim, complete subordination of the future “political destiny” of the state to foreign 
powers is in direct conflict with the principle of self-determination – and it therefore must 
follow that “past consent is no consent.”
157
  
Notwithstanding the theoretical complexity of the question of the ab initio 
validity of forward-looking intervention treaties, the practical problem regarding the 
latter can arise mainly in real time, when a government seeks to withdraw its consent in 
light of an impending intervention, and not in the moment of the conclusion of the treaty. 
Thus, focusing on the capacity of withdrawal in certain circumstances, rather than on the 
theoretical question of the ab initio legality of intervention treaties, allows us to better 
center the discussion on the core issues of practical importance.
158
  
Withdrawal of consent can occur, in practice, in two main situations. In the first, a 
government might withdraw its past consent in the face of an impending treaty-based 
intervention. In such cases, the question is confined to the capacity of governments – in 
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general and specifically – to do so. This remains the sole question until, for some reason, 
the government ceases to be recognized, after which it obviously loses its capacity of 
withdrawal. A prime example for the latter situation is when a government refuses to step 
down following democratic elections, in which case the international community might 
withdraw its recognition and transfer it to the elected individual or party.
159
 A second 
situation arises when a government is overthrown, and the de facto junta now claims to 
have withdrawn the consent of the previous regime. Here, it has to be first determined 
whether the junta is recognized as the new government. If it is not, then the question of 
withdrawal-capacity is quashed.  
The question of intervention treaties and real-time withdrawal of consent raises 
seemingly intractable dilemmas. On the one hand, as aforementioned, withdrawal of 
consent is virtually an absolute right, and thus, an implicit right of revocation should be 
read into such treaties. On the other hand, the main objective of such agreements is 
precisely to negate such power in certain situations;
160
 a fact that cannot be taken lightly 
considering that arrangements of this type have been concluded in recent years – as is 
demonstrated in the next Section – by major regional and sub-regional organizations. 
Nonetheless, at least in a pure “failed state” scenario, in which no entity would be 
otherwise capable of expressing ad hoc consent, the case is theoretically simpler: since 
when there is no government physically capable of withdrawing previous consent, the 
past-consent remains as it stands.
161
 Indeed, if one assumes that in a failed-state situation 
valid consent is impossible, one must reach the same conclusion regarding the power to 
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 In these instances, the intervening party may be looked 
upon as acting in trusteeship for the state, until a representative government emerges.  
In sum, forward-looking intervention treaties remain controversial.  As will be 
suggested later on, however, the concept of effective protection can play a clarifying part 
in the analysis of the question.   
 
III.3 FORWARD-LOOKING INTERVENTION TREATIES IN AFRICA 
Significant practice of forward-looking intervention treaties can be found, nowadays, in 
Africa. In the past two decades, such agreements were concluded on the bilateral as well 
as regional African levels. The Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997, in favor of 
the ousted (and democratically elected) President Ahmed Kabbah, is a prime example of 
an intervention based on a bilateral forward-looking agreement.
163
 In 1997, Sierra Leone 
and Nigeria signed a Status of Forces Agreement, granting Nigeria the "right" to use 
force to assist Sierra Leone against "internal or external threats."
164
 On May 26
th 
1997, 
one day after a junta forced him to flee to Guinea, President Kabbah requested Nigeria to 
intervene in his favor. Nigerian forces responded, but retreated after confronted with stiff 
resistance by the junta.
165
 Eventually, ECOWAS forces intervened also, by ad hoc 
request of Kabbah, and expelled the junta.
166
 
                                                 
162
 See DINSTEIN, supra note 145, at 122–124; see also Chapter 9, Sec. II.3.  
163
 Other examples of bilateral forward-looking intervention agreements are those between Senegal, Guinea 
and Guinea-Bissau, which lead to the former's intervention in the latter in 1998. See Jeremy Levitt, African 
Interventionist States and International Law, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES 15, 28 (Oliver Furley 
& Roy May eds., 2001).  
164
 See id., at 24 (quoting from the Status of Forces Agreement Between the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone Concerning the Provision of 
Military and Security Assistance to the Republic of Sierra Leone, 1997). 
165
 See id. at 23.  
166
 See id., at 23, 25–26.  The intervention of ECOWAS was based on “real time” consent by the de jure 
government, rather than on a forward-looking intervention treaty. It was conducted before the adoption of 
 339 
The Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone represents the classic dilemma of 
forward-looking intervention treaties, being a seemingly pro-democratic intervention 
against the will of a de facto junta – a “revolutionary autocracy,” as we shall label such 
regimes later on.
167
 It sheds light, as we shall see in Chapter 11, on the dynamics of 
forward-looking treaties and recognition, since President Kabbah was still the 
internationally recognized ruler of the state during the intervention, although he was 
ousted from the state’s territory.
168
   
In the first decade of the 21
st
 century, forward-looking intervention treaties have 
become a central pillar of African regional security arrangements. Article 4(j) if the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted in 2001, entrenches the right of Member 
States to request intervention from the Union. In addition, Article 4(h) famously 
establishes, as a basic principle of the Union, “[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”
169
 Note, that excluding 
“ethnic cleansing,” the acts enumerated in article 4(h) are similar to those referred to in 
paragraph 138 of the WSO Document.
170
  
                                                                                                                                                 
the ECOWAS Protocol, discussed infra. The same can be said regarding ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia 
in 1990. See David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in ENFORCING 
RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 157, 166–167 (Lori Fisler-
Damrosch,ed., 1993). 
167
 On the distinction between established and revolutionary autocracies see Chapter 11, Sec. I.2.  
168
 See id. at 24.  
169
 Constitutive Act of the African Union arts. 4(h), 4(j),  Jul. 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3. It should be noted, 
that although it is a significant legal instrument, article 4(h) has not been invoked as of April 2012. See 
Thomas G. Weiss, supra note 37, at 3. 
170
 This does not imply that the A.U. excluded ethnic cleansing from the scope of article 4(h), as the article 
refers to “grave circumstances” in general. 
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Article 4(j) of The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security of the African Union, adopted in 2002 (The A.U. Protocol),
171
 reflects the 
arrangement set forth article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. Accordingly, the Peace and 
Security Council has the power to recommend to the Assembly of the Union to undertake 
intervention, in the enumerated cases.
172
 In such circumstances, the Peace and Security 
Council can make decisions without the consent of the target state, as the affected state is 
not allowed to vote – hence the Protocol's forward-looking nature.
173
 The Council is 
mandated to “take initiatives and action” regarding potential or “full blown” conflicts,
174
 
and for that purpose, the Protocol establishes an “African Standby Force.”
175
 
Interestingly, forcible intervention strictly on pro-democratic grounds (when a coup 
d’état occurs), in absence of other “grave circumstances,” is not mandated by the 
Protocol. In such cases, resort will be to non-forcible intervention.
176
 This distinction 
reflects the process outlined above, in which in the moment of intervention, 
considerations of protection might trump those of electoral democracy.
177
   
Intervention treaties can be found also on the African sub-regional level: The 
1999 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and 
Security (Lomé Protocol) sets forth such an arrangement.
178
 Articles 21 and 22 
                                                 
171
 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security of the African Union, Jul. 9, 2002 
[hereinafter A.U. Protocol]. 
172
 Id. art. 7(1)(e). 
173
 Id. art. 8(9). 
174
 Id. arts. 9, 15. 
175
 Id. art. 13(1).  
176
 Id. art. 7(1)(g). However, in such cases, since the ousted government might retain its recognition, its 
consent can legitimize such intervention. 
177
 See Section II.5 supra and discussion in Chapter 11. 
178
 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peace-Keeping and Security, Dec. 10, 1999 [hereinafter Lomé Protocol]. 
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permanently establish ECOMOG – The ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group – a 
standing intervention force available for immediate deployment. Article 25 stipulates the 
conditions in which the intervention “mechanism” will apply; among them are instances 
of “internal conflict” that “threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster” or that “poses 
serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region;” and – significantly – “an 
overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.” Importantly, 
the authority to “initiate” “all forms” of intervention is delegated, in Articles 10 and 26, 





III.4 FORWARD-LOOKING INTERVENTION TREATIES AS ALTERNATIVES TO SECURITY 
COUNCIL ACTION 
Both protocols discussed above (ECOWAS and A.U.) challenge the U.N. Security 
Council’s monopoly on the authorization of forcible intervention. This is since the 
protocols can be reasonably interpreted as mandating that in the event of withdrawal of 
                                                 
179
 In contrast to the Lomé Protocol, which is relatively clear in its provisions, the 2003 South African 
Development Community’s (SADC) Defense Pact does not include an explicit “forward-looking” 
intervention mechanism in cases of internal armed conflict, and is very ambiguous. Instead, the SADC 
Defense Pact’s “Collective Action” mechanism is triggered by an “armed attack,” which is defined, Article 
2, as “the use of military force in violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of a 
State Party.” It is not clear whether this article also encompasses such use of force from within the State’s 
territory. Internal armed conflict seems to be included in the pact’s definition of “destabilization” (Article 
2), which does not seem to mandate collective action. Destabilization is not addressed through the 
collective action mechanism of the Defense Pact (although its brought under the SADC’s jurisdiction in 
Article 11(2) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (The SADC Protocol)) 
, but only through a prohibition on assistance to any body which “destabilizes” a State Party (Article 8). 
Furthermore, Article 7(2) provides that any assistance to a State Party be at its own “request” or “consent”, 
except where the SADC Summit decides otherwise; however, the Summit can only decide on such 
measures with Security Council authorization (Article 11(3)(d) of the Protocol). The bottom line is that 
even if the Pact authorizes collective action in cases of internal armed conflict, if such action would be 
against a State Party’s wish, Security Council authorization would be needed. For brief analyses of the 
SADC Defense Pact, see Benjamin Sirota, Sovereignty and the South African Development Community, 5 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 343 (2004). 
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consent by a de facto ruling government, ECOWAS and the A.U. would still have the 
power to intervene forcibly, even without Security Council authorization. As such, the 
African protocols demonstrate that consensual intervention can serve as an alternative to 
Security Council action in extreme cases, namely when the protection of civilians is 
required.  
Accordingly, while the Lomé Protocol is “mindful” to the U.N. Charter and 
namely to Chapters V, VI and VII,
180
 reaffirms the commitment of ECOWAS members 
to the “principles” of the Charter,
181
 and pledges to “cooperate” with the U.N.,
182
 it does 
not explicitly precondition action upon prior Security Council authorization. It merely 
requires a “report” to be submitted to the United Nations in case of intervention.
183
 
Elsewhere, in Article 52, it provides that “[i]n accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of 
the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS shall inform [inform, rather than condition its 
action on Security Council authorization] the United Nations of any military intervention 
undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of this Mechanism,”
184
 perhaps alluding to the 
obligation set forth in Article 54 of the U.N. Charter. The latter requires that regional 
organizations inform the Security Council of their activities for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. However, Article 54 of the Charter does not refer to 
forcible measures, which ipso facto can only be prescribed by the Security Council. 
Arguably, thus, the Lomé Protocol seeks to “reverse” the presumption of illegality of the 
use of force embodied in the U.N. Charter: while Chapter VII is understood to require an 
                                                 
180
 Lomé Protocol, supra note 178, prmbl. 
181
 Id. art. 2. 
182
 Id. art. 52. 
183
 Id. art. 27. 
184
 For an analysis of the Lomé Protocol's relation to the limitations imposed by the U.N. Charter, see 
ADEMOLA ABBAS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: 
BEYOND CHAPTER VIII OF THE U.N. CHARTER 163 (2004). 
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explicit Security Council authorization prior to the use if force, the Lomé Protocol’s 
Article 52 suggests that by default, ECOWAS will be authorized to intervene forcibly; it 
will only inform the Security Council, which in turn will choose whether to condone or 
condemn the intervention. The Protocol does not, however, explicitly state what will be 
the reaction of ECOWAS in a case where the Security Council will demand it to halt its 
intervention.  
This approach is echoed also in the A.U. Protocol. Much like the Lomé Protocol, 
it acknowledges that the U.N. Security Council “has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security,” but does not explicitly subject A.U. 
interventions to Security Council authorization.
185
 It merely stipulates that the A.U. Peace 
and Security Council shall “cooperate and work closely” with the U.N. Security 
Council.
186
 Essentially, this can only be understood as a mechanism utilized by the A.U. 
to retain for itself the authority to intervene in “grave circumstances,” where the Security 
Council fails to do so. As is the case with the similar mechanism in the Lomé Protocol, 
these provisions can place the A.U. in direct conflict with the U.N. Charter, in cases 
where A.U. intervention is pursued against the will of the targeted government – 
meaning, where the government withdraws its forward-looking consent – and Security 
Council authorization to intervene is absent.        
Over the years, various attempts have been made to justify unilateral forcible 
actions by regional organizations by noting, for instance, that such actions have been, at 
                                                 
185
 See Jean Allain, The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force: The Failures of 
Kosovo and Iraq and the Emergence of the African Union, in 8 MAX PLANCK Y’BOOK U.N. L. 237, 265–
266, 284–289 (Armin von Bogdandy & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2004) (arguing that the Protocol constitutes 
a serious challenge to Security Council authority – even to the point of “usurpation” of its power –  since it 
is “unwilling” to subordinate itself to Security Council authorization for the use of force). 
186
 A.U. Protocol, supra note 171, Art. 17(1). 
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times, approved ex post by the Security Council, as was arguably the case in Liberia in 
1992-1993 and Sierra Leone in 1997-1999.
187
 Furthermore, some have claimed that 
unilateral regional actions do  not amount to “enforcement actions” under Article 53 of 
the U.N. Charter, which require Security Council authorization even when conducted by 
regional organizations – but rather that they are actions “relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action” as prescribed in 
Article 52.
188
 However, Article 52 qualifies that such actions be “consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” This qualification, reasonably read in 
light of the purposes of the Charter, clearly subjects Article 52 actions to the prohibition 
on the use of force.  
It is high time for a principled treatment of this question, going beyond ex post 
justification or ad hoc attempts of creative interpretation of the U.N. Charter. In this 
context, the African challenges to the Security Council can be reconciled, as we shall see 
in the next Section, if we adopt an approach according to which when a government fails 
to exercise effective protection, it suffers the loss of sovereign power to withdraw 





                                                 
187
 See, e.g., ICISS Report, supra note 18, ¶6.5, 6.35; Farer, supra note 1, at 69. Note that the Sierra Leone 
operation was conducted in favor of a democratically elected, and thus recognized government. See the 
discussion in Chapter 11, Sec. I.2; see also Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of 
Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL 
DILEMMAS, supra note 1, at 204, 221–224.  
188
 See Farer, supra note 1, at 72 –74, referring to an argument presented by Sean D. Murphy. 
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III.5 RTOP, EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT 
As with consent power at large, there are several prisms through which the power to 
withdraw consent can be analyzed. Of course, a traditional approach can precondition this 
capacity on considerations of effective control, or to bind withdrawal power to the related 
but distinct failed state threshold.
189
 Other prisms through which to assess this question 
can be substantive. One, which is analyzed in Chapter 11, is through the principles of 
democratic legitimacy. Here, the argument will be that a junta that overthrows a 
democratically elected government will be devoid of power to withdraw its consent from 
an intervention treaty.
190
 Such a construction can be based on two justifications: One is to 
simply rely on the plain language of a treaty that explicitly allows for pro-democratic 
intervention, assuming that we are willing to accept the general legality of such 
agreements. Such a clause is found, for instance, in Article 25 of ECOWAS Lomé 
Protocol, but is absent from the A.U. Charter and its Peace and Security Protocol. The 
latter limits interventions in such cases only to non-forcible measures (assuming an anti-
democratic coup does not amount to “grave circumstances” in itself). 
 A second justification can be based on the acknowledgment of a customary 
“democratic entitlement,” which couples sovereignty with electoral democracy, in a 
manner strong enough to negate a regime’s power to withdraw the state’s consent, or, 
perhaps, to negate the regime’s recognition.
191
 A robust version of this approach might 
argue for the negation of withdrawal power even in absence of the overthrow of an 
elected government – and merely on counts of the regime’s autocratic nature. In this 
                                                 
189
 Chapter 9, Sec. II.3, supra Section III.2. 
190
 See, e.g., Treaty-Based Intervention, supra note 146, at 608; David Wippman, Military Intervention, 
Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 218 –220 (1996); 
191
 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 46 
(1992). 
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sense, the discussion merges with our analysis of democracy and consent power, and the 




Yet another view analyzes the background of the specific intervention-treaty. 
Wippman, for instance, proposes a model of “concurrent consent,” that takes into 
consideration the political divisions within state,
193
 in light of the fact that in many states, 
the population is so divided that it cannot be looked upon as a single political 
community.
194
 Thus, he concludes that in cases when intervention treaties are a part of an 
agreed settlement of a severe inter-communal conflict, consent can only be withdrawn 
through joint-action of the relevant communities.
195
 However, such a standard naturally 
applies only in specific cases, and does not resolve cases of intervention treaties that are 
not part of an inter-communal settlement. Moreover, and importantly, while the 
concurrent consent model seems to be fair, it does not itself prejudge important 
substantive questions, namely, whether the analysis changes if one of the parties to the 
communal settlement is engaged in mass atrocities or other grave violations of 
international law. 
The protection principle, and the understanding of sovereignty as responsibility, 
can assist us in laying down a workable doctrine in this context. Just as lack of effective 
protection results in the negation of government consent power, it can also be viewed as 
negating withdrawal power. The underlying principle is simple: in cases where a 
government cannot express consent, meaning, as discussed in Section II.4, when it fails 
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 Sec. I.2. 
193
 Treaty-Based Intervention, supra note 146, at 611.  
194
 Id. at 612. 
195
 Id. at 612, 623–632, 646 –653.  
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to exercise effective protection – it will also lack the sovereign power to withdraw 
previous consent. As phrased by Bellamy – “[a]lthough military deployments for R2P 
[RtoP] purposes benefit from host state consent, once they are in place they should 
prioritise civilian protection over the need to maintain host government support in cases 
where one cannot be established except at the expense of the other.”
196
  
Indeed, the act of withdrawal, in itself, is an act of sovereignty. Therefore, in 
situations in which sovereign power is lost due to failure to effectively protect civilians, 
the capacity to withdraw previous consent is diminished. Conversely, the capacity of 
withdrawal would only exist in those cases in which a government exercises effective 
protection: meaning, where it fulfils its responsibility to protect. This analysis, beyond 
providing conceptual clarity, also serves to reconcile between intervention treaties and 
the jus cogens prohibition on the use of force: since the target government would not 
have the sovereign power to withdraw consent, the previous consent remains, and the 
intervention will therefore not be considered as conducted against the will of the state. 
This approach can also assist us in the assessment of the withdrawal power of a de 
facto junta that has overthrown a democratically elected government, as further discussed 
in Chapter 11. Since, in the majority of the cases – even if otherwise recognized – the 
junta would have to resort to grave human rights violations in order to secure its power, it 
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 Compare BELLAMY, supra note 36, at 148. 
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IV. FAILURE TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION: THE THRESHOLD QUESTION 
As in many questions of law, the concept of effective protection presents a threshold 
question: what scale of a violation triggers the loss of consent (or withdrawal) power. The 
question might be formulated as such: while it is true that a state must abide by all of its 
obligations, it is obvious that not any violation of international law automatically results 
in loss of consent power. For instance, even a generally law abiding military can violate 
international law, at some point, during an armed conflict. While there is no doubt that 
even small-scale and non-recurring violations must be addressed, the question is what 
level of violations entails a degree of loss of sovereign-power that negates a 
government’s consent capacity altogether.  
The answer is found within the ICISS Report, the WSO Document, as well as in 
the inherent characteristics of the crimes enumerated in the RtoP doctrine. Thus, the 
ICISS report expressly refers to “large scale” loss of life or ethnic cleansing as failures in 
the fulfilment of sovereign responsibility, noting that in most cases there will be no major 
disagreement regarding the existence of such circumstances.
197
 Similarly, Paragraph 139 
of the WSO Document mentions the “manifest” failure of protection as a cause for 
forcible enforcement measures – which must mean acts that are either large-scale or 
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 ICISS Report, supra note 18, ¶¶4.19 –4.21. 
198
 WSO Document, supra note 62, at ¶139.  The “manifest” threshold, as a cause for the rebuttal of the 
presumption in favor of governments, can be traced back to the 17th century writings of Grotius. 1 HUGO 
GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, Book  2, Ch. 25, §8 (William Whewell, trans. 1853) 
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This threshold can also be deduced from the components of the crimes 
enumerated in the WSO Document, as these can be found in the ICC Statute.
199
 
Regarding “war crimes,” while even a single act of wilful killing, for instance, constitutes 
a war crime, the Statute stipulates that the ICC shall have jurisdiction “in particular,” 
when war crimes are “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.”
200
 Regarding “crimes against humanity” – ethnic cleansing, 
functionally, falling within this category of crimes – these are per se “widespread or 
systematic.”
201
 The same is true for genocide, which is by nature widespread and 
systematic as it is committed against a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.
202
  
This conclusion is augmented when analyzing consent power in light of 
international human rights law. Since, as aforementioned, human rights are inherently 
complex, it would be inconceivable that a single case or minor cases of infringement of 
human rights would suffice to negate consent power. Thus, when analyzing the 
international effects of human rights violations, the threshold of “gross and large-scale” 
violations has emerged as a parameter for international action.
203
 Such violations, 




Last, the problem of identifying the situations in which gross, grave, widespread 
or systemic breaches of the principle of protection occur, and the longstanding question 
of “who decides,” are inherent in the international system in the absence of a collective, 
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 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
200
 Id. art. 8(1).  
201
 Id. art. 7(1).  
202
 Id. art. 6. 
203
 See, e.g., Definition of Gross and Large-Scale Violations of Human Rights as an International Crime, 
U.N.Comm’n Hum. Rts., ¶¶12–22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/10 (Jun, 8, 1999).  
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objective and universally binding adjudication mechanism.
205
 International law is 
constantly struggling to find the balance between its (still) decentralized, auto-
interpretive nature on the one hand,
206
 and its growing preoccupation with universal ideas 
on the other. This problem is persistent in all aspects of international law, and cannot be 
exhausted in this work. However, the proliferation of mass media, including through 
ubiquitous availability of new-media online instruments; the institutionalization of 
international fact-finding missions conducted by the U.N. and other international 
organizations;
207
 and the increasing role played by regional organizations,
208
 can account 
for increased transparency in the international system, that potentially allows for sounder 
judgments as to the existence of gross, grave, widespread or systemic breaches of the 
principle of protection. As noted in the ICISS Report, while disagreements on the existent 
of large-scale violations of the principle of protection can occur in “marginal cases,” most 
cases will not – hopefully – generate major disagreement.
209
 
Thus, it can be concluded, that consent power of governments will be negated 
when these are in gross, grave, widespread or systemic breach of the protection principle, 
and that such loss of consent capacity is affected by – at least – loss of a degree of 
sovereignty.  
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 See, e.g., HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 (1948); ORFORD, supra 
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 On the problem of auto-interpretation see HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE 
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 ICISS Report, supra note 18, ¶4.22. 
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V. OTHER POSITIVE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR THE NEGATION OF CONSENT IN CASES 
OF LACK OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION: JUS COGENS, IHL AND IHRL  
In previous sections, we have discussed the general principle of protection of civilians 
and its normative expression in the RtoP doctrine. As aforementioned, a part of RtoP’s 
significance is in its incorporation under a unified normative umbrella of various existing 
legal instruments; the interpretational value of the concept of sovereignty as 
responsibility when analyzing these instruments; and the concept of “responsibility” as 
reflecting a transition to an “administrative,” rather than “rights”-based, outlook 
regarding the question of intervention. However, even if one rejects the view that RtoP 
has any significant normative value, and accordingly that it elevates the principle of 
protection to the level of an integral component of sovereignty, violation of the principle 
of protection can still lead to the invalidation of consent power. If forced to categorize 
these different mechanisms, the argument from RtoP is based on “public law” principles, 
stemming from the limitations of sovereign power in international law. The following 
mechanisms, conversely, are rooted in more traditional notions, perceiving the relations 
between states as parallel to those between private individuals, and are therefore 
reflective of private, treaty-law based doctrines of invalidation.   
As we have seen, the RtoP doctrine, as formulated in the WSO Document, 
concerns the protection of civilians threatened by four types of atrocities: genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
210
 Unsurprisingly, the prohibitions 
on such acts also constitute peremptory norms of international law, or jus cogens.
211
 It is 
a well-established principle that acts that are contrary to jus cogens are invalid: thus, 
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 WSO Document, supra note 62, ¶138. 
211
 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 –203 (2005); see also Articles on State Responsibility 
with Commentaries, supra note 152, art. 40, ¶¶3–4. 
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Article 53 of the Vienna Convention invalidates treaties conflicting with such norms.
212
 
This provision is complemented by Article 41(2) of the Articles on State Responsibility, 
providing that no state shall recognize situations created by serious breaches of 
peremptory norms, nor assist in maintaining that situation.  Significantly, a similar article 
is found in the Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations.
213
 Therefore, 
when a government that fails to exercise effective protection, as formulated in the WSO 
document and entrenched in jus cogens, invites a state or a regional organization to 
intervene on its behalf, whether through a treaty, in the strict sense, or through any type 
of other agreement,
214
 the invitation is invalid. Importantly, this is true even absent a 
U.N. Security Council resolution to that effect. 
A state that acts upon such consent, notwithstanding its invalidity, and chooses to 
intervene in favor of the perpetrating government, is itself in violation of international 
law, as it violates the obligation not to render assistance to violations of jus cogens. Thus, 
it can be subjected to various non-forcible sanctions imposed unilaterally or by regional 
organizations. States indeed have a right to sanction other states that assist in violations 
of jus cogens, since such violations are considered to be erga omnes, meaning, owed to 
the entire international community.
215
 Furthermore, according to Article 41(1) of the 
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Articles on State Responsibility, states are obliged to cooperate, through lawful means, to 
bring an end to violations of peremptory norms of international law. Imposition of non-
forcible sanctions does not require Security Council authorization, and therefore they 
undoubtedly constitute lawful means to confront the violation.
216
 
The notion of jus cogens has also implications on the capacity to withdraw 
consent, in the context of forward-looking intervention treaties, when a government 
commits mass atrocities. Indeed, where a government withdraws its consent in order to 
enable it to commit actions in violations of the jus cogens norms that are reflected in the 
principle of protection, the instrument of withdrawal itself constitutes an action designed 
to breach jus cogens. In such cases, third parties – states and international organizations 
alike – are obliged not to recognize the withdrawal.
217
 Indeed, not only is the instrument 
of withdrawal itself considered a violation of jus cogens, it is arguable – without 
exhausting this issue – that the mere acceptance of such instrument can be viewed as 
rendering aid or assistance in maintaining that situation, as prohibited in the Articles on 
State Responsibility. This conclusion applies, naturally, also to the regional organization 
empowered to authorize a forcible intervention in a forward-looking intervention treaty. 
In sum, in cases in which a government violates its responsibility to protect, it will not 
possess the sovereign power to withdraw from a forward-looking intervention treaty – 
since its act of withdrawal itself will be invalidated. 
Violations of the protection principle during internal armed conflicts are 
necessarily violations of IHL. While considerations of jus in bello are traditionally – and 
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rightfully so – separated from those of jus ad bellum,
218
 violation of the protection 
principle might raise the curtain between these separate spheres, at least with regard to 
the question of consent power. This result can be affected through Common Article 1 of 
the Geneva Conventions, obliging states “to respect and to ensure respect” for the 
conventions, in all circumstances.
219
 Common Article 3, which applies to internal armed 
conflicts, is among those provisions which the respect of must be ensured. The ICJ, in the 
Wall Advisory Opinion, interpreted Common Article 1 as not only requiring states to act 
positively in the face of violations committed by their armed forces, but as applying also 
in the relations between the conflicting state and external states. Meaning, IHL imposes 
an independent erga omnes obligation on uninvolved parties to ensure compliance by the 
conflicting states, inter alia by withholding any aid or assistance to violators of IHL.
220
   
A further instrument that can delegitimize instances of consensual intervention 
can be found also in Article 2 of the ICCPR, requiring member states to “to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.”
221
 A state that embarks on an intervention pursuant 
to consent by a state that fails to exercise effective protection, and crossing the threshold 
discussed above, will necessarily be in violation of its obligations under international 
human rights law, either through extra-territorial application of the latter, or by serving as 
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 See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello 
in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 48, 48 (2009). 
219
 On Common Article 1 and RtoP see Hanna Brollowski, The Responsibility to Protect and Common 
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and Obligations of Third States, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 90, at 93. 
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 Wall Opinion, supra note 14, ¶¶158–159. 
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 ICCPR, supra note 124. 
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 On the extraterritorial application of human rights law see, e.g., Wall Opinion, supra note 14, at ¶¶109–
112. On its application during armed conflict see Chapter 9, Sec. II.1. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONSENT POWER, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND  SELF-
DETERMINATION 
 
I. CONSENT BY NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: DEMOCRACY AS PROTECTION 
I.1 THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC AND NON-
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES  
It is beyond doubt that genuine democratic governments enjoy a strong presumption in 
their favor during internal strife, since substantive democracies necessarily exercise 
effective protection of their civilians, through their internal mechanisms for the protection 
of human rights. It can be said, that just as substantive democracies have proven to better 
maintain peace between each other, they are more likely to maintain peace between their 
citizens.1 Therefore, to deny a democratic government’s consent power will require a 
very high evidentiary threshold pointing that it does not fulfill its protection 
responsibilities. 
Considering this assumption, do non-democratic, regimes enjoy, at all, the 
presumption in favor of governments in the context of consensual intervention? All other 
things equal, it seems that the answer is positive. It cannot be denied that non-democratic 
regimes are participators in the international system, including in bodies such as the 
Security Council, that they enjoy the principle of sovereign equality,2 and that states do 
not withdraw previously granted recognition from long-established non-democratic 
                                                 
1 See, generally, MICHAEL W. DOYLE, LIBERAL PEACE: SELECTED ESSAYS (2011). 
2 U.N. Charter, art. 1(2). 
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governments.3 Therefore, it would be an exercise in wishful thinking to argue that under 
international law, such regimes a priori lack consent power. Instead, a more nuanced 
approach is required. 
For instance, it is helpful to look at the case of Yemen. The authoritarian regime 
of Ali Abdullah Saleh has been challenged by mass protests in the Arab Spring of 2011, 
to which the former responded with a deadly crackdown. Eventually, Saleh has resigned 
as part a regional transitional plan.4 Simultaneously, Yemen has been involved in a 
conflict with elements allegedly tied to Al-Qa’ida.5 It is fairly reasonable that Saleh’s 
unlawful response to the Arab Spring protests – regarding which he did not possess 
consent power – does not also entail that the regime lost its consent power with regards to 
actions against Al-Qa’ida, to the extent that it is genuinely involved in an armed conflict 
with jihadist elements. Thus, the position of non-democratic regimes vis-à-vis the 
question of consensual intervention is more complex. Any attempt at its articulation 






                                                 
3 See Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and Recognition, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 123, 143–146 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).  
4 See Brian Whitaker, Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh Resign – But it Changes Little, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 24, 
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/24/yemen-ali-abdullah-saleh-resigns; see also 
S.C. Res. 2014 , U.N. Doc. S/RES/2014 (Oct. 21, 2011) (endorsing the transition plan outlined by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council).  
5 See, e.g., Yemenite Troops Target Al-Qaeda, AL-JAZEERA, Jan. 5, 2010, available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/01/201015132832598600.html. 
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I.2 THE ELECTORAL ASPECT: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “ESTABLISHED” AND 
“REVOLUTIONARY” AUTOCRACIES 
Any discussion of the role of democracy in the context of intervention merits the 
clarification of the general components of democracy. The first relates to the procedural, 
electoral aspect of democracy. The other connotes the protection of human rights, which 
are a precondition for the existence of substantive democracy.  Regarding the “electoral” 
aspect, when analyzing the conduct of the international community, it seems that a clear-
cut distinction is drawn between longtime “existing” non-elected regimes (“established 
autocracies”) on the one hand, versus regimes that have overthrown an elected 
government or otherwise fail to respect the ballot (“revolutionary autocracies”).  This is 
true in particular when the elections have been internationally supervised. While 
established autocracies are not per se excluded from the international system – at least 
until a significant rebellion takes place – revolutionary autocracies are ostracized and 
sometimes face a forcible intervention.6  
Indeed, even the proponents of the general legal right to democratic governance – 
the “democratic entitlement” – demonstrate their arguments while referring to 
revolutionary autocracies, rather than to situations in which the regime has long been 
                                                 
6 In the Inter-American system, for instance, a 1992 amendment to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) authorized the OAS General Assembly to suspend a state “whose democratically 
constituted government has been overthrown by force.” Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the 
Organization of American States "Protocol of Washington", art. 9 (Dec. 14, 1992).  See also The  Inter-
American Democratic Charter, arts. 19, 21 (2001). Recently, UNASUR (Union of South American 
Nations), the emerging South American integration organization, has also adopted a protocol authorizing 
sanctions in cases of overthrow of democratically elected governments. See Protocolo Adicional 
Compromiso con la Democracia, available at 
http://www.unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=292&Itemid=340; see also 
article 25 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, Dec. 10, 1999. In recent years, ECOWAS has suspended several 
states on considerations of democratic elections – Niger, Guinea (2009), Côte d'Ivoire (2010) and Mali 
(2012). For official ECOWAS press releases by year see http://news.ecowas.int/presselist.php. 
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unelected to begin with.7 Thus, the 1964 British intervention upon the request of ousted 
President Nyerere of Tanganyika is an early case of an intervention against a 
revolutionary autocracy.8 The 1994 international intervention in Haiti, the 1996 French 
intervention in the Central African Republic, and the 1997 ECOWAS operation in Sierra 
Leone in 1997–1998 are paradigmatic post-cold war examples.9 The refusal of Laurent 
Gbagbo to step down following elections in Côte d’Ivoire, and the forcible international 
reaction of 2011 constitutes a recent case.10 Furthermore, upon the March 2012 coup in 
Mali, in which elected president Toure was ousted by a military junta, ECOWAS and the 
African Union (A.U.) imposed sanctions on the junta, while the former discussed the 
deployment of its regional Standby Force in the country. Soon thereafter, however, the 
parties reached an agreement according to which Toure will resign and the junta will 
hand over control to interim institutions.11 As of the writing of this chapter, it remains to 
be seen how the Malian crisis be ultimately resolved. Nonetheless, in all of these cases, 
clear preference was given to largely ineffective, democratically elected governments, 
over revolutionary autocracies that exercised at least some de facto power. 
It is possible to justify the distinction between established and revolutionary 
autocracies on both practical-political and legal-theoretical levels. Practically, the 
                                                 
7 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 146 –151 (critiquing the notion of the democratic criterion for recognition). 
8 See David Wippman, Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 293, 300. 
9 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance 86 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 46. 47 
(1992); Murphy, supra note 3, at 146 –147; see also Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The 
Spread of Liberal Democracy and its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 1, 3; Pro-democratic Intervention by Invitation, supra note 8, at 
300.  
10 S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011). 
11 Press Release, ECOWAS Joint Chiefs of Defense Staff Hold Emergency Meeting on Mali Crisis (Apr. 5, 
2012), available at http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=098&lang=en&annee=2012; See also A.U. 
Peace & Sec. Coun. Communique, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXVI) (Apr. 3, 2012), available at 
http://au.int/en/dp/ps/sites/default/files/psc%20comm%20mali%2003-04-2012.pdf; Mali Leader Resigns 
Ahead of Power Transfer, AL-JAZEERA, Apr. 8, 2012, available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/201248172256860746.html. 
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international community will simply descend into chaos if all non-elected regimes be 
suddenly stripped of their sovereignty, not to mention, of course, that it is politically 
impossible in the existing international power structure. Legally, such distinction is 
reasonable, since when an elected government has been ousted, we can positively claim 
that the people have been forcibly deprived of their system of choice – since there is no 
democracy without the consent of the governed – while this claim can be at least doubtful 
where no electoral-democracy was ever established. In this sense, the removal of an 
elected government can be viewed as an outrage on the principle of self-determination, 
according to its contemporary understanding as connoting political participation.12 
Moreover, in cases of revolutionary autocracies it is rather easy to distinguish between 
the “democratic” and “non-democratic” party, which, as we argue, is rather difficult in 
other situations.   
Revolutionary autocracies can be broken down into two categories: the first 
concerns situations where an autocrat appropriates power through a coup d’état against an 
elected government (The Haiti and Sierra Leone scenarios). The second refers to rulers 
who refuse to step down following elections (The Côte d’Ivoire scenario). While both 
situations raise the same theoretical questions regarding the relations between de facto 
and de jure regimes, the latter poses, at least from a classic effective-control point of 
view, a more significant challenge. This is because in such cases, intervention would be 
undertaken in favor of a ruler that has never exercised effective control over the state, 
which perhaps amounts to a more dramatic external involvement.  
Furthermore, both scenarios pose the same perplexing problem of categorization, 
requiring an answer to the question whether, theoretically, consent expressed by 
                                                 
12 See Sec. II.2. 
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ineffective elected governments is considered “governmental,” or rather, it counts as 
consent by the opposition. Here the question of consensual intervention merges with the 
question of recognition of revolutionary autocracies. A model strictly based on territorial 
effective control would have to result in the contention that pro-democratic interventions, 
as these were conducted, were undertaken in the support of the opposition. Such a 
contention is, ironically, a more revolutionary idea than the assertion that revolutionary 
autocracies were not recognized to begin with and, thus, the interventions were in support 
of governments.  
For these and other reasons, it seems that the international community prefers the 
second contention, by withholding recognition from revolutionary autocracies and 
maintaining the recognition of the de jure elected regime.13 The 2011 intervention in Côte 
d’Ivoire illuminates this trend. 
 
I.3 CȎTE D’IVOIRE 2011 – COUPLING SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY WITH CIVILIAN 
PROTECTION  
In November 2010, Côte d’Ivoire held its first presidential elections since 2000, when 
Laurent Gbagbo came to power through questionable elections. The 2010 elections, 
monitored by the U.N. as part of the long peace-process in the country, resulted in the 
victory of Alassane Ouatarra. However, the state’s Constitutional Council, controlled by 
Gbagbo loyalists, invalidated hundreds of thousands of votes, to proclaim Gbagbo as the 
                                                 
13 For a detailed analysis of practice in this context see Jean d’Aspremont, Responsibility for Coups D’état 
in International Law, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 455–468 (2010); see also Gregory H. Fox, The 
Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539 (1992). The manifestation of 
this idea in the cases of Haiti and Sierra Leone, and its relation to the question of consensual intervention, 
were discussed extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., Pro-democratic Intervention by Invitation, supra note 8, at 
301–311. 
 362 
winner of the elections with 51.4% of the vote. Grave political violence ensued as 
Gbagbo resorted violent measures to stay in power. 14 
Regardless of the fact that Gbagbo has not given up power and was in firm 
control of the state’s elite security units as well as various militias, Ouattara has been 
widely recognized as the de jure president by regional and international actors. For 
instance, the U.N. General Assembly accepted the credentials of his ambassador on 
December 23, 2010.15 Likewise, ECOWAS has quickly recognized Ouattara and 
suspended Côte d’Ivoire from the decision making bodies in the organization until 
Gbagbo stepped down. The A.U., while recognizing the elections’ result, took a rather 
ambiguous stance towards the means to resolve the standoff – however, it too suspended 
the participation of Côte d’Ivoire in the organization.16  
These international reactions have taken place regardless of the fact that, at the 
time, Ouattara took refuge in a hotel in Abidjan under the protection of U.N. 
peacekeeping forces (UNOCI,) completely unable to exercise control over the country.17 
Ouattara has managed, however, to strike an alliance with a former rebel group, the 
Forces Nouvelles (F.N.), by appointing its leader as prime minister and minister of 
defense. F.N. forces were located, however, in a geographically distanced area in the 
north of the country and were thus physically separated from the president-elect.18 
On December 20th 2010, the U.N. Security Council condemned the attempt to 
“usurp the will of the people” and welcomed the non-forcible measures adopted by 
                                                 
14 See Int’l Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option? 1–9, ICG Africa Report No. 171 (Mar. 3, 
2011). 
15 G.A. Res 65/237, U.N. Doc. A/65/237 (Dec. 23, 2010). 
16
 Is War the Only Option?, supra note 14, at 12 –14; Decision of the African Union Peace and Security 
Council (Dec. 9, 2010). 
17 Is War the Only Option?, supra note 14, at 10. 
18 Id. 
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ECOWAS and the African Union.19 It recalled the previous authorization given to 
UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, including for the protection 
of civilians, and requested UNOCI to support, in coordination with Ivorian authorities, 
the provision of security for the government and “key political stakeholders.” It 
furthermore extended the longstanding authorization given to the French Forces already 
present in the country, to support UNOCI.20 The French Forces, it should be noted, have 
intervened in the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002, on the basis of a 1961 
mutual defense pact and apparently for the purpose of protection of French nationals.21 
Thus, in essence, the first presence of the French Forces in the country was a consensual 
intervention based on a forward-looking intervention treaty. Since their 2002 
intervention, the French Forces have remained in Côte d’Ivoire and have been involved in 
robust peacekeeping operations. The Security Council, at the time, welcomed the French 
operation and authorized the presence of French troops, in support of ECOWAS troops, 
in February 2003.22 The mandate of the French Forces was since modified to complement 
and support the U.N. peacekeeping forces, and extended periodically thereafter.23 
Thus, when the events of 2011 unfolded, a significant presence of foreign forces 
was already on the ground in Côte d’Ivoire. Therefore, Security Council Resolution 1975 
of March 30, 2011, which used explicit RtoP language, served mainly as a blunt 
identification of the culprit – Laurent Gbagbo. The Resolution identified Ouattara as the 
president of Côte d’Ivoire, “as recognized by ECOWAS, the A.U., and the rest of the 
                                                 
19 S.C. Res. 1962, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1962 (Dec. 20, 2010).  
20 Id. ¶14, 15, 17. 
21 France-Diplomatie – Political Relations, available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-
files_156/cote-ivoire_191/france-and-cote-ivoire_2426/political-relations_6122/index.html. 
22 S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464 (Feb. 4 2003).  
23 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1479, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1479 (May 13, 2003); S.C. Res. 1528,  U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004); S.C. Res. 2000, S/RES/2000 (Jul. 27, 2011).  
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international community;” specifically condemned Gbagbo for not stepping down; called 
upon all of the Ivorian institutions to yield to Ouattara’s authority; and demanded that 
Gbagbo immediately lift the siege of the Golf Hotel, where the president-elect took 
refuge.24 It furthermore condemned all atrocities committed in the course of the turmoil.25 
However, when recalling the forcible mandate of UNOCI, the resolution alluded to 
UNOCI’s “impartial” mandate to protect civilians, perhaps implying, that in terms of 
forcible enforcement, it remained “neutral” between the parties’ conflicting claims 
regarding the elections, reserving any forcible actions only to the extent needed to protect 
civilians.26  
Resolution 1975 was adopted two days after Ouattara launched a wide scale 
attack against Gbagbo, utilizing the forces of his northern F.N. allies.27  Since Resolution 
1975 authorized UNOCI “to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian 
population,”28 there was significant interpretive room to construct the resolution as 
mandating a proactive military campaign against Gbagbo. Accordingly, for instance, the 
U.N. and French forces deployed attack helicopters against Gbagbo’s forces. The foreign 
forces were instrumental in the FN’s assault on Abidjan, and on April 11th, 2011, Gbagbo 
was arrested by forces supporting Ouattara.29   
The most significant lessons that can be learned from the Gbagbo affair are two. 
First, that revolutionary autocracies, even those that do not engage in a positive coup 
d’état, but simply refuse to step down following elections, are not likely to be recognized 
                                                 
24 S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011), ¶1, 3, 4, 11. 
25 Id. ¶5. 
26 Id. ¶6. 
27 Int’l Crisis Group, A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in Côte D’Ivoire, ICG Africa Report No. 176 
(Aug. 1, 2011). 
28 S.C. Res. 1975, supra note 24, ¶6. 
29 A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability, supra note 27, at 1–2.  
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as governments, including for the purpose of consent (or withdrawal) power. Since the 
ousted elected government will typically retain recognition – as was in the cases of Haiti, 
Sierra Leone,30 and recently in Côte d’Ivoire – it is safe to say that such “pro-democratic” 
interventions against revolutionary autocracies are essentially interventions in favor of 
governments, and are thus firmly positioned within the theoretical sphere of  the 
preference of governments. This is true both when the intervention was pursued absent 
Security Council authorization (Sierra Leone);31 and in cases where such authorization 
was granted (Haiti,32 Côte d’Ivoire). It should be noted however, that the Sierra Leone 
intervention was conducted by a regional organization, and not by a single state, which 
might account for the operation’s implied ex post endorsement by the Security Council.33  
The second lesson is that regardless of the consequentially pro-democratic nature 
of the intervention and the wide condemnation of Gbagbo’s actions, the forcible acts that 
led to the latter’s arrest were actually conducted primarily under the banner of “civilian 
protection,” and not under a mandate to enforce electoral democracy. This fact 
demonstrates the coupling of the principle of civilian protection and substantive 
democracy, as illustrated in the next section, and correlates with the prevalence of the 
protection principle over other considerations.  
It seems thus, that cotemporary international law can be summarized in the 
following terms: revolutionary autocracies are denied recognition, and therefore do not 
enjoy consent power; ousted elected governments, conversely, retain recognition and 
                                                 
30 Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation, supra note 8, at 301, 304. 
31 Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, “You, the People”: Pro-Democratic Intervention in International 
Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at  259, 288–290;Pro-
Democratic Intervention by Invitation, supra note 8, at 304 –306. 
32Byers & Chesterman, supra note 31, at 284–288. 
33 Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation, supra note 8, at 311. 
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therefore might possess, in theory, consent power,34 at least for the immediate period 
following their loss of control.35 However, the Sierra Leone intervention, which is a 
paradigmatic case in which consent power, inter alia, has been used as a justification for 
pro-democratic unilateral intervention,36 involved a regional organization. While there is 
no inherent differentiation in the jus ad bellum applicable to regional organizations as 
opposed to single states, the former enjoy wider credibility as collective decision making 
instruments.37 Therefore, accordingly, consensual interventions pursued by regional 
organizations, in such scenarios, are likely to be more widely accepted.       
 
I.4 ESTABLISHED AUTOCRACIES FACING A GENUINE PRO-DEMOCRATIC INSURRECTION: 
DECONSTRUCTING THE “DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT” 
What is the law in instances in which a longstanding and established autocracy is 
challenged by a democratic opposition? Any answer would require making the difficult 
preliminary determination that an opposition group that raises the flag of “democracy” is 
genuinely willing or able to “deliver” its promise – a key condition for any attempt to 
justify the encouragement of such groups at the expense of incumbent regimes by 
negating the latter’s consent power.38 Mere claims by an armed opposition that it is 
“democratic” are certainly not enough. Indeed, it seems that there is almost no 
contemporary organized armed group, even guilty of mass atrocities, which does not 
include the word “democracy,” in some form, in its name. Moreover, since internal 
                                                 
34 Compare ICISS REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶4.26 (2001).  
35 Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation, supra note 8, at 302–303. 
36 Id. at 308 –309. 
37 See, e.g. ICISS REPORT, supra note 34, ¶¶6.31–6.32; THE INDEPENDENT INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE 
KOSOVO REPORT 195 (2000). 
38 See, e.g., the actions of Laurent Kabila after ousting Mobutu Sese Seko and establishing the Democratic 
Republic of Congo; Murphy, supra note 3, at 146. 
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armed conflict is essentially a non-democratic phenomenon, being that it substitutes 
political deliberation with violence, it is extremely difficult, in most cases, to identify 
genuine democratic tendencies among the conflicting parties (in contradistinction to cases 
of revolutionary autocracies, where a genuine democratic government previously 
existed). This dilemma is ever present when assessing external intervention in armed 
strife: it was prevalent, for instance, in the debate surrounding U.S. support of the 
Contras,39 as well as the nature of the rebelling forces during the Arab Spring, for 
instance, in the internal armed conflict in Libya.40  
In a hypothetical case in which we can clearly establish that a non-democratic 
regime is challenged by a genuinely pro-democratic opposition, the question whether a 
regime’s non-democratic nature affects its consent power, can be viewed as intrinsically 
woven with the debate whether, and to what extent, “democracy,” as a system of 
governance, is a right under international law, perhaps granting a collective right to oust a 
non-elected leadership with some measure of international support.41 This notion has 
been famously suggested by Thomas Franck, upon his analysis of the development of the 
customary principle of self-determination, state practice, and various multilateral 
documents and treaties.42 
However, while the concept of the democratic entitlement has certainly affected 
the understanding of international law in the last two decades, there is no consensus that 
                                                 
39 See ROBERT KAGAN, A TWILIGHT STRUGGLE: AMERICAN POWER AND NICARAGUA  1977–1990 355 
(1995). 
40 See, e.g., Jon Lee Anderson, Who are the Rebels? THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 4, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/04/04/110404taco_talk_anderson. 
41 Fox & Roth, supra note 9, at 10–11.  
42 Franck, supra note 9; see also Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: an International Legal 
Right or the Pipe Dream of the West? 27 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 289 (1995); STEVEN WHEATLEY, 
DEMOCRACY, MINORITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 –140 (2005). For an updated analysis see 
Susan Marks, What Has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance? 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
507 (2011). 
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it has galvanized, as such, as an unequivocal rule of customary international law,43 a 
fortiori in a manner that can affect the laws on the use of force. 44 As some argue, this is 
especially true since the concept of democracy itself is not authoritatively defined, as 
such, in international law and discourse.45 With the multitude of political systems and 
their intricacies, it is sometimes difficult to objectively pinpoint which government 
represents is a “true” democracy, and to what extent.46  
Indeed, if we limit the “democratic entitlement” to the narrow, procedural 
requirement of “free and fair elections” and majority rule, it loses much of its appeal – 
since free and fair elections are not sufficient, in themselves, to secure human rights; 
however, if we understand the entitlement as connoting also substantive democracy, we 
must recognize that such a system of governance is built on numerous rights and interests 
that are not absolute, and are therefore subject to unique balancing in different societies, 
in accordance with their cultures and circumstances.47 It is in this context that there is 
constant tension – whether justified or not – between the idea of democratic entitlement 
and those that suspect that the concept is yet another method to perpetuate an alleged 
“western” hegemony, which is at odds with the concept of non-intervention, as it is 
sometimes understood in the developing world.48  
                                                 
43 Steven Wheatley, Democracy in International Law: a European Perspective, 51 INT’L & COMPARATIVE 
L. Q. 225 (2002);  Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   supra note 3, at 48. 69; see also Marks, supra note 
42, at 511 –513 (and the sources cited therein).  
44 Although a regime’s non-democratic nature might suffer reduced consent power due to the norm of non-
intervention. See Chapter III, sec. III.2. 
45 Fox, supra note 43, at 48–49; see also Marks, supra note 42, at 511 –512, 522; see also 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1 ¶135, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1 (Sept. 15 2005). 
46 Marks, supra note 42, at 511 –512; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Intolerant Democracies: A Reaction, 37 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 231, 231 –232 (1996). 
47 On substantive democracy, see Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, in DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 389,  401 –405. 
48
 See Franck, supra note 9, at 78, 82; Koskenniemi, supra note 46, at 231 –232. 
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Some, while admitting that the “democratic entitlement” has indeed taken form in 
the last two decades, argue that the ongoing economic crisis in the western world, the 
growing global security concerns and the rise of authoritarian superpowers could 
undermine the establishment of the democratic entitlement in the near future. They 
identify a process in which the overarching idea of “democracy,” in its procedural sense, 
is marginalized in favor of a pragmatic analysis of a government’s adherence to basic 
human rights standards.49 According to this view, in certain situations – among them 
when consensual intervention is sought – the question whether a government has been 
democratically elected (“legitimacy of origin”), is secondary to the question of how the 
government exercises its powers (“legitimacy of exercise.”) According to this approach, 
the lack of the latter, but not necessarily of the former, can result in the “disqualification” 
of consent.50 
It is beyond this work to add to the robust literature debating whether a 
democratic entitlement exists, whether it has achieved the status of customary 
international law, and if so, what is its scope. Instead, we can constructively focus on the 
rights constituting the “compounds” of democracy. Indeed, rather than stressing the 
concept of “democracy” as such, it is helpful to focus on the various rights that comprise 
it – thereby “returning” the elusive concept of “democracy” to the realm of positive 
international human rights law.51 From here, it is only a short theoretical distance to reach 
                                                 
49 Jean d’Aspremont, The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in International Law: A Reply to Susan 
Marks, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 549 (2011). 
50 See Jean d’Aspremont & Eric De Brabandere, The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in International 
Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise, 34 FORD. INT’L L. J. 190, 209 –210; Jean 
d’Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 877, 906 –
909 (2005).  
51 See Cerna, supra note 42, at 328; see also d’Aspremont, supra note 49. at 559 –560. 
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the conclusion that substantive democracy and the concept of effective protection are 
merging together.   
Setting aside the complexities of the right to free and fair elections as enshrined in 
article 25 of the ICCPR,52 the truth remains that autocratic regimes are virtually always 
violators of other well-founded norms of international human rights law. Indeed, 
repression is a precondition needed to secure and protect autocracy. It is here that the 
“democratic entitlement” can receive significant legal augmentation: as aforementioned, 
democracy, in its substantive sense, does not only connote (procedural) electoral rights 
and majority rule –53 but is comprised also of a bundle of (substantive) rights that must 
supplement it,54 the chief of them being the right to life.55 While “democracy” in itself is 
controversial as a “right” in international law, many of these rights are enshrined in 
positive international law; some of these rights – though not all – are integral to the 
concept of effective protection as a source of sovereign power. Therefore, when assessing 
the consent power of established autocracies, in the context of an internal armed conflict, 
the focus should not be solely on their autocratic, non-elected nature, but rather on the 
gross violations of legally protected human rights, and namely those amounting also to a 
breach of the principle of protection, that such regimes almost always commit when 
attempting to preserve their rule.56 This tendency has been clearly demonstrated in the 
events of the Arab Spring. 
                                                 
52 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 
 Fox, supra note 43, at 55–59. 
53 See Marks, supra note 42, at 511–512. 
54 See Thomas Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW,  supra note 3, at 25, 25–26. 
55 ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 5. 
56 In this sense, it is theoretically possible that an autocracy will exercise effective protection over its 
populations. This perhaps correlates with Rawls’ idea of “decent hierarchical peoples.” See JOHN RAWLS, 
THE LAW OF PEOPLES, §8 (1999).  However, it is hard to imagine a situation in which an autocracy would 
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This legal approach to assess consent power seems prudent. Since at issue is the 
lawfulness of forcible intervention, with all of its political and humanitarian 
consequences, it makes sense – at least in the moment when assessing a possible 
intervention – to shy away from sweeping ideological terms and to focus on the way the 
consenting government exercises its power, rather on that power’s origins. Namely, as 
discussed at length in Chapter 10, this exercise of power will be judged according to the 
notion of protection of civilians, which offers a widely accepted standard, at least in 
principle, for the assessment of parties to an internal armed conflict.57 It is highly 
reasonable, as aforementioned, that autocratic regimes will rarely exercise their power in 
accordance with the principles of effective protection – but this fact has to be ascertained 
in the given instance nonetheless. This approach is fitting since the ultimate concern of 
the international system, during internal conflict, should be to swiftly respond to the 
suffering on the ground rather than to secure a complex democratic system, which 
requires a lengthy process of post-conflict institution building. This approach seems to 
correlate with the contemporary “protection now, democracy later” practice of the U.N. 






                                                                                                                                                 
deal with mass protests against it without breaching the protection principle, and still be considered an 
autocracy.   
57 d’Aspremont, supra note 49, at 559–560. 
58 Chapter 10, Sec. II.5. 
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II. DEPRIVATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND CONSENT POWER 
II.1 SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE COLONIAL CONTEXT AND BEYOND 
Self-determination is universally accepted as a basic principle of international law, its 
promotion entrenched in Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter as one of the organization’s 
purposes. Nonetheless, the meaning of the principle of self-determination has not been 
constant. On the contrary, it has evolved and changed significantly throughout the 20th 
century. It has developed from the Wilsonian model of the norm, based on the protection 
and self-governance of minorities in post WWI Europe; to a strong preoccupation with 
decolonization in Africa and Asia in the post WWII world; and, in its latest form, to the 
contemporary concept of internal self-determination, as discussed in Section II.2.59 A 
longstanding, inherent tension exists between the concept of self-determination, and the 
principle of territorial integrity, which is manifested chiefly regarding the legal debate on 
the existence or scope of the right of secession. This tension, as well as the general theory 
and scope of the principle of self-determination, have been robustly addressed in the 
literature, and will not be extensively analyzed in this work.60 We shall only discuss it 
here in the context of its possible effects over consent power and forcible intervention.  
As aforementioned, much of the consideration of the principle of self-
determination, in the first decades of the U.N., took place in relation to the process of 
                                                 
59 See Franck, supra note 9, at 52–56. 
60 See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); 
KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). For a concise history 
of the principle see JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION 7–43 (2000); 
compare Christian Tomuschat, Secession and Self-Determination, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
PERSPECTIVES 23, 37–38 (Marcelo G. Kohen, ed., 2006) see also Independent Int’l Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Conflict in Georgia, Report (Vol. 2), at 135–136 (Sept. 30, 2009); ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, 
LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 331–426 
(2004). 
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decolonization.61 It is interesting to note, in this context, that the normative treatment of 
colonial wars in the U.N. era constituted, in itself, a significant departure from the 
traditional perception of sovereignty as a corollary of effective control. Recall, that in the 
19th century, colonial wars have been looked upon as internal armed conflicts, where the 
colonized party was perceived as seeking secession by force from an empire that 
exercised effective control over its territory.62 This has changed remarkably in the post-
War era.  
Indeed, during the era of decolonization, latter-day colonial powers such as 
Portugal sought to maintain the traditional distinction of colonial wars as internal 
struggles for secession. However, the international community unequivocally rejected 
this stance, making it clear that colonial struggles were no longer considered as internal 
armed conflicts.63 In the U.N. era, thus, colonial struggles have been excluded from the 
internal realm, and were therefore no longer analyzed according to the law of secession. 
Instead, such conflicts were treated as belonging to a separate category of struggles for 
self-determination, which were closer, in their nature, to international armed conflicts. 
Whether such struggles, sometimes labeled as “wars of national liberation,” spawned also 
the right to receive forcible support from third parties – perhaps comparable to collective 
self-defense rights of states – remained controversial throughout the years.64 This 
controversy has led, perhaps, to the implied dictum by the Court in Nicaragua, according 
to which situations of colonialism might be analyzed under a paradigm of intervention 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South African in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ¶¶52–53, 1971 
I.C.J. 16 (June 21). 
62 Chapter 6, Sec. I. 
63 CASTELLINO, supra note 60, at 27–31.    
64 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 70–73 (5th ed. 2011); Julius Stone, Hopes 
and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 224, 233 –237 (1977).  
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differing from that relating to “pure” internal armed conflicts– a possibility vehemently 
rejected in the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel.65 
Nonetheless, in its 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and People, the U.N. General Assembly called for the cessation of “all armed 
action or repressive measures” directed against dependent peoples, while still reaffirming 
that any disruption of a state’s territorial integrity is incompatible with the U.N. Charter.66 
In this sense, the latter Declaration, and subsequent resolutions,67 clearly established that 
in the context of decolonization, the question of self-determination is  distinct from the 
issue of secession, and that colonial wars, thus, do not challenged the principle of 
territorial integrity. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations explicitly reaffirmed this 
notion, by declaring that territories under colonial rule have a “separate and distinct 
status” from the administering state. 68 By thus, the Declaration clarified that the issue of 
secession, in the internal sense, is irrelevant to the question of decolonization. This 
determination corresponds with the approach expressed in the (controversial) article 1(4) 
of Additional Protocol I, which provides that struggles against colonial domination and 
racist regimes, in the exercise of the right of self-determination, are to be considered 
international armed conflicts in the context of IHL.69  
The exclusion of colonial wars from the internal sphere and their transfer to the 
realm of external jus ad bellum, necessarily removed them also, in the context of 
                                                 
65 Military Aid and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27), ¶206.; compare id. ¶1, ¶¶178–181 (Schwebel J., dissenting).  
66 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, ¶4, 7, 
U.N. Doc. A/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
67
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. Doc. A/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960).  
68 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States,  Principle 5¶6, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
69 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Jun. 8, 1977, art. 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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consensual intervention, from the paradigm of government preference – resulting 
therefore in the negation of colonial powers’ capacity to request and receive assistance 
from third parties.70 This conclusion is expressed in the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, which proclaims that states have a duty to refrain from any forcible action 
which deprives peoples of their right to self-determination.71 The Declaration goes, 
however, a step further, stating that “such peoples” “are entitled to seek and to receive 
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”72 This vague 
phrasing – as we shall discuss in Chapter 12 –73 raised questions regarding the lawfulness 
of forcible support to peoples struggling for self-determination. Indeed, despite its clear 
wording on the scope of the application of the principle – when attempting to 
circumscribe the means for the principle’s implementation, the Declaration plunged into 
nearly unworkable incoherence, characteristic of cold-war era compromises.74  
Thus, the Declaration enumerated the possible routes for the implementation of 
self-determination, as consisting of the establishment of an independent state; association 
or integration with an independent state; or any other political status chosen by the 
people.75 However, considering that the Declaration stipulates that self-determination is 
not strictly limited to instances of colonialism – by acknowledging that the principle 
applied to “all peoples”–76 it remains unclear whether the methods of implementation, as 
set forth in the Declaration, refer only to situations of decolonization or otherwise.  
                                                 
70 See David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 209, 215 (1997). 
71 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 68, Principle 5¶5. 
72 Id. 
73 Sec. II.3. 
74 See Georgia Report, supra note 60, at 138. 
75 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 68, Principle 5¶4. 
76 Id. Principle 5¶1.  
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The situation is further complicated by Principle 5¶7 of the Declaration, providing 
that the Declaration should not be construed as authorizing any actions to dismember the 
territorial integrity of independent states that comply with the principles of equal rights 
and self-determination.77 It can be inferred from this statement, by way of negation, that 
the territorial integrity of states that do not comply with the principles of equal rights and 
self-determination is not an absolute value. Furthermore, Principle 5¶7 can hardly be 
understood as applying strictly to colonized peoples, since its reference to “equal rights” 
alludes to a wider spectrum of situations. In particular, the qualification of the principle 
of territorial integrity, implied in Principle 5¶7, could be relevant to racist regimes which 
are not per se colonialist – Apartheid South Africa the most clear-cut example.78 This 
notion is augmented by the fact that similar paragraphs have been included in other U.N. 
documents, even as late as in 1995 – long after the colonial era ended – in parallel and 
shortly following the collapse of the Apartheid regime in South Africa.79  
The Declaration’s putative qualification of the principle of territorial integrity, 
also in some non-colonial situations, could arguably be construed as opening the door for 
the possibility of remedial secession, as the term is discussed in the next Section. 
However, the Declaration quickly contradicts this thought, in Principle 5¶8, proclaiming 
unequivocally that states shall refrain from any action aimed to disrupt the territorial 
integrity of any other state.80 This last Principle, however, can be interpreted as applying 
to any instance not covered by previous paragraphs, ostensibly allowing support to 
                                                 
77 Id. Principle 5¶7. 
78 See Ioana Cismas, Secession in Theory and Practice: The Case of Kosovo and Beyond, 2 GOETTINGEN J. 
INT’L L. 531, 546–547 (2010). 
79 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action: Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.157/23, (Jul. 12, 1993); G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. Doc. A/50/6 (Oct. 24, 1995); cited in Cismas, 
supra note 77, at 547. 
80 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 68, Principle 5¶8. 
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secessionist groups in certain circumstances. Therefore, the ambiguity regarding the 
question of secession and the Declaration on Friendly relations nevertheless remains.81  
  
II.2 RELEVANCE IN THE DECOLONIZED WORLD: INTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION, 
REMEDIAL SECESSION, CIVILIAN PROTECTION AND CONSENT POWER 
The principle of self-determination, although prevalent in the discourse on 
decolonization, is not limited only to this specific context. It is entrenched, in addition, as 
an internationally protected human right. Accordingly, Common Article 1 of the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR provides that the principle applies to all peoples, whether or not under 
foreign domination. However, there is significant difference in the application of the 
principle in the colonial versus the non-colonial contexts. While peoples under colonial 
rule would have a right to establish independent states, in already established and 
independent states, conversely, self-determination is limited to internal application. In 
practice, the immediate meaning of this qualification, as we shall see, is that in the 
decolonized world, the principle of self-determination does not in general spawn a 
positive right of secession, even if not prohibiting it per se.82 
Thus, in the decolonized world, in which the vast majority of peoples are no 
longer under foreign rule, the discussion of the principle of self-determination has 
become somewhat narrower. The principle is now commonly analyzed under the concept 
of internal self-determination, meaning, the application of the right within an existing 
                                                 
81 See Georgia Report, supra note 60, at 137 –138. 
82 Franck, supra note 9, at 58–59; CASTELLINO, supra note 60, at 31–34. Arguably, international law does 
not prohibit secession; see Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Question “Is the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo in Accordance with International Law?” Written Statement of the United Kingdom (Apr. 17, 
2009) 87–93, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15638.pdf. In any case, in absence of a 
positive right of secession external support to the seceding party is a violation of international law.  
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independent state, manifested in the relation between the state and its civilians. The 
concept of internal self-determination derives from the practical understanding that the 
international system could not withstand the perpetual fragmentation created by infinite 
claims for secession, and that the principles of territorial integrity and uti possidetis – 
meaning, the respect of colonial borders as they were in the time of independence –83 
must counterbalance the right to self-determination.   
The notion of internal self-determination has been viewed by some, in the past, as 
synonymous with non-intervention. Indeed, self-determination as been cited as a key 
justification for the strict-abstentionist approach to the question of consensual 
intervention.84 However, the rationale of internal self-determination has been 
underscored, by most contemporary scholars, as being based on some form of a right to 
political participation.85 When equating internal self-determination with a notion of 
political participation, the discussion of self-determination merges, to a large extent, with 
the debate surrounding the question of democratic entitlement and its effect on 
government consent power. In this sense, our conclusions regarding the relations between 
democracy and consensual intervention are applicable also in the context of the 
interaction between internal self-determination and intervention: both should be analyzed 
according to the substantive human rights violations that usually accompany their 
deprivation; when such violations amount to a breach of the principle of effective 
                                                 
83  See SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED WORLD: THE ROLE OF UTI 
POSSIDETIS 4 (2002). 
84 See Chapter 8, Sec. III. See also Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by 
Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y’BOOK INT’L L. 189, 200 (1985).  
85 See DAVID RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 237–238 (2002), and the sources 
cited therein, in n. 42. 
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protection by the government, the latter loses its sovereign power to request assistance 
during an internal armed conflict.  
However, the question of internal self-determination spawns another dilemma, 
concerning the positive consequences of its breach. Due to the prevalence of the principle 
of territorial integrity, as aforementioned, self-determination in the decolonized world is 
to be fulfilled within the framework of the state. It is thus clear that a right of forcible, 
unilateral, non-consensual secession cannot be an inherent component of the right of 
internal self-determination.86 This conclusion is merited both in light of the substantive 
meaning of the principle of internal self-determination,87 and on counts of the dangerous 
practical implications of the recognition of a right to secede.88 Accordingly, and at least 
since the early 1960s, when the international community adopted a strong anti-
secessionist in the context of the Katanga affair,89 it can be definitely said that state 
practice has not recognized a right of secession based strictly on the notion of internal 
self-determination.90  
In the context of consensual intervention, the implication must be that – other 
things equal – a claim cannot be made for the negation of government consent power 
when the government is facing an armed secessionist movement, when the secessionists’ 
                                                 
86 Internationally recognized secession can be, undoubtedly, a product of an agreement between the state 
and the opposition. This agreement can be the result of an internal armed conflict or not; the key issue is 
that the secession is validated, in relation to the international community, by consent of the rump state. A 
recent example is the secession and recognition of South Sudan in July 2011, following a referendum that 
was conducted after a longstanding internal armed conflict. Compare Dapo Akande, The Newly 
Independent State of South Sudan – Should We Rethink the Right to Secession EJIL: TALK (Jul. 15, 2011), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-newly-independent-state-of-south-sudan/. 
87 See Emilio J. Cárdenas & Maria Fernand Can͂as, The Limits of Self-Determination, in THE SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION, AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 110–112 
(Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2002).  
88 Tomuschat, supra note 60, at 24–25. 
89 See Georg Nolte, Secession and External Intervention, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
PERSPECTIVES 65, 67–70 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006). 
90 For a summary of practice, see Tomuschat, supra note 60, at 27–34. 
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claims are based solely on an alleged deprivation of internal self-determination. It could 
be further prescribed that, all other things equal, any loss of territorial effective control 
resulting from such actions cannot be used as a claim against the government’s consent 
power. If, however, the conflict is not one of secession, but for control over the state 
apparatus, any limitation of consent power justified on counts of a violation of internal 
self-determination should be analyzed according to the same principles outlined in the 
discussion regarding the democratic entitlement. 
It is in this context that the unresolved issue of “remedial secession” has to be 
analyzed. Until now, we have generally discussed the effects of “regular” violations of 
internal self-determination over government consent power. However, the idea of 
remedial secession, a term first used by Buchheit,91 suggests that in exceptional 
circumstances a group might be entitled – in accordance with international law – to be 
considered as a “people” possessing a right to secede, as a remedy for grave and massive 
violations of human rights directed against it in a discriminatory fashion.92 Thus, while 
for the purpose of consent power internal self-determination merges with the question of 
substantive democracy, the question of remedial secession is related to the notion of 
effective protection of civilians. Importantly, this supposed right will apply also in the 
non-colonial context, meaning, where the notion of internal self-determination usually 
prevails. In any case, on counts of the danger it presents international stability, it must be 
invoked “last resort” remedy;93 the ultimate remedy for the affected group.94 
                                                 
91 LEE BUCCHEIT, SECESSION, THE LEGITIMACYOF SELF-DETERMINATION 222 –223 (1978). 
92 Tomuschat, supra note 60, at 35; see also BUCHANAN, supra note 60, at 247 –248 (on the meaning of the 
remedial aspect of the right). 
93 On the high threshold of violations required for remedial secession see Cismas, supra note 77, at 544–
546 (and the sources cited therein). 
94 BUCCHEIT, supra note 91, at 223. Buchanan argues, however, that a revocation of intrastate autonomy 
agreements, such as was the case in Kosovo, can also be seen as a cause for remedial secession. See Allen 
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Frequently referred to as based on Principle 5¶7 of the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations,95 the doctrine of remedial secession has received much support in legal 
literature, in contradistinction to scant support, if at all, in state practice.96 In recent times, 
the question of remedial secession has been most heavily debated in the context of 
Kosovo’s struggle to secede from Serbia.  
In response to the mass atrocities conducted by the Serbian army in 1998–1999, 
NATO launched a unilateral bombing campaign against Serbia, which led to the 
establishment of a U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
supplemented by a NATO-dominated security presence (KFOR), mandated in Security 
Council resolution 1244.97 In practice, the international civil and military presence in 
Kosovo amounted to a complete transfer of the control over Kosovo to the international 
community.98 Following a long stalemate in the final-status negotiation between 
representatives of Kosovo and Serbia,99 Kosovo declared independence on February 17th, 
2008,100 to be recognized, as of April 2012, by 89 states.101  
The debate regarding remedial secession in the case of Kosovo revolves around 
the question whether such right exists in international law to begin with; and if not, 
whether the Kosovo case sets any legal precedent for such a right; or rather, as commonly 
                                                                                                                                                 
Buchanan, Uncoupling Secession from Nationalism and Intrastate Autonomy from Secession, in 
NEGOTIATING SELF-DETERMINATION 81, 84 (Hurst Hannum & Eileen Babbitt eds., 2006).   
95 See supra, text accompanying nn. 77–81. 
96 For a summary of opinions in the literature see ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND 
UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS 141–142 (2007); Georgia Report, supra note 60, at 138; Tom J. Farer, 
Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL DILEMMAS 53, 57  (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).  
97 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1999 (Jun. 10, 1999); Cismas, supra note 77, at 571 –572.  
98 See K. William Watson, When in the Course of Human Events: Kosovo’s Independence and the Law of 
Secession, 17 TUL. J. INTI’L & COMP. L. 267, 269 –274 (2008).  
99 See Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status, S/2007/168 of 26 
March 2007, 2. 
100 Cismas, supra note 77, at 577–578. 
101 For an updated list of states that have recognized Kosovo, including the texts of the recognitions, see 
http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/. 
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claimed by states that have recognized Kosovo, the recognition of Kosovo is merely a sui 
generis case, its unique circumstances negating any potential precedential, norm-creating 
value.102 
The sui generis argument is best exemplified in the positions expressed in the 
dramatic Security Council discussion taking place a day after Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence.103 There, the U.K. recalled that the Council, in resolution 
1244, took an “unprecedented step” by depriving Serbia of its control over Kosovo, in 
response to its attempt to expel the Albanian population from Kosovo in 1999. It argued 
that these events “shape” the current situation.104 It blamed Serbia for the collapse of the 
negotiations, and repeated the claim that the situation is sui generis.105 The U.S. 
presented similar reasoning, claiming that the declaration of independence was a “logical, 
legitimate and legal response” considering the historical backdrop and the ongoing failure 
of the negotiations between Kosovo and the Serbian government. However, it too 
stressed that the unique Kosovar situation negates any precedential value.106 Croatia 
followed the same route,107 and so did France.108 
The sui generis argument regarding Kosovo, thus, bases itself on a three-pronged 
set of justifications. First, it refers to the “unprecedented step” taken by the Security 
Council in resolution 1244, in its decision to de facto remove Kosovo from Serbian 
control; second, it relies on the Serbian attempts to expel the Albanian population; and 
third, it points out the ongoing failure of the negotiations between the parties. 
                                                 
102 Cismas, supra note 77, at 581–586; For an overview of the sui generis debate see Georgia Report, supra 
note 60, at 139–140. 
103 U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5839th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5839 (Feb. 18, 2008). 
104 Id. at 12.  
105 Id. at 13–14. 
106 Id. at 18 –19. 
107 Id. at 16.  
108 Id. at 19–20. 
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However, an analysis of the argument reveals that it does not convincingly set-
forth a rational basis for a sui generis claim. The reliance on past “unprecedented” 
actions by the Security Council as connoting the situation’s uniqueness is somewhat of an 
ipse dixit, due to its circular reasoning (requiring us to accept a false statement, according 
to which since the international community acted unprecedentedly, the situation does not 
constitute a precedent for future actions by the international community.) Furthermore, 
the argument does not explain why it is inconceivable that similar circumstances might 
take place again, in the face of mass atrocities elsewhere; or in other places where 
negotiations fail to achieve a political solution.109 Indonesia, for instance, rejected the sui 
generis argument, rightly asserting “that all issues that are on the agenda of the Council 
have their own unique character,” and called for the continuance of negotiations.110 
Similarly, other states, namely Russia and China, were not convinced by the sui generis 
argument and warned against the future implications.111 The 2010 ICJ advisory opinion 
regarding Kosovo’s declaration did not clarify these issues, as it rendered a very narrow 
opinion legalizing merely the act of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, without 
grappling with the substantive question of remedial secession.112 
Even if we are willing to accept the notion that a positive right of “unilateral” 
remedial secession exists,113 it is obvious that any such putative right does not materialize 
under “regular” circumstances of deprivation of internal self-determination, in the form 
of denial of political participation. Such an extreme result would be problematic when 
                                                 
109 For similar critique, see Cismas, supra note 77, at 585–586. 
110 S/PV.5839, supra note 103, at 11. 
111 Id. at. 6–8.   
112 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 (July  22).   
113 See Tomuschat, supra note 60, at 38–44. 
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offered as a remedy for a violation of such an ambiguous norm. Indeed, even the 
unilateral NATO intervention in Kosovo was based on the atrocities committed by 
Serbia, and not the right to self-determination, in its narrow sense, of Kosovo.114 
Accordingly, in its report on the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, the International Fact-
Finding Mission concluded that although Georgia has violated, for a time, the internal 
right of self-determination of the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the latter were 
not entitled to secede.115  
Struggles for secession, could be, however, affected by the principle of protection 
of civilians, even if one does not recognize the doctrine of remedial secession as such. 
Indeed, if secession is sought as a response to mass atrocities, as was the case in Kosovo, 
or in instances of other “grave and massive” human rights violations,116 government 
consent power can be negated – a fact that can indirectly assist the seceding party. Here, 
our analysis merges, to a large extent, with the discussion in Chapter 10 regarding the 
principle of protection of civilians, and its implementation through the RtoP doctrine.117 
Whether secessionist forces are entitled – should the idea of remedial secession be 
accepted – also to a positive right of remedial forcible intervention in the form of the 
power to request external assistance – is a complex question, on the seam between the 
concept of humanitarian intervention and recognition, which will be addressed in the next 
Chapter. What is clear, however, is that a government that actively disregards the 
principle of protection of civilians will lose its consent power when facing a secessionist 
movement, whether we accept the concept of remedial secession or not.       
                                                 
114 Farer, supra note 96, at 57. 
115 Georgia Report, supra note 60, at 145 –146, 147. 
116 Tomuschat, supra note 60, at 35. 
117 Compare id. at 41–42 (paralleling the question of remedial secession and humanitarian intervention).  
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CHAPTER 12  
CONSENT BY OPPOSITION GROUPS: BETWEEN  RECOGNITION AND 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; BETWEEN LEGALITY AND NECESSITY 
 
 
I. FRAMING THE DISCUSSION: BETWEEN RECOGNITION, HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND SELF-DEFENSE 
In previous chapters, we have analyzed the scope of the principle of government 
preference. However, the negation of government consent power does not necessarily 
entail the positive transfer of consent power to opposition groups. Indeed, external 
forcible support of opposition groups during internal strife has been a longstanding and 
controversial question of international law. During the cold-war, this issue underlined the 
controversial Brezhnev and Reagan doctrines; it was also a prevalent question in the 




An analysis of state practice in terms of support to opposition groups is a 
problematic exercise. Because of their prima facie illegality and reasons of political 
prudence, states will rarely admit, in specific cases, that they are substantially engaged in 
such activities –
2
 even when it is otherwise a matter of declared policy.
3
 Instead, a more 
helpful way to address the question is through a three tiered, principled approach. First, 
we must ascertain whether an intervention is in fact in favor of the opposition, or rather it 
                                                 
1
 Chapter 8, Sec. II. 
2
 CHRISTINE D. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105–107 (2008). 
3
 For instance, it is interesting to compare between the legal justifications given by the U.S. to its actions in 
Nicaragua (collective self-defense), and the various expressions of the Reagan Doctrine, which ostensibly 
condoned the support of opposition “freedom fighters.” See Chapter 8 Sec II.    
 386 
is a “regular” case of intervention in support of a government. In this context, if the 
intervention was undertaken following the recognition of the benefited group as a 
government or a state, it is potentially not at all a question of intervention in favor of the 
opposition. Second, and conversely, if the benefitted group is unrecognized to begin with, 
or recognized unlawfully only as a pretext for the intervention, any unilateral forcible 
support given to it – unless can be separately justified as an act of self-defense – is a 
prima facie violation of the laws on the use of force and the norm of non-intervention. 
Third, in such cases, if humanitarian justifications are invoked, we may inquire as to the 
potential role of consent in the legitimization
4
 of such an intervention within the 
paradigm of unilateral humanitarian intervention.   
As in cases of government consent, international self-defense actions by third-
party states can amount, in practice, to interventions in support of opposition groups 
involved in a separate armed conflict against the aggressor government.  An example can 





 In the initial stages of operation Enduring Freedom, coalition 
forces de facto supported the Northern Alliance in its armed struggle against the Taliban 
                                                 
4
 The term “legitimate,” as opposed to “legal,” is used here in the generic form, meaning an act that is not 
legal per se but is rather perceived as justified or excused on some other basis. For a theoretical discussion 
of the term “legitimacy” in various context of international law see BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL 
ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Ch. 2 (2001); THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY 
AMONG NATIONS (1990). 
5





 assuming that the latter was indeed the government of Afghanistan, considering 
that it was not recognized by the vast majority of states.
7
  
However, as opposed to government consent, that – as we saw in Chapter 1 – can 
augment controversial self-defense claims against non-state actors,
8
  it seems that support 
granted to opposition groups in the context of self-defense operations does not produce 
the same effect. On the contrary, it can potentially transform an otherwise legal self-
defense action into an unlawful intervention. This is because regime change, assuming it 
is sought by the opposition and supported by the attacking state, is not necessarily a valid 
objective of self-defense actions in light of the jus ad bellum principles of necessity and 
proportionality.  
Nevertheless, the assessment of the relations between self-defense, opposition 
consent and regime change can only be conducted on a case-by-case basis, upon analysis 
of the gravity of the threat posed to the intervener by the attacked regime.
9
 Since this is 
primarily a question of the law of self-defense, we shall not analyze it further here.
10
 
Nonetheless, it should be added that there is potential merit in the claim that like in the 
context of self-defense, not every case of humanitarian intervention – as we shall discuss 
the context later on – warrants regime change.
11
 However, in light of the understanding of 
                                                 
6
 Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, Characterizing U.S. Operations in Pakistan: Is the United States 
Engaged in an Armed Conflict? 34 FORD. INT’L L. J. 151, 179 –180 (2010);  Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting 
and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 85 INT’L L. STUF. SER. U.S. NAVAL WAR COL. 307, 
308–309 (2009). 
7
 The U.N. continuously refused to accept the credentials of the Taliban government upon its taking power 
in 1996. See, e.g., 1996 Y’BOOK U.N. 1482; 2000 Y’BOOK U.N. 1369. 
8
 Sec. I.2. 
9
 For an ethical analysis of regime change and jus ad bellum see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST 
WARS ix –xviii (4
th
 ed., 2006).  
10
 See Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 105 
AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 268 (2011) (addressing the question of regime change within the proportionality 
requirement of the law of self-defense). 
11
 See James Pattison, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L. AFF. 1, 3–4 
(2011). 
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the concept of sovereignty as entailing responsibility, it seems intuitively right that 
contributing to regime change – inter alia through support of the opposition – can be, in 
certain circumstances, more reasonable in cases of internal mass atrocities, than in most 
instances of “pure” inter-state self-defense.  
 
II. GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION: DISTINCTION, INTERACTION AND THE 
BASIC RULE AGAINST THE FORCIBLE SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION GROUPS  
II.1 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 
The legality of any act of consensual forcible support granted to a party recognized by the 
intervener as a government or as an independent state raises an immediate question in the 
field of the law of recognition. If the act of recognition itself is lawful, then the question 
is not one of support to opposition groups – but rather to governments, and should 
thereafter be analyzed according to the presumption in favor of governments. If the 
conflict is one of secession, and the opposition is lawfully recognized as a separate state, 
then the question ceases to be one of internal armed conflict.  
Of course, the problem of government or state recognition is one of the perpetual 
questions of international law. Not less complex is the question of “who decides,” in a 
particular instance, whether a party is indeed the government or is an independent a 
state.
12
 Indeed, absent binding collective mechanisms, recognition is highly prone – as we 
                                                 
12
 It is in this context where the long-standing argument between the declarative and constitutive doctrines 
of recognition takes place. This work will not add to the abundance of scholarship regarding this question. 
For a survey of the constitutive and declaratory doctrines of recognition see See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  2–3, 38–42 (1948); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES 
IN INTERNATIONAL 1–17, 22 –26 (2006); THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES 2 –12 (1999). 
We shall instead adopt, as a given, when using the term “recognition,” the contemporary view that 
recognition has having both declarative and constitutive elements. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 12, at 
23; GRANT, supra note 12, at 19, 71–73. The dual nature of recognition seems especially true considering 
the recent debates on questions of recognition, both in the context of the recognition of Palestine, and in the 
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shall see – to abuse. However, the primary distinction between recognized and non-
recognized entities, in the context of the law on the use of force, remains theoretically 
sound nonetheless. While this postulation merits a study of its own, we will simply 
assume that nowadays, recognition is more likely to be internationally accepted – and in 
particularly in the context of intervention – when conducted through universal or regional 
bodies. For instance, U.N. membership or acceptance of credentials, can serve as acts of 
recognition of enhanced legitimacy;
13
 positions by regional organizations, as we saw in 
the context of the 2011 Gbagbo affair, can also play a substantial role.
14
  
Conversely, any intervention on behalf of a group not fully and completely 
recognized at the time as the lawful government or as a separate state is an intervention 
on behalf of an opposition group. Indeed, this definition provides some conceptual 
clarity. However, as a mirror image of the question of recognition of governments, it 
presents the same practical difficulties. Here, too, the absence of a collective mechanism 
for recognition can result in anomalous situations where recognition is granted to 
opposition groups by certain states but not by others –
15
 as is the case today regarding 
Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
16
 In other instances, such as in the 2011 Libyan 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arab Spring.  See JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST CONFLICT (2010) (making the case that Palestine is a state); but see The Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l 
Crim. Court, Situation in Palestine (Apr. 3, 2012) (asserting that the Prosecutor cannot decide that Palestine 
is a state absent full U.N. membership, or a determination by the Court’s Assembly of State Parties). On 
recognition in the context of the Arab Spring, see next Sections. 
13
 ROTH, supra note 4, at 126. 
14
 Chapter 11, Sec. I.3. 
15
 Compare., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (2005); GRANT, supra note 12, at 19–22. 
Compare LAUTERPACHT, supra note 12, at 53–54 
16
 See, e.g., Rein Müllerson, Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases 
of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 2 (2009).  
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conflict, recognition can be a “rolling” affair, some states being quicker to recognize the 
opposition as the government than others.
17
  
Since we define the “opposition” negatively – meaning, as the party not 
recognized as a government – it is worthwhile to ask whether there are also positive 
criteria for the identification of opposition groups. Essentially, the mere occurrence of an 
internal armed conflict, as defined in Chapter 2, presupposes the existence of “organized 
armed groups.”
18
 The same threshold of “organization” that is used to ascertain whether 
an internal armed conflict exists could thus be used also for the identification of the 
opposition in a certain instance. Of course, the opposition can often consist of fragmented 
groups, constantly shifting alliances and splintering into smaller groups, thereby making 
it impossible to treat it as a unified body capable of expressing any kind of collective 
will. However, in certain instances, loosely aligned opposition groups were relatively 
quick to form quasi-representative bodies, such as the Libyan National Transitional 
Council;
19
 the Syrian National Council, established in September 2011 attempted to play 
the same role, to a lesser degree of success on the ground, at least as of April 2012.
20
 For 
instance, the latter concluded a National Covenant in March 2012, where it laid a vision 
for a free and democratic Syria.
21
 Thus, such bodies purport to represent the general 
                                                 
17
See Section II.2. 
18
 Sec. II. 
19
 Int’l Crisis Group, Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V):Making Sense of Libya 24–
26, ICG Mid. East/North Africa Report No. 107 (Jun. 6, 2011). 
20
 Syrian Opposition Unveils Council Names, B.B.C. NEWS , Sept. 16, 2011, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14929813. In December 2011, the Syrian National Council 
pledged  to unify with other groups and to promote democratic transition. See David Batty, Syrian 
Opposition Groups Unite to Chart Roadmap to Democracy, THE GUARDIAN , Dec. 31, 2011, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/31/syria-opposition-plan-democratic-future. The study of how 
and when organized opposition groups form political wings, or when they enter into political participation, 
is a science in itself. See, e.g., Benedetta Berti, Armed Groups as Political Parties and Their Role in 
Electoral Politics: The Case of Hizballah, 34 STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM 942 (2011). 
21
 National Covenant for a New Syria, Apr. 4, 2012, available at 
http://www.syriancouncil.org/en/issues/item/618-national-covenant-for-a-new-syria.html. 
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interest of the opposition – many times consisting of many groups with different agendas 
– in front of the international community.
22
 As we shall see, if they exercise or seek to 
exercise effective protection of civilians, or are confronting government forces that do 
not do so, the international community might be more willing to engage such opposition 
groups – and perhaps even to recognize them. 
 
II.2 EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND NON-FORCIBLE INTERACTION WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS 
Consistent with our analysis in Chapter 10, the concept of effective protection can trump 
considerations of territorial effective control also in the context of the international 
community’s will to engage with opposition groups prior to official recognition. Here, we 
do not address as of yet the question of forcible intervention on behalf of such groups, but 
merely the interaction with such groups by external parties.  
In a manner reminiscent of – yet differing from – the traditional insurgency 
doctrine,
23
 intermediate situations in which external parties engage opposition groups, on 
different levels, occur also in contemporary practice. For instance, Turkey has maintained 
contact with Syrian opposition groups during the 2011–2012 Syrian uprising
24
 prior to 
official recognition; it moreover cooperated to a certain extent with armed Syrian groups, 
namely the Free Syrian Army.
25
 A similar position was taken by France, admitting that it 
                                                 
22
 For instance, on January 21, 2012, the Syrian National Council requested the League of Arab States to 
refer the Syrian crisis to the U.N. Security Council. See Opposition Urges Arab League to Refer Syria to 
U.N., REUTERS, Jan. 21, 2012, available at 
http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL6E8CL0AH20120121. 
23
 Chapter 6, Sec. III.  
24
 See Peter Harling & Sarah Birke, Beyond the Fall of the Syrian Regime, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND 
INFORMATION (Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022412.  
25
 Dominic Evans, Turkey Holds Talks with Syrian Opposition Council. REUTERS, Oct. 18, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/18/us-syria-idUSTRE79H3VB20111018;   Liam Stack, In Slap at 
Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, available at 
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was “helping” the opposition and “encouraging them to get organized.”
26
 Britain sent a 
special envoy to the Syrian opposition, and other countries urged various Syrian groups 
to cooperate with each other.
27
 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also met the 
Syrian opposition, calling it a “leading and legitimate representative of Syrians seeking a 
peaceful democratic transition”–
28
 a statement short of full recognition but is undoubtedly 
one of support.
29
 The Syrian opposition was also a party to failed Arab League 
reconciliation processes,
30
 and was considered in the 2012 Six-Point peace plan outlined 
by Kofi Annan, acting as a joint envoy of the U.N. and the Arab League.
31
 
 All of these interactions were met with general international acquiescence. 
Indeed, following vetoes exercised by China and Russia in relation to any condemnation 
of the Syrian regime in the Security Council,
32
 many dozens of states participated in anti-
regime summits under the auspices of the “Friends of the Syrian People” framework, 
where the Syrian National Council presented reports regarding the situation on the 
ground, and received recognition “as a legitimate representative of all Syrians.”
33
 The 




 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Russia Stands by Assad as Pressure Mounts on Syria, REUTERS, Nov. 17, 2011, 
available at  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/us-syria-idUSL5E7MD0GZ20111117. 
27
 Syria’s Opposition Gaining Ground, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21541847 
28




 Britain made a similar declaration. See Martin Chulov & Matthew Weaver, Saudi Arabia Backs Arming 
Syrian Opposition, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 24. 2012, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/24/saudi-arabia-backs-arming-syrian-opposition. 
30
 Syria “Violence Defies Peace Deal,” AL-JAZEERA ENGLISH , Nov. 4, 2011, available at 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/11/201111381935847935.html;  
31
 S.C. Prst. 2012/6, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2012/6 (Mar. 21, 2012) (endorsing and outlining the Six Point 
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 See infra, n. 143. 
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 Steven Lee Myers, Nations Press Halt in Attacks to Allow Aid to Syrian Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
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to-pressure-assad.html?ref=todayspaper; Full Text of the Chairman’s Conclusions of  the International 
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Friends’ Group further pledged to set up a Sanctions Working Group to monitor 
sanctions against the regime and, importantly, to grant financial support “to meet the 
needs of the Syrian people,”
34
 which reasonably will be channeled through the Syrian 
opposition. A comparable international reaction took place, as we shall shortly see, 
during the 2011 Libyan conflict. 
In the past – as we have discussed in detail in Part 2 – the rigid belligerency 
doctrine, and to a large extent also the flexible insurgency doctrine, made the interaction 
with opposition groups contingent mainly upon their attainment of a degree of territorial 
effective control. Furthermore, the point of departure underlying these doctrines was, in 
general, one of neutrality between the conflicting parties. However, it seems that 
nowadays the interaction is influenced – once the uprising becomes substantial – 
primarily by considerations of effective protection, shedding the pretense of neutrality or 
“impartiality.” Accordingly, the more that opposition groups are deemed as violators of 
the protection principle, the more the international community might be willing to rely on 
territorially ineffective governments. Conversely, the more a government violates the 
principle of protection, the international community might be more willing to give credit 
to relatively ineffective opposition groups as potential fulfillers of the responsibility to 
protect. In other cases, any substantial positive interaction with opposition groups might 
amount to a violation of the norm of non-intervention.
35
 
In order to exemplify this notion it is revealing to juxtapose the treatment, in 
recent times, of opposition groups in Somalia versus their treatment in Libya. As detailed 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conference of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People ¶4, 10 (Apr. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=749074282. 
34
 Id. ¶¶17–18. 
35
 Chapter 3, Sec. II.2. 
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in Chapter 9, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia has retained its 
international recognition, including in the context of consent power, although it barely 
controls any territory. It has received the forcible support of Ethiopia 2006, and again in 
late 2011, when it also received the support of Kenya;
36
 likewise, the Security Council 
has emphasized it support to the Transitional Government in many resolutions. 
Conversely, the opposing Al-Shabaab militia, accused of links with Al-Qa’ida and of 
obstructing humanitarian aid, has not, in general, received any intermediate recognition 
by the international community – despite controlling vast parts of Somalia. Furthermore, 




Regarding the 2011 Libyan conflict, the reaction has been the exact opposite. 
First, many states have engaged the Libyan opposition, prior to full recognition, as 
legitimate “political interlocutors” with which dialogue can be conducted.
38
 For instance, 
in March 2011, the U.S. appointed a Liaison to the Libyan rebels, in order to “determine 
how the United States could help them.”
39
 This approach is reminiscent of the flexible 
insurgency doctrine, except for the significant fact that it reflects a blunt preference of the 
opposition, on substantive grounds rather than on counts of territorial effectiveness.  
Second, the intermediate status of the Libyan opposition can be demonstrated in 
the extremely unusual circumstances of the Security Council debate of February 26, 
                                                 
36
 Chapter 1, Sec. I.2; Jeffery Gettleman, Ethiopian Troops Said to Enter Somalia, Opening New Front 
Against Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, available at 
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 On these dynamics regarding Somalia see Chapter 9, section II.4; Chapter 10, section II.4; Chapter 1, 
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 See Stefan Talmon, Recognition of the Libyan Transitional Council, 15 AM. SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Jun. 
16, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110616.cfm. 
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 Helene Cooper, U.S. to Name a Liaison to Libyan Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, available at 
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2011, which surprisingly were not heavily discussed.
40
 In mid-February 2011, protests 
against the Al-Qadhafi regime erupted, spreading to the west of the country from the 
eastern city of Benghazi.
41
 As the regime responded forcefully, key Libyan diplomats 
resigned or sided with the opposition. On February 21
st
, Libya’s deputy ambassador to 
the U.N. called for Al-Qadhafi’s resignation, proclaiming that the delegation serves the 
Libyan people, and not the regime.
42
 So did Libya’s delegations to the U.N. Human 
Rights Council and the Arab League.
43
 On February 25, the same “former” representative 
of Libya, appearing in the Security Council, appealed for support, calling for a “swift, 
decisive and courageous resolution.”
44
 A day later, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1970, recalling “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its 
population,” imposing sanctions and referring the situation to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court.
45
 As the resolution imposed an arms embargo on Libya, it a 




Significantly, the resolution – and the circumstances of its adoption – exemplifies 
the international readiness to interact with opposition groups, in instances where the 
government violates the principle of protection. Accordingly, although the Libyan 
                                                 
40
 See, in this context, Eliav Lieblich, Consensual Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, in THE 
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 Libyan U.N. Diplomats: Al-Qadhafi Should Resign C.B.S. NEWS, 21 Feb., 
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 mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV/6490 (Feb. 25, 2011). 
45
 S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
46
 See U.N. Charter art. 2(5). 
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delegation ceased to represent the Al-Qadhafi regime, the Resolution noted the letter of 
the Permanent Representative of Libya, in which he expressed support for Security 
Council action.
47
 In his statements, the representative of Libya thanked the Council for 
the resolution and commended it as a “sincere attempt to protect civilians.” He expressed 
confidence that it will bring “a definite end to the fascist regime that is still in place in 
Tripoli;” he also called on the Libyan armed forces to abandon Al-Qadhafi.
48
  
Although resolution 1970 did not yet authorise a forcible intervention – this 
happened in resolution 1973, adopted a few weeks later, which led, in practice, to Al-
Qadhafi’s ouster –
49
 it demonstrates that in cases of loss of effective protection, support 
by those opposing the regime can affect the decision-making process in the Council. This 
notion was reflected in statements by several Council members. While China referred 
laconically to the “special situation in Libya” as grounds for its support for the 
resolution,
50
 other states were less ambiguous. India stated that the position of the Libyan 
delegation “strengthened” its support for the resolution.
51
 Nigeria declared that the 
Libyan delegation’s stance and the “cries of help of the Libyan people” persuaded it to 
vote positively.
52
 Brazil stated that it gave “due regard” to the requests by the 
delegation.
53
 South Africa and France went further. The former declared that the Council 
“responded swiftly and resolutely” to the call of the Libyan delegation.
54
 France 
welcomed the fact that the Council has “unanimously and forcefully responded” to the 
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appeal by the Libyan representative.
55
 It is inconceivable that the members of the Council 
were not fully aware of the peculiar situation. It is equally implausible that they were 
willingly engaged in a joint violation of international law, in such a public international 
forum. There can thus be little doubt that the failure of the Al-Qadhafi regime to 
effectively protect its civilians resulted in some de facto status granted to the opposition 
in front of the Council; this was true although the Al-Qadhafi regime was still considered 
by the Council as the “authority” in Libya, and the credentials of the Libyan National 
Transitional Council were accepted by the General Assembly only months later.
56
  
Indeed, the decision of the international community to interact with opposition 
groups, without recognizing them as governments, cannot in itself grant them the power 
to consent to forcible intervention. However, from the case of Libya we can learn two 
main things: first, that opposition consent can play a role in Security Council 
considerations; and second, that protection of civilians plays a prominent role in the will 
of states to deal with the opposition in specific instances.  
 
II.3 THE BASIC RULE: FORCIBLE INTERVENTION IN FAVOR OF OPPOSITION GROUPS AS AN 
UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE 
As evident from the prohibition on the use of force as entrenched in Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter, and as was ruled in the Nicaragua case,
57
 any unilateral intervention in an 
internal armed conflict justified strictly on counts of opposition consent – and absent a 
credible self-defense claim by the intervener – is a prima facie violation of the norm of 




 G.A. Res. 66/1A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/1A (Sep. 16, 2011). 
57
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non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force. Accordingly, The Declaration on 
Friendly Relations proclaims that –  
 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or 
terrorist acts in another State or in organized activities 
within its territory directed towards the commission of such 
acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph 




The Declaration further declares that “no State shall organize, assist, foment, 
finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the 
violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another 
State.”
59
 Additionally, Article 3(g) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression – reflecting 
customary international law – defines as aggression indirect forcible intervention in the 
form of “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as 
to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”
60
 The same 
formula has been adopted in the 2010 Kampala definition of the crime of aggression.
61
 
However, the nature of the prohibition on support to opposition groups has not 
always been entirely clear. As we saw in Chapter 11, the era of decolonization ushered a 
robust debate regarding the scope and implications of the principle of self-determination, 
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and its relation to the law on the use of force. A product of this era, Article 7 of the 




Nothing in this Definition … could in any way prejudice 
the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, 
as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of 
that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial 
and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor 
the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek 
and receive support, in accordance with the principles of 






Presumably, then, the Definition allows for the provision of positive support to 
opposition groups, in the circumstances enumerated. An analysis of the Article reveals 
that these circumstances encompass struggles against three distinct (but potentially 
overlapping) forms of oppression: colonial regimes, racist regimes, and “other forms” of 
alien domination.
63
 Two of these scenarios refer to instances which are expressly matters 
of international conflict, and therefore not of our concern; the third, conversely, could 
theoretically extend also to certain internal situations. Indeed, as we saw have seen, anti-
colonial struggles have been excluded from the realm of internal strife, and in any case of 
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are of less contemporary significance.
64
 Cases of “alien domination,” by their nature, also 
cannot be considered as internal issues.
65
 The third instance, however, refers to “racist 
regimes,” a term that can include regimes that are not colonialist or alien, but are still 
“racist” – the main relevant example being Apartheid South Africa. In essence, then, of 
the three scenarios mentioned in Article 7, struggles against “racist regimes” could 
theoretically fall within the paradigm of internal armed conflicts. In such instances, 
Article 7 can be construed as recognizing that opposition forces, in internal conflicts 
against racist regimes, are entitled to seek and receive support. In this sense, the Article 
represents a move towards substantive analysis of opposition groups, permitting their 
support on counts of the nature of their struggle.  
However, much like the Declaration of Friendly relations, the Definition of 
Aggression is an ambiguous document. A typical document of the cold-war era U.N., its 
adoption by consensus required a high degree of normative vagueness that 
accommodated the conflicting interpretations of the rivaling blocs.
66
 Accordingly, Article 
7 does not explicitly refer to the right of peoples to use force, but rather to their 
“struggles,” thereby alleviating the concerns of some states that it would be perceived as 
recognizing a positive right to engage in armed resistance.
67
 Moreover, as the Definition 
of Aggression subjects itself both to the Declaration of Friendly Relations and to the 
principles of the U.N. Charter, the scope of any putative right of peoples to “seek” and 
“receive” support is rather unclear, and in particular with regards to the power to request 
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forcible intervention. In light of the supremacy of the jus cogens prohibition on the use of 
force, the correct interpretation of the Article would be that at least to the extent that it 
encompasses situations that could be qualified as “internal” – i.e., racist regimes –  any 
right to seek and receive support would have been limited to non-forcible measures.
68
 
In the circumstances of the post-colonial international system, the significance 
and controversy surrounding Article 7 is of less importance.
69
 Notably, the Article does 
not at all refer to one of the most burning issues of the contemporary system – the 
protection of civilians, and whether mass atrocities are could affect, in anyway, the power 
to consent to and receive forcible assistance. 
  
III. CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION AND RECOGNITION  
III.1 STATE RECOGNITION, REMEDIAL SECESSION AND REMEDIAL INTERVENTION 
As discussed in Chapter 11, the question of remedial secession remains controversial in 
international law. Naturally, if we do not accept the existence of such right to begin with, 
it is obvious that a mere claim for secession cannot alter the opposition’s lack of capacity 
to request and receive support from third parties. However, if we do accept the 
plausibility of remedial secession, does it follow that the seceding-seeking party also 
attains the right of “remedial forcible intervention”?  
The answer is rather simple, at least in legal-theoretical terms. It involves a two-
stepped approach, requiring first to address the issue as a question of state-recognition; 
                                                 
68
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and in the second stage, as a case of collective self-defense. Indeed, the remedy offered 
by the doctrine of remedial secession is the recognition of the seceding party as a state, 
and not unilateral forcible intervention on its behalf.
70
 After such recognition is granted, 
however, the conflict is no longer one between a “government” and “opposition” groups, 
but rather one between two states. In this stage, it can be looked upon as an international 
armed conflict, in which the seceding state, if attacked by the rump-state, can invoke the 
right of collective-self defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
71
 In such 
cases, the right of the seceding state to request forcible support is not controlled by the 
principle of government preference, but rather by the jus ad bellum law of self-defense.  
This analysis naturally raises acute questions regarding the law of state 
recognition. Of course, as in questions of recognition at large, the absence of a collective 
recognition mechanism is prone to abuse, during secession struggles, by interested 
external parties. For instance, on August 26, 2008, Russia has unilaterally recognized 
secession-seeking Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s as states independent from Georgia, 
shortly after Russian forces invaded the breakaway territories.
72
 In addition to justifying 
its initial operations in Georgia as self-defense actions
73
 – a claim partially vindicated by 
a fact-finding mission – Russia based its recognition of the breakaway territories on 
counts of remedial-secession. Thus, it argued that –   
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Constantly trying to use brutal military force against the 
very ethnic groups whom he purportedly wanted to see as a 
part of his state, [Georgian President] Mr. Saakashvili left 
them with no other choice but to seek ways to ensure their 
security and the right to self-determination as independent 
nations. In this respect the Decrees issued by President 
Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation recognising 
Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence offered the 
only opportunity to save the lives of people and prevent 




After its recognition of the breakaway territories, Russia has proceeded to justify 
its operations on counts of the right of collective self-defense.
75
 Whatever the legal merits 
of the Russian position in this context – and considering these were rejected by the fact-
finding mission –
76
 the dynamics of the Russia-Georgia conflict clearly represent the 
dangers of unilateral state-recognition granted as a pretext for intervention justified 
thereafter on counts of collective self-defense. However, these “secondary” concerns in 
themselves do not challenge the “primary” theoretical soundness of such claims, should 
we accept the doctrine of remedial secession. Recent practice, in particular the robust 
involvement of regional organizations in internal conflicts and the general international 
deference to their views, can potentially alleviate these concerns.
77
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In any case, as regarding government and belligerency recognition, the traditional 
law of state recognition is based on standards of effective control, as provided for in 
Article I of the Montevideo Convention of 1933. In order to be considered a state – the 
controversy regarding the constitutive versus declarative approaches notwithstanding –
78
  
the entity had to possess a permanent population; a defined territory; a government; and 
the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
79
  
However, the mere idea of remedial secession presupposes the possibility of a 
substantive analysis of the parties, since it connotes a right of secession independent from 
considerations of effective control, namely the protection of civilians. For instance, if we 
consider the Kosovo case as an example of remedial secession, we must agree that the 
existence or inexistence of territorial effective control in the hands of the Kosovar 
authorities was not a dominant consideration in the eyes of the international community. 
In fact, neither the opponents nor the proponents of Kosovo’s statehood, regardless of 
their stance regarding its precedential value, referred explicitly to territorial effectiveness 
as a justification for their positions.
80
  
In a similar vein, the principle of territorial integrity – which in general serves to 
curtail the possibility of secession – must presuppose that secession does not connote 
automatic recognition even in cases where the seceding party fulfills the Montevideo 
criteria. Otherwise, the principle of territorial integrity would be rendered utterly 
meaningless. We can see this tendency in the case of Somaliland: while that breakaway 
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 mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5839 (Feb. 18, 2008) (the positions of states in the 
Security Council debate following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence).   
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territory of Somalia generally fulfills the traditional Montevideo conditions for 
statehood,
81
 as of April 2012 Somaliland was not officially and fully recognized by any 
state. Instead, the international community has opted to continue the recognition of 
Somalia in its previous borders, administered through completely ineffective transitional 
governments. Western powers, in general, are reluctant to extend recognition to 
Somaliland before the African Union takes such a step; the latter has neither accepted nor 
rejected a formal request of recognition by Somaliland, submitted in December 2005, 
despite an overall favorable report by its fact-finding mission regarding this matter.
82
  
It is obvious, then, that the Montevideo criteria do not reflect the complex 
balancing of interests required to address the question of secession: in regular struggles 
for secession, the principle of territorial integrity seems to trump the Montevideo 
effectiveness criteria; if, conversely, one adopts the doctrine of remedial secession, then 
the guiding principle for recognition must be the protection of civilians – since that 
principle forms the basis of the doctrine to begin with.  
Nevertheless, even if we do accept the doctrine of remedial secession in principle, 
when states intervene in favor of a secession-seeking party prior to full and official state 
recognition, as was the case in Kosovo, or when recognition is merely a pretext for 
intervention – as was in the Russia-Georgia conflict – then the intervention is a prima 
facie violation of the prohibition on the use of force. If justified on humanitarian grounds, 
then the discussion falls within the ambit of the humanitarian intervention question, 
which we will address in section IV.  
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III.2 RECOGNITION OF THE OPPOSITION AS THE GOVERNMENT 
As discussed in Section II.1, once opposition groups are recognized as governments, any 
consent they grant must be analyzed according to the presumption in favor of 
governments. The question of government recognition differs from state recognition in 
secession struggles, since the former does not challenge directly the principle of 
territorial integrity, as does the latter. However, despite this difference and others, the two 
are similar in two main aspects: both spheres of recognition traditionally rely on criteria 
of territorial effectiveness;
83
 and regarding both there is an inherent potential for abuse 
emanating from the absence of collective recognition mechanisms. This danger has been 
consistent throughout the decades, as government recognition was granted or otherwise 
manipulated as pretext for forcible interventions. This was definitely the case of the 1936 
recognition of the Franco regime as the government of Spain by Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy;
84
 possibly with regards to the 1962 Egyptian recognition granted to the 
ineffective Yemen Arab Republic;
85
 and arguably in the case of the 1983 American 
reliance on the invitation of Grenada’s Governor General as one justification for its 
intervention there.
86
 This potential for abuse persists also in present times.  
In any case, traditionally, opposition groups that managed to wield “effective 
power, with a reasonable prospect of permanency, over the whole – or practically the 
whole – territory of the State” were seen as entitled to recognition.
87
 Thus, as long as the 
conflict was in progress, their recognition as governments was perceived as contrary to 
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 Like in the context of state recognition, this test was not concerned 
with the level or type of violence used by the entity in order to achieve and secure its 
control.
89
 Nor, in general, was the consent of the governed a necessary condition for 
recognition – although some, such as Lauterpacht, viewed such consent as an indication 
that effective control indeed exists.
90
  
Indeed, the question of recognition of insurgents as governments has troubled 
international lawyers for centuries. Lauterpacht, for instance, perhaps seeking to 
reconcile between the general principle of non-recognition, state practice and the 
jurisprudence of British Courts in the context of the Spanish Civil War, set forth an 
intricate theory of de facto versus de jure recognition. According to this theory, 
opposition groups could be granted de facto recognition as the governments of the 
territories they control, but as long as the conflict continued, they could not be recognized 
as the de jure government.
91
  
Whatever the surviving merits of this distinction –
92
 and without embarking on an 
attempt to apply it in the contemporary international system – it is obvious that for 
recognition of opposition groups to result in the materialization of consent power, it must 
be full and complete; any act short of recognizing the opposition as the sole entity that 
speaks for the state, accepting thereby all legal and political consequences that such 
recognition entails,
93
 will render any forcible support given to it – whether through direct 
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In any case, the movement away from strict territorial effectiveness approaches in 
the context of state recognition must also inform the debate about the recognition of 
governments. We have discussed above the competing principles of territorial integrity 
and remedial secession as two non-effectiveness based notions relating to the question of 
secession. Likewise, with regards to recognition of new states – most notably during the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. – a host of substantive criteria for recognition 
has emerged. For instance, the European Communities’ Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union
95
 provided a substantive 
framework for the recognition of new states. By demonstrating a movement away from a 
formal, effectiveness based process of recognition to a value-based assessment, the 
Guidelines reflected a significant reform in traditional recognition law.
96
 The Guidelines 
maintained that the E.C. will adhere to “normal standards of international practice” 
concerning recognition, but set forth additional conditions – relating to the principles of 
self-determination; democracy; respect for the U.N. Charter; minority rights; territorial 
integrity; and non-aggression.  
Taking this development into consideration, it is unreasonable that the decline in 
the status of effectiveness as the sole criteria for recognition in the context of new states 
does not also trickle to the recognition of new governments, emerging from internal 
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 This is true although several states have adopted, in recent times, a formal – and 




Indeed, the question of recognition of governments emerging from internal armed 
conflicts merits an entire study for itself. Notably, some scholars identify a recent 
tendency to shy away from robust ideological criteria, as these were presented, for 
instance, in the E.C. Guidelines. However, this trend does not connote a return to strict 
criteria of territorial effectiveness, but rather the predominance of narrow substantive 
criteria that correlate more or less with the principle of protection.
99
  
In this context, we shall only point out two general directions. The first is the 
widespread recognition of ineffective transitional governments established pursuant to 
multilateral reconciliation or reconstruction processes – the continuing recognition of the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia being the quintessential example.
100
 Such 
governments receive credit on counts of their perceived potential to reconcile internal 
differences – in a multilateral way and through engagement with the international 
community – in order to bring stability and to end mass atrocities.  
The second direction spawns from the perception of effective protection as a key 
determinant of sovereignty. Whether it will ultimately result in a wide transformation of 
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the international law of government recognition during internal strife remains to be seen; 
however, it is undoubtedly a logical corollary of the idea of RtoP. Namely, the concept of 
effective protection can challenge the traditional, effective-control based perception, 
according to which the opposition cannot be recognized as long as the conflict endures. 
Recent events in Libya demonstrate this notion. In contrast to Somalia,
101
 Libya was by 
no means a failed-state when the uprising against the Al-Qadhafi regime erupted. 
However, the regime’s violations of the protection principle have rather swiftly resulted 
in the gradual recognition of the Libyan opposition.  
Thus, the opposing National Transitional Council (NTC) has been recognized by 
several states as the “legitimate representative” of Libya or the Libyan people, long 
before it even showed minimal prospects of defeating the regime in battle. France became 
the first state to recognize the NTC as the “legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people” on March 10, 2011, only weeks after the conflict erupted, and more than seven 
months before the conflict’s conclusion.
102
 Italy went further, in April 2011, by 
recognizing the NTC “as the country’s only legitimate interlocutor on bilateral 
relations;”
103
 Qatar and Kuwait issued similar statements.
104
 Whether these statements 
amounted to full de jure recognition is highly doubtful.
105
 However, they clearly reflected 
a movement towards the assessment of the rights of opposition parties according to the 
concept of protection of civilians.  
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Soon enough, the intentions of key members of the international community 
became clearer. In June 7, 2011, France “upgraded” the status of the NTC by labeling it 
as “the only holder of governmental authority in the contacts between France and Libya 
and its related entities;” The United Arab Emirates did the same.
106
 On July 15, following 
a meeting in Istanbul, 32 Western and Arab States (the Libya Contact Group) granted the 
NTC full recognition as the government of Libya, thus allowing it, in principle, to access 
the frozen assets of the regime.
107
 In its statement, the Contact Group asserted that “the 
Al-Qadhafi regime no longer has any legitimate authority in Libya … Henceforth and 
until an interim authority is in place, participants agreed to deal with the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate governing authority in Libya.”
108
 
Significantly, the recognition was granted over three months before the NTC would 
establish a reasonable measure of effective authority over the state’s territory – and by 




The dynamics of recognition in the Libyan conflict, as reflected in the Contact 
Group’s statement concerning the regime’s loss of “legitimate authority” – and the 
subsequent recognition of the yet ineffective NTC – arguably represent an application of 
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the principle of effective protection in the context of government recognition.
110
 This can 
indeed be a significant development in the law of recognition; the coming years will tell 
whether it will solidify as a leading doctrine.    
In any case, it is important to emphasize that in the Libyan crisis forcible 
intervention was mandated by a Security Council resolution.
111
 Notwithstanding our 
claim that in such cases opposition consent can play a role in the Council’s 
considerations,
112
 it is still yet to be seen whether the unilateral recognition of opposition 
groups as governments, on counts of considerations of civilian protection, will be 
accepted as legitimate justifications for consensual interventions on their behalf, absent 
Council authorization. Considering the potential of abuse inherent in such dynamics, as 
discussed above, it should at least be required that such recognition will be granted 
through credible multilateral mechanisms and by a substantial number of states. In other 
cases, the recognition and subsequent intervention might be deemed unlawful, and will 
therefore be analyzed through the prism of unilateral humanitarian intervention – which 
we will now turn to consider. 
    
IV. CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION AND UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
IV.1 UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RTOP: THE UNRESOLVED DEBATE 
The debate over the problem of forcible intervention in internal strife has been 
dominated, in the past two decades – and most notably before the events of September 
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, 2001 – by the dilemma of unilateral humanitarian intervention.
113
 The term 
“humanitarian intervention,” as suggested by Holzgrefe, connotes “the threat or use of 
force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending 
widespread and grave violations of fundamental human rights of individuals” without the 
consent of the target-state.
114
 Furthermore, when the term is used in this work, it refers 
specifically to situations in which the intervention has been conducted unilaterally, 
meaning, without Security Council authorization.
115
  
As such, our use of the term is rather narrow, since it does not encompass every 
intervention conducted for humanitarian purposes, but only those unauthorized by the 
Security Council and conducted against the will of the target-state’s government. Our 
definition thus refers to the scenarios such as the famous 1999 Kosovo intervention, and 
excludes, for instance, the 2011 intervention in Libya. Other frequently cited cases of 
unilateral humanitarian interventions are India’s 1971 intervention in East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh); Vietnam’s actions against the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (1978); 
Tanzania’s ousting of Idi Amin in Uganda (1979); or the 1991 allied operations in 
Northern Iraq following the regime’s repression of the Kurds.
116
  
Since we have elaborated, in previous chapters, on the principle of protection and 
RtoP, some conceptual clarification is merited. Humanitarian intervention and RtoP, 
ideally, set out to defend the same values – namely, the protection of civilians facing 
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mass atrocities. However, RtoP has developed in the backdrop of the massive controversy 




The ICISS Report sought to diffuse this controversy both on the terminological 
and the substantive levels. On the former level, the Report candidly admitted that it 
deliberately avoided the use of the term “humanitarian intervention,” although some 
aspects of RtoP, as reflected in the Report, are not far removed from the concept.
118
 On 
the substantive level, by extending RtoP also to the responsibility to prevent and 
rebuild,
119
 ICISS successfully diluted the idea’s forcible component, thereby presenting a 




Furthermore, RtoP shifted the discussion from the “right” of humanitarian 
intervention to the more executive-leaning, principled concept of “responsibility,” which 
better addresses, at least in theoretical terms, the concerns of small states fearing that the 
concept will be exploited by great powers.
121
 Doing so, ICISS rephrased and developed 
the controversial concept of unilateral humanitarian intervention, accommodating it 
within a wider framework.
122
 These terminological and substantive developments made it 
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easier, in turn, for ICISS to issue an implied challenge the Security Council’s monopoly 
over the use of force, as detailed elsewhere in this work.
123
  
However, it soon became evident that RtoP will not be accepted worldwide if it 
would imply – even indirectly – that unilateral humanitarian intervention can be 
acceptable. This accounts for the transformation of RtoP from its initial form, as found in 
the ICISS report, to the narrower concept reflected in the 2005 WSO document. As 
opposed to the ICISS report, the WSO document unequivocally reaffirmed the Security 
Council’s monopoly over the authorization of forcible interventions.
124
 Thus, while 
resolving, to a large extent, the longstanding question whether the Security Council is 
mandated to act with regards to strictly internal situations,
125
 the WSO document did not 
address the consequences of a failure to act by the Council. Therefore, the old debate 
regarding unilateral humanitarian intervention is very much kept alive, even in the RtoP 
era. This realization compels us to revisit some of the well-recognized dilemmas of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, and – in our context – their relation to the question 
of consent.  
 
IV.2 INTRA-CHARTER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE 
QUESTION OF CONSENT 
Humanitarian intervention cannot – ipso facto – be a consensual intervention in favor of 
governments;
126
 theoretically, thus, it can be considered an intervention pursued with 
                                                 
123
 See id. Sec. II.1. 
124
 Id.; see also Welsh, supra note 20, at 2; 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶138–139, U.N. 
Doc. A/60/L.1 (Sept. 15 2005). 
125
 See id. Sec. II.2; see also the discussion in Holzgrefe, supra note 114, at 40–43.  
126
 See, e.g.,THE INDEPENDENT INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 193 (2000). 
 
 416 
opposition consent. The nexus between humanitarian and consensual intervention is a 
rather uncharted area of international law. Indeed, our approach towards this question is 
necessarily informed by our perception regarding unilateral humanitarian intervention at 
large. If we categorically reject – whether on legal or ethical terms – any extra-Charter 
forcible intervention conducted without government consent, then, of course, consent by 
opposition groups cannot play any legalizing or legitimizing role in the assessment of an 
intervention. If, however, we do accept that unilateral humanitarian intervention can be 
permissible in extreme situations, then our approach towards the effects of opposition 
consent depends on the legal or ethical basis upon which we ground our justification for 
humanitarian intervention. In particular, the answer depends on whether we base our 
justification on intra or extra-Charter sources.     
Humanitarian intervention raises numerous ethical questions. It can be justified or 
rejected on utilitarian grounds, as classically reflected in the works of Mill or Bernard.
127
 
It can be based on cosmopolitan claims – whether founded on natural law or on principles 
of social-contractarianism – that might spawn a “right” or “duty” of humanitarian 
intervention in extreme circumstances.
128
 Legally, the concept of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention challenges the plain language of the prohibition on the use of force as 
entrenched in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. However, attempts have been made to 
counter this challenge in two main ways. The first recognizes intra-Charter justifications 
for unilateral humanitarian intervention, by interpreting the Charter as accommodating 
                                                 
127
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 The second set of justifications concedes that the U.N. Charter prohibits 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, and therefore seeks extra-Charter or extra-legal  
sources for justification. 
Simply put, the intra-Charter approach posits that Article 2(4), by prohibiting the 
use of force against the “territorial integrity and political independence of states,” is 
actually meant to permit other types of forcible actions, meaning – those not conducted 
against the territorial integrity or independence of states.
130
 Moreover, this approach 
constructs the Article’s phrasing – “or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations” – as allowing interventions which are supposedly consistent with 
the purposes of the organization, such as those aimed to halt atrocities and promote 
human rights.
131
 Another intra-Charter justification presents a hybrid claim: arguing that 
even if Article 2(4) cannot be construed to allow humanitarian intervention in itself, once 
the Security Council has recognized, in general, that a certain situation constitutes a 
threat to international peace – there is no need for another resolution specifically 
authorizing the use of force.
132
  
Nonetheless, attempts to find intra-Charter justifications for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention are not convincing, and indeed, most international lawyers – 
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and indeed many states – object to such constructions.
133
 The U.N. Charter, as any treaty, 
is to be interpreted in light of its “object and purpose,” supplemented, inter alia, by the 
circumstances of its conclusion.
134
 It suffices to say that the stated purpose of the U.N. to 
“maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures”
135
 places an extremely heavy onus on those who argue for the Charter’s 
interpretation as condoning unilateral forcible intervention. In addition, the context of the 
drafting of the Charter, in particular in light of the failed earlier attempts to restrict the 
war power of states,
136
 establishes a strong interpretive presumption against any unilateral 
use of force.
137
 This must be true also with regards to the interpretation of Security 
Council resolutions. For this reaspm, Charter law cannot be interpreted as recognizing an 
implicit authorization for the use of force, merely upon the general recognition by the 
Security Council that a situation amounts to a threat to international peace.
138
 However, 
such previous determination by the Council might still assist the intervener if invoking a 
claim of necessity – as the concept will be discussed shortly.  
The objections above notwithstanding, if one does accept the intra-Charter 
justifications – opposition consent could augment the legality of an intervention in 
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specific instances. Thus, consent by forces opposing atrocities – in particular in cases in 
which they have formed relatively credible transitional entities – could indicate that the 
intervention is in fact not aimed against the territorial integrity or independence of the 
target state, nor contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. In particular, consent 
from a credible internal entity – which seeks to fulfill the responsibility to protect – can 
fortify a claim that the intervention seeks to promote the U.N.’s purpose to encourage 




In a similar vein, as the discussion of humanitarian intervention has shifted from a 
“rights” based discourse to notions of executive “responsibility,” deliberation with groups 
representing the victimized population, prior to the intervention, can carry some weight – 
perhaps comparable to a process of “fair hearing” – in placing the intervention within the 
(widely interpreted) Charter paradigm. As in any case of unilateral forcible intervention, 
these assumptions would be fortified when the intervention is conducted within the 
framework of a regional organization – assuming that the collective decision-making 
process, coupled with the deeper understanding of the conflict by neighboring states, 




IV.3 EXTRA-CHARTER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: NECESSITY, 
JUST WAR THEORY AND CONSENT  
Although the purposes of the U.N. Charter seem to preclude unilateral humanitarian 
interventions, the same purposes can hardly be reconciled with the capricious use of the 
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veto power enjoyed by permanent Council members, which can block any collective 
action envisioned in Article 1 of the Charter.
141
 This problem still remains, although the 
deadlock days of the cold-war are long gone.
142
 A recent example could be found in the 
failure of the Security Council, as of April 2012, to adopt a binding resolution 
condemning the Syrian regime in the context of its violent suppression of Arab Spring 
protests, let alone to impose sanctions on it.
143
 Instead, the Council played “second-
fiddle” to other bodies, by resorting to rather non-committal, non-binding presidential 
statements endorsing their actions.
144
  
The “capricious veto” problem leads to an unbearable tension between the 
Charter’s stated purposes and the procedures set forth for their implementation. Indeed, 
even those that generally do not accept the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
recognize this deficiency, and sometimes argue for necessary revisions of the U.N. 
Charter.
145
 This tension underlines much of the discussion of humanitarian intervention 
and the U.N. Charter, and has accordingly given rise to the second set of justifications for 
humanitarian intervention – extra-Charter ones.  
As suggested by Buchanan, extra-Charter justifications for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention can be classified under three distinct categories: one relies on 
fundamental legal principles beyond the Charter’s provisions (the “Lawfulness 
Justification.”) A second approach views humanitarian interventions as illegal actions 
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undertaken in order to reform positive international law (the “Illegal Legal Reform 
Justification.”) This can be potentially done in two ways. One is the establishment, 
through conclusion of new treaties, of an alternative collective intervention 
mechanism.
146
 Proponents of this idea envision some version of a benevolent “league of 
democracies,” acting in parallel to the U.N. system in order to halt mass atrocities.
147
 
Arguably, the member states of the African Union have done just that – albeit in a 
regional context, and not based on “democracy” per se – when adopting Article 4(h) of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
148
 Another suggested way to push for legal 
reform would be through contrary state practice designed to create new customary 
international law, more amenable to humanitarian intervention.
149
   
Both the “Lawfulness” and the “Illegal Legal Reform” justifications are fraught 
with difficulties. In general, their focus on “general principles” or on state practice as 
potentially affecting the application of the prohibition on the use of force does not 
attribute sufficient weight to the jus cogens nature of the norm.
150
 Whether peremptory 
jus cogens norms are special cases of customary international law or manifestations of 
“natural” law,
151
 it is clear that in contemporary law, such norms – and specifically those 
entrenched in the U.N. Charter – cannot be circumvented simply by reference to other 
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basic principles. Nor can they be altered merely through the regular creation of new 
customary law.
152
 This “normative pyramid” correlates with the process of 
“constitutionalization” of international law at large – and of the U.N. Charter, namely 
through Article 103 –
153
 and the related decline of the perception of international law as a 
product of state consent only.
154
 Indeed, any argument condoning the modification of the 
prohibition on the use of force through contrary practice – even for humanitarian 
purposes – might open the door to additional “customary” challenges to the mere 
prohibition itself.  
Regarding the possibility of legal reform through alternative collective 
mechanisms, we have already addressed, in Chapter 10, the potential challenge to the 
U.N. system manifested in regional (or other) forward-looking intervention treaties. We 
have suggested that in cases of mass atrocities, in which a government ceases to exercise 
effective protection, it will lose the sovereign power to withdraw the state’s previously 
given consent. In this sense, we have reconciled, to an extent, between such treaties and 
Charter law, since our construction mitigates the conflict between these arrangements and 
Article 103 of the Charter, as well as with peremptory norms of jus cogens.
155
 However, 
our analysis of forward-looking intervention treaties relies on the existence of an initial 
expression of consent by the target state. As such, our attempt at reconciliation cannot 
serve to justify intervention – reminiscent, perhaps, of the NATO operation in Kosovo – 
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conducted by a hypothetical “league of democracies” against a state which was never a 
member in the alternative arrangement to begin with. 
The third set of justifications suggested by Buchanan is based on the concept of 
“necessity:” accepting the prima facie illegality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, 
but asserting nevertheless that in extreme situations, basic ethical values can legitimize 
the violation of the prohibition on the use of force. This notion correlates with the 
“illegal, yet legitimate” paradigm, as famously advanced by the International 
Commission on Kosovo.
156
 Necessity claims can be either “soft” or “hard.”  
“Soft” claims point to necessity exceptions found in positive law, and therefore do not 
challenge the rule from a meta-legal point of view.
157
 Without exhausting the possible 
theoretical debate on this comparison, such claims may reflect an internationalized 
version of the domestic criminal law defense of “necessity” – commonly understood as 
justifying an otherwise unlawful act –
158
 or allude to like norms from within the 
international law of state-responsibility. “Hard” necessity claims, conversely, are based 
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on ethical principles, independent from any legal instrument recognizing or excluding 
such exceptions.  
Considering the difficulties with other categories of extra-Charter justifications, it 
seems that the “necessity” paradigm is the most coherent manner to discuss extra-Charter 
humanitarian intervention. However, this by no means implies that the necessity 
exception is without its own difficulties. For one, in positive international law, “soft” 
doctrines of necessity are an extremely shaky ground upon which to base unilateral non-
defensive uses of force.
159
 While the Articles on State Responsibility, in Article 25, 
recognize situations of “necessity” as precluding the wrongfulness of an act, the doctrine 
is manifestly narrow. It requires that the act be the “only way” to safeguard an “essential 
interest against a grave and imminent peril” and that it will not “seriously impair” an 
essential interest of the target state or the “international community as a whole.”
160
 The 
doctrine is further qualified by the condition that necessity cannot be invoked if the 
specific international obligation excludes that possibility.
161
  
Last, Article 26 expressly provides that necessity cannot justify acts that are 
contrary to peremptory norms of jus cogens.
162
 Since the prohibition on the unilateral use 
of force is widely accepted as such a norm, it seems that recourse to the necessity 
doctrine cannot legally justify unilateral humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the 
Commentaries on the Articles on State Responsibility concede that the question of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention cannot find its solution under Article 25, and while 
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“necessity” considerations might still “have a role” regarding this problem in general, the 
required balance is already “taken into account” within the primary obligations of the law 
on the use of force.
163
   
However, the “illegal but legitimate” paradigm is situated on the seam between 
questions of law and morality.
164
 Recognizing that law and morality are not one,
165
 we 
must also evaluate the question through the prism of “hard” necessity. Indeed, the 
question of moral necessity is first and foremost a subject for the political philosopher – 
and thus, its detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. Nonetheless, the 
fundamental criteria of traditional Just War theory will surely dominate any ethical 
discussion of humanitarian intervention.
166
 As widely accepted, these criteria are 
comprised of just cause, meaning, in the context of humanitarian intervention, halting 
large scale atrocities of the type referred to, for instance, in the WSO Document; right 
authority, meaning, that the use of force be authorized by a sovereign political entity; 
right intention, meaning, that the action be conducted in accordance with the just cause, 
and not merely based on self-interest; proportionality, meaning, that the overall good 
achieved by the use of force be greater than the harm done; last resort, meaning, that no 
other means will achieve the justified ends; and that the act has reasonable prospects of 
success in fulfilling the just cause that prompted it.
167
 
Indeed, if one generally accepts the moral plausibility of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, it could be said that opposition consent, in general, is redundant, since the 
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humanitarian catastrophe is the main legitimizing agent – and that in any case consent is 
not a prerequisite for intervention according to just-war theory. However, closer analysis 
reveals that opposition consent can still affect the application of the just-war tests. The 
following exercise – by no means an exhaustive one – can lay down some directions for 
further thinking. 
For the purpose of our exercise, we shall assume the existence of a government 
that commits grave atrocities, faced with an opposition that generally seeks to protect the 
civilian population, and has formed a reasonably representative transitional entity. In 
such cases, it is rather intuitive that genuine consent by the representative opposition 
group can serve as an indication that just-war criteria are fulfilled;
168
 and, in the same 
vein, that lack of consent might increase the culpability of the intervener if the 
intervention proves, ex post, to have been unjustified.
169
 Indeed, as suggested by 
McMahan, the ethical role of consent in the question of humanitarian intervention can be 
paralleled to the requirement of state-consent in the context of the right of collective self-
defense: just as it seems morally right that states can refuse third-party assistance when 
confronting an aggression, it seems just that victims of atrocities – assuming they have a 
representative voice – can reject an external intervention, in a manner that would 
derogate from its legitimacy.
170
 
Thus – returning to just-war criteria – regarding right authority, it seems that 
opposition consent would not be of acute importance, since we presuppose that the 
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intervention is conducted by a sovereign or a regional organization. However, it could be 
argued that when opposition identifies and requests assistance from a specific actor, that 
actor would be the most suitable one to act, since the mere request adds to the legitimacy 
of the intervener, and creates at least some moral proximity between the intervener and 
the internal party.  
Just cause can also be augmented by opposition consent. It is a reasonable 
assumption – although a clearly reversible one – that in most cases, credible opposition 
groups would not be quick to request forcible intervention unless the condition of the 
affected public is genuinely dire. This is because superfluous reliance on external forces 
will surely harm the opposition’s internal credibility. Imagine, conversely, that major 
opposition groups are against a proposed humanitarian intervention. Intuitively, the 
reluctance of the opposition seems to adversely affect the just cause aspect of the 
intervention. If this is so, we must also accept the inverse claim: that consent by the same 
forces produces some legitimizing effect. In light of the above, if the intervening party 
can demonstrate that a credible opposition group that opposes atrocities consents to its 




The existence of right intention can also be significantly bolstered by the consent 
of reasonably representative opposition groups. It is obvious, in this context, that genuine 
opposition consent can greatly reduce the concerns that the intervener is acting only for 
selfish reasons. Of course, this notion is fortified when the intervener is operating 
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 Compare McMahan, supra note 168, at 53 (“While potential interveners may believe that the risks to 
which intervention would expose the intended beneficiaries are ones the latter should be willing to accept 
in exchange for the benefits, the beneficiaries themselves may disagree … To the greatest extent possible, 
the potential intervener must allow the people themselves to decide whether to accept the risks.”) 
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pursuant to a decision of a regional organization, in which such concerns are lesser to 
begin with. As noted in the ICISS Report, right intention is “better assured” in 




The reasonable prospects principle is also one which could be affected by the 
existence of consent, for obvious reasons. For instance, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, the 
Security Council, in virtually all of its operations, seeks some degree of consent by at 
least one party to the conflict, and, conversely, can be reluctant to act when consent is not 
acquired. This tendency, as we have shown, is partially based on the practical advantages 
of consent – meaning, its contribution to the prospects of the operation’s success.
173
  
A closely related effect of opposition consent can be on the question of 
proportionality. Cooperation of the intervening forces with at least some internal parties 
will necessarily lead to an operation of a smaller scale, duration and intensity, since the 
intervener will be forced to enter into conflict only with some internal elements and not 
against all of them. Furthermore, for reasons of internal credibility, it is reasonable that 
the request or consent by the opposition will not go beyond what is actually required to 
tip the scale against the perpetrating regime. For instance, in the Libyan context, the 
opposition – probably in order to bolster its legitimacy – firmly asserted that no foreign 
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 See Chapter 1, at Section IV.1.  
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CONCLUSION AND DETAILED SUMMARY 
 
In part I of this work, we sought to define and clarify the main concepts addressed in this 
study. Chapter 1 clarified our use of the term “consensual intervention.” It began by 
demonstrating the wide spectrum of the term, as encompassing situations beyond the 
traditional “intervention upon invitation” paradigm. We posited that the potential agent of 
legalization in such interventions is the “consent” itself, and that “invitation” is merely 
one possible vehicle for the expression of such consent. We have thus offered a wide 
definition of the term, arguing, in essence, that since every partial intervention serves to 
further the interests of one party to the conflict over the other, it is reasonable to presume 
that the party which benefits from the intervention has consented, in some way or the 
other, to the operation. Therefore, we considered any non-impartial intervention as 
consensual, in relation to a certain party, unless the intervention is publically and credibly 
rebuffed by all parties.  
The Chapter then noted that consent often interacts with various other 
justifications for intervention, such as self-defense, and exemplified that the mere fact 
that consent constitutes but one of several justifications does not mean that it is ipso facto 
devoid of legal value of its own. Thereafter, it explored the distinction between 
“external” validity and “internal” consent power: the first aspect refers to the relations 
between the consenting party and the intervener – a relation which we define as a 
“revocable agency.” The second aspect refers to the internal legitimacy of the consenting 
party. In the latter context, the Chapter outlined the general debate between “effective-
control” and “legitimism” as sources of sovereign power. We then proceeded to 
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exemplify the dynamics of intervention and consent in the complex environment of the 
Congolese conflicts in the years 1996 –2010.  
Building on that scenario and others, we inquired into the relations between 
consent and interventions authorized by the U.N. Security Council. While consent in 
itself is not a legal precondition for such interventions, we argued that party consent plays 
a significant role in Security Council considerations. This is indeed mostly a matter of 
policy; however, as we have demonstrated, it might also have some secondary legal 
effects – in particular, if we attribute to the Council “administrative” characteristics. 
Chapter 1 concluded with a brief analysis of the effects of the withdrawal of consent 
given to Security Council authorized interventions, asserting that such withdrawal is 
usually powerless – unless the relevant resolution binds its application to the consent of 
the party.  
Chapter 2 presented a “working definition” of internal armed conflicts, as well as 
their basic typology. The determination of whether an internal armed conflict exists is of 
much importance, since it can potentially affect the legality of forcible actions by external 
parties. In general, our definition follows the ICTY’s Tadic case, which defines internal 
armed conflict as “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a state.” Our discussion 
highlights the fact that the development of human rights law has shifted the discourse on 
the existence of armed conflicts: if in the past, states were reluctant to recognize that an 
internal armed conflict exists within their territories, nowadays they might be quicker to 
do so; this is because human rights law imposes stricter obligations on state violence than 
international humanitarian law.  
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Thereafter, the Chapter presented a categorization of internal armed conflicts, has 
served as the basis for some of our later discussion. In general, we typified conflicts 
according to the objective goals the parties wish to achieve – as far as these can be 
ascertained. The typology of such conflicts is important since there is considerable 
difference, in the international legal sense, between struggles that challenge the principle 
of territorial integrity – such as struggles for secession – and those that do not, such as 
struggles that aim to achieve regime change. Likewise, there is a difference – at least in 
the context of the application of the norm of non-intervention – between regular struggles 
for control over the state apparatus, and struggles between a government and an entity, 
such as Al-Qa’ida, that does not accept the international system of states to begin with. 
Chapter 3 addressed key distinctions and theoretical issues relating to the concept 
of “intervention” at large. It began by surveying theoretical clarifications that are relevant 
to the question of intervention across different disciplines. In this context, we highlighted 
the perceptions of the term across several disciplines and how they interact, and briefly 
touched upon the differences between “legal” and “realist” approaches towards 
intervention in general, and consensual intervention specifically. Thereafter, we briefly 
offered six possible theoretical grounds for a distinction between intervention in internal 
armed conflicts and intervention in pure “political” conflicts. These grounds stem from 
utilitarian, democratic, humanitarian and legal standpoints.  
The Chapter then turned to key distinctions relevant to the question of 
intervention in international law. We first laid down the crucial distinction between 
“physical” intervention – meaning, the physical act of intervention itself, without 
prejudice to the question of its legality – and “normative” intervention, meaning, actions 
 432 
that might violate the principle of non-intervention. We thereafter presented a typology of 
intervention: non-forcible versus forcible, negative versus positive, and unilateral versus 
multilateral, and the general normative frameworks that govern them. Last, the Chapter 
dealt with an issue that underlies the entire study: the (shifting) meaning of the norm of 
non-intervention. We demonstrated the dilemma that this centuries-old norm poses to 
liberal thinkers: on one hand, liberals justify the norm of non-intervention since it is a 
necessary corollary of the right to self-determination. On the other hand, the same liberal 
principles can be used to justify intervention, when people are denied this right. We argue 
that in light of the developments in international law in recent decades – and namely, the 
predominance of the human rights discourse, the emergence of the concept of 
“democratic entitlement” and the birth of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine – the 
norm of non-intervention has arguably shifted its focus ensuring non-intervention in 
sovereign will, to non-intervention in the substantive democratic will of peoples. 
However, the Chapter clarifies the any redefinition of non-intervention as relating to 
notions of democracy does not have automatic bearing on the question of forcible 
intervention. This complex question is thoroughly dealt with in later chapters.  
Chapter 4 delineates the actions that constitute forcible interventions. At large, we 
argue that all forms of the use of force as these are legally defined, whether amounting to an 
armed attack or not, are forcible actions, and therefore can also be considered forcible 
interventions. We thus adopt a rather wide definition of the term, encompassing actions from 
the provision of arms, through aerial incursions, and up to large-scale invasions. Such acts 
can include terrorist attacks, as well as – potentially – acts of cyber warfare. We thus 
conclude that forcible interventions can include “grave” uses of force: meaning, armed 
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interventions by a state's military forces, or by non-state actors sent by the state; and “less-
grave” uses of force, such as acquiescence and toleration of actions taken by non-state actors 
operating from the state’s territory or transfers of arms. The Chapter then discusses the 
attribution of forcible acts to states – a question of increasing importance, due to the growing 
involvement of non-state actors in transnational warfare. It posits that attribution depends on 
whether we adopt the “overall” or “effective” control standards in determining state 
responsibility; and that attribution in cases of inaction (meaning – failure to stop actions by 
organized armed groups) requires the recognition of a positive duty of “due diligence” to 
prevent acts by non-state actors. Furthermore, the Chapter distinguishes between forcible 
interventions by U.N. forces, in which the use force is mandated, and classic, supposedly 
“neutral” peacekeeping operations, which do not constitute forcible interventions. 
  The second Part of the study embarked on an in-depth historical and legal analysis 
of the law regarding internal armed conflicts in the pre-U.N. Charter era. The discussion 
served three purposes. First, to clarify, to the extent possible, an area in traditional 
international law that has been notoriously vague. Second, we argued, and by this challenged 
some contemporary commentators, that prior to the prohibition on the use of force – at least 
before the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact – the question of intervention and consent was largely 
irrelevant, since sovereigns enjoyed an unlimited war-prerogative. Third, it demonstrated the 
generally amoral, effective-control based doctrines, which have dominated the era. These can 
be contrasted with the substantive doctrines of later decades, which have direct implication 
over the contemporary law regarding consensual intervention.   
Accordingly, Chapter 5 addressed the general question of intervention and 
consent in the era of the “prerogative of war.” It started with an overview of the 
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belligerency doctrine – the traditional doctrine of international law regarding internal 
strife, which assessed the rights and powers of parties almost strictly according to their 
effective control over territory. The belligerency doctrine, developed through the 19
th
 
century and galvanized in the American Civil War, circumscribed the conditions for the 
recognition of parties to internal conflict as belligerents – meaning, as engaged in a war 
in the legal sense. These conditions included the existence of an armed conflict; exercise 
of effective control by the opposition over parts of the state’s territory; adherence of the 
opposition to the laws of war; and the existence of circumstances that made it necessary 
for outside states to define their attitude towards the conflict.  
Belligerency recognition, albeit short of full recognition of the parties as separate 
states or governments, was generally granted through a proclamation of neutrality by 
third-party states. It would thus deliver the strife from the strictly internal context into the 
international level, thereby granting the opposition a limited, temporary, international 
personality. Prior to such recognition, governments enjoyed various privileges over the 
opposition. Significantly, states at peace with the government were required not to 
transfer arms or funds to the opposition, nor to allow “hostile expeditions” to leave their 
territory in support the rebels, or to interfere, in general, in the government’s efforts to 
quell the uprising. After recognition of belligerency, some of these privileges were lost, 
as third states could assume a neutral disposition towards the parties without it being 
considered a violation of the peaceful relations with the challenged government. 
Significantly, belligerency recognition affected maritime trade, as it allowed rebels to 
exercise war-time rights on the high seas – such as blockade, visit-and-search and capture 
of neutral vessels carrying contraband.  
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After surveying the implications of belligerency recognition, we proceeded to 
clarify some modern commentaries on the belligerency doctrine and its relation to the 
question of consensual intervention. Indeed, some modern literature connects between 
these issues. One approach posits that upon recognition of belligerency, third states 
acquired a duty of neutrality. The other approach asserts that upon such recognition – and 
only upon it – states gained the power to intervene on behalf of either party. However, we 
argue that these approaches are imprecise, since prior to the prohibition on the use of 
force, states could wantonly intervene – irrespective of recognition of belligerency – by 
exercising their sovereign war prerogative. Accordingly, there could be no obligation of 
neutrality regarding internal armed conflicts, since there was no law that prohibited states 
from ending their neutrality as they wished – if they were willing to accept the 
consequences of war. Therefore, the Chapter demonstrated – by referring to historical 
examples and statements by officials – that intervention in the war-prerogative era was a 
matter of choice; and that the belligerency doctrine was only one available course of 
action, to be chosen by external parties in accordance with their interests.  
Chapter 6 again addressed the pre-Charter law of internal strife, demonstrating its 
emphasis on territorial effective-control as a source of rights. In particular, the Chapter 
focused on the amoral dynamics of the era with regards to the determination of rights and 
powers of parties to internal armed conflicts. We thus surveyed the development of the 
belligerency doctrine through early cases such as the American Revolution, the Spanish 
Colonial Wars of the early 19
th
 century and others. Our analysis exemplified the 
centrality of maritime trade to the considerations of the parties, and in particular, the 
effects recognition of belligerency has had over maritime prize law.  
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We then turned to focus on a pivotal case in the development of international law 
regarding internal conflicts: the American Civil War. The Chapter demonstrated that the 
debate regarding the Confederacy’s international status was largely amoral, although the 
conflict was centered on the issue of slavery – which was already recognized at the time 
as a glaring immorality. It is in this context where the amoral approach of the 
belligerency doctrine was most starkly emphasized.  
Since the recognition of belligerency inflicted economic and diplomatic costs on 
third parties, it is unsurprising that states were reluctant to grant it. Therefore, states had 
to determine the status of opposition forces that, for one reason or another, were not 
recognized as belligerents. This need prompted the development of the “insurgency” 
doctrine – an elastic legal instrument aimed to deal with internal armed conflicts in the 
absence of belligerency recognition. The insurgency approach is of contemporary 
importance since it reflects, to some extent, today’s flexible approach of the international 
community towards internal armed conflicts. In general, insurgency, as a status, could be 
understood in several ways: as entailing a few rights for the insurgents, but mostly 
obligations taken by third states in accordance with their domestic neutrality laws; or as a 
liability, as it serves to limit only insurgents, but not governments; still another view 
attributes to insurgency consequences similar in essence to that of belligerency, disposing 
of the need to make any positive acts of recognition to begin with. The Chapter analyzed 
in depth the development and possible implications of this status, and demonstrated that 
like the belligerency doctrine, it was also based largely on amoral considerations of 
effective control. 
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Chapter 7 addressed the question of consensual intervention in the inter-war 
period, when  nascent prohibitions on the use of force were first set forth, and the 
international system started to shift towards collective decision making regarding 
problems of international peace and security. The Chapter first explains the intricate 
system of the Covenant of the League of Nations regarding the use of force, and its heavy 
reliance on procedure as a tool for the pacific settlement of disputes. As such, the Chapter 
demonstrates that the Covenant system had significant “gaps” that allowed states to 
legally resort to war, and could theoretically be utilized to justify forcible interventions 
even against governments.  
We then move on to discuss the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was the first 
international attempt at the per se abolishment of the right of war, however imperfect. 
After the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it was safe to say that intervention in internal armed 
conflicts could no longer be viewed as the choice of the intervener, and therefore, it 
became valid to ask whether, and under what circumstances, the expression of consent 
could legalize intervention. It is at this point that the major questions concerning this 
issue, such as whether consent power could be limited on counts of territorial 
effectiveness or on other, substantive criteria, were given real legal substance. We then 
discuss the changing nature of the international system and of international law at the 
time, through an analysis of international reactions to the Spanish Civil War.  
Indeed, the emergence of global ideologies such as communism and fascism 
fundamentally challenged the nature of inter-state relations. Since the stakes became 
high, traditional, effectiveness-based doctrines of international law regarding internal 
armed conflicts were not sufficient to address the concerns of external parties. Thus, the 
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international community’s reactions to the Spanish Civil War were novel. More than 
anything, they reflected a system in transition, in which traditional approaches such as the 
belligerency doctrine were abandoned. In essence, three approaches could be identified 
towards the question of consensual intervention in the debate regarding the Spanish Civil 
War. One approach argued for an obligation amounting to mandatory neutrality, based on 
the right of the parties to self-determination. Another argued for a mandatory preferential 
treatment of the Spanish government. Still another argued for a substantive preference for 
the Spanish government, based on its democratic credentials.  
The Chapter discusses the consensual interventions in the Spanish Civil War in 
favor of both sides, and the novel non-intervention agreement concluded in relation to the 
conflict, prohibiting states to intervene in favor of both parties to the conflict. The 
agreement was unprecedented both on counts of its collective nature and in its imposition 
of legal obligations of neutrality, without any recognition of belligerency of the parties. 
The fact that the agreement did not distinguish between the government and the 
opposition spawned significant controversy – signifying the demise of the stringent 
belligerency doctrine as a central doctrine of international law, and the triumph of more 
flexible approaches, such as the insurgency doctrine. 
The third Part of the study concerns the law of consensual intervention in the era 
of the U.N. Charter. Thus, In Chapter 8 we established the general principle of the 
presumption in favor of governments. The Chapter identified two distinct approaches 
towards the question whether consent can serve as an exception to the prohibition on the 
use of force as enshrined in the U.N. Charter: the first approach is strict abstentionism, 
which advocates for the complete abstention from any intervention in internal strife, and 
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is chiefly found in the literature; the second approach is the notion of government 
preference, recognizing, in principle, the power of governments to consent to forcible 
interventions – which is dominant in state practice. We explored the background for the 
development of these approaches during the Cold-War era, in which the aspiration to 
“tame” the malicious interests of the blocs – manifested, for instance, in the Reagan and 
Brezhnev doctrines – has influenced the consolidation of both approaches.  
Thereafter, the Chapter analyzes the rationales of strict abstentionism. In essence, 
these rationales revolve around a rather orthodox understanding of the concepts of non-
intervention and self-determination, very much rooted in the idea of effective-control 
over territory as the chief source of sovereignty. After discussing these ideas, we offer a 
critique of strict-absentionism, claiming that this position has been possibly rendered 
obsolete. We argue that strict-abstentionism was mainly compelling in the eras of 
decolonization and the cold-war, when the main concern of the international community 
was to suppress the attempts of colonial powers to support subordinate local 
governments, and to quash the frequent manipulative actions taken by the rivaling blocs. 
The concerns of the contemporary system are significantly different. For instance, strict-
abstentionism does not take into account the problem of mass atrocities; nor does it take 
into consideration the legal differences between various types of internal strife.  
Bearing this in mind, the Chapter explored the concept of the rebuttable 
presumption in favor of governments, which is structured around the basic principle that 
the entity that speaks for the state is the recognized and established government. We 
emphasize that while strict-abstentionism has been endorsed by prominent scholars of 
international law, it is virtually non-existent in the opinio juris of states. The Chapter 
 440 
notes that during the cold-war, states did not object to the principle of government 
preference, mainly because members of both blocs utilized it for their own benefit; and 
that after the cold-war, the end of the bloc-struggle significantly reduced the motivation 
of states to oppose consensual interventions to begin with.  Accordingly, we exemplify 
the vast reliance in state practice on the principle of government preference, from the 
1957 British intervention in Muscat and Oman and up to present day counterinsurgency 
operations. Last, the Chapter addressed the principle of government preference as 
expressed in ICJ decisions. 
Chapter 9 inquired into general questions, traditionally raised, regarding the scope 
of the consent power of governments. It first places the discussion in contemporary 
context, asserting that the current preoccupation of the international community with the 
protection of civilians and the struggle against transnational terrorism informs the 
discussion on intervention, moving it away from its focus on territorial effectiveness and 
on to other considerations.  
Thereafter, we analyzed the scope of governmental consent power, by setting 
forth several thresholds. First, we propose a reversal of some traditional doctrines that 
negate government consent power when “civil wars” take place, by suggesting that 
nowadays, the existence of an armed conflict is a precondition for the power to consent to 
forcible intervention. This is because international human rights law prohibits states to 
resort to extrajudicial military force against civilians, absent circumstances that amount to 
internal armed conflicts. Thus, in cases where human rights law prohibits the internal use 
of force – for instance, in absence of an internal armed conflict between at least two 
organized armed parties – it necessarily follows that consensual forcible intervention in 
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favor of the government is also prohibited. Therefore, we concluded that the legality of 
consensual interventions depends, as a threshold, on the determination that an internal 
armed conflict exists in the state to begin with; and that the existence of an “armed 
conflict” is not invoked by the territorial state merely as a pretext to circumvent its 
obligations under human rights law.  
We then move to challenge the use of the term “civil war” to connote situations in 
which consent power is negated, as opposed to situations of “local unrest,” where consent 
power ostensibly remains. We argued that when commentators use the term “civil war” 
they actually allude to the loss of territorial effectiveness that “civil war” entails and 
therefore, for the sake of clarity, the term should be abandoned. We also point out that the 
terms “use of force” and “armed conflict” have replaced the term “war” in the context of 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello respectively, and that it thus makes no sense to retain the 
term “civil war” as a threshold only in the context of consensual intervention.  
We then discuss the “failed state” threshold as a credible effective-control based 
standard for consent power. Indeed, in a situation where it is obvious that there is no 
functioning government at all, and the state is torn by fluid and unstable warring factions, 
it is logical that there will be no government preference. However, we emphasize that 
such situations are rare, and that nowadays, the international community prefers to grant 
recognition to transitional governments that do not exercise territorial effectiveness, 
rather than to permit the de jure failed state scenario. The Chapter proceeds to exemplify 
these dynamics in the situation in Somalia, since the 2004 formation of the ineffective 
Transitional Federal Government.  
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Finally, the Chapter attempts to update the old doctrine of counter-intervention, 
traditionally used by governments as a “defense claim,” when losing effective control, to 
justify their power to request foreign intervention. The doctrine asserted that when loss of 
territorial effectiveness is fomented by external intervention, the government too is 
entitled to receive assistance. We argue that while the counter-intervention doctrine is 
still theoretically sound, it was particularly important in the colonial and cold-war eras, in 
which bloc-related proxy-wars were common. Nevertheless, the Chapter seeks to clarify 
some aspects of counter-intervention, and in particular its interaction with the doctrine of 
collective self-defense. We argue that like collective self-defense, a state that embarks on 
a counter-intervention must also have the genuine consent of the “victim” government. 
Moreover, the Chapter posits that counter-intervention cannot be used as a valid claim 
when challenges to governmental consent power are based on substantive issues, rather 
than on technical loss of effective control. For instance, if a government commits mass 
atrocities, it would not be able to rely only on the doctrine of counter-intervention as a 
source of consent power.
.
 
In Chapter 10 we set forth the concept of protection of civilians as an emerging 
fundamental principle of international law, which also affects our perception of 
sovereignty, and thus also of consent power. As the mass atrocities of the 1990s 
unfolded, the international community was forced to turn away from its initial post-cold 
war preoccupation with democracy, to the more primordial issue of civilian protection. 
The Chapter presents several milestones that exemplify the growing emphasis of 
international law on the protection of civilians, and proceeds to describe how the 
unilateral NATO operation in Kosovo forced the international community – in order to 
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salvage the collective security arrangement of the U.N. Charter – to robustly address the 
principle of civilian protection in various forums.  
These discussions spawned numerous reports by the U.N. Secretary General, in 
which calls were made for the promotion of a “culture of protection,” focused on the 
individual rather than the state, whose “primary function” is to secure the civilian 
population. The discussions further resulted in general, forward-looking Security Council 
resolutions expressing the paramount importance of the principle of protection. We argue 
that since the principle of protection is not necessarily connected to s certain system of 
government, it enjoys wide credibility across states with different political cultures and 
systems. Accordingly, the “primary” legal validity of the principle of protection – in 
distinction from the methods to implement it in specific instances – has emerged as a 
normative consensus in the international community. The Chapter thus concludes that 
that collective opinio juris has arguably elevated, in the last two decades, the principle of 
protection of civilians to the level of a basic principle of international law, 
complementing and redefining our understanding of other basic principles.  
Having discussed the emergence of protection of civilians as a general 
fundamental principle, we turned to argue that the principle has become also a component 
of sovereignty, manifested through the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) concept; and that 
through RtoP, the notion of “effective protection” has come to challenge the threshold of 
“effective control” as a key determinant of sovereign power. To that effect, we trace the 
development of RtoP from its roots in a 2001 report by a group of experts, through its 
unanimous endorsement by the U.N. General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit, and 
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up to its recent application by the Security Council in the conflicts in Cȏte d’Ivoire and 
Libya.  
The Chapter outlines the critiques of RtoP, including the claim that it has no 
normative significance. We counter this claim, arguing that much of the idea’s 
significance is found in its effect over our understanding of traditional, effective-control 
based doctrines for the assessment of parties engaged in internal armed conflicts. In sum, 
we claim that RtoP, in its legal sense, is an aggregation of all the existing normative and 
institutional obligations stemming from the basic principle of protection of civilians, 
which bridges between these obligations and our understanding of sovereignty, non-
intervention, and the emerging “administrative” role of international bodies.  
We then turn to analyze the effects of the principle of protection, manifested 
through the RtoP concept, on the question of consensual intervention. In essence, the 
study argues that the idea of “effective control” as a primary determinant of sovereignty, 
is being replaced by the standard of “effective protection,” at least when assessing the 
question of intervention. We thus demonstrate that the concept of effective protection, 
being a source of sovereignty, can both negate and augment the power of governments to 
consent to forcible intervention in specific instances.  
The Chapter then briefly addresses the distinction between the concepts of 
effective protection, human rights and democracy. We concede that these standards are 
closely related, but should still be distinguished from one another. The complex nature of 
human rights frequently makes them a problematic measure for the assessment of consent 
power, in contrast to the minimalist principle of protection, which focuses on the core 
values that law sets out to protect during armed conflict. In contrast to human rights law, 
 445 
the principle does not aspire to create an ideal society; it aspires to end atrocities as soon 
as possible. This notion also informs our understanding of the role of democracy and the 
question of consensual intervention: while the establishment of substantive democracy is 
a main element of post-conflict rebuilding, at the time of intervention, effective 
protection should be the main guiding principle. We call this approach “protection now, 
democracy later,” and exemplify it through the international response to the Libyan 
conflict of 2011.  
The Chapter then takes on the question of effective protection and the capacity to 
withdraw consent. The question of withdrawal of consent is of particular importance and 
complexity when consent is given through general, forward-looking intervention treaties. 
We analyzed the different scenarios in which withdrawal of consent, in the context of 
such treaties, can occur; and demonstrated the mechanisms of such treaties as they are 
found in contemporary regional arrangements in Africa. We claim that forward-looking 
intervention agreements pose a direct challenge to the Security Council’s monopoly over 
the authorization of the use of force. However, we suggest that these challenges can be 
reconciled by adopting the position that when a government fails to exercise effective 
protection, it suffers the loss of sovereign power to withdraw consent previously given. 
Just as lack of effective protection results in the negation of government consent power, it 
can also negate withdrawal power, since withdrawal is also an act of sovereignty. 
Conversely, the capacity of withdrawal would only exist when a government exercises 
effective protection: meaning, where it fulfils its responsibility to protect.  
After briefly establishing that the level of failure to protect that causes loss of 
sovereign consent (or withdrawal) power must amount to a grave, widespread or systemic 
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breach of the protection principle, we proceed to analyze additional legal mechanisms, 
beyond the concept of effective protection, which can lead to the invalidation of consent 
power. Such mechanisms are namely found in international treaty law and the law of 
state responsibility, and relate to the notion of peremptory norms of jus cogens – norms 
that cannot be contravened by any consent-establishing agreement.   
Chapter 11 explored further substantive criteria for the analysis of parties to an 
internal armed conflict. Particularly, it addressed the relation between consent power, 
democracy, human rights and self-determination. In essence, we argue that nowadays all 
of these criteria, when it comes to the question of intervention, boil down to the 
protection of civilians. We start by addressing the question of the presumption in favor of 
governments in democratic and non-democratic regimes. Regarding the former, we argue 
that democratic governments enjoy a strong presumption in their favor during internal 
conflict, since substantive democracies, by nature, exercise effective protection of their 
civilians. However, we concede that all other things equal, in the current international 
system, non-democratic regimes also enjoy a presumption in their favor; and that, 
accordingly, evaluation of democracy and consensual intervention requires a more 
nuanced approach.  
The Chapter then makes a distinction between the “electoral” and “substantive” 
aspects of democracy. Regarding the first aspect, we identify and explain\ the clear-cut 
distinction, in international practice, between longtime “existing” non-elected regimes 
(labeled as “established autocracies”), which are generally accepted participants in the 
international system; and de facto regimes that have overthrown an elected government 
or otherwise fail to respect the ballot (“revolutionary autocracies.”) In contrast to the 
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former, the latter are ostracized and sometimes face intervention. We further found that 
when interventions against revolutionary autocracies take place, the international 
community, in general, withholds recognition from the de facto junta, and maintains the 
recognition of the de jure elected regime. Thus, intervention in favor of such regimes 
falls within the normative framework of the governmental preference. Thereafter, the 
Chapter exemplifies these dynamics as they were unfolded in 2011 forcible intervention 
in Cȏte d’Ivoire.  
The Chapter then focuses on the complex scenario of established autocracies 
facing a genuinely pro-democratic insurrection. It debates the notion of the “democratic 
entitlement,” and argues that since there is no consensus that it has galvanized, as such, as 
a rule of customary international law, it is problematic to judge consent-power strictly on 
counts of the inexistence of electoral democracy. Instead, we offer to break down the 
concept of “democracy” to its substantive components, and asserted that these are similar 
to those enshrined in the principle of protection of civilians. Since non-democratic 
regimes, when facing a pro-democratic insurrection, virtually always violate the principle 
of protection, the question of their consent-power, essentially, merges with the analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 10.  
We then turn to inquire into the effects of the principle of self-determination on 
consent power. We begin by outlining the principle of self-determination and its shifting 
meaning throughout the 20
th
 century. We then note the inherent tension that exists 
between the concept of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity, and 
demonstrate that during the process of decolonization, this tension was resolved by the 
position taken by the international community – to the chagrin of colonial powers – 
 448 
according to which colonial struggles were no longer considered as internal armed 
conflicts; and that therefore they could not be considered as internal struggles for 
secession.  
The Chapter discusses thereafter the question whether colonial struggles for self-
determination spawned also the right to receive forcible support by third parties – a 
question that was never resolved. However, what was indeed clear is that the exclusion of 
colonial wars from the internal sphere necessarily removed them also, in the context of 
consensual intervention, from the paradigm of governmental preference – resulting 
therefore in the negation of colonial powers’ capacity to request assistance from third 
parties. 
We then address the concept of self-determination outside the colonial context, 
through international human rights law. The Chapter stresses that while peoples under 
colonialist rule would have a right to establish independent states, in already independent 
states, conversely, self-determination is limited strictly to internal application. Internal 
self-determination has been understood, by most contemporary scholars, as connoting a 
right to political participation. In general, when equating internal self-determination with 
a notion of political participation, the discussion of governmental consent power 
essentially merges with our analysis of the question of the democratic entitlement. In this 
sense, our conclusions regarding the relations between democracy and consensual 
intervention are applicable also in the context of the interaction between internal self-
determination and intervention: both should be analyzed according to the violations of the 
protection principle that usually accompany their deprivation. When these violations 
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amount to a breach of the principle of effective protection by the government, the latter 
loses its sovereign power to request assistance during an internal armed conflict.  
Nonetheless, the Chapter emphasizes that on counts of the principle of territorial 
integrity, it is clear that a positive right of forcible, unilateral secession cannot be an 
inherent component of the right of internal self-determination in the decolonized world. 
This conclusion is a product both of the substance of the principle of internal self-
determination, and of the realization that recognition of a right to secede entails 
dangerous consequences for the international system. In the context of consensual 
intervention, thus, a claim cannot be made for the negation of governmental consent 
power in a struggle against a secessionist movement, when the secessionists’ claims are 
based only on an alleged deprivation of internal self-determination.  
We then address the controversial question of “remedial secession” – a doctrine 
which suggests that in exceptional circumstances, a group might be entitled to be 
considered as a “people” possessing a right to secede, as a remedy for grave and massive 
violations of human rights directed against it. We note that while the doctrine of remedial 
secession has received much support in legal literature, it receives little support, if at all, 
in state practice. Accordingly, we discussed the debate regarding Kosovo’s 2008 
unilateral declaration of independence, and the various justifications given for it.  
The controversy on remedial secession notwithstanding, the Chapter concludes 
that struggles for secession could in any case be affected by the principle of protection of 
civilians: it is clear that a government that actively disregards the principle of protection 
of civilians will lose its consent power when facing a secessionist movement, whether we 
accept the concept of remedial secession or not. In this context, the analysis merges to a 
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large extent, with the discussion in Chapter 10 regarding the principle of protection of 
civilians, and its implementation through the RtoP doctrine. The question whether 
secessionist forces are entitled, in the context of remedial secession, also to a positive 
right of remedial forcible intervention, beyond the negation of governmental consent 
power, is addressed in Chapter 12.  
Chapter 12, thus, addressed the controversial question of consent by opposition 
forces. The Chapter analyzes this question through a principled approach – first, by 
asserting that any forcible support granted to opposition groups is a prima facie violation 
of the laws on the use of force; and second, by analyzing the question on the spectrum 
between recognition and humanitarian intervention. In this sense, any support granted to 
a party recognized as a government or as an independent state, is per se not a consensual 
intervention in favor of the opposition, but rather in favor of a government. Such cases 
should be analyzed under our previous discussion of government consent power. 
Conversely, any intervention on behalf of an unrecognized opposition group should be 
discussed within the debate regarding unilateral humanitarian intervention.  
Thus, the Chapter begins by noting that the negation of governmental consent 
power in a specific instance does not necessarily entail the positive transfer of consent 
power to opposition groups. Consensual intervention in favor of the opposition, if cannot 
be justified independently by the intervener as an act of self-defense, is prima facie 
contrary to international law. The Chapter then discusses the identification of opposition 
groups, and offers a rather simple test: the opposition is every party which at the time of 
intervention is not recognized by the international community as the state’s government, 
or as representing a separate state in struggles for secession.  
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We acknowledge that this definition presents practical difficulties, since a 
binding, collective international mechanism for government or state recognition is still 
absent. Notwithstanding this negative definition, we still offer some positive attributions 
for the identification of such groups. First, the mere existence of an internal armed 
conflict, as defined in Chapter 2, presupposes the existence of “organized armed groups;” 
thus, opposition groups must be organized. Second, in recent internal uprisings, loosely 
aligned opposition groups were relatively quick to form quasi-representative bodies, such 
as the Libyan National Transitional Council, that have interacted with the international 
community. 
The Chapter then suggests that nowadays, the international community’s will to 
interact with opposition groups is influenced primarily by considerations of effective 
protection. Essentially, the more a government violates the principle of protection, the 
more the international community would be willing to give credit to relatively ineffective 
opposition groups as potential fulfillers of the responsibility to protect. We demonstrate 
this hypothesis by juxtaposing the negative treatment of the Al-Shabaab forces in 
Somalia, versus the positive interaction with the Libyan opposition to the Al-Qadhafi 
regime.  
We thereafter consider the question of remedial secession and remedial 
intervention. If we accept the doctrine of remedial secession, then the question of 
consensual-remedial intervention involves a two-stepped process, comprised first of 
state-recognition, and in the second stage, of the exercise of the right of collective self-
defense in the context of an international armed conflict between the newly recognized 
state and the rump-state. The Chapter concedes that this approach is prone to abuse by 
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third-parties through arbitrary recognition of the opposition. However, we argue that it 
still maintains its theoretical vigor. We furthermore claim that this danger can be 
mitigated through the contemporary dominance of regional organizations in resolving 
questions of recognition. 
The analysis then turns to discuss the question of opposition consent in relation to 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. We begin by maintaining that the RtoP 
doctrine, as endorsed by the General Assembly, does not resolve the debate regarding 
humanitarian intervention – meaning, interventions absent government consent or 
Security Council authorization. We then move to explore the relatively uncharted nexus 
between humanitarian and consensual interventions in light of the different legal and 
extra-legal justifications given to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Without 
expressly accepting these justifications, we argue and demonstrate that if we do accept 
them, opposition consent can indeed play a legitimizing role for forcible interventions. 
We arrive at this conclusion both by analyzing the provisions of the U.N. Charter 
regarding the use of force, and through an inquiry into the possible effects of the 
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